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Religious hatred and its contribution to human conflict: 
exploring psychodynamic approaches and  
some implications for dialogue and diapraxis 
 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate religious hatred, seeking to 
understand its particular intensity from a psychodynamic point of view, and to identify 
some of the implications of this understanding for scholar-practitioners working in the field 
of conflict resolution.   
 
The dissertation begins by establishing the parameters of the investigation and the 
methodologies used.  Following a review of selected literatures of conflict resolution and 
transformation, psychology of religion and psychodynamic psychology, highlighting in 
particular scholarship that pertains to religious hatred, the dissertation identifies and 
examines six dimensions of religion (identity, doctrine and practice, emotion and 
experience, mythology, sacred values and power and control), looking for insights into 
how and why religious hatred may evolve into marginalisation, persecution and even 
genocide. 
 
The dissertation argues that the intensity of religious hatred is caused as much by the 
psychological nature of religious belief as by its social, political or historical context.  It 
argues that psychodynamic concepts such as personal and cultural complexes, narcissism,  
the divided self and the shadow provide important insights into religious hatred and 
explain the threat that such hatred poses to those who may be considered Other. 
 
The dissertation concludes by exploring how dialogue and diapraxis can take account 
of psychodynamic insight and enable people in conflict to explore their beliefs, 
relationships and perceptions of Others, and to transform historic and present prejudices, 
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Religious hatred and its contribution to human conflict: 
exploring psychodynamic approaches 
and some implications for dialogue and diapraxis 
PART 1  
 




This chapter is ordered by the four parts into which this dissertation is divided.  Part 
1 provides an overview, setting out the purposes of the dissertation, the context in which it 
is written, and its potential contribution to the work of scholar-practitioners in the field of 
conflict resolution and transformation, particularly for those intervening or planning to 
intervene in religious conflict or conflict which has religious dimensions.1  It also 
introduces the approaches and methods used, emphasising the importance of the scholar-
practitioner model of inquiry and how this translates research and theory into dialogue and 
diapraxis.2  Part 1 also provides an overview of relevant literature in the fields of the 
psychology of religion, psychodynamic psychology, and conflict resolution and 
transformation.  Part 2 introduces two subjects of central importance to the dissertation: the 
nature of religious hatred and the psychodynamic concepts which are pertinent to it.  Part 3 
focuses on religious hatred as it finds expression through six dimensions of religion which 
frequently provide a context, framework or justification for the expression of religious 
 
1 The use of these terms is discussed below. 
2 The term ‘diapraxis’ was first used by the Danish theologian Lissi Rasmussen in ‘From Diapraxis to 
Dialogue’ in the 1988 Newsletter of the Office on Christian-Muslim Relations: “I see dialogue as a living 
process, a way of living in co-existence and pro-existence. Therefore I want to introduce the term ‘diapraxis’. 
While dialogue indicates a relationship in which talking together is central, diapraxis indicates a relationship 
in which a common praxis is essential. Thus by diapraxis I do not mean the actual application of dialogue but 





hatred.  Finally, Part 4 reviews the conclusions of the dissertation and its implications for 




This dissertation has two main themes. The first is to understand the phenomenon of 
religious hatred, the reasons for its particular intensity and to explore psychodynamic 
insights into religious hatred.  The second is to identify the implications such insights may 
have for the conduct of processes intended to reduce or prevent religious hatred. 
 
At this starting point it is also worth stating clearly what this dissertation does not 
aim to do.  Most importantly, it does not attempt to analyse differences between 
expressions of hatred in different religions; in fact, it would perhaps be more accurate to 
say that it is about hatred linked to the psychological processes of belief rather than 
religion, but it is the psychological processes of religious belief which are its primary 
focus.  This focus is also limited, for two reasons, to the processes of belief as they tend to 
be enacted and experienced within Western culture.3  The first reason is the constraints of 
time and space: there are some four thousand religions currently extant in the world, and 
some six billion adherents of the major world religions alone.4  To provide a 
comprehensive account of religious hatred, taking into consideration all the variables of 
character, community and culture, were it even possible, would be the work of several 
 
3 It is notable, when the topic of this dissertation is discussed, how often it is assumed that it must centre on 
Islamic fundamentalism.  This in itself may be regarded as a good reason for a focus closer to home. 
4 Data from Global Religious Futures, Pew Research Centre 2010 http://globalreligiousfutures.org [viewed 
18.10.19]. In addition “surveys of more than a million people living in 163 nations show that: 
81% claim to belong to an organized religious faith....74% say religion is an important part of their daily 
lives. 50% report that they have attended a place of worship or religious service in the past seven days. 56% 
believe that “God is directly involved in things that happen in the world”. In very few nations do as many as 
5% claim to be atheists...” (Stark 2015, p. 11). 
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lifetimes.  The second reason is also methodological: as well as desk research this 
dissertation draws on the experience of a scholar-practitioner5 raised and working within 
mostly Western traditions and cultures that can be understood emotionally and intuitively 
as well as intellectually using the approach known as the sociotheological.6 
 
Chapter 2 of Part 1 describes this dissertation’s engagement with the literature and 
experience of scholars and practitioners in three areas of study and activity: the fields of 
conflict resolution and transformation, psychodynamic psychology, and, to a lesser extent, 
the psychology of religion.  The literature in all three of these fields is very extensive and 
for this reason the literature review is selective, focusing on the work within the literature 
that is relevant either to religious hatred or to how it is expressed in the public domain.  
The starting point in each field is notably different.  The literature of the conflict resolution 
field is relatively spare when it comes to considering in any depth the role of religion in 
conflict; this may be explained by the largely secular backgrounds of scholars in this field 
but it is still surprising given how frequently and popularly (albeit erroneously) religion is 
considered to be a source of conflict.7  The psychology of religion literature is included to 
provide context and background to psychodynamic literature.  Although this has 
 
5 The concept and roles of scholar-practitioners in the field of conflict resolution and transformation - 
referring to those who both study conflict and practise as designers, mediators and facilitators of dialogue and 
diapraxis - are discussed later in this chapter.  The scholar-practitioner approach combines a scholarly 
approach to theory-building within the subject matter with a practitioner’s regard for the realities of praxis.  
This has to inform both the nature of the language to be used and the framework of the dissertation, 
acknowledging some inevitable tension between the demands of scholarship and practice which is informed 
to some extent by the empathetic and immersive methods of sociotheology.  
6 For an account of the framework that sociotheology provides to enable the study of the social reality of 
religious activists see Juergensmeyer, M and Sheikh, M 2012, ‘The Sociotheological Turn in the Study of 
Religion and Violence’ in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence (eds. Jerryson, M, Juergensmeyer, 
M and Kitts, M, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  In essence sociotheology argues that the motivations of 
political actors who use religious language and ideas are both religious and secular: there is no distinction 
between defending a faith and struggling for a new socio-political order based on a religious vision. This 
means, for example, extending the traditional boundaries of international relations study to include 
accounting for religious thinking and rationality and so become better able to appreciate how social reality 
looks through the eyes of religious believers. 
7 See Footnote 11 below. 
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historically been inclined to emphasise the more negative aspects of religion and reluctant 
to admit the positives, this has been changing in recent years.  In particular this dissertation 
reviews the work of Carl Jung, a founder of the field, who has in recent years been viewed 
with disfavour in the academy.  Whatever the past perceptions of Jung’s deficiencies, the 
significance of his contributions to the understanding of religion and his value as a cultural 
critic as much as a psychotherapist are being newly appreciated.8  Concepts such as the 
cultural complex, the shadow and the transcendent function deserve wider exposure and 
will bring his insights, and those of his ‘post-Jungian’ successors, into both religion 
generally and into religious hatred, to a new generation.9   
 
Part 2 of this dissertation then discusses, in the wake of the literature review, the 
natures of hatred in general and religious hatred in particular, possible approaches and 
methods that should be employed in turning evidence, particularly from psychodynamic 
literature, into an analysis of the causes, manifestations and motivations of religious hatred.  
Bearing these in mind, Chapter 4 explains the decision to concentrate on psychodynamic 
approaches, arguing that these deserve to be reconsidered in general, and outlining specific 
concepts that, this dissertation argues, are essential to an understanding of religious hatred.  
In particular it is argued the roots of religious hatred lie in a combination of personal and 
cultural complexes and other unconscious elements in the human psyche that can be 
triggered by external and internal events and experiences, and which only psychodynamic 
psychology, with its emphasis on the unconscious and apparently irrational, can explain, 
and into which aspects of Jung’s analytical psychology in particular can provide insights. 
 
8 See for example Hauke, C 2000, Jung and the Postmodern, Routledge, London; Brooke, R 2015, Jung and 
Phenomenology, Routledge, London; Barnaby, K and D’Acierno 1990 and 2017, C.G. Jung and the 
Humanities: Toward a Hermeneutics of Culture, Princeton University Press, Princeton.  Jung’s approach to 
religion is discussed in detail on page 47.  
9 Jung’s contributions are considered in depth in Chapter 4. 
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Part 3 then examines in detail, in six chapters, each of six dimensions of religion and 
how they can provide the pressures and circumstances that may activate such complexes 
into the forms of hatred with which scholar-practitioners are familiar.  The dimensions of 
religion considered are those of identity; doctrine and practice; emotion and experience; 
myth; sacred values; and power and control.  While these are not claimed to be 
comprehensive, this theoretical framework is informed by practice and experience, and it is 
intended to provide a starting point for further research.  This point is emphasised in Part 4 
where some conclusions are drawn and the implications discussed for future intervention in 
religious conflict through dialogic and diapractic approaches.   
 
Background and context 
 
The genesis of this dissertation lies in both scholarship and praxis: years of seeking 
to understand the many dimensions of conflict that confront those who wish to intervene 
constructively in it, and as many years designing and conducting such interventions with 
people professing many types of ideological belief, both religious and secular.  This work 
has fallen under a number of headings within the field generally known as ‘conflict 
resolution’.10  The majority of it is best described as ‘designing, facilitating and mediating 
dialogue processes’, with the majority of participants in these dialogue processes being 
individuals or organisations who have needed to understand each other better in order to 
resolve their differences or to enable future cooperation.  The issues dividing them have 
ranged from the philosophical to the practical: from questions of human rights, inter-
 
10 The field of ‘conflict resolution’ is referred to throughout this dissertation because this is the term most 
widely used in both the literature and in popular parlance (Miall et al 2005, pp. 8-9).  The term ‘conflict 
transformation’ is generally used in relation to intervention that aims at the more profound relational, 
structural and cultural changes (e.g. Lederach 2015) that will prevent and remove underlying reasons for 
conflict. It is arguable that to be properly effective intervention in conflicts with religious dimensions should 
always aspire to be transformative.    
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generational equity and environmental stewardship to the building of roads, reefs and 
runways - virtually always with political dimensions and participants vociferous in their 
advocacy in one direction or another.     
 
On occasion this work has had specifically religious dimensions, involving conflict 
in the Middle East, Southern Africa and in the United Kingdom.   This raises the question 
of what constitutes ‘conflict with religious dimensions’ (CRDs).  This term is used to 
describe political and social situations that are shaped in part by the religious feelings, 
aspirations or frustrations of those involved in them.  It is used in deliberate contrast to the 
term ‘religious conflict’ and its implication that a conflict is wholly about religion11 or 
between people of different religious persuasions because very few conflicts – perhaps 
none at all in the modern age – are about religion alone or fuelled exclusively by religious 
hatred.12  It is a given that all conflicts tend to have multiple causes ranging from the 
immediate and shallow to the long-festering and deeply-embedded, complicated by 
competing loyalties, adherences and identities, some of which are more obvious than 
others.13  In addition they are shaped by the economic, cultural and political contexts in 
which they occur, where poverty, ethnicity, governance, exclusion and democracy may 
also be issues.  Amidst this complexity “Conflict analyses must capture these complexities, 
 
11 It is a popular trope that religion is often the cause of war but it is in fact the cause in only a very small 
minority.  The Phillips and Axelrod Encyclopedia of Wars (Facts on File 2004) indicates that 123 out of 
1,763 wars (7%) over the last five millennia can be described as religious in nature.  In 35 armed conflicts 
since 2013 religion did not play any role at all in 14 or 40% (Peace and Religion 2014, Institute for 
Economics and Peace, Sydney). Gordon Martel’s The Encyclopedia of War (Wiley-Blackwell 2012) suggests 
a similar figure while William Cavanaugh’s The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots 
of Modern Conflict (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) deems the idea of ‘religious wars’ to be a largely 
modern Western invention, stating all wars have secular political or economic causes.  
12 The criteria and methodology for classifying conflict as ‘religious’, however, are controversial: see for 
example Barter, S and Zatkin-Osburn, I 2014, ‘Shrouded: Islam, war, and holy war in Southeast Asia’, 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion vol. 53 no. 1, pp. 187–201 and subsequent responses.  
13 This said, the term ‘religious conflict’ is not wholly redundant.  When an individual or group expressly 
describe their conflict as ‘religious’, or define their grievances as exclusively religious, it would be otiose to 
forego the term in favour of ‘conflict with religious dimensions’ even if it is suspected that that there are 
issues other than the religious that are fuelling the conflict. Within this dissertation the term ‘religious 
conflict’ is also used as shorthand for ‘conflict with religious dimensions’ on the grounds of concision. 
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taking account of theological narratives and socio-economic challenges. They must 
acknowledge that the causes of conflict are often non-religious, but that religious motives 
can still help determine conflict behaviour” (Shannahan and Payne 2016).14  The focus 
here, though, is less on conflict itself, or on specific conflicts, but rather on religion or 
belief-generated hatred as a phenomenon that can contribute to any situation of human 
conflict.  
 
While the origins of this dissertation lie in the experience of intervention in conflict 
where people are divided by beliefs as much as by material realities, its precise focus is 
hatred, and more specifically religious hatred.  While personal experience as a scholar-
practitioner15 has always suggested that abstract or ideological differences are often 
expressed more forcefully than more practical or material ones, the experience of dialogue 
within the Church of England addressing the subject of human sexuality revealed how the 
intensity of feeling that can accompany religious differences in particular is not confined to 
war zones or other extreme situations.16  Sitting for many hours with people with 
conflicting views on how their faith should, or should not, accommodate people with 
differing sexualities provided some insight into how many aspects of religious difference 
could evolve into intense hostility.  It was then not difficult to imagine how, in other 
circumstances and beyond the constraints deliberately imposed by the protocols of the 
Church of England’s Shared Conversations process, such intensity of feeling could 
develop into active hatred.  This observation, together with past study of psychodynamic 
 
14 The question of what constitute ‘religious motives’ may have been complicated in the United Kingdom by 
a recent tribunal ruling that ethical veganism is a philosophical belief and so a ‘protected characteristic’ under 
the Equality Act 2010 (BBC report, 3.1.20 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-50981359, viewed 14.1.20).  See 
also Donaldson, B 2016, ‘From Ancient Vegetarianism to Contemporary Advocacy: when Religious Folks 
Decide that Animals Are No Longer Edible’, Religious Studies and Theology, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 143-160. 
15 The methodology shaping and informing this practice and experience is described on pages 16-20. 
16 See http://www.sharedconversations.org [viewed 14.1.20].  The general methodology of such dialogue 
processes is discussed on pages 247-8.  
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literature and some experience of psychotherapeutic approaches, raised the possibility that 
this emotional intensity could not be entirely due to cognitive differences of opinion or 
doctrine.  Reflection also recalled other situations rendered more severe by levels of 
intensity occasioned by differences of belief, whether religious, philosophical or 
ideological.  In combination these situations suggested that the intensity of belief-based 
differences, religious or otherwise, might be triggered by unconscious psychological 
tensions, and that a psychodynamic approach to religious hatred would fill some important 
gaps in theoretical understandings of it and raise significant implications for how 
practitioners should respond to it.  
 
Immersion in psychodynamic literature and reflection on these implications supports 
the argument underlying this dissertation that intervention in conflict with religious 
dimensions, whether by state-backed politicians or diplomats, international organisations 
such as the United Nations (UN) or Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), ‘Track 2’ diplomats or other non-state mediators, requires, in addition to a 
knowledge of the basic premises and traditions of the religion with which they are 
concerned, an understanding of psychodynamic psychology as it pertains to the holding 
and expressing of beliefs.17   This is also why it is this general understanding of the 
processes and perspectives common to belief systems, rather than of any particular 
religion, that is the focus of this dissertation.18 This understanding can reasonably be 
expected, in turn, to inform the type of intervention deemed appropriate to any specific 
situation where religious beliefs inform or sustain the protagonists; it should even influence 
 
17 The term ‘Track 2 diplomacy’ is commonly used to describe intervention by individuals or organisations 
without official standing.  Examples from the United Kingdom are organisations such as International Alert 
(https://www.international-alert.org) and Conciliation Resources (https://www.c-r.org). Meanwhile ‘Track 1’ 
refers to official actors and non-state elites; ‘Track 3’ to grassroots actors. 
18 In a significant proportion of dialogue work on environmental issues it is fair to say that the motivations of 
some of the participants are, if not ‘religious’ in the most normative sense, involve beliefs that are at least 
quasi-religious in terms of how they are held and expressed.   
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some details of process design when the finer points of intervention come to be 
considered.19 
 
It should be made very clear, however, that this dissertation is not intended to be a 
handbook of process design, mediation or other forms of intervention: the focus is on 
theory-building and outlining key principles and broad avenues of approach to dialogue 






This introductory chapter also describes two methods used in this dissertation.  As so 
often with qualitative rather than quantitative studies, there is no single over-arching 
methodology that can underpin evidence which is, by its nature, exploratory and 
ruminative, but their combination provides a structure and discipline. The first is that of the 
scholar-practitioner which combines a phenomenological quest for understanding with the 
desire to turn understanding into praxis; the second is empathetic immersion: the narrative 
process of developing this understanding from the inside out because objective inquiry has 
its limitations with a subject such as religious hatred which, this scholar-practitioner 
argues, needs to be felt as well as thought.   
 
One characteristic of the field of conflict resolution is that it has benefitted from 
individuals who combine the research, writing and teaching involved in conflict 
scholarship with an active role as mediators, facilitators and trainers, drawing on their 
 
19 ‘Process design’ is the term used by mediators and facilitators to describe the process of decision-making 
involved in deciding how to intervene in conflict: it covers everything from who should be involved, what 
should be discussed and how, to the nature and amenities of the space in which they should meet.  
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experience to inform their scholarship, and vice-versa - hence their common designation as 
‘scholar-practitioners’ (Miall, Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse 2005, p. 52).20  While the 
training of scholar-practitioners in the field of conflict resolution and transformation has 
yet to become as systematic as, for example, for those with clinical or legal 
responsibilities, the roles are not dissimilar in the sense of combining theoretical learning 
with hands on experience, usually through the medium of meetings and workshops that 
bring together parties in processes of dialogue.   There is in addition the commitment to 
confidentiality, essential to praxis, that can complicate the reporting of experience and the 
sharing of learning.21  While theory has always informed praxis, it is perhaps less true that 
praxis has informed theory especially as intervention strategies, such as third party 
mediation, have come to be more widely used to resolve legal, commercial and public 
policy issues.22  Where praxis has informed theory it has tended to be more in the field of 
international and communal conflict resolution where the results are more publicly obvious 
and less bound by issues such as legal confidentiality.  This is true in the case of this 
dissertation, where the quest for new theory is influenced in part by the experience of 
designing dialogue and intervention strategies which have often involved participants 
motivated by religious beliefs, ethical considerations or by intimations of the sacred as they 
affect public policy issues.23    
 
20 The concept of the scholar-practitioner evolved out of the idea of the scientist-practitioner model, or 
Boulder Model, accepted by the American Psychological Association in 1949 for the training of clinical 
psychologists dealing with veterans returning from the World War II. The hallmark of the Boulder Model 
was a strong foundation in psychology and other applied sciences coupled with the learning of therapeutic 
principles, the skills required to treat patients and supervised field experience (Baker, Benjamin & Ludy 
2000). 
21 A number of footnote references in this dissertation are designated ‘private communication’ for this reason.  
The obligation of confidentiality remains, in some cases, in perpetuity for security purposes and can severely 
restrict both scholarship and the open attribution of learning.  
22 Mediation, one of the most common forms of third-party intervention in conflict, has been an accepted 
adjunct to legal dispute resolution procedures in the United Kingdom since the launch of the Centre for 
Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) in 1990. 
23 See for example Schwartz, S 1994, ‘Are there universal aspects in the structure and content of human 
values?’ Journal of Social Issues, vol. 50, pp. 19-45 and Schultz, P, Shriver, C, Tabanico, J and Khazian, A 




The scholar-practitioner role is also a third party role in that it means acting as a 
bridge between scholarship and praxis, absorbing the evidence and opinion of the former 
and translating it into a form which can ultimately be of value for the latter.  This role 
grows more complex with the complexity of the issues considered, given the identification 
of vested interests, the differences among scholars, the rival intellectual histories, cultures 
and claims to be understood and interpreted, and the formulation of language that may find 
a way through such differences to a tentative reconciliation.  However the field of conflict 
resolution develops, the scholar-practitioner will retain a role in cultivating the symbiotic 
relationship between praxis and scholarship, which “involves a continuing interaction 
between practice, on the one hand, and theory development and empirical research, on the 
other” (Kelman 2000).  One of the purposes of this dissertation is to support this 
relationship not least by encouraging scholars within the conflict field to look more closely 
at how religion and religious hatred influence conflict, scholars in fields such as the study 
of religion to ensure their potential contributions to peace and reconciliation are better 
recognised, and practitioners to absorb and apply the resultant lessons. 
 
 The role and stance of the scholar-practitioner in relation to the situations in which 
he or she may be asked to intervene has also influenced the methodology underlying this 
dissertation.   There are a number of issues that can arise in any situation, but the 
experience of intervening in conflict with religious dimensions highlights issues of 
particular importance and sensitivity. It is axiomatic, for example, that third parties must 
act impartially if they are to gain and retain the trust of the parties involved.  This is rarely 
straightforward: the meaning of ‘impartial’, for example, may be different in a parish 
dispute than if a political interlocutor is suspected of past war crimes.  It can be argued that 
true ‘impartiality’, let alone ‘neutrality’, is almost impossible for human beings with a 
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normal range of biases and prejudices, conscious and unconscious.   The proper stance of 
scholar-practitioners in their approach to religion and religious hatred is affected by a 
further consideration: whether the presence or absence of religious conviction, or of some 
religious belief different from those in conflict, is preferable or should be avoided.   
 
Another methodology used by this scholar-practitioner which also shapes this 
dissertation is that of the ‘empathetic immersion’ approach of sociotheology, described by 
Mark Juergensmeyer and Mona Kanwal Sheikh (2013, p. 631) as entering into a person’s 
culture and worldview, understanding what people intend to mean as well as what they say, 
and becoming completely immersed in their frames of reference.24  There are alternative 
approaches: practitioners working in the world of legal and commercial conflict, for 
example, are more inclined to avoid close identification with the content of the situations 
in which they intervene (Roberts 2007, pp. 131-145) both to avoid any hint of partiality 
and because they are often lawyers or other commercial professionals trying to avoid any 
confusion between their roles as mediators and their roles as experts in their field.   
Intervening in religious situations poses different challenges: some scholar-practitioners, 
however skilled, may struggle to make headway with interlocutors for whom the absence 
of a shared belief on the part of the practitioner may render the building of trust difficult if 
not impossible.25   The question of stance may become more acute the more extreme the 
nature of the belief or behaviour encountered.26  In such circumstances another alternative 
 
24 While this resonates strongly with the conflict resolution exercises that most practitioners experience as 
part of their training, it can come as an apparent novelty to those whose positions and experience have not 
extended beyond their cause.  Juergensmeyer and Sheikh provide the example of the documentary film The 
Fog of War in which Robert McNamara, the former US Secretary of Defense, advises policy makers to 
“empathize with the enemy”.  He implies that had this been done during the Vietnam War it would have 
changed American attitudes to the North Vietnamese and enabled them to see it as a nationalist struggle 
against foreigners rather than, or at least as well as, a communist crusade (2013, p. 632).  
25 For example, a practitioner asked to intervene in a recent religious dispute decided that declaring herself 
‘agnostic’ might reassure both sides as to her impartiality.  This had an unintended effect: her absence of 
religious commitment was interpreted by both sides as an inability to understand the issues under discussion. 
26 A recent exercise in religious reconciliation was brought to a premature end when one key interlocutor 
declared that the mere fact of talking to others with different viewpoints was heretical (private 
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to empathetic immersion might be the deliberate detachment from the issues exemplified 
by an approach adopted in the relatively early days of conflict resolution: ‘controlled 
communication’.  This method saw panels of academic experts listening to protagonists 
and then helping them work through the options for resolving their differences (Miall, 
Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse 2005, p. 49).  While this detachment may have aided 
objective analysis of situations, the experience of this practitioner suggests that in conflicts 
with religious dimensions empathetic immersion is more likely to enable a scholar-
practitioner to build the quality of relationship with protagonists that will subsequently 
enable difficult and sensitive issues to be discussed with some hope of progress.  The 
reason for this is perhaps that people of faith in a largely secular culture have become used 
to being derided and even marginalised, so a practitioner who listens deeply and 
empathetically is more likely to be accepted and even welcomed than one who is perceived 
to be more intellectually and emotionally detached.  
 
Empathetic immersion is particularly relevant, according to Juergensmeyer and 
Sheik (2013, p. 635), when it comes to understanding how the narrative structure of a 
storyline seeks to explain how religion can justify hatred and even violence, including 
where religion-related violence is set in the context of cosmic war where battle is done as 
much through symbols as weapons.  They use the example of the jihadi narrative of cosmic 
warfare in the wake of the 9/11 tragedies and how these were affirmed by the responses 
and the language of the then US administration.  The administration might have thought 
twice about using the word ‘crusade’ to describe its ‘war on terror’ if it had been better 
understood that this would be interpreted in the Middle East as a call to the ‘clash of 
civilisations’ and an evocation of the spirit of hate which had led Christian knights to 
 
communication, November 2017). ‘Reconciliation’ for those with strong beliefs can depend on capitulation 
by those who do not share them.   
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repeated assaults on Jerusalem in centuries past.27  Other examples illustrate the supreme 
importance of perceiving situations and contexts from the protagonists’ points of view, 
especially when some protagonists are inclined to be categorized as ‘Other’.28  
Practitioners are taught to recognise the importance of narrative as part of the process of 
intervention in conflict; John Winslade and Gerald Monk in Narrative Mediation (2001) 
state that it is “more useful to concentrate on viewing stories as constructing the world 
rather than viewing the world as independently known and then described through stories” 
(p. 3).29  This process also delivers the mediation process from what Winslade and Monk 
call the “totalizing descriptions” that mean protagonists can become entrapped in dominant 
storylines that enshrine negative perceptions of each other. 
 
The importance of empathetic immersion for this dissertation is that, like the 
narrative approach to conflict, it reduces the inadvertent exclusion of ideas or explanations 
that do not fit pre-conceived notions of relevance or significance.  The problems caused by 
over dominance of a particular ideology or belief system or even approach are not confined 
to interventions where religious hatred is a factor.  In any situation empathetic immersion 
is not without its challenges: it is always easier for protagonists to insist on working only 
within the parameters with which they feel comfortable.30  One of the distinctive methods 
 
27 See Huntington, S 1993, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3. 
28 The concept of ‘Others’ and ‘Otherness’ recurs repeatedly in this dissertation.  Where the words are 
capitalised this indicates that the meaning goes beyond the generic. These concepts are crucial to an 
understanding of religious hatred. 
29 Narrative mediation is an approach to conflict based in part on the development of narrative therapy, which 
was developed in the 1970s and 1980s as a means to help people identify and develop their own skills and 
knowledge so they could be brought to bear on the problems they faced. See for example White, M and 
Epston, D 1991 Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends, Norton, New York or Combs, G and Freedman, J 
1996 Narrative Therapy: The Social Construction of Preferred Realities, Norton, London. Narrative 
mediation, like narrative therapy, has been criticised for its social constructionist approach.  
30 For example, during a dialogue process convened by the UK Sciencewise programme to discuss the use of 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in agriculture and food production, it became apparent that 
scientists supporting GMOs viewed their use purely in scientific and food safety terms whereas opponents 
wanted to discuss the ethical, social, economic and environmental impacts on, for example, farmers in 
developing countries. Had the advocates of GMOs been willing to adopt a more empathetic and immersive 
approach to the subject instead of confining the dialogue to scientific issues, the dialogue process would have 
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that scholar-practitioners bring to conflict resolution processes has been reflected in the 
approach to the research that has informed this dissertation: rather than starting at Point A 
and moving steadily through Points B, C and D until the final point, the approach has been 
to start at Point A, have a look at Point B and then return to Point A to see if understanding 
of it has changed in the light of Point B.  Then perhaps a look at Points B and C before 
again returning to Point A, or perhaps looking at Points C and D from Point B to see if that 
suggests a more creative option for reaching Point E, and so on.   Underlying most conflict 
resolution strategies are methods that perceive conflict not as battles to be won but as 
problems best solved by protagonists working together to find mutually acceptable 
solutions, and this involves enhanced understandings of protagonists’ needs and interests, 
values, fears and expectations best achieved through immersion in their points of view 
(Miall, Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse 2005, p. 18; Carpenter & Kennedy 1988, pp. 128-9; 
Moore 1986, pp. 38-9; Acland 1990, pp. 147-156).    
 
It is arguable that all scholarship by definition involves empathetic immersion in the 
research, arguments and evidence of other scholars, and this dissertation is no different.  
Immersion here, however, has gone beyond typical academic desk research in two ways.  
First, it has involved the study of para-academic texts, such as those produced by 
practitioners, and non-academic media produced by a wide variety of haters, homophobes, 
racists and other bigots of many different persuasions and degrees of coherence.31  
Secondly, such expressions of ambition, grievance and frustration need to be analysed 
emotionally and intuitively as well as rationally: intellectual analysis alone is insufficient 
 
been less likely to collapse before it could make any progress. For further information see 
http://www.sciencewise-erc.org.uk/cms/food-the-use-of-genetic-modification-a-public-dialogue/ [viewed 
20.12.17.]  Sciencewise is a programme funded by the UK government’s Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). Its remit is to bring into dialogue scientists, policy-makers and members of 
the public to discuss the social and ethical dimensions of innovative science and technology. 
31 It has not been felt necessary to reproduce or reference such material in this dissertation; its nature and 
extent has become an unfortunate accompaniment of everyday discourse.  
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to appreciate the shades and nuances of impact though the scholarly literature that responds 
to them provides a useful baseline.  The importance of intense discourse analysis, first to 
identify any ‘negativity effect’32 and then to describe its consequences in terms of 
evaluating impressions of other individuals or groups, their moral stances or likely 
decisions, is well established among scholar-practitioners, the critical point being that 
negative evaluations tend to have more influence than positive evaluations (Coovert and 
Reeder 1990; Taylor 1991).33  While not all expressions of religious hatred are necessarily 
as extreme as some of those studied, their potential to become so is evident in the language 
used, and the most chilling are sometimes the less extreme in that they demonstrate an 
understanding of how to infiltrate the minds of those who do not, at present, share their 
wilder beliefs. This distasteful research has reinforced the conviction that it is only the 
literature of psychodynamic psychology that can enter the minds of its authors and explain 
how religious hatred can arise and contribute to religious conflict.  It is a bonus that in this 
respect empathetic immersion as a methodology is appropriate for both scholars and 
practitioners.    
 
Thirdly, the research for this dissertation has also involved a systematic review of 
professional experience since 1985.  This work has involved a wide range of people and 
organisations expressing strong beliefs and values. These have included religious believers, 
environmental campaigners, human rights activists and adherents to indigenous religious 
cultures.  The review of this work has included reading case histories, post-intervention de-
briefs, independent analyses of lessons learned and insights gained, and reflections on how 
 
32 The ‘negativity effect’ is extant when the negative impression conveyed by any communication outweighs 
any positive effects (Vonk 1993). 
33 The negative impacts of hate propaganda tend to increase intolerance of other people and their views and 
undermine the trust and interdependence that maintain political participation and social interdependence 
(Johnson and Johnson 2000).  
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this accumulated experience has been processed into professional training for bodies such 
as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), various non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), law firms, academic and research institutions, government agencies and local 
government bodies.  Training others has particular value in that it enforces the discipline of 
reviewing experience and distilling what has been learned into forms - written, summarised 
and illustrated - that can be assimilated by others; in this sense professional training of 
others can almost be considered a form of methodology for research.34  
 
While on the subject of research, questions have arisen about the accuracy, validity 
and applicability of some university-based academic psychological research.  This has 
been prompted in part by the work of Joseph Henrich and Ara Norenzayan among others 
who argue that much research on human behaviour and psychology assumes that everyone 
shares most fundamental cognitive and affective processes, and that findings from one 
population apply to others. “A growing body of evidence suggests that this is not the case” 
(Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010).  Among the reasons mentioned are variations in 
factors affecting research such as visual perception, analytic reasoning, fairness and 
cooperation: agreeing with anthropologists that people from Western, educated, 
industrialised, rich and democratic societies, and particularly American undergraduates on 
whom much psychological research relies, “are some of the most psychologically unusual 
people on earth” (ibid.).35  Where this dissertation uses such research it should be assumed 
that it comes with appropriate caveats as to its reliability. 
 
 
34 The field of conflict resolution increasingly emphasises the importance of reflexivity as a means to distil 
important experience, to refine training methods and to build the habit of reflection amongst practitioners, 
and this in turn is influencing research methodology: see for example Attia, M and Edge, J 2017, 
‘Be(com)ing a reflexive researcher: a developmental approach to research methodology’, Open Review of 
Educational Research, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 33-45. 
35 The acronym WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic) is increasingly being used 
to remind researchers of the bias inherent in using subjects from this demographic. 
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Language and format 
 
For the scholar-practitioner language is always an issue because using it badly can 
make difficult situations worse.  Scholar-practitioners tend therefore to be measured in the 
language they use, wary of words that may challenge perceptions of their impartiality, and 
careful that what they say cannot be misinterpreted.  Those who spend time designing and 
facilitating dialogue processes often emphasise structure and clarity in their use of 
language: the former to ensure that issues and are addressed in the way and sequence that 
optimizes the likelihood of a dialogue process working for all protagonists, the latter to 
minimize the possibility of misunderstanding contributing to what may already be a 
difficult situation.  The mediator Kenneth Cloke goes further than this when he suggests 
that mediators develop a new language, allowing problems to be described as belonging to 
both parties, “that does not victimize or demonize, that empathizes and acknowledges 
emotions, that strengthens heart and spirit, that encourages responsibility for resolution and 
openness to transformation” (Cloke 2001, p. 149).  Cloke is addressing practitioners in a 
field of third party intervention, the law, where language can be used as much to obscure 
and divide as to clarify and transform, but his admonitions are universal and some scholar-
practitioners are focusing on deliberately developing language designed to avert conflict.36   
 
An academic dissertation focused on understanding religious hatred is removed from 
the exigencies of praxis, but the practitioner habit means that this dissertation uses 
language that, wherever possible, puts a premium on clarity.  Similarly, it also tries to keep 
in mind the issues surrounding the use of examples and anecdotal evidence in illuminating 
a subject such as religious hatred.  Detailed case studies in any field can enable the study of 
 
36 See for example Ramsbotham, O 2010, Transforming Violent Conflict, Routledge, London. 
 
 25 
lived reality, the processes involved in causal relationships, the impact of the unexpected, 
and conceptual development drawn from multiple viewpoints, but experience as a scholar-
practitioner and conflict resolution trainer suggests that there are also dangers and 
limitations in their use.37  Chief among these is the difficulty of choosing case studies that 
are of universal value when every situation is individual, and the consequent danger of the 
lessons of one situation being assumed to be relevant in another.  For this reason the 
approach preferred in this dissertation is to illustrate ideas and concepts through the use of 
examples that are specific and constrained rather than to rely on larger case studies where 
the key points may be lost amidst the detail. 
 
There is a final point as regards the format of this dissertation.  Eleven chapters out 
of its twelve are concerned primarily with the exploration of religious hatred designed to 
be of interest to scholars in the fields of religious studies, theology, the psychology of 
religion and conflict and conflict resolution.  The twelfth chapter discusses some of the 
implications for dialogue and diapraxis raised by these ideas and is intended to be of value 
for theory-building among practitioners, including diplomats, politicians and conflict 




37 See for example Hodkinson, H and Hodkinson, P 2001, ‘The Strengths and Limitations of Case Study 
Research’, Paper for the Learning and Skills Development Agency Conference, Research, Making an Impact 
on Policy and Practice, Cambridge. 
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Chapter 2: Reviewing the literature of conflict resolution, the psychology 





This literature review covers three fields of scholarship: conflict resolution and 
transformation, the psychology of religion and psychodynamic psychology.  Although the 
latter two of these became formally established at the beginning of the last century while 
the first is younger by about half a century, the literatures of each are extensive and reflect 
the significance of their subject matters.  This review provides an overview of these three 
fields of scholarship as they pertain to the subject of religious hatred - though religious 
hatred is often more implicit than explicit in all three literatures and sometimes has to be 
extrapolated from milder expressions of religious anger or difference, or from situations of 
conflict where hatred may be more general than specific.38 
 
Conflict resolution and transformation 
 
Conflict resolution, as a defined field of study, had its origins in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Miall, H, Ramsbotham, O and Woodhouse T 2005, p. 3) when superpower conflict 
threatened the use of nuclear weapons and the future of the planet.  It was a multi-
disciplinary field from the outset: small groups of pioneer researchers in Europe and North 
America began to see the potential of applying the literature of dealing with conflict 
learned from arenas as diverse as industrial relations, the civil rights movement and 
matrimonial dispute resolution to that of international relations.  Progress was slow in that 
the diplomats, politicians and international relations scholars who had traditionally 
 
38 It becomes increasingly clear as this dissertation progresses that hatred is qualitatively different from 
anger; the nature of hatred, and religious hatred in particular, is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.  
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documented the processes of dialogue among nation states saw little reason to admit 
scholars with ideas originating outside their experience or scholarship.  Gradually, 
however, the value of fresh thinking began to be appreciated, institutions and scholarly 
journals were established and field experience began to feed into scholarship and vice-
versa.39  The field was also bolstered by the realisation among the United Nations 
Organisation, non-government organisations and humanitarian agencies that conflict 
resolution often needed to be a precursor to, or be congruent with, international 
development work (ibid., p. 4).  The end of the Cold War and its various proxy conflicts 
during the 1990s also opened up opportunities for conflict resolution scholarship as well as 
the re-heating of territorial ambitions that had been quiescent since 1945.  Conflict 
resolution mechanisms began to be institutionalised within bodies such as the UN, the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU, now the African Union, AU), and many educational institutions, 
think-tanks and universities began their own scholar-practitioner study and training 
programmes.   It is these bodies which have been largely responsible for the evolving 
literature of conflict resolution and for the literature which focuses most explicitly on the 
challenges to peace that have developed since the attacks of 11 September 2001 and have 
given fresh urgency to understanding the phenomenon of religious hatred.   
 
Looking strategically at the literature of conflict resolution, it is apparent that there 
are, broadly speaking, four areas of scholarship. The first is concerned mainly with 
relations between states or major non-state actors and focused on improving the existing 
mechanisms for early warning of impending conflict, preventive diplomacy, hotlines and 
 
39 Among the first major areas where conflict resolution ideas made a tangible difference were the 
confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia in the 1960s and the Centre for Intergroup Studies work on 
apartheid in South Africa in the 1980s.  
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confidence-building measures through bodies such as the United Nations.  The second is 
focused on better understanding of the processes of negotiation and mediation,40 building 
in particular on the work of bodies such as the Harvard Program on Negotiation, the 
Berghof Foundation,41 the Carter Center42 and in the United Kingdom the work of 
university departments such as that of the Division of Peace Studies and International 
Development at the University of Bradford,43 the Conflict Analysis Research Centre at the 
University of Kent,44 the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at the University of 
Coventry45 and the University of Winchester’s Centre for Religion, Reconciliation and 
Peace46 to improve the practical functioning of human relationships when they are under 
pressure.  The third area of scholarship is focused on better understanding of human needs 
and interests, especially those relating to identity and self-determination where the driving 
forces are movements, cultures and sub-groups within larger entities. The fourth area is a 
separate but parallel approach to the third and seeks to understand what it takes to 
transform rather than merely resolve conflict in any context (for example Vayrynen, ed. 
1991; Jabri, 1996; Francis, 2002; Lederach, 2003).  The subject of conflict transformation 
is particularly relevant to religious hatred: this dissertation argues that overcoming 
religious hatred depends ultimately on deep-seated changes of attitude made possible by 
processes akin to religious epiphanies facilitated through dialogue and diapraxis. 
 
There is relatively little literature in either conflict resolution, the psychology of 












concerned with religious hatred.  Searching the Journal of Conflict Resolution (JCR) for 
‘religious hatred’ produces just 69 ‘hits’, for example; the same exercise with the 
International Journal of Conflict and Violence about half that number, while the 
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion produces a similar number but many 
are duplicates and, as with those produced by the JCR, most are about the fact of hatred 
rather than its anatomy.  Searches in the ATLA Religion Database using various 
permutations of the search terms find a hundred or so entries, again mostly about incidents 
of religious hatred or legal and political discussion of it; there is little about what brings 
individuals to such strong feeling.  This suggests that the power of religious emotion is 
under-estimated.   In the fifty-five years between May 1935, when Josef Stalin famously 
asked how many divisions the Pope could muster, and the return of democracy to Poland in 
1990 aided in part by the election of a Polish Pope, it appeared to many that religion had 
lost not only institutional power in the world, but perhaps more importantly its power to 
move people (Sahliyeh 1990; Haynes 2007).   The fallibility of this viewpoint was 
challenged first by the Iranian revolution in 1979, and has been proved repeatedly since 
then by the advent of polities rendered unstable by the pressures of faith (Atran 2010; 
McGrath 2004; Stark 2015).  Religion wields emotional power, and when the emotion 
associated with such power is hatred then it is important to understand both its conscious 
and unconscious appeals (Moïsi 2009, pp. 76-8) and what this means for a contemporary 
world that is erroneously supposed to have turned its back on religion (Smith 2001, pp. 
154-162). 
 
In the absence of evidence it is reasonable to speculate why the literature of the 
conflict resolution field in particular does not consider religion in more depth.47  First, it is 
 
47 It is not just the conflict resolution field: international relations theory, the mid-wife of conflict resolution, 
ignored religion for most of the 20th century.  The reasons for this are discussed in Fox, J and Sandler, S 
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possible that those who write books and journal articles about conflict regard other issues 
as more salient than religion even though the history of recent years suggests that this 
would be an oversight.  Secondly, religion may appear to be absent from the literature of 
conflict because it appears in other guises, for example as a dimension of culture and a 
marker of identity rather than a subject in its own right.   Thirdly, religion is increasingly 
treated as a subset of ‘worldviews’, cognitive orientations to the world that articulate and 
summarise an individual’s or a society’s aims, beliefs and values (Naugle 2002).  In this 
understanding ‘religion’ may be equated or conflated with secular worldviews such as 
Marxism, radical environmentalism or indeed any system of thought with influence on the 
way people and societies think.  Finally, it should be observed that conflict resolution is a 
largely secular field but the neglect of religion is still surprising given how frequently 
religion is considered to be a source of conflict.48 
 
Often during the research for this dissertation answers to many questions have 
emerged from the grey areas between disciplines and where literatures overlap, and this is 
true of insights into religious hatred.  The literature prompted by the growth of religious 
terrorism in the years since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since the 11th 
September 2000 attacks in the United States, contains a wealth of social anthropology 
which also covers the nexus of religion and violence.  While such texts do not, strictly 
 
2005, ‘The Question of Religion and World Politics’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 
293-303. 
48 “Overall, conflict scholars have tended to neglect religious dimensions of conflicts, and scholars of religion 
have tended not to incorporate the insights from conflict studies into their analysis” Svensson, I 2016, 
‘Conceptualizing the Religious Dimensions of Armed Conflicts’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 
vol. 55, no. 1, pp.185–189.  A similar issue is discussed by Professor Jeffrey Seul of Harvard Divinity School 
in ‘Religion in Cooperation and Conflict’ (in Honeyman, C and Kupfer Schneider, A (eds.) 2017, The 
Negotiator’s Desk Reference Vol. 1, DRI Press, Saint Paul, Minnesota).  In a footnote Seul comments that 
much of the research discussed in his chapter was conducted by social scientists who are atheists, and quotes 
theologians Sarah Coakley and Martin Nowak “if it is simply assumed that ‘religion’ may be explained away 
in terms of something else, all attempts to clarify its workings will inevitably fall prey to the same reductive 
principles” (from Coakley, S and Nowak, M 2013, Evolution, Games, and God: The Principle of 
Cooperation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.) 
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speaking, fall within what is usually considered the conflict resolution field, they can be 
said to build on Johan Galtung’s half a century of extensive studies, well summarised in 
Transcend and Transform: An Introduction to Conflict Work (2004), of the structural 
relationships between conflict, violence and peace.  Among the literature of value to those 
studying religious violence and hatred are Stern’s Terror in the Name of God (2003); 
Fields’ Martyrdom: The Psychology, Theology, and Politics of Self-Sacrifice (2004); 
Silberman’s ‘Religious violence, terrorism, and peace’ in Paloutzian and Park’s Handbook 
of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality (2005); Atran’s Talking to the Enemy 
(2010); Yanay’s The Ideology of Hatred: The Psychic Power of Discourse (2013); Nations 
under God: The Geopolitics of Faith in the Twenty-First Century edited by Luke 
Herrington, Alasdair McKay and Jeffrey Haynes (2015) and Juergensmeyer’s Terror in the 
Mind of God (2017).  
 
The conflict resolution field is focused as much on methods of intervention as 
analysis, and this is of particular interest to scholar-practitioners.  Numerous books have 
suggested methods of intervention, usually including case studies describing what has 
worked or not worked in different circumstances.  The literature on intervention in 
religious conflict is relatively limited though in recent years a number of publications have 
begun to fill this gap.  The work of Scott Appleby, including The Ambivalence of the 
Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation (1999) and Strong Religion: The Rise of 
Fundamentalisms around the World (2011), is particularly notable in this regard, as is his 
editorship of the Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding (2015) which 
contains seminal essays by scholars and practitioners including Marc Gopin, John Paul 
Lederach, David Little, Atalia Omer and Lisa Schirch among others.  Its companion 
volume, The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence (2015), edited by Mark 
Juergensmeyer, Margo Kitts and Michael Jerryson, contains the work of similarly 
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distinguished scholars in the field.  Recent years have also seen the publication of literature 
directed more towards practitioners, including, for example, the United States Institute for 
Peace’s Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding (Frazer and Owen 2018),  a systematic 
guide to analysing and understanding modes of intervention in religious conflict; Mark 
Owen and Anna King’s ‘Enhancing the Efficacy of Religious Peacebuilding Practice: An 
Exploratory Evidence-Based Framework for Assessing Dominant Risks in Religious 
Peacebuilding’ (Religions, vol. 10, no. 12, p. 641); and the work of the Center for Security 
Studies in Zurich, for example Approaching religion in conflict transformation: concepts, 
cases and practical implications (Frazer and Friedli 2015).  There is also a volume of 
literature of relevance to those interested in conflict resolution generally that documents 
the role of religious leaders and communities of faith as interveners in conflict.49 
 
The other approach to conflict in general, but which has a particular resonance for 
scholarship concerned with religious hatred, is the so-called ‘transformative’ approach.  
Conflict transformation, mentioned above as a development of conflict resolution, is 
different to conflict resolution in a number of regards.  First, it starts from the presumption 
that the only way finally to resolve conflict is to address its roots by, for example, tackling 
the structural injustices that may feed it, or the differing frames of reference that sustain it.  
Notable examples of literature setting out this approach include Adam Curle’s Tools for 
Transformation (1990) and John Paul Lederach’s Preparing for Peace: Conflict 
 
49 See for example Johnston and Sampson’s Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft (1994) and 
Conflict and Reconciliation: The Contribution of Religions (2008), edited by the religious scholar John 
Bowker, followed by, among others, The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding (Mayall & Silvestri 
2015) and Faith-based Interventions in Peace, Conflict and Violence: A Scoping Study (Shannahan & Payne 
2016).  While these publications document or advocate relatively formal interventions in religious conflict, 
they can sometimes overlook work done on the ground by religious groups such as the Quakers and 
Mennonites, both of whom have been convening and mediating peace talks for many years.  The works of the 
Quaker Adam Curle and the Mennonite John Paul Lederach, are primary sources in this regard; Lederach’s 




Transformation Across Cultures (1995); more recently Oliver Ramsbotham’s 
Transforming Violent Conflict, (2010) has focused attention on the vital importance of how 
language is used. Religion is one of the frames of reference where arguably differences 
cannot be resolved but must be transcended through the transformation of the relationships 
which may have given rise to strong emotions, such as hatred, that fuel conflict.  In such 
situations scholar-practitioners have been exploring the use of methods that enable 
protagonists to express feelings that may be too sensitive or complex to be put into words, 
and to develop empathy across chasms of history, religion and experience. There has been 
growing interest in the use of the arts, for example, to bridge strong emotional divisions 
and there is an expanding literature in this area of conflict work.50   
 
Even a passing acquaintance with the literature of conflict resolution reveals the 
extent to which it is founded, in the broadest possible sense, on understandings of how 
human beings behave whether at the personal or global level: whether the focus of 
discussion is an international treaty, trying to help an aid convoy pass a roadblock manned 
by drunken militia, or an academic analysis of structural conflict in some corner of a war-
torn country half a world away.  So it is right that the other two literatures considered here 
 
50 For a useful overview see Bang, A 2016, ‘The Restorative and Transformative Power of the Arts in 
Conflict Resolution’, Journal of Transformative Education, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 355–376. See also Michelle 
LeBaron’s essay ‘Creating Shifts: Using Arts in Conflicts with Religious Dimensions’ in Religion in Conflict 
Transformation (Politorbis no. 52, pp. 53-8, Center for Security Studies, Zurich, 2011) and her work with 
Emily Beausoleil where the arts and neuroscience are brought together in the quest for radical 
transformation: Beausoleil, E & LeBaron, M 2013, ‘What moves us: Dance and neuroscience implications 
for conflict approaches’, Conflict Resolution Quarterly, vol. 31, pp. 133–158; and also Acland, A, LeBaron, 
M & Macleod, C (eds.) The Choreography of Resolution: Conflict, Movement and Neuroscience (2013). 
Other literature that contributes to this aspect of the conflict resolution field includes Cynthia Cohen’s essay 
‘Creative approaches to reconciliation’ in Fitzduff, M and Stout, C Fitzduff, M and Stout, C, The Psychology 
of Resolving Global Conflicts: Group and social factors, Praeger, Westport, pp. 70-89; Coleman, P and 
Deutsch, M 2014, ‘Some guidelines for developing a creative approach to conflict’ in Coleman, P, Deutsch, 
M and Marcus, E, Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, pp. 
478-489; and Craig Zelizer’s fascinating 2003 article ‘The role of artistic processes in peacebuilding in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’, (Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, vol. 10, pp. 62-75) on the role of artistic 




are first, that of the psychology of religion to provide some brief background and context, 
and then that of psychodynamic psychology to explore possible explanations of religious 
hatred beyond those currently provided by scholars of the other two.  
 
The psychology of religion  
 
It can be argued that the literature of conflict resolution is in many ways a 
psychological literature in that both conflict analysis and the study of methods for 
intervention rely to a great extent on an understanding of the psychology of conflict.  Most 
scholar-practitioners in the conflict field have at least a lay appreciation of behavioural 
psychology – having some understanding of conflict behaviour is essential for praxis – but 
this counts for little when faced with the complexities of religion.  Moreover, the first thing 
lay practitioners realise on approaching the psychology of religion, with perhaps the names 
of Freud and Jung at the head of their list, is that the contributions of the founders of 
psychoanalysis and analytical psychology are often not counted in the mainstream of 
psychology of religion scholarship (Stausberg 2013).  While such omissions reflect 
divisions among scholars not only as to what is to be included in the canon of the 
psychology of religion, but also where the lines between the psychology, anthropology and 
sociology of religion, to name but a few of the possible sub-sets, should be drawn, some 
recent texts provide a foundational but not comprehensive grip on the subject.  Among 
these are Hood, Hill and Spilka’s The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach 
(2018); Paloutzian and Park’s Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 
(2005 and 2013); Argyle’s Psychology and Religion: An Introduction (2000); and 
Loewenthal’s The Psychology of Religion: An Introduction (2000).  These texts provide an 
introduction to the many subjects within the field, and also to the importance of 
recognising where the authors’ interests lie, ranging from Argyle’s broadly sympathetic 
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view of religion, through Paloutzian’s emphasis on methodology and research to 
Loewenthal’s determination to look beyond Christianity to Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism 
and new religious movements.   
 
 It becomes apparent that the study of the psychology of religion assumes some 
familiarity with both religion and psychology.   For example, Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi’s, 
The Psychology of Religious Behaviour, Belief and Experience (1997) illuminates the 
relationships between what people believe and how they behave.  Similarly, Seul’s 1999 
essay ‘'Ours Is the Way of God': Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict’ (Journal of 
Peace Research, vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 553-569) provides useful insights into the relationship 
between group identity and religious conflict, and Teehan’s In the Name of God: The 
Evolutionary Origins of Religious Ethics and Violence (2010) puts sacred values into the 
context provided by evolutionary and cognitive psychology.  John Teehan, Associate 
Professor of Religion at Hofstra University in New York, provides a concise starting point 
in saying that evolution has designed the human mind in such a way that it possesses a set 
of mental tools that shape religions and moralities.  Moreover, and more specifically, he 
argues that religious traditions are cultural expressions of underlying cognitive and 
emotional pre-dispositions that are themselves the products of evolutionary processes 
(Teehan 2010, p. 4).  One of the contentions that flows from this is particularly germane to 
the problem of religious hatred, namely that the same processes that generate the pro-
social, constructive morality found in religion are also those that generate prejudice and 
violence.  Following this argument, it is not then a question of whether religion, or any 
particular religion, is peace loving or violent; Teehan argues that they are all both, 
inherently.   
 
The main thrust of the evolutionary psychology of religion is that religion developed 
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because it conveyed some sort of evolutionary advantage, probably by encouraging 
cooperation among individuals and communities, despite the costs associated with 
religious practices such as ritual, sacrifice and celibacy.  The cognitive evolutionary 
approach also raises as many questions as it answers when it comes to the idea of religious 
consciousness, from Stephen Jay Gould’s idea that religion is an exaption or spandrel51 to 
Pascal Boyer’s in Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought 
(2001) that religion is essentially a mental capacity that has supported a number of human 
tendencies that are evolutionarily advantageous.  Boyer’s work, though important in its 
own right, arguably ignores most of the work done in the behavioural study of religion and 
to this extent is of limited value when it comes to a phenomenon such as religious hatred 
other than to see it as a mechanism for strengthening the resolve or the solidarity of one 
individual or one community against another.52  It does little to explain why modern and 
relatively sophisticated individuals can succumb to such a crude emotion, and inevitably, 
when its scope is exhausted, the temptation for the scholar is to revisit behavioural 
explanations.53  Nevertheless, the work of scholars in evolutionary biology, cognitive 
psychology, anthropology and, to some extent, neurotheology has resulted in the 
development of a new cognitive science of religion which has, over the last twenty years or 
so complemented – some might say overtaken – the psychology of religion as it developed 
 
51 Gould, SJ 1991, ‘Exaptation: a crucial tool for an evolutionary psychology’, Journal of Social Issues, 
vol. 4, pp. 43–65. 
52 For a contemporary review of the cognitive science of religion see Martin, L and Wiebe, D (eds.) 2019, 
Religion Explained?  The Cognitive Science of Religion after Twenty-five Years, Bloomsbury Academic, 
London. 
53 With regard to this Steven Reiss published, shortly before his death in 2016, The 16 Strivings for God 
(Mercer University Press, Macon) which claims to be the first comprehensive theory in the psychology of 
religion that has been peer-reviewed and scientifically verified.  In it Reiss sets out the theory that people’s 
religious beliefs and experiences are motivated by the need to satisfy certain particular personal needs that 
are deeply rooted in human nature.  While some of these are predictable, such as acceptance (the desire for 
positive self-regard), power (the desire for influence or leadership) and tranquillity (the desire for safety), 
others are perhaps less obvious: such as order (the desire for structure), curiosity (the desire for 
understanding) and saving (the desire to collect) (Reiss 2016, pp. 17-8). While such a theory sounds prosaic 
compared with those of others in the field it may have the advantage of being more securely evidence-based, 
though it is still too soon to know the ultimate reception of Reiss’s theories among scholars or whether his 
notions of religious motivation can also explain some aspects of religious hatred. 
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for most of the 20th century.  The work of cognitive anthropologists such as Scott Atran’s 
In Gods We Trust (2002) and Ara Norenzayan’s Big Gods: How Religion Transformed 
Cooperation and Conflict (2015) argue that religion is either a cultural by-product of 
various evolutionary adaptations or a cognitive by-product of parts of the human mind that 
evolved for other purposes.   
 
As a contemporary approach that prides itself on evidence-based analysis, the 
cognitive evolutionary approach may appeal to both scholars and practitioners in the 
conflict field who would otherwise have little interest in religion either because they 
underrate its significance despite the fact that 84% of the world’s population is religiously 
affiliated,54 or because they have little interest in theoretical accounts of religion if they are 
not evidence-based.  Secondly, it provides a counterpoint to other approaches, highlighting 
how the same subject matter can be understood and interpreted from different directions.  
Thirdly, the cognitive evolutionary approach may develop in such a way that it commands 
intellectual respect further into the future, so appealing to future generations of scholars 
and practitioners.  The question for this dissertation has been whether the current state of 
cognitive evolutionary research can provide reliable insights into religious hatred.  The 
conclusion here, on balance, is that while it provides many insights into, especially, 
religious experience,55 it does not at present contribute as much specifically to the subject 
of religious hatred as the psychodynamic approach.  
 
 While this more recent approach to the psychology of religion has provided some 
 
54 The Changing Global Religious Landscape, Pew Research Center 2017. 
55 As McNamara says, “Religious experiences are among the most powerful experiences that human beings 
can have. They can produce both awe-inspiring saintliness and horror inspiring maliciousness. They can elicit 
the most profound pouring out of the Self for others in some people and the most abject self-absorption in 




immediate background and context for this dissertation, the pioneering literature in this 
field, such as Edwin Starbuck’s The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Study of the 
Growth of Religious Consciousness, (1899),56  William James’s The Varieties of Religious 
Experience (1902) and James Leuba’s The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion 
(1909) have also provided some underpinning.   James’s approach, which can be regarded 
as primarily phenomenological, resonates with the spirit of this dissertation when, for 
example, it defines religion as “the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in 
their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they 
may consider the divine” (James 1902, pp. 31–2), and in his insistence that the term 
‘divine’ be interpreted very broadly and that it is futile to make the definitions of religion 
and divinity too precise.  He was similarly critical of the clerical tendency to want to over-
rationalize transcendent experience and to reduce the sense of presence, familiar from 
mystical literature, to abstractions.  This contains an important reminder for scholars and 
practitioners: that rational argument provides little competition for religious experience and 
perception.57  Beyond this, James’s division of religion into that of the ‘healthy-mind’ and 
the ‘sick soul’ has possible relevance to the origins of religious hatred; this is considered in 
more depth in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
 
Overall, psychology of religion literature provides a useful context from which to 
consider religious hatred, and combined with the insights of religious studies scholars such 
 
56 Starbuck’s book was the first to use the term “the psychology of religion” (Main 2008). 
57 Although William James is generally recognised as one of the most significant figures in the establishment 
of the psychology of religion Dittes (1973) comments that he “is revered in the first chapter of a textbook and 
then ignored in the substance of the book”, adding that his “psychology is not employed by the field, and, far 
more importantly, his spirit does not inspire it”. While it can be argued that James’s research methods would 
not pass modern scrutiny, perhaps his chief importance lies in his willingness to describe personal religious 
experience without succumbing to the temptation to explore whether or not what people believe is true, his 
interest being in what and how they experience faith, the nature of its effect on their lives, and the wider 
consequences for them and those around them.  His impact is also discernible, albeit perhaps less explicitly 
acknowledged, on the evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists who have brought new understandings 
of religion over the past twenty years. 
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as Ninian Smart (1969) and sociologists such as Linda Woodhead (2010), has helped to 
identify  the structures and dimensions of religion which provide, in Part 3 of this 
dissertation, the framework within which to build theories of how and why religious hatred 




This section begins with a brief definition of psychodynamic psychology and an 
explanation of why it has been chosen to explore this branch of psychology as a means of 
better understanding religious hatred.  It would be perfectly reasonable to take a largely 
social psychological approach to hatred.  Evan Harrington (2004), for example, provides a 
useful overview of how the subject of hatred has been studied by social psychology 
researchers investigating issues such as prejudice, ethnocentrism, intergroup hostility and 
aggressive behaviour.60  Harrington concludes by saying that while hatred per se has not 
 
58 This summary of the psychology of religion excludes neurotheology: the attempt to explain religious 
experience and behaviour in neuroscientific terms.  Advocates of neurotheological approaches to religion 
such as McNamara, P 2009, The Neuroscience of Religious Experience, (Cambridge University Press); 
Kisak, P (ed.) 2016, Neurotheology, (CreateSpace); Newburg, A 2010, Principles of Neurotheology, 
(Routledge, London); and Persinger, M 1987, Neuropsychological Bases of God Beliefs, (Praeger, New 
York), argue that there is a neurological as well as evolutionary basis for religious experience.  The 
explanation and interrogation of neuroscientific approaches merits an entire dissertation in itself, though their 
current stances are still somewhat tentative and the evidence in support of them is arguably less than 
conclusive (see for example critiques such as Schjoedt, U 2011, ‘The neural correlates of religious 
experience’ in Religion, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 91-5).  
59 ‘Psychodynamic psychology’ is used in this dissertation as shorthand to include descriptors such as ‘depth 
psychological’, ‘humanistic’, ‘transpersonal’, ‘existential’ and ‘phenomenological’ as well as 
‘psychoanalysis’ and ‘analytical psychology’: i.e. an approach to psychology that explores the psychological 
forces, especially the unconscious ones, that are perceived to underlie human feelings and emotions and 
consequently behaviour. 
60 Harrington, E 2004, ‘The Social Psychology of Hatred’, Journal of Hate Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 49-82.  
Harrington identifies at least three major independent approaches: the social-political attitudes perspective 
based on the seminal work of Adorno et al., (The Authoritarian Personality 1950) and more recently of 
Altemeyer (Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-wing Authoritarianism 1988 and The Authoritarian 
Specter 1998); the social influence perspective which looks at how the presence of others can change the 
behaviour of individuals and groups as exemplified in theories such as diffusion of responsibility (Latane, 
The Unresponsive Bystander 1970), obedience to authority (Milgram et al., ‘Collective Behavior: Crowds 
and Social Movements’ in The Handbook of Social Psychology (1968), the power of social roles (e.g. 
Zimbardo, A Situationist Perspective on the ‘Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good People are 
Transformed into Perpetrators’ in The Social Psychology of Good and Evil 2004 edition; and the power of 
example (Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence 1989). The third 
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been a focus of research in social psychology, aspects of hate have been studied 
extensively by researchers in different branches of social psychology.  It is also fair to say 
that such researchers, while largely secular in their focus, have paid some attention to 
religious hatred.61   It would also be reasonable to focus on and document religious hatred 
purely as a cognitive process, examining how, for example, anti-semitism has been used 
throughout history, or how more recently religious identity was deliberately used to whip 
up nationalist feeling in former Yugoslavia; there is no lack of evidence in connection with 
either.   
 
The focus of this dissertation on religious hatred, however, concerns not how groups 
or even whole communities and nations can be lead, coerced or manipulated into religious 
hatred, but how and why individuals, and by extension communities, who profess a 
religious faith, can apparently abandon its tenets and accompanying values in their need, 
desire or willingness to indulge in an emotional intensity of hatred for others who espouse 
no faith, a different faith or even the same faith in a different way.  This requires the more 
profound understanding of individuals that psychodynamic psychology provides.  It can 
reach beyond the rational and the conscious, looking for reasons for hatred outside of 
current awareness.  It can pursue phenomenological approaches to religious experience 
which examine the particulars of individuals’ thinking and feeling.  Psychodynamic 
psychology also has an appreciation of ultimacy that it shares with many forms of religion 
(Emmons 1999 and 2005; Schlauch 2006; Hoffman et al, 2015 and 2019), and it is perhaps 
 
approach is the social cognition approach which has explored bias and preference within groups (e.g. 
Bettencourt et al, 2001, ‘Status Differences and In-Group Bias’ in Psychological Bulletin, vol. 127, no. 4, pp. 
520-542). 
61 Obedience to authority, for example, has been studied as an aspect of hate in a number of religious groups, 
among them the Mormons (Sasse and Widder 1991), Hare Krishna (Hubner and Gruson 1988), Branch 
Davidians (Robbins and Post 1997) and Aum Shinrikyo (Juergensmeyer 2000).  There is also evidence that 
obedience to authority plays a role in some Islamic religious factions where followers are willing to sacrifice 
themselves (Juergensmeyer 2000).  
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this which gives it a particular resonance for those perceiving some correspondence 
between ultimacy and religious hatred.62  There is one final and perhaps particularly 
significant reason for seeking to understand religious hatred through lenses that focus on 
interiority.  Scholar-practitioners in the conflict field recognise that the strong feelings that 
accompany conflict often stem from unresolved internal conflict, and this applies whether 
a protagonist is an individual, a community, an organisation or sometimes even a nation: 
internal tensions spill over and find expression in external aggression.  Intra-personal, 
intra-communal or intra-national tensions often need to be addressed, reduced or if 
possible resolved before progress can be made with the aggression and conflict that can be 
the consequences (Bowker 2008, p. 52). Where religious hatred grows out of such internal 
tensions it is essential that its origins, conscious and unconscious, are thoroughly 
understood.  It is the contention of this dissertation that psychodynamic approaches to 
religious hatred provide a much-needed complement to social-psychological approaches. 
 
Jarvis (2004, p. 2-3) identifies five characteristics of psychodynamic approaches to 
psychological phenomena: “the continuity between childhood and adult experience”; “the 
significance of early relationships”; “the primacy of affect” (original emphasis) in contrast 
to behavioural psychology’s focus on observable behaviour and cognitive psychology’s on 
thinking and reasoning; “the psychological significance of subjective experience”, 
including fantasy and sense of identity; and “the influence of the unconscious mind”.  It is 
the latter three which are particularly relevant to a psychodynamic approach to religious 
hatred.  While the insights provided into all these by psychodynamic psychology are likely 
 
62 ‘Ultimacy’ in this dissertation implies the approach of Tillich (1957).  For recent discussions of ultimacy in 
the philosophy of religion see for example Neville, R 2018, ‘Philosophy of religion and the big questions’,  
Palgrave Communications, vol. 4, no. 126 and Draper, P and Schellenberg, J (eds.) 2017, Renewing 





to be of value, the question has always arisen, not least among scholar-practitioners, about 
the reliability of such insights and the need for empirical evidence in support of them.  This 
question is becoming less pertinent, however, with the gradual accumulation of empirical 
evidence that provides a testing of psychodynamic theory, exemplified by books such as 
Morris Eagle’s Core Concepts in Classical Psychoanalysis and its companion volume 
Core Concepts in Contemporary Psychoanalysis (both 2018) and similarly rigorous 
publications such as Roth and Fonagy’s What Works for Whom? (2005), and Fonagy et 
al’s  ‘Theoretical and empirical foundations of contemporary psychodynamic 
approaches’ in Luyten et al’s Handbook of psychodynamic approaches to psychopathology 
(2015, pp. 3–26).  This latter essay sets out to demonstrate “not only that psychoanalytic 
concepts can be tested empirically, but also that solid evidence supports many 
psychoanalytic assumptions” (ibid., p. 4), and cites the many studies that support this 
contention.  This reflects the awareness within psychoanalytic circles of the need for such 
evidence, and also of two parallel and complementary cultures: one that is qualitative and 
interpretive, emphasising meaning and purpose in human behaviour based on traditional 
case study methods, and the other using methods from the natural and social sciences that 
seek explanations for cause and effect based on probabilistic data analysis models (ibid., p. 
5).  The evidence discussed in this essay provides support for a number of ideas used in 
this dissertation to explore religious hatred, such as the importance of unconscious 
motivation, defence mechanisms, the ubiquity of transference,63 the complexity of 
psychological functioning and the need to focus on people’s inner worlds.   
 
 While the original thinking of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and Carl Jung (1875-
1961) has been developed and in some aspects superseded by that of their followers, it is 
 
63 ‘Transference’ describes the process whereby “social interactions in any context…. are filtered through 
internalised schemas of past relationships” (Fonagy et al, 2015, p. 11). 
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still arguably Jung and Freud who provide the chief groundwork for attitudes to 
psychodynamic psychology and religion.64  Freud provided psychodynamic perspectives 
on religion in five of his works (‘Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices’ (1907), Totem 
and Taboo (1913), The Future of an Illusion (1927), Civilization and Its Discontents 
(1930), and Moses and Monotheism (1939), all of them relying on anthropological texts 
and an approach that “is decidedly interpretive rather than empirical” (Main 2008).  
Building on the work of James and Leuba, Freud applied his psychoanalytic methodology 
to the psychology of religion in a way that sealed the seriousness both of the subject and of 
a scientific method of studying it, meaning that he was bound to be listened to even when 
his conclusions were, for many, deeply shocking.  Central to Freud’s thesis is that 
civilization is built upon the rejection of instinctual behaviour, causing all manner of 
neuroses, and that religion is both a means to impose the behavioural norms that society 
demands and a means of compensating the human animal for the instinctual desire 
sacrificed in the process. While Freud acknowledged the importance of religion in human 
development as a way of overcoming aggression and helping human beings to come to 
terms with the internal pressures of our instinctive lives, he argued that this has been at the 
costs of guilt and neurosis and of living with an illusion that keeps us in a state of 
dependence.  Despite the fact that Freud’s psychology of religion has been widely 
criticised it remains influential in general culture, albeit not always in its specifics, and it 
does provide some insights into how, for example, unconscious psychological processes 
such as projection and sublimation may act.  While Freud was personally atheistic, he was 
not, contrary to what many believe, entirely hostile to the idea of religion: he recognised its 
cultural importance and in his clinical writings he actively promoted a position of 
 
64 Though it was the French psychologist Pierre Janet (1859-1947) who ‘discovered’ the unconscious and 
who made particular studies of religion and religious phenomena, and the Swiss philosopher and 
psychologist Théodore Flournoy (1854-1920) who influenced both William James and Jung with his 
insistence that religion should be studied objectively and religious experience empathetically.   
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‘benevolent neutrality’ towards religious issues (Corveleyn 2000).65   His followers were 
divided on the subject.  Zilboorg, Erikson, Fromm and Loewald, for example, explicitly 
rejected Freud’s view that religion is “illusionary, delusionary, infantile and neurotic”66 
(Black 2006, p. 25), though this remained the dominant view until about the mid-1980s 
when the work of scholars such as Rizzuto’s The Birth of the Living God (1979), Eigen’s 
The Psychoanalytic Mystic (1998), Kakar’s The Analyst and the Mystic (1991), Spezzano 
and Gargiulko’s Soul on the Couch (1997), and Jones’s Terror and Transformation (2002) 
showed a new interest in the relationship between psychoanalysis and religion and more 
nuanced appreciations of Freud’s views on religion. 
 
It is fair to say that Carl Jung’s relationship to religion was very much more positive, 
especially in Modern Man in Search of a Soul (1933) and Psychology and Religion: West 
and East (1938), and he regarded the establishment of a ‘religious’ outlook on life as being 
fundamental to the achievement of what he called ‘individuation’: a person’s successful 
integration of the disparate conscious and unconscious elements of their life into a 
 
65 Numerous scholars have attempted to explain Freud’s antipathy to religion, with many blaming this on 
early failures of relationship with his parents, particularly his mother (for example Jones, 1955; Gedo, 1968; 
Harrison, 1979; Rizzuto, 1998).  Ryan LaMothe (2004) argues that the presence of envy, caused by these 
failures depriving Freud of a capacity for ‘oceanic’ feelings, has been overlooked in Freud’s views on 
religion.  
66 Freud says of the psychic origin of religious ideas: “These….are not precipitates of experience or end-
results of thinking: they are illusions, fulfilments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind. 
The secret of their strength lies in the strength of those wishes. As we already know, the terrifying impression 
of helplessness in childhood aroused the need for protection -- for protection through love -- which was 
provided by the father; and the recognition that this helplessness lasts throughout life made it necessary to 
cling to the existence of a father, but this time a more powerful one. Thus , the benevolent rule of a divine 
providence allays our fears of the dangers of life…. And the prolongation of earthly existence in a future life 
provides the local and temporal framework in which these wish-fulfilments shall take place” (Freud 1961, p. 
30). Freud is careful to explain at this point the subtle difference between “illusion” and “delusion”, and this 
is something that scholar practitioners in conflict need to pay attention to.  Whereas a delusion is based on 
fantasy and the flight from reality, illusion is the manifestation of desires so powerful that it overcomes 
individuals’ and societies’ need to create a transcendent reality: something that can so outrun the limitations 
of human conception that it is not subject to the ordinary demands of credibility.  It is arguably the power and 
positive importance of illusion that has inspired generations of thinkers to create semantic constructions in 
defence of ideas that no amount of wordplay can render convincing to someone who does not share the need 
or desire for the illusion. 
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meaningful whole.67 In fact, he went so far as to say that he had never encountered a 
patient in the second half of life whose problems were not, at base, their failure to achieve 
such a reconciliation (Jung 1933, p. 234).68  Furthermore, his concept of the ‘collective 
unconscious’69 as a means by which archetypal stories and their associations are 
transmitted across generations to nurture patterns of belief and behaviour that are then 
played out in real life can be seen as the forerunner of Kimbles’ and Singer’s idea of the 
cultural complex in The Cultural Complex: Contemporary Jungian Perspectives on Psyche 
and Society (2004) which, this dissertation argues, provides one of the most potent 
explanations of religious hatred.  Jung’s concepts of the complex,70 the shadow71 and the 
transcendent function72 are also particularly relevant in relation to religious hatred.  All are 
 
67 While the term ‘individuation’ has been used similarly by people as diverse as Empedocles, Nietzsche and 
Schopenhauer, it is commonly attributed to Jung and defined as the process of differentiation from the 
general collective psychology and the norms and the values of the society in which the individual is 
immersed (Jung, C.G. Psychological Types, CW6, para. 757). Jung saw the human psyche as divided by 
unconscious polarities such as light and dark, good and evil, and life and death, with a tendency to identify 
more with one pole than another, and to project the suppressed pole onto others.  The antidote to this is the 
individuation process which makes us aware of such polarities and enables us to build a new archetype, the 
self, where these unconscious forces are balanced and reconciled to create a new wholeness. 
68 It was this which crystallised the differences between Freud and Jung.  For the former religion was a 
symptom of psychological disease; for the latter, it was the absence of religion that underlay all adult 
psychological illnesses, including addictions, and his life’s work was the search for a psychology that would 
explain and treat the diseases of the human soul in a time when traditional religions could no longer play this 
role (White 1952, p. 47). 
69 Jung used comparative mythological and etymological material to analyse the psychological dynamics 
behind religious phenomena, arguing that the images contained in mythology and theology provided a 
psychic system which was inherited in the same way as physical characteristics.   
70 A complex is a collection of unconscious images and ideas accompanied by particular feelings which, 
when activated, affect behaviour. The idea of the complex became an increasingly important part of Jung’s 
psychology when he suggested that at the core of complexes are what he termed ‘archetypes’, inherited and 
universal patterns of experience that comprise what he called the ‘collective unconscious’  to distinguish it 
from the personal unconscious of Freudian thinking.   
71 The shadow is the inferior being in every person, the Mr Hyde to every Dr Jekyll, the qualities and 
impulses that a person denies but can see clearly in other people.  The shadow is the most powerful and 
dangerous of archetypes (primordial psychic patterns) not only in that it can enable activities that 
consciousness, and conscience, would not condone, but in that efforts to suppress it can also suppress 
creativity, spontaneity and the strong emotions that underlie character and personality, leaving people 
appearing and feeling shallow and spiritless (Jung 1964, pp. 168-170).   Efforts to repress the shadow also 
encourage and strengthen it: Jung hypothesized that one of the reasons for the atrocities committed in the 
name of religion is that religion has a tendency to suppress the shadow, causing its dark propensities to 
intensify and strike back (ibid.). 
72 The transcendent function is what enables the process of finding meaning, balance and wholeness beyond 
the divisions and limitations of everyday life, uniting the opposites of conscious and unconscious in ways 
that effect a psychological shift in attitude.  It is called ‘transcendent’ because it makes the transition from 
one attitude to another organically possible and brings the conscious and unconscious into a new relationship 
(Jung 1916, p. 279).  This shift in attitude may result in changes in the personality, a new approach to life, a 
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discussed at length elsewhere in this dissertation, drawing on material from, for example, 
Dieckman’s Complexes: Diagnosis and Therapy in Analytical Psychology (1991); Meeting 
the Shadow (1991), a collection of essays by, among others, Jung himself, Robert Bly, 
Joseph Campbell, James Hillman and Marie-Louise von Franz; and Jeffrey Miller’s The 
Transcendent Function, (2004). 
 
There are three reasons for putting Jung’s work at the heart of psychodynamic 
discussion in this dissertation: his profound knowledge and understanding of religion as 
central to human experience; his willingness to explore the problem of evil as a human, 
eschatological and soteriological problem; and his identification of enantiodromia and 
“epiphany” (in the psychological sense) as crucial processes in the transcending of human 
hatreds.73 The inclusion of Jung in any scholarly work, however, has in recent years been 
called into question and needs to be defended.  There are five main grounds on which the 
academy has neglected and even shunned Jung.  First, his reputation has been tainted by 
the nature of his relationships with some of his female patients; this is undoubtedly 
justified.  Secondly, he has been accused of anti-Semitism and, thirdly, support for the 
Nazi regime in Germany in the 1930s.  The second is arguable (Samuels 1990); the third 
unjust and in fact the reverse of the truth (Samuels 1992; Bair 2004, pp. 213-23).   The 
fourth accusation against Jung is that he was more mystic than scientist. Many of his 
followers would argue that this is because Jung understood religion from the inside rather 
than being an objective outsider.74  Jung himself deplored what he saw as a caricature of 
 
religious epiphany or even a new identity; this makes the transcendent function vital to resolving the deeper 
differences that underpin cultural or religious conflict.    
73 It is important to emphasise that “epiphany” as used in this dissertation refers to processes of sudden 
realisation which may or may not have a religious constituent, but whether positive or negative in character 
have a profound effect on an individual’s thinking, feeling and way of life.  
74 Jung was the son of a Swiss Reformed pastor and used his Christian background to illuminate the 
psychological roots of all religions. Jung believed religion was a profound psychological response to the 
unknown - both the inner self and the outer worlds - and he understood Christianity as a meditation on the 
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his work and regularly protested, not least at the beginning of the Terry Lectures at Yale 
University upon which his Psychology and Religion (1938) was based, that 
“Notwithstanding the fact that I have often been called a philosopher, I am an empiricist 
and adhere to the phenomenological standpoint” (ibid., p. 1).  Nevertheless, the nature and 
opacity of some of Jung’s writings lends itself to the accusation of mysticism rather than 
science, and this accusation will remain until his work is more generally reassessed, as 
commentaries by prominent contemporary psychologists such as Andrew Samuels and 
Jean Knox demonstrate.75 76  The fifth objection to Jung being taken seriously in the 
academy may stem from the publication of Memories, Dreams, Reflections, first published 
in 1963 as his ‘autobiography’, and widely read and perceived as a definitive statement of 
his work.  In fact Jung never saw nor approved the final manuscript, and the manuscripts 
he did see were considerably edited after his death (Shamdasani 2003, p. 23).  In addition 
to these five main grounds there is a sixth: Jung’s most pervasive presence outside the 
therapeutic world, often unacknowledged, has been through the medium of the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), a psychometric test widely used in the business world and 
based supposedly on Jung’s Psychological Types (1921).   Contemporary psychologists are 
inclined to regard MBTI as problematic at best and pseudo-science at worst (see for 
 
meaning of the life of Jesus of Nazareth within the context of Hebrew spirituality and the Biblical worldview. 
Jung’s work is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
75 The accusation that Jung was a mystic deserves closer examination. Smyers (2002) argues that it has three 
possible meanings as regards Jung.  First, if it means “a state of consciousness that surpasses ordinary 
experience through the union with a transcendent reality” (Dupre 1987, p. 246) then Jung can be regarded as 
a mystic though he himself defined mystical experience as an “experience of the archetypes” (Jung 1968, p. 
110) rather than of some external ontological reality.  Secondly, “mystic” is a pejorative term used by 
rationalists to describe what they are not and to label Jung, because of what he studied and how he did it, as 
Other to the world of science and rationality. Assigning this label has worked as a kind of taboo to prevent 
people reading Jung’s work and drawing their own conclusions. The third use of “mystic” to describe Jung is 
because his subject matter includes worldviews that can account for phenomena that cannot be explained by 
the mechanistic Newtonian worldview of contemporary Western intellectuals (though may be by recent 
discoveries in quantum physics). Jung’s investigations of religious phenomena persuaded him that there are 
powerful psychic forces that operate in humans which have been projected outwards as gods and spiritual 
beings. This reflects the contrast with Durkheim (1976) for whom God is a projection of the experience of 
society whereas for Jung God is the projection of an internal psychological experience. 
76 See for example Knox, J 2003, Archetype, Attachment, Analysis: Jungian Psychology and the Emergent 
Mind, Routledge, London; Samuels, S 2017, ‘The future of Jungian analysis: strengths, weaknesses 
opportunities, threats’, Journal of Analytical Psychology, vol. 62, no. 5, pp. 636-649. 
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example Hunsley et al 2004); it has done nothing to increase Jung’s reputation in the 
academy. 
 
What might rehabilitate Jung?  His exclusion from the academy has presumably 
meant that fewer scholars have become closely acquainted with the 20 volumes of his 
Collected Works or the same expanse of ancillary writings, nor perhaps with the 
development of contemporary post-Jungian thought (Abramovitch and Kirmayer 2003).  
Sonu Shamdasani and James Hillman argue in Lament of the Dead: Psychology after 
Jung’s Red Book (2013) that the process of reassessment has already begun with the long-
awaited publication, in 2012, of Jung’s Red Book.77  It has been asserted (Shamdasani 
2003, p. 25) that this  “foundational text” for analytical psychology will reduce some of the 
hostility to Jung and his thinking once it has been more widely read, understood and 
appreciated, though this probably overestimates the impact of what is by any measure an 
arcane and obscure text.  It is more likely that Jung’s work will be reassessed because of 
his influence in three arenas: his influence on contemporary religion particularly for people 
looking for a framework for understanding and the spiritual dimension of human 
experience (e.g. Palmer 2003; Tacey 2013); on cultural commentary more generally when 
secular humanism and rationalism fall short (e.g. Hauke 2000; Abramovitch and Kirmayer 
2003); and, perhaps, on social and political activism where conventional politics is 
perceived as limited in its response to current social and political challenges such as 
climate change and social injustice (Kiehl, Saban and Samuels 2016).78   Having said this, 
 
77 Jung’s Red Book or Liber Novus is a calligraphic manuscript created by Jung between 1915 and 1930.  It 
details Jung’s experiments with his own psyche and since it first became available for study in 2009 is 
increasingly recognised as being central to the full understanding of his work.  The Black Books of C.G. Jung 
(1913-1932), also edited by Sonu Shamdasani and published in October 2020, sheds further light on Jung’s 
methods and experience. 
78 It is also possible, although perhaps less likely, that his work on synchronicity with the physicist Wolfgang 
Pauli will eventually be vindicated as the quantum world gives up more of its secrets. See Jung, CG 1952, 
Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle, Collected Works Vol. 8; also Donati, M 2004, ‘Beyond 
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and while valuing the elements of Jung’s work used in this dissertation, it is unlikely there 
will be a wholesale acceptance of his legacy: parts of it, and his explanations of them, may 
be too inaccessible to many modern minds.  There is also the question of whether Jung’s 
analytical work stands up to scientific and empirical examination.79  Jung himself was 
quite clear that it did, based as it was on his extensive clinical work, and analytical 
psychologists are prepared to argue that Jung’s ideas, on dreaming for example, have stood 
the test of time far better than Freud’s (Stevens 1993, p. 24).  But it is also true that the 
foundations of analytical psychology were based on intuition, self-analysis and a limited 
patient demographic, allied with far-reaching explorations of esoteric, mythological, 
alchemical and metaphysical literatures.80  Nevertheless, in the strict etymological sense an 
empiricist is “someone who relies on direct seeing and inner experience while rejecting all 
dogmatic theories” (Marciano 2019, pp. 235-256), and perhaps this is the sense in which 
Jung understood the empirical.  More recently Peter Kingsley’s Catafalque (2018) insists 
that Jung really should be treated as a Gnostic prophet, his understanding and interpretation 
of Jung differing markedly from that of most Jung scholars.81  While these differences do 
not affect the central but limited use of Jung’s work in this dissertation, they reinforce the 
need for a review of his legacy both within the academy and beyond. 
  
The reassessment of Jung’s work, and recognition of his importance for the 
 
synchronicity: the worldview of Carl Gustav Jung and Wolfgang Pauli’, Journal of Analytical Psychology, 
vol. 49, pp. 707-728. 
79 As Karen Smyers argues (2002) “Whether or not Jung is seen as “scientific” depends on one’s definition of 
science, but it is a fact that he constantly modified his models and terminology as his ideas changed based on 
evidence from his clinical practice and continuing study and travel, showing an empirical openness to 
evidence”.   Fordham (1960) and Fuller (1992) discuss Jung’s claim to empiricism.    
80 Jung had more to say about metaphysics than might be expected from most empirical investigators, and 
readily acknowledged the function of philosophy in calling attention to his assumptions, saying that one of 
Freud’s mistakes was to overlook the value of philosophical criticism. In fact Jung took a dim view of all 
philosophical and theological criticisms of his work on the grounds that only criticism from a scientific 
viewpoint was valid (Smith 1977). 
81 For a review of Catafalque which highlights these differences (and opens up whole new vistas of Jung’s 
work) see Marciano, M 2019, ‘Revisiting Jung and Corbin: A Review of Peter Kingsley’s Catafalque’, 
Dionysius, vol. 37, pp. 235-256. 
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understanding of religion and its darker aspects in this dissertation, has been aided by the 
work of scholar-practitioners in the field of analytical psychology.  An overview of post-
Jungian psychology is provided by Andrew Samuels’ Jung and the Post-Jungians (1985) 
and his views, and those of Freud, on religion by Michael Palmer’s Freud and Jung on 
Religion (1997).  The relationship between Jung and Freud, and their influence on each 
other, has also been increasingly scrutinised in recent years.  Ernst Falzeder (2020), for 
example, is clear that Jung’s theory was not “an offshoot from psychoanalysis” and that, on 
the contrary, Freud took more of his ideas from Jung than vice-versa.  Analytical 
psychology as a field continues to offer insights into religion and violence, in for example 
Terror, Violence and the Impulse to Destroy: Perspectives from Analytical Psychology, 
papers from the North American Conference of Jungian Analysts and Candidates edited by 
John Beebe (2002).  Lionel Corbett’s Psyche and the Sacred: Spirituality beyond Religion 
(2012) links individual interiority with religion and spirituality.  James Hillman, foremost 
among those who evolved the controversial school of archetypal psychology from Jung’s 
work,82 provides what is perhaps one of the profoundest studies of the psychology of war 
and conflict in his A Terrible Love of War (2004).  
 
The quest for psychodynamic insights into religious hatred has not been confined to 
Jungian literature and has involved re-visiting work by other psychologists who have fallen 
out of fashion.  For example, while Abraham Maslow is best known for his Hierarchy of 
Needs (1943),83 his work on human ‘self-actualisation’ and ‘peak experiences’ ( Maslow 
 
82 Since Jung’s death in 1961 three main schools of post-Jungian thought and training have emerged: the 
classical, which mostly follows Jung’s own thinking and reasoning; the developmental which blends ideas 
from Kleinian and other psychoanalytic theories of development; and the archetypal which follows a more 
postmodern, literary and semiotic model based on the pervasiveness of archetypal structures and the work of 
James Hillman (Abramovitch and Kirmayer 2003).  
83 Maslow, A 1943, ‘A theory of human motivation’, Psychological Review, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 370-396.  
Maslow has been criticised both for lack of scientific rigour, elitism and for bias towards Western cultures 
and values. This view is contested by some on the grounds that the pyramid frequently associated with 
Maslow’s needs theory, and which has provoked particular criticism, was neither suggested nor supported by 
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1964)84 provides some relevant background ideas.85  Although his hierarchy of needs is 
now disregarded86 by academic psychologists (Hoffman 1994), it does provide, for 
scholar-practitioners, an interesting albeit somewhat speculative link to human needs 
theory as articulated by scholars such as John Burton, one of the founders of the conflict 
resolution field whose work has also been subject to contemporary critique.87   The 
mention of Maslow reflects the overall stance of this dissertation in relation to Jung and to 
other psychologists from earlier days, such as Joseph Campbell and William James, whose 
work is sometimes viewed within the academy as having been overtaken by that of later 
scholars.  Psychodynamic psychology is always concerned with individual interiority, and 
it is arguably premature to reject ideas judged significant a hundred years ago because 
more recent ones have emerged, and rash to focus on refinements of theory rather than on 
original insights.    
 
Key texts on religious hatred  
 
The paucity of contemporary scholarly writing specifically on religious hatred by 
 
Maslow himself, and that later developments of his theory are increasingly progressive and nuanced (e.g. 
Sosteric & Ratkovic 2020). 
84 Maslow, AH 1964, Religions, Values and Peak Experiences, Viking Penguin, New York. 
85 It is Maslow’s work on what he called ‘peak experiences’ that may be significant for an understanding of 
some forms of religious hatred, though this needs further study.  For example, if it can be shown that such 
experiences are fundamentally important, albeit unconsciously, to a psychologically satisfying religious life, 
the failure to have such experiences may drive some people to stronger and more divisive forms of religion to 
try to generate such feelings. Maslow’s work on peak experiences may also be relevant to the work being 
done by scholar practitioners to explore the arts as media of intervention in conflict in the belief that they can 
influence human emotions in ways that more conventional forms of intervention may not.   
86 Yet it continues to resonate: see for example Rajasakran, T, Sinnappan, S & Sundara Raja, S 
2014 ‘Purushartha: Maslow’s Need Hierarchy Revisited’, The Anthropologist, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 199-203, 
which links Western concepts of motivation and the Hindu principles of purushartha (a Sanskrit word that 
can be translated as the ‘object of human pursuit’ or ‘goals of man’; the four purusharthas are dharma (moral 
duty), artha (economic prosperity), kama (love or pleasure) and moksha (spiritual liberation).  Discussing 
how Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and purusharta function as adaptive systems and exploring how spiritual 
connections and relatedness may improve understandings of motivation. 
87 See Burton, J (ed.) 1993, Conflict: Human Needs Theory, Macmillan, London and criticism in Park, L 
2010, ‘Opening the Black Box: Reconciling Needs Theory through Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory’, 
International Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1-26. 
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psychologists (Sternberg and Sternberg 2008, p. vii)88 has meant that research for this 
dissertation has involved exploration of many parallel subjects, case studies and sometimes 
texts which apparently have little immediate relevance in the quest for insights which can 
be developed and used as the grounds for further study.  There are a number of texts that 
have provided such insights that can fit under all or none of the literatures detailed above.  
This final section enumerates some that have proved particularly useful.  
 
The definition of hatred in general has generated a literature of its own over the 
centuries, and Robert Sternberg’s The Psychology of Hate (2005) provides a useful account 
of this history.  Putting this history into political and social context has been important: 
Nations under God: The Geopolitics of Faith in the Twenty-First Century (2015), a 
collection of essays by some thirty scholars from across the globe features insights and 
empirical research on the role that religions play in contemporary world affairs including 
case studies of some of this century’s most distressing convulsions. As a counterpoint to 
this Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature (2012) provides a more optimistic 
view of current violence in the world based on a thousand pages of empirical evidence.  
Meanwhile John Bowker’s edited collection Conflict and Reconciliation (2008) provides 
insights into religious hatred from scholars of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism and 
Christianity.  
 
On religious hatred itself, the scholar-practitioners of the psychotherapeutic world 
bring insights that combine the theoretical and practical.  For example the cognitive 
therapist Aaron Beck’s Prisoners of Hate (1999) provides valuable insights into the 
 
88 The Sternbergs say "psychology has offered up very few theories that deal explicitly with the subject of 
hate, which might result, in part, from the fact that there is no commonly accepted definition of hate” 




relationships between thinking processes and emotional and behavioural expressions of 
hatred, including domestic abuse, bigotry and genocide as well as many forms of political 
and religious conflict, including into the “collective narcissism” (p. 243) that can 
accompany many forms of religious observance and proselytising.  Similarly, Coline 
Covington’s Everyday Evils: A psychoanalytic view of evil and morality (2017) looks at 
the evils committed by ‘ordinary’ people in a range of different contexts, using concepts 
such as group behaviour, dissociation and trauma to argue that hatred and evil have a range 
of causes and are highly contextual.89  Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred 
(1997) by Robert Robins and Jerrold Post provides further insight into such contexts.  
Psychiatrist William Gaylin covers similar territory in Hatred: The Psychological Descent 
into Violence (2004) though with a greater focus on religious hatred while Rush Dozier’s 
Why We Hate (2002) provides scientific accounts of how hatred arises in the human 
nervous system.   These texts all serve as companions to Erich Fromm’s Anatomy of 
Human Destructiveness (1977), Joseph Berke’s The Tyranny of Malice (1989) and Ervin 
Staub’s The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (1989) 
which all probe, illuminate and illustrate the darker sides of human character and culture.90 
  
 
89 It is difficult, when exploring the subject of hatred, to avoid discussing concepts of evil which may give 
rise to it.  In doing so it pays to be mindful of, if not agree with, the late Susan Sontag’s point that “We have 
a sense of evil” but we no longer have “the religious or philosophical language to talk intelligently about 
evil” (quoted in Waller, J 2002, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 12)  
90 As counterpoints to such texts, whether or not they address directly the subject of religious hatred, there are 
more positive psychodynamic explorations of human spirituality, for example Lionel Corbett’s The Religious 
Function of the Psyche (1996) and Psyche and the Sacred (2012); Murray Stein’s Jung’s Map of the Soul 
(1998) and Larry Culliford’s The Psychology of Spirituality (2011) all provide insights into what a healthy 
spirituality might mean in terms of humankind’s everyday interior functioning.  
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PART 2: UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS HATRED 
 
Chapter 3: Cognitive approaches to religious hatred 
 
Introduction   
 
Part 2 of this dissertation examines two approaches to religious hatred.  This first 
chapter looks at cognitive approaches to religious hatred: approaches that depend on an 
analysis of what is immediately apparent, using the scholarship of anthropologists, social 
scientists and cognitive and evolutionary psychologists to explore what has been written 
about hatred in general and to tease out how this may apply to religious hatred in 
particular.  The following chapter looks at how psychodynamic psychology has understood 
religious hatred and how it may live in the unseen, unconscious areas of the human and 
cultural psyche.91  
 
When Byron wrote in Canto XIII of Don Juan that “.... hatred is by far the longest 
pleasure/ Men love in haste but they detest at leisure” he highlighted two aspects of hatred. 
First, that hatred is a complex emotion and sometimes more than just an extreme 
manifestation or consequence of rage or anger, as it is sometimes portrayed.  Secondly, 
that hatred is not generally something that can arise and subside quickly, again like anger: 
it is more often something planted in fertile psychic soil, nurtured and cultivated over time, 
and ripening when circumstances dictate or allow.  If this is true of hatred generally, then it 
is perhaps true even more of hatred fermented in the timelessness of much religion.  The 
 
91 Choosing to focus on cognitive and psychodynamic approaches to religious hatred alone may be perceived 
as overly restrictive by those who believe that religious hatred amounts to a form of mental disorder. For this 
approach see for example Bolton & Gillet’s The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease: New 





purpose of this chapter is to explore the overt nature of religious hatred before, in the 
following chapter, looking at its underlying psychodynamic characteristics.  Before doing 
this, however, it might be useful to provide a simple summary first, of the differences 
between anger and hatred, and secondly what this dissertation means by ‘religious hatred’. 
 
Janne van Doorn (2018) suggests that the key difference between anger and hate is 
that the goal of anger is to restore or change a situation while the goal of hate is to hurt and 
eliminate the hated target.  “Compared to anger,” he says, “feelings of hate often involve 
deep and repeated violations of one’s (sense of) justice”, adding that this might explain the 
shift of focus between anger and hatred, the former responding to an unjust situation, the 
latter to an unjust nature (referencing Otony, Clore and Collins 1988; original emphasis).   
A similar differentiation argues that anger is a natural reaction to almost any actual or 
perceived attack, hurt or threat and is therefore normal and appropriate and not 
psychologically harmful. Hatred, meanwhile, depends upon the cultivation of anger which 
in turn creates supporting cognitive structures which continue to produce anger and 
negative affect, causing psychological pathology.  This secondary anger is really a 
response to the underlying hateful cognitive structures compared to primary anger which is 
created by actual threats (Vitz and Mango 1997).   This differentiation between primary 
and secondary anger adds depth to a more everyday differentiation which might, for 
example, contrast anger’s short-lived and relatively spontaneous character, a relatively 
straightforward emotion substituting for more complex feelings of hurt or pain, fear or 
frustration, with hatred’s longer-term, deeper-rooted and sometimes more carefully 
nurtured and self-reinforcing character.  Further depth again is added by Rina Lazar (2003) 
citing Akhtar (1995), reflecting on the range of feeling that can be involved in hatred of 
any kind.  Akhtar (1995) makes a distinction between rage and hatred, marking the latter as 
being defensive. Rage, he maintains, is a reaction to frustration and acute whereas hatred is 
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chronic and, with its more complex psychic nature, may be with an internalised object. In 
addition hatred binds a person to the objective of hatred while rage tends to be freeing and, 
focused as it is in the moment, demands immediate expression.  In comparison hatred is 
slow burning, becoming a constant background process enmeshed in the past and the 
future, and providing food for the identity and protection against “fear, guilt, dependent 
longing, repressed mourning, abandonment anxiety and the fear of psychotic 
disintegration, as well as from the need to be loved, passivity, helplessness and feelings of 
affection….. Hatred is very often preferred to emptiness or corroding anxiety. It provides 
the individual with an experience of continuity and a clear sense of identity” (Lazar 2003).  
 
 
At the core of all forms of hatred is the focus on eliminating the hated person or 
group (Fischer et al, 2018), and it is arguably this existential element which defines 
religious hatred rather than the somewhat anodyne legal definitions which merely identify 
its target.92  In other words, in discussing religious hatred the focus needs to be on the 
nature of the hatred as well as at whom it is directed: the compulsion, whether realised or 
not, to want to destroy utterly another person or group because he, she or they are 
perceived to represent or symbolise something that is in some way blasphemous or 
sacrilegious.  While the focus here is on the more extreme manifestations of hatred, as 
much as on the circumstances in which it can arise or the unfortunates at whom it is 





92 For example, Section 29A of the United Kingdom’s Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, adding a new 
Part 3A to the Public Order Act 1986, defines ‘religious hatred’ as meaning ‘hatred against a group of 
persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief’. 
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Conceptualisations of hatred 
 
The literature of psychology, sociology, anthropology and politics discussed in 
Chapter 2 suggests a number of ways that hatred generally can be conceptualised. The first 
is that the capacity for hatred is innate in the human species in the same way as aggression: 
in the words of the psychiatrist Anthony Storr, “if man were not aggressive, he would not 
be man at all” (Storr 1992, p. 10).  Freud maintained that strong human feelings are natural 
and while they are normally constrained by the dictates of civilisation, there are forces, 
such as the death instinct and aggression, that are sufficiently powerful to overwhelm such 
defences and lead people to the extremities of behaviour especially in the name of self-
preservation (Robins and Post 1997). Hate, for Freud, “always remains in an intimate 
relation with the self-preservative instincts” (Freud 1915, p. 139).  Jung also saw 
aggression as an expression of psychic energy93 and hate largely as a consequence of 
projection: the human tendency to project onto others the aspects of ourselves that we 
prefer to disown (Fromm 1973, p. 596).   
 
More recently Staub (2003) has defined hatred as a strong negative feeling, with the 
hater seeing the object of his or her hatred as bad, immoral, dangerous or a combination of 
these, with acts of hatred intended to make such objects be damaged or destroyed. 
Professor Jose Navarro of the University of Cadiz says that hatred is built on a “complex 
mix of cognitions and emotions.  The cognitive components are related to the devaluation 
of the other, the perception of them as a threat.  The emotional part includes a set of 
feelings like anger, fear, distress and hostility” (Navarro 2013).  So much is perhaps 
 
93 Freud and Jung’s early collaboration was terminated in part by their differences over the definition of 
libido.  For Freud libido was largely and primarily a sexual energy while Jung used the term much more 
broadly to include any form or expression of psychic energy. 
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obvious, but Navarro adds that “another element related to hatred is a certain, sometimes 
crazy, sense that we are justified in acting against – or even eliminating – the object of our 
hate”.   It is the combination of these two factors, argues Navarro, that lie at the root of 
hatred: the devaluation of the victim and the ideology of the hater which reduce empathy, 
because haters move increasingly away from the objects of their hatred. They remove 
obstacles that could limit hatred towards others by transforming any and all other feelings 
into hatred: “They not only change our ideas and feelings, but even the social norms that 
guide our behaviour towards the object of our hatred. The new behaviour ends up being 
accepted and normal; and institutions may even be created to promote and spread hatred” 
(ibid.).  Navarro is here following the idea that hatred begins with “automatic thoughts” 
(Beck 1997, p. 94-7): cognitive distortions such as overgeneralisation which expands a 
particular instance of behaviour, for example, to become characteristic of an entire group; 
dichotomous thinking that polarises and ultimately demonises everyone into good guys and 
bad guys; tunnel thinking that discards anything that might contradict such reasoning; and 
catastrophic thinking which involves losing all perspective and encouraging over-reactions 
(Beck and Pretzer 2005, p. 70).  A similar approach is taken by those who see the idea of 
‘integrative complexity’ (IC) as providing indicators of those likely to be drawn into 
religious fundamentalism and extremism (Savage 2011).  According to this approach low 
IC is characterized by rigid, black-and-white thinking, intolerance for ambiguity and 
uncertainty, a desire for rapid closure, and the inability to recognise the validity of other 
viewpoints. Conversely, high IC is marked by flexible, broad thinking that recognizes 
multiple aspects and possible interpretations of an issue and sees connections and dynamic 
tensions between perspectives (Suedfeld 1985).94  
 
94 Integrity complexity is defined as “the structure of information processing, independently of its content. It 
entails two aspects: differentiation and integration, where differentiation refers to the extent of perceiving a 
variety of dimensions and perspectives when considering an issue, whereas integration is a capacity to create 




Beyond these cognitive conceptualisations is the ‘duplex theory of hatred’ (Sternberg 
2005, p. 69) that goes deeper than the purely cognitive.  Hatred, says Sternberg, is 
psychologically related to love, and like love has its origins in personal stories that 
characterise our emotions, and is built on passion, commitment and the negation of 
intimacy.  It is this latter, the distancing and detachment that comes with the lack of 
intimacy, that enables us to repudiate others because of their characteristics (race, religion) 
or actions (treachery, deceit), or to be influenced by propaganda that emphasises 
characteristics that enables us to imagine others as sub-human or inhuman. The passion 
element in hatred can arouse feelings of anger and fear especially in response to a threat, 
whether perceived or manufactured.  The commitment element stems from the devaluation 
of the human characteristics of an individual or a group to the point where systematic 
action against them becomes not only possible, but required.  Navarro suggests that these 
three elements – negation of intimacy, passion and commitment - can combine into 
different types of hatred.  The Venn diagram below is based on Navarro’s interpretation of 
Sternberg’s theory.95  The possible combinations, described in the white boxes, suggest 
certain consequences: negation of intimacy and commitment create the slow-burn, 
simmering hatred that may in time lead to pre-meditated, deliberate action against others; 
detachment and passion can cause sudden eruptions against others; passion and 
commitment combine to encourage systematic denigration such as changes in law that 
discriminate against certain groups.  Where all three elements overlap the total annihilation 
as seen in the Holocaust or in Rwanda becomes possible (Szanto 2019). 
 
 
95 It is tempting to substitute a word like ‘detachment’ or ‘indifference’ for ‘negation of intimacy’ because it 
would reframe the concept into something more deliberate, but the use of ‘intimacy’ emphasises its value as a 







The summary above can make Navarro’s model seem overly simplistic, but the 
details and qualifications he adds tend to suggest that this conceptualisation may be valid 
for hatred in many different contexts.  Fanaticism, for example, “dilutes empathy, 
awareness of others’ suffering, and feelings of guilt towards the object of our hatred” 
(ibid.).   With personal frustration generating poor self-esteem a person “blames others for 
this accumulation of misfortunes and enters a moral vacuum……In this context…..it is not 
uncommon to generate idealized expectations that violence and the “revolutionary” 
objective will solve existing personal problems”.  Peer group support means shared bonds, 
behaviours and ideals that make a person feel responsible and valued while at the same 
time limiting external influences (“contamination”) and enabling actions that obtain the 
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Developed from Navarro, JI 2013, ‘The Psychology of Hatred’, The Open Criminology Journal, vol. 6, pp. 10-17. 
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approval of the group with few adverse consequences.  All are compounded if the 
individual in question is emotionally immature.96   
 
A model such as Navarro’s also arguably fits with past reflections on hatred.  For 
example, one of Aristotle’s first points in Rhetoric (ii.4)97 is that while anger is always 
concerned with individuals, hatred is directed also against “classes” (which in this age can 
be interpreted as “groups”).  Paraphrasing more of this passage, Aristotle goes on to say 
that anger aims at giving pain, whereas hatred is intended to cause harm; the angry people 
want their victims to feel, haters do not mind whether they feel or not; the angry may 
eventually feel pity, the hater never; the angry want their offenders to suffer, the haters 
“would have them cease to exist”; and anger can be cured by time, hatred not.  For 
Aquinas, “hatred can be understood only in relation to love…”.  Just as everything that 
exists is characterized by natural love, so it is characterized by what Aquinas calls “natural 
hatred” (odium naturale), adding that everything in the universe is vulnerable to being 
harmed by its interactions with other things, and at its core hatred is the dissonance that we 
feel when we apprehend something that is potentially harmful to us (Gereboff et al 2009).98  
Aquinas also, and of particular relevance for this dissertation, identifies what we might call 
“religious hatred” when, speaking as a Christian, he encounters anything that threatens “his 
or her beatitude, the beatitude of others, and the glory of God” (ibid.), and might both be 
 
96 This echoes Scott Atran’s assessment of the importance of group dynamics as a determinant of personal 
identity and behaviour: “small-group dynamics can trump individual personality to produce horrific 
behaviour in ordinary people” he argues in relation to the creation of religious terrorists and the importance 
of friendships and peer relations in maintaining their commitment right through to suicidal acts (Atran 2010, 
pp. 36, 310, 479). 
97 See Gereboff, J, Green, K, Fritz Cates, D and Heim, M 2009, ‘The Nature of the Beast: Hatred in Cross-
Traditional Religious and Philosophical Perspective’, Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics, vol. 29, no. 
2, pp. 175-2.  Aristotle, Aquinas and Buddhaghosa are selected from the many examples this article provides 
to illustrate three particular philosophical and religious approaches to hatred. 
98 Gereboff et al note that Aquinas treats hatred formally in two brief articles of the Summa theologiae (ST I-
II 29; and II-II 34), adding that to get the most out of his account, it needs to be interpreted in the light of his 
complete theory of emotion, which is set within the broader context of his theological ethic.  
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able to justify feeling that hatred and taking steps to change it.  Gereboff et al use this point 
to explain, for example, the conduct of those at Westboro Baptist Church who demonstrate 
against homosexuality using signs such as, “God hates fags” and “AIDS kills fags dead”, 
arguing that the Westboro congregation are not simply disturbed on a sensory level by their 
images of gay people, but that their “interior disturbance is a way of registering a genuine 
threat to society” and thereby justify their calls for repentance.99  As Gereboff et al point 
out, there is likely pleasure in their hatred of what they perceive as evil, and at this point 
“the most frightening dimension of hatred can appear: self-righteous delight in the 
suffering that one causes other human beings”.   
 
Overall, Aquinas’s attitude seems to be that hatred is in some respects a natural 
human reaction to things, material or spiritual, that threaten a person’s or community’s 
wellbeing, and how it is responded to is of necessity a complex calculation involving 
interpretations of natural and divine law and the exercising of personal wisdom and 
discernment.  Buddhaghosa, to use an example of thought from outside the Western canon, 
provides an interesting counterpoint to the relative ambivalence of both Aristotle and 
Aquinas.100  Buddhaghosa is quite clear that hatred is pathological and a contagion, 
becoming “all-consuming and almost unstoppable when released into cycles of revenge” 
(ibid.); he describes a “hating temperament” that stems from previous lives where the 
person did vicious and violent things and altogether lacks the ability to be in sympathy 
 
99 Westboro Baptist Church has in recent years provided many examples of religious bigotry and intolerance. 
A recent non-scholarly account of this Christian assembly where hate is central to theology appears in 
Phelps-Roper, M 2019, Unfollow: A Journey from Hatred to Hope: Leaving the Westboro Baptist Church, 
Quercus, London.   
100 Buddhaghoṣa was a 5th-century Indian Theravada Buddhist commentator and scholar. His best-known 
work is the Visuddhimagga "Path of Purification", a comprehensive summary and analysis of the Theravada 
understanding of the Buddha's path to liberation. The interpretations provided by Buddhaghosa have 
generally constituted the orthodox understanding of Theravada scriptures since at least the 12th century 
CE. He is generally recognized by both Western scholars and Theravadins as the most important 
commentator of the Theravada (Encyclopaedia of Buddhism) 
encyclopediaofbuddhism.org/wiki/Buddhaghosa [viewed 14.2.20] 
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with others.101  Hatred is a danger because it becomes obsessional and all-pervasive: 
Buddahaghosa “finds no value whatsoever in hatred” and “nor can hatred bear some of the 
innocuous shades of meaning that it finds in the finely nuanced distinctions of Aquinas’s 
system” (ibid.).  
 
Evolutionary psychological approaches 
 
In addition to the cognitive approach to understanding hatred discussed above it is 
worth looking briefly at other understandings of hatred in general while also beginning to 
look in more detail at religious hatred.  The evolutionary approach to hatred builds on the 
work of ethologists such as Nikolaus Tinbergen’s Study of Instinct (1951), Konrad 
Lorenz’s On Aggression (1966) and Desmond Morris’s The Naked Ape (1967) which lead 
to a re-thinking of B.F. Skinner’s work on environmental conditioning that had 
marginalised earlier thinking on the nature of human nature and in the middle years of the 
20th century emphasised behaviourism.102  The evolutionary psychologist James Waller 
identifies “two foundational, innate, evolution-produced tendencies of human nature that 
are most relevant to our capacity for hate: ethnocentrism and xenophobia” (Waller 2004), 
arguing that studies worldwide show that these tendencies are universal, starting in 
infancy. Ethnocentrism can be summarised as the tendency to focus on one’s own group as 
the “right” one (Sumner 1906)103; xenophobia as the tendency to fear outsiders or 
strangers.  There is, as Waller comments, nothing very new in this: “Theologians beat 
evolutionary psychologists to the discovery of the “animal in humans” by several 
 
101 Visuddhimagga in The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi (Wisdom Books, 
Boston 2000), p. 298 in Gereboff et al 2009.  
102 For a concise history of thinking about hate and the approach of evolutionary psychology see Waller, J 
2004, Our Ancestral Shadow: Hate and Human Nature in Evolutionary Psychology, paper presented at the 
Conference to Establish the Field of Hate Studies, Spokane, WA, March 19, 2004.  
103 Defined by Sumner as “a differentiation that arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and 
everybody else, or the others-group, out-groups”, quoted in Waller (2004). 
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centuries”, adding that it is a central element of the Christian view of human nature often 
captured in the doctrine of Original Sin. 
 
If religion can be explained as an adaptation that carries evolutionary advantages by 
strengthening the solidarity of human groups, it can be argued that religious hatred is a 
mechanism that can amplify this in-group ethnocentrism and also, unfortunately, reinforce 
innate human xenophobia.  Using evolutionary psychology as a total explanation of 
religious hatred, however, seems to overlook the forces of intellectual and cultural 
evolution that have in so many ways advanced human nature beyond its animal origins 
even if they linger in dark corners and can be summoned by the maleficent.  It is hard to 
believe that the more refined forms of religious hatred, erupting for example among those 
who differ over matters of doctrine, the original odium theologicum,104 are not as likely to 
stem from cultural, historical or individual psychodynamic differences as from the innate 
unconscious seeking of evolutionary advantage, or indeed from the circumstantial or 
environmental contexts in which hatred is a consequence of people’s responses to their 
situations.  This latter conceptualisation of hatred emphasises the interaction between 
external factors and the intrinsic human capacity for violence, and the hate that may flow 
from, for example, the fight-flight reaction (Cannon 1963), frustration and grievance 
(Berkowitz 1989), or from the dark meanings that can be inferred, incorrectly or otherwise, 
from apparently innocent interactions (Bandura 1985).  If the hatred of the oppressed for 
their oppressors illustrates one side of the coin (Hooks 1995), then the famous Milgram 
experiments on obedience and authority, bearing in mind some important caveats, illustrate 
 
104 “The bitter hatred of rival religionists. No wars so sanguinary as holy wars; no persecutions so relentless 
as religious persecutions, no hatred so bitter as theological hatred” (Room, A (ed.) 2001, Brewer’s Dictionary 
of Phrase and Fable, (Millennium edition), Cassel & Co, London.  
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the other.105  Though the history of the 20th century should have been witness enough, it is 
clear from recent conflict in the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Africa that, 
according to the psychiatrist Anthony Storr, “...the extremes of ‘brutal’ behaviour are 
confined to man; and there is no parallel in nature to our savage treatment of each other.  
The sombre fact is that we are the cruellest and most ruthless species that has ever walked 
the earth....” (Storr 1992, p. 9).  Storr’s opinion is not shared by all.  The Dutch biologist 
Frans de Waal calls this ‘veneer theory’, “the notion that civilisation is nothing more than a 
thin veneer that will crack at the merest provocation” (de Waal 2013, p. 43).106  Historian 
and philosopher Rutger Bregman says that “In actuality, the opposite is true. It’s when 
crisis hits – when the bombs fall or the floodwaters rise – that we humans become our best 
selves” (Bregman 2020, p. 4).  He blames the media for a picture that is consistently the 
opposite of reality and uses examples such as a real life Lord of the Flies story to illustrate 
his point (ibid., pp. 6 and 36),107 while Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker uses empirical 
evidence to demonstrate that humankind is becoming less violent in The Better Angels of 
Our Nature (2011). 
 
So although the overall state of humankind, in relation to the threat and use of 
violence, may be improving, given the behavioural tendencies noted by Storr and the 
evidence of most of human history - pace Pinker - it can be argued that religious hatred 
 
105 The Milgram experiments famously appeared to demonstrate, in summary, that an alarmingly high 
proportion of normally humane people can be induced to inflict pain on others if they are told to do so by 
someone in a position of authority. See Helm, C and Morelli, M, 1979, ‘Stanley Milgram and the Obedience 
Experiment: Authority, Legitimacy, and Human Action’, Political Theory vol. 7, pp. 321-46.  More recently 
doubt has been cast on both the ethics and methodology of Milgram’s work (see for example Perry, G 2013, 
‘Deception and Illusion in Milgram’s Accounts of the Obedience Experiments’, Theoretical & Applied 
Ethics, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 79–92) to the extent that the results should be viewed with caution. Rutger Bregman 
goes further in Humankind: A Hopeful History (2020), “I know of no other study as cynical, as depressing 
and at the same time as famous as his experiments at the shock machine…..A man who misled and 
manipulated to get the results he wanted” (p. 164). 
106 Quoted in Bregman 2020, p. 4. 
107 William Goldings’s novel Lord of the Flies (1954) is arguably one of the most influential works of 20th 
century fiction, appearing regularly on the lists of school set texts. It features a group of British schoolboys 
who, stranded without adults on a remote island, rapidly revert to a state of lawless savagery. 
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provides another reason, or excuse, and sometimes active encouragement, for malignant 
human behaviour, with the precepts of religion providing little defence against it.   Pinker 
and Bregman’s more optimistic views offer hope that religion can be among the influences 
that swing behavioural choices in more positive directions: itself a good reason to 
understand better what influences such choices.  But it is perhaps as well also to introduce 
at this point a concept that properly belongs in the following chapter on psychodynamic 
approaches to religious hatred: the notion of enantiodromia, the tendency of everything in 
nature sooner or later to switch the direction of its flow towards its opposite (Stevens 1990, 
pp. 140-1).  Perhaps, when it comes to the light and dark sides of religion, what we witness 
are many different flows, some in one direction, others in the opposite, and it is as well to 
be prepared for both.  
 
Perhaps also it is the very defiance of religious precepts which renders religious 
hatred qualitatively different from its secular equivalent, though it is doubtful whether 
victims of the latter would agree.  While contemporary religious hatred seems as likely to 
grow out of social, historical or cultural circumstances as out of either innate capacity or 
evolutionary advantage, it may be that such situations trigger latent and primal inclinations 
both to prepare individuals for the conflict that is likely to flow from religious hatred, and 
to inculcate the will to win when it arises.  For this reason it seems reasonable to conclude 
that all of these approaches to religious hatred contain something of relevance.  In 
summary, if religion is innate, then it seems likely that so are the problems that it produces; 
if religion brings evolutionary advantages, then again it seems reasonable to suppose that 
aggression, and if necessary hatred perceived to be in defence of religion, are likely 
concomitants; and to the extent that religion always lives in relation to its social and 
historical circumstances, human responses to these are likely to include responses to the 
religion that is part of them.  It can be argued, nonetheless, that religious hatred does have 
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characteristics that are particular to itself.  In particular the concept of ‘religious hatred’ 
needs to be understood as echoing traditional notions of spiritual damnation: willing the 
total separation of person from any sense of themselves, any relation with others, and any 
inclusion in whatever ultimacy is perceived.  Religious hatred involves the harming of 
others in a way beyond human reparation: it is the loss of Nirvana, divorce from the Dao, 
deprivation of any hope of Moksha, the loss of any sense of ultimacy – metaphysically, 
axiologically, soteriologically.  It is in these terms that the full severity of religious hatred 
needs to be appreciated.  Speed Leas, a scholar-practitioner who specialises in 
ecclesiastical conflict, provides a brutal summary of the purpose of religious hatred: 
“People’s goal is to destroy one another. They see themselves as part of an eternal cause, 
fighting for universal principles. They justify any means to achieve their all-important 
ends” (Leas 1985 quoted in McKay 2019, pp. 90-91).  The consequences are 
communication that features outright condemnation of others coupled with extreme 
emotional volatility and the inability to disengage once battle has been joined.  
 
Particulars of religious hatred 
 
This brings us to a deeper focus on the cognitive approach to religious hatred as 
exemplified by Aaron Beck’s Prisoners of Hate: The Cognitive Basis of Anger, Hostility 
and Violence (1999).  Beck, one of the pioneers of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT), 
provides detailed analysis of how innate, evolutionary or contextually-generated hatred, or 
indeed hatred driven by any other motivations, manifests itself in the actual behaviour of 
human beings.  His starting point is the continuity running through the spectrum of 
behaviour from the personal to the genocidal, arguing that regardless of the external causes 
of antagonistic behaviour (“Anger is anger, whether provoked by a rebellious child or a 
rebellious colony; hate is hate, whether evoked by an abusive spouse or a ruthless 
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dictator”), the same internal or psychological mechanisms are generally involved in its 
arousal and expression (Beck 1999, p. 15).  Beck applies this to the hatred of people and 
sets out the stages through which haters go in order to reach hatred in its extreme and 
deadly forms.  The first characteristic of hatred is that is based on a distorted image of 
someone who then becomes characterised as ‘the enemy’.  For hate to really take root this 
image has to become more extreme and, as Navarro (2013) has it, more detached from the 
reality it represents (for example the image of the Jew used by Hitler and the Nazis) so that 
it then becomes possible to project any deleterious characteristic onto this enemy, this 
Other.  As part of this process the enemy then becomes homogenized and stereotyped: 
individuals lose their discrete identities, and thereby become interchangeable and 
disposable.  In the next stage individuals become dehumanized and so devoid of value as 
people and undeserving of empathy.  It becomes possible to kill them without feeling.108  
The final stage is demonization.  The enemy becomes the embodiment of evil and 
therefore must be exterminated as a moral obligation for fear that others may be 
contaminated.  
 
These stages are well recognised by organisations such as Genocide Watch as part of 
the process of preparing the ground for genocide (Stanton 1996).  Religious factors appear 
in several of these stages: classification, where religion is used as an identifier of 
difference; symbolization, where specific symbols are associated with the vulnerable 
group; preparation, where victims are separated from the rest of the population so they can 
be more easily targeted; and finally in the stage of denial, when the perpetrators of 
genocide may defend themselves by asserting that their accusers are biased because of 
 
108 Propaganda in Rwanda before the 1994 genocide repeatedly referred to Tutsis as “cockroaches”.  See 
Woolf, L and Hulsizer, M 2005, ‘Psychosocial roots of genocide: risk, prevention, and intervention’, Journal 
of Genocide Research, vol. 7, no.1, pp. 101-128. 
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their politics, ethnicity or religion.109   The stages described above relate to the treatment of 
individuals.  Observation from experience suggests that abstract ideas, beliefs and values 
can be denigrated in the same way with similar objectives: namely to discredit them, and 
those who hold them, so thoroughly that both can be discarded with ease.  In dialogues 
with religious groups about human sexuality, for example, it is not unusual to hear 
homosexuality being distorted by being conflated with paedophilia, and of course it is 
relatively straightforward to demonise an enemy who can be presented as a paedophile 
(Herek 2000).  
 
Similarly, the details, subtleties and nuances of ideas can become lost in the effort to 
homogenize and stereotype ideas: “Christianity is a vehicle for Bible-thumping rednecks”; 
“all Muslims are Islamic terrorists” and so on.  Both the ideas, and the people who are 
perceived to represent them, become scapegoats and from then on every negative quality 
can be associated with them: this is presumably how religion has come to be blamed for so 
much conflict when, as Chapter 1 established, it is in fact very rarely a causal factor in any 
conflict.110  Once reduced to this semi-pariah status, as for example, arguably, religion has 
been by the increasing secularisation of the academy, it becomes harder for people to 
espouse certain ideas without both them and their ideas being marginalised and even 
ridiculed.  Ideas can similarly become so diminished as to be unworthy of being taken 
seriously and deserving of immediate censorship; a university may even ban a Christian 
 
109 Steven Jacobs argues in ‘Genocidal Religion’, Journal of Hate Studies, vol. 9, pp. 221-235 (2011) that 
there are four precipitating factors for genocide: tribalism, religious exclusivism, privileged access to the 
divine and “a particularistic and parochial reading of sacred texts”.  As genocide is arguably the ultimate 
expression of hatred, the idea that three out of the four precipitating factors are connected in some way to 
religion supports Jacobs’s contention (2011) that a religious dimension is a prerequisite for genocide.  
110 Even the so-called ‘Wars of Religion’, roughly from 1559 until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and 
comprising at least twenty-five international wars and the same number of civil wars (Pinker 2011, p. 281) 
may have disrupted the Catholic order in Europe but religion, far from being the cause, is regarded by some 
historians as a proxy for territorial ambitions, the clash of financial interests and Great Power conflicts (see 
for example Cavanaugh, W 2009, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern 
Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford). 
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society.111  This is bad not only for those being diminished but also for their persecutors: it 
feeds self-righteousness, egotism and narcissism, and in so doing allows the shadow side 
(Jung 1938, p. 131) of the persecutor to flourish as will be discussed in the following 
chapter.  Quite apart from the negative impacts on individuals, the process also encourages 
the sort of over-generalisation and tunnel vision which are both destructive in themselves 
and sow the seeds for the further narrowing of understanding and intellect that integrative 
complexity identifies as fertile soil for extremism (Savage 2006).  The final and most 
destructive stage is ideas being demonised lest they, and those who dare to utter them, 
influence others. The consequence is the no-platforming of speakers even in institutions, 
such as universities, which exist to explore and debate ideas (Smith 2016). This encourages 
the polarised and dichotomous thinking – the dividing of the world into the black and 
white, good and evil – that often accompanies religious hatred.112 The link again to the 
concept of integrative complexity becomes apparent.  The overall consequence of the 
process described by Aaron Beck and summarised above is one of transforming people and 
arguably even ideas into images of evil which appear, or can be made to appear, to threaten 
the vital interests or even the existence, physical or moral, of the aggressors.  These reified 
concepts are projected onto the people or ideas that embody the threat, so while it is the 
projected images that are attacked, it is real people who become the victims.  The remedy 
for this process, according to Beck, is modification of the belief system that predisposes 
the individual to overreact to supposed threats, and the development of strategies to 
 
111 “An Oxford College has banned the Christian Union from its freshers’ fair on the grounds that it would be 
“alienating” for students of other religions, and constitute a “micro-aggression”. The organiser of Balliol’s 
fair argued Christianity’s historic use as “an excuse for homophobia and certain forms of neo-colonialism” 
meant that students might feel “unwelcome” in their new college if the Christian Union had a stall” 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/2017/10/10/oxford-college-bans-harmful-christian-union-freshers-
fair/ [viewed 29.11.18]. 
112The contemporary accusation of promoting of ‘thoughtcrime’, vividly evoked by George Orwell in his 





interrupt the hostile sequence in its earliest stage so as to induce abandonment of violence 
as an acceptable weapon (Beck 1999, pp. 17-8).    
 
This is very much the grounding of the process advocated by Genocide Watch for 
preventing genocide.113  Applying Beck’s cognitive analysis to religious hatred also 
highlights what he calls the ‘Moral Paradox’ (Beck 1999, p. 21), though he describes it as a 
cognitive rather than a moral problem.  The summary of the paradox is that while religions 
such as Christianity and Islam are ostensibly committed to love and peace, they have been 
invoked by individuals to justify acts as diverse as the Crusades, 9/11 and the murder of 
abortionists, furthermore “It is my strong contention that religion in both its institutional 
forms and its intellectual formulations has played a truly significant if unexplored role in 
all [sic] genocides, past and present….” (Jacobs 2011).  Beck argues that the failure of 
religious values to reduce hostile behaviour, and in some cases the evocation of religious 
values to encourage it, reflects the power of the innate, evolutionary and environmental 
thinking and beliefs that drive them. When people perceive that either they or their values 
are threatened they can enter, or be induced or manipulated into entering, the cognitive 
processes described above, and the force of this may be more powerful than human 
qualities such as empathy or the behavioural norms encoded in religious teachings (ibid., p. 
22).114 
 
113 For example, Stanton advocates: “Vigorously protest use of dehumanizing words that refer to people as 
“filth,” “vermin,” animals or diseases; deny people using such words visas and freeze their foreign assets and 
contributions; prosecute hate crimes and incitements to commit genocide; jam or shut down hate radio and 
television stations where there is danger of genocide; provide programs for tolerance to radio, TV, and 
newspapers; enlist religious and political leaders to speak out and educate for tolerance; organize inter-ethnic, 
inter-faith and inter-racial groups to work against hate and genocide (Stanton 1996). 
114 Beck himself identifies two remedies for this process.  The first is to “deactivate” the hate mode when it is 
triggered by methods such as cooling-off periods, distraction, and the sort of dialogic methodologies used by 
mediators.  The other, which Beck describes as a more enduring approach, is to intervene in the way that 
people perceive themselves, their values, and each other, insisting on rational judgments, developing 
objective criteria to help people evaluate more clearly, and encouraging greater awareness of how easily 
perceptions and categorisations can become biased and incomplete.  These are, again, methods used by 
mediators to design and construct dialogue processes that can bridge limited thinking and defuse aggression. 




This suggests that, contrary to the arguments of modern atheists, the answer to the 
hatred unquestionably generated by religion and among religious people is not less religion 
but more religion.  As the philosopher of religion John Schellenberg says in Evolutionary 
Religion, “Maybe religion needs to be born again” (Schellenberg 2013, p. 90), a reminder 
that in terms of the temporal landscape the world’s religions as we know them today are 
barely more than six thousand years old, and it is only within the last three thousand that 
they have mostly been codified and established.  Schellenberg points out that human 
religion is still in its infancy and it is difficult to imagine how it may evolve over the 
millennia ahead.  One starting point, in terms of reducing the scope for religious hatred, 
would perhaps be to discover forms of religion which change the balance between the 
devotional and the coalitional in favour of the former.115 
 
Hatred as addiction 
 
There is an additional aspect of religious hatred that deserves mention: its apparent 
addictiveness in that, like other forms of addiction, the addict can seem impervious to 
reason and evidence when presented with the negative consequences of the addiction.  To 
appreciate this we need to look at the psychology of addiction and realise that anything can 
serve as the object of an addictive process including religions and their associated beliefs 
and promises (Maté 2018, p. 375).116  If those beliefs include ideas that can be considered 
 
behaviour both in its negative and positive forms in terms of its contribution to human survival and 
reproduction, it had not, at the time of his writing, contributed as much on the evolution of cognitive patterns 
and especially primal thinking (Beck 1999, p. 23). 
115 Ginges, Hansen and Norenzayan (2009), studying the motivation for suicide attacks, divide religiosity into 
the devotional and the coalitional, suggesting there is a correlation between the latter and the motivations of 
suicide attackers, whereas the former seem less inclined to violence and self-sacrifice.   
116 The use of the word ‘addiction’ in the pathological sense is relatively recent. Thomas de Quincey in 
Confessions of an Opium Eater (Penguin 2003), first published in 1821, for example, never refers to his 
narcotic devotions as addiction. The Romans, however, had a usage that prefigures our current one: an 
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pernicious, such as the superiority of some races over others, that homosexuality is a 
human malignancy, or that the followers of other religions are evil or deluded, for 
example, then presumably such beliefs can also be or become addictive, in which case it is 
important to understand the nature of addiction.  A consensus of experts on drug addiction 
in 2001 declared that addiction is a “chronic neurobiological disease … characterized by 
behaviors that include one or more of the following: impaired control over drug use, 
compulsive use, continued use despite harm, and craving” (Hall-Flavin and Hofman 2003).  
The question of whether addiction is really a form of disease will continue to be debated,117 
but its characteristics less so: “compulsion, impaired control, persistence, irritability, 
relapse and craving - these are the hallmarks of addiction - any addiction” (Maté 2018, p. 
131).118 
 
It feels uncomfortable to conclude that some believers, perhaps especially those 
attracted to ‘strong’ religion, may display some of the characteristics of those addicted to 
drink or drugs, and that religious hatred is a destructive consequence akin to the 
 
addictus was a person who was assigned to a creditor as a slave, which is where presumably the idea of 
addiction as a form of enslavement derives (Rosenthal, R & Faris, S 2019, ‘The etymology and early history 
of ‘addiction’’, Addiction Research & Theory, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 437-449). 
117 “As we delve into the scientific research, we need to avoid the trap of believing that addiction can be 
reduced to the actions of brain chemicals or nerve circuits or any other kind of neurobiological, psychological 
or sociological data. A multilevel exploration is necessary because it’s impossible to understand addiction 
fully from any one perspective, no matter how accurate. Addiction is a complex condition, a complex 
interaction between human beings and their environment. We need to view it simultaneously from many 
different angles—or, at least, while examining it from one angle, we need to keep the others in mind. 
Addiction has biological, chemical, neurological, psychological, medical, emotional, social, political, 
economic and spiritual underpinnings - and perhaps others I haven’t thought about” (Maté, G 2018, p. 402). 
118Although the term addiction has been controversial for quite some time (Shaffer 1986; Davies 1992), 
Brown (1993, p. 245) states that conceptually addiction ‘has fairly widespread agreement on the core 
phenomena’. Brown’s criteria have been compared with the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders) III and IV criteria for pathological gambling (Charlton 2002). Brown’s core criteria 
include: (a) Salience: when the activity (behavioural) and one’s thinking (cognitive) dominates the person’s 
life; (b) Euphoria: describes the ‘buzz’ or ‘high’ feeling gained from the activity; (c) Tolerance: the need to 
engage in the activity to a progressively greater extent to achieve the same ‘buzz’; (d)  Relief: when a person 
repeats the behaviour to avoid an uncomfortable state; (e) Withdrawal: experiencing unpleasant emotions or 
physical effects when the activity is halted; (f) Conflict: when the activity leads to conflict with other people 
or self-conflict; (g) Relapse/ reinstatement: the activity is resumed with just as much vigour following 
attempts to abstain.  
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physiological and neurological consequences of narcotic addiction. Rabbi Jonathan Sacks 
in his book Not in God’s Name: Confronting Religious Violence, names hate as a form of 
enslavement, “even of self-enslavement” (Sacks 2016, p. 238).  So perhaps it is sometimes 
religious hatred, rather than religion itself, that is addictive, providing the intoxication that 
blurs and obliterates all other demands and responsibilities, increasingly holding sway over 
every facet of the life of the individual and overruling any rational consideration, 
amounting, in fact, to an ‘evil force’ (Schoen 2009, p. 4).  It reinforces the argument in 






119If ‘strong’ religion (Almond et al 2003) can be addictive in the same way as other narcotics, then it raises 
the question of what might take the form of a curing conversion experience as advocated by groups like 
Alcoholics Anonymous: to what ‘Higher Power’ can de-radicalisation programmes, for example, advocate an 
appeal if the focus of the addiction is in fact a Higher Power or its associations?  
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Chapter 3 explored cognitive and evolutionary psychological understandings of 
hatred and religious hatred; the focus of this chapter is to examine how psychodynamic 
psychology explains the capacity latent in some individuals and groups for religious 
hatred.  The central argument is that individuals, groups and cultures can be possessed by 
largely unconscious psychological complexes,120 rooted in personal or collective histories, 
that can cause or facilitate religious hatred.   This chapter therefore begins with an 
exploration of what a complex is, how it arises, and how it performs within the conscious 
and unconscious life of individuals, and goes on to present the concept of the cultural 
complex which argues that such complexes can take on a more collective form for whole 
communities and even nations.   
 
The approach here is to identify psychodynamic theories that are relevant, introduce 
them supported by evidence from scholarship, and build on these to the extent that the 
evidence allows.  This approach is deliberately cautious because the relationship between 
psychodynamic psychology and natural science has been complicated since Freud’s 
Project for a scientific psychology (1895).  In recent years the tensions among 
psychodynamic psychology, cognitive behavioural psychology, neuroscience and 
neurobiology, to identify but a few of the fault lines, have complicated the search for 
 
120 It should be noted that the use of the term ‘complex’ is to some extent controversial in psychodynamic 
psychology.  It is used here because the concept is fairly widely accepted even if the detailed language of its 
description and explanation continues to develop. For a full explanation of the concept and some of the 
arguments around it see Samuels, A 1985, Jung and the Post-Jungians, Routledge, London, pp. 47-52; for an 
example of new thinking about the complex see Bovensiepen, G 2006, ‘Attachment-Dissociation Network: 





empirical evidence in support of the ‘talking cures’ and the theories on which they are 
based. The complexity of the subject matter, and the relative difficulty of using standard 
verification processes such as double-blind testing, means that even theories well-
established through practice in clinical settings are treated with some caution by the more 
empirically-minded.121  The ideas taken from psychodynamic psychology are those judged 
likely to resonate both with the literature of religious hatred and with the field experience 
of scholar-practitioners. 
 
The idea of the complex  
 
A complex is, in essence, a collection of unconscious images and ideas accompanied 
by particular feelings (Kaplinsky 2008) which, when activated, affect behaviour.  If such 
feelings are triggered by some conscious or unconscious event they will bring to the 
surface a variety of associations, memories, perceptions, desires, prejudices, likes or 
dislikes that were stored in the unconscious with the original feelings.  The term complex 
was coined by the German psychiatrist Theodor Ziehen (1862-1950) who used the word-
association test, invented by Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911)122 in 1879, to demonstrate that 
unconscious feelings would cause experimental subjects to display signs of emotion, 
hesitation, slips of the tongue and other oddities of behaviour in response to stimulus 
words.  During these tests a researcher would read a list of 100 words to each subject who 
was asked to say as quickly as possible the first thing that came to mind in response to each 
 
121 For a thorough introduction to this subject see Knox, J 2003, Archetype, Attachment, Analysis: Jungian 
psychology and the emergent mind, Routledge, London and Samuels, A 1985, Jung and the Post-Jungians, 
Routledge, London. 
122 Galton’s use of the galvanometer to test the speed of human reaction to a stimulus was designed to 
measure human intelligence, the assumption being that faster reactions equalled higher intelligence.   
Galton’s research into human ability lead eventually to the foundation of differential psychology (Jensen 
2002) and also his now controversial work on the subject for which he coined the description - eugenics 
(Gilham 2001).  
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word, with his or her reaction time being measured in fifths of a second.  Patterns detected 
in subjects’ responses were perceived to be indications of unconscious beliefs and 
feelings.123 
 
The idea of the complex became an early component of psychodynamic psychology 
as it appeared to verify the influence of unconscious processes on personality and 
behaviour, but its use was developed in different directions, notably by Sigmund Freud and 
Carl Jung.  Freud built much of his psychology around the Oedipus complex but did little 
to develop the concept further apart from some discussion of the equivalent Electra 
complex.124  The reasons for this, according to Dieckmann (1991), was that for Freud, as a 
natural scientist of his time, the idea of the complex was too vague and too large; like 
others at the time he preferred a more reductive approach and this meant looking for the 
basic constituents which, in his case, were the drives which explained psychic functioning. 
Jung, on the other hand, regarded complexes as so central to his theories that he originally 
intended to call his whole approach “complex psychology” (Casement 2001, p. 13) on the 
basis of his experience at the Burghölzli Hospital, the psychiatric clinic of Zurich 
University, where he worked between 1900 and 1908.  Jung developed his theories on the 
back of Galton’s word association test but took them much further; indeed, his early 
reputation and his initial association with Freud was founded on the publication of a book 
 
123 For a full description of his use of the word-association test see Jung, CG 1904-7, Studies in Word 
Association in Experimental Researches, CW2 and also Tavistock Lecture II contained in his Collected 
Works, vol.18 paras. 97-106; also Cramer, P 1968, Word Association, Academic, New York. 
124 Freud introduced the Oedipus complex in The Interpretation of Dreams (1899).  The positive Oedipus 
complex refers to a child’s unconscious sexual desire for the opposite sex parent and hatred for the same sex 
parent, and the negative Oedipus complex vice-versa. The Electra complex was suggested by Jung in his 
1912 Fordham Lecture The Theory of Psychoanalysis (subsequently published as Psychology of the 
Unconscious and revised in 1952 as Symbols of Transformation) as the equivalent complex for young girls; 
Freud rejected it, proposing instead that the Oedipus complex could apply to children of either sex but would 
be manifested as castration anxiety in boys and penis envy in girls. For a contemporary discussion of the 




in 1906, edited with his mentor Eugen Bleuler,125 summarising these experiments.126  Jung 
described complexes in various ways, for example as an “autonomous groups of 
associations that have a tendency to move by themselves, to live their own life apart from 
our intentions” (Jung CW18, para. 151).  He argued that both the personal unconscious and 
the collective unconscious consist of an indefinite and unknown number of complexes, and 
they can be identified because they are characterised by their “intense feeling-tone” (ibid., 
para. 148) and the physiological symptoms that accompany them, such as raised blood 
pressure, stomach cramps and changes in skin tone (ibid.). 
 
 
It is important to note that Jung is proposing that complexes operate in autonomous 
or semi-autonomous ways, separately from conscious intention.  This became an 
increasingly important part of his psychology when he came to suggest that at the core of 
complexes are what he termed ‘archetypes’,127 inherited and universal patterns of 
experience128 that comprise what he called the ‘collective unconscious’129 to distinguish it 
from the personal unconscious of Freudian thinking.  For this dissertation the significance 
 
125 Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939) was Director of the Burghölzli Hospital from 1898 to 1927 and is remembered 
both for his early influence on Jung and for his seminal work in using the term ‘schizophrenia’ to replace the 
older ‘dementia praecox’. 
126 For a contemporary assessment of Jung and Bleuler’s word association tests, using fMRI scanning, see 
Escamilla, M, Sandoval, H, Calhoun V and Ramirez M 2018, ‘Brain activation patterns in response to 
complex triggers in the Word Association Test: results from a new study in the United States’, Journal of 
Analytical Psychology, vol. 63, no. 4, pp. 484–509. 
127 Archetypes in the Jungian sense are generally understood in four ways: 1. As biological entities in genes 
providing the mental equivalent of DNA for the mind; 2. As organised but abstract mental frameworks 
without symbolic or representational content so incapable of being experienced directly; 3. As core meanings 
that contain representational content and therefore provide a central symbolic significance to our experience; 
4. As metaphysical entities that are eternal and independent of the body (Knox 2003). 
128 Jung wanted to distance himself from Jean-Baptise Lamarck (1744-1829), whose theory that evolution 
proceeded from the inheritance of characteristics acquired through subjective experience had been challenged 
by Darwin's theory of natural selection. Jung wrote that the term archetype, “is not meant to denote an 
inherited idea, but rather an inherited mode of functioning, corresponding to the inborn way in which the 
chick emerges from the egg, the bird builds its nest, a certain kind of wasp stings the motor ganglion of the 
caterpillar, and eels find their way to the Bermudas. In other words, it is a 'pattern of behaviour’. This aspect 
of the archetype, the purely biological one, is the proper concern of scientific psychology” (Jung, Collected 
Works vol. 18, para. 1228.)  




of complexes, and the archetypes that drive them, lies in Jung’s key description of their 
nature: “Everyone knows nowadays that ‘people have complexes’. What is not so well 
known, though far more important theoretically, is that complexes can have us [original 
emphasis]” (Jung CW8, para. 200).  The existence of complexes, according to Jung, throws 
serious doubt on the assumption that consciousness is unified and human will reigns 
supreme; in fact complexes can impede the intentions of the will and are sometimes 
responsible for actions that exceed conscious intention. An active complex, he continues, 
“puts us momentarily under a state of duress, of compulsive thinking and acting, for which 
under certain conditions the only appropriate term would be the judicial concept of 
diminished responsibility” (ibid.).  
                
 
The import of this is hard to exaggerate: Jung is saying that there are aspects of 
human behaviour that are beyond our conscious control.  This raises the question of 
whether and, if so, how, matters of religion, faith and belief, or something associated with 
them, can generate a complex that, whether or not intended, gives rise to religious hatred.   
To make the significance of this clear, imagine, simplistically, that a child is forced to take 
part in a religious ritual that involves, say, prostrating himself before a scarlet image while 
an attendant flogs him.  It could be that forever after he associates both the religion and the 
colour scarlet with feelings of pain and humiliation.  If, many years later, he sees a group 
of people wearing scarlet, or professing that same religion, might he again experience these 
feelings and, possibly, either take action to avoid them by running away, or perhaps attack 
them to avenge himself and symbolically, as well as maybe literally, destroy those 
unpleasant memories and feelings?  This is to put, at its crudest, the case for how a 
complex might stimulate religious hatred in an individual even though there is no direct 
connection between either the past ritual, or its attendant colouring, and the current 
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incident.  This is, obviously, an extreme example to set out the basic connection between 
an unconscious complex and subsequent behaviour, but it is not difficult to find instances 
in real life: for example, the middle-aged woman still paralysed by the sight of snow after a 
difficult childbirth twenty years earlier made more traumatic by her doctor’s consequent 
failure to reach her130; the elderly man still revolted by certain foods that conjure images 
from an emotionally deprived childhood.131 The clinical literature contains many more 
examples of how past experience, long buried in the unconscious, can give rise to current 
problems.132   
 
It must be emphasised that complexes per se are not unhealthy: in fact they are 
normal parts of the psyche which provide the individual the energy and qualities needed to 
pursue life in general (Dieckmann 1991, p. 5).  But complexes can become pathological in 
one of two ways when they introduce a one-sided over-emphasis of a certain aspect of the 
psyche.  First, they can consume excessive energy because they contain deeply rooted 
feelings of love or hate linked to equally deep fears and aggressive impulses. Secondly, 
they can become pathological if split off and isolated from the rest of the psyche as a 
consequence of these overpowering energies and the excessive accumulation of 
associations and amplifications they bring about. The consequence, says Dieckmann, is 
“like a dictator who arrogates all power to himself, the complex tends to suppress and 
repress everything that will not fit in its frame of reference, and this causes the conscious 
ego-complex to act again and again in self-damaging and overtaxing ways that would be 
avoided if it could reflect rationally” (ibid., p. 34).  In considering the possibility that even 
 
130 Personal communication 2017. 
131 Personal communication 2018. 
132 For further examples see Dieckmann, D 2014, Complexes: Diagnosis and Therapy in Analytical 




a proportion of religious hatred stems from a complex turned pathological is to risk 
pathologising behaviour that may, in certain circumstances, be not unreasonable.  If, for 
example, a village has just been razed and the inhabitants slaughtered by the fanatics of the 
Islamic State, to hate everything they stand for, including their religion, does not require a 
complex turned bad.  Harbouring a constant, unflinching and behaviourally enacted hatred 
for the Anglican parson who prefers Common Worship to the Book of Common Prayer 
may seem excessive.  Dieckmann appears to be making this distinction when he adds that 
complexes have three characteristics: “they tend 1) to be uncorrectable; 2) to operate 
automatically; and 3) to enrich themselves with archaic, mythological amplifications” 
(ibid.).  The first reflects how very difficult it is to dissuade someone in the grip of such a 
complex from their point of view; the second the way that people sometimes sound as if 
they are on auto-pilot when expressing themselves; and the third the readiness with which 
ancient history is recruited to justify and legitimise a current perspective.  These 
characteristics are unlikely to be apparent in the victim of Islamic State.  On the other hand 
they were apparent, for example, during a dialogue process involving representatives of the 
Dutch Reformed Church justifying apartheid: the absolute conviction, the slightly robotic 
tone with which the usual arguments were produced, and the delving back into the 
mythology of Afrikanerdom for support (Acland 1990, p. 165).   In the middle ground is 
the memory of discussing homosexuality with a group of those opposed to the ordination 
of gay clergy into the Church of England.  There was certainly the absolute conviction of 
being correct, and the inclination to draw on and amplify Biblical texts to justify 
opposition, but there was no impression that they were on automatic pilot: they were 






William James, the ‘healthy-mind’ and the ‘sick soul’ 
 
Discussion of the possible pathology of religious hatred is a reminder of William 
James and his division of religion into that of the ‘healthy-mind’ and the ‘sick soul’ in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience (James 1952, pp. 275 and 365).133  James defines 
healthy-mindedness as “the tendency which looks on all things and sees that they are 
good” and describes such people as the ‘once-born’ because their optimism means they do 
not seek any form of re-birth or new awareness.  Sick souls, he says, see the world as 
essentially evil, seek redemption and re-birth elsewhere and are ‘twice-born’.  He argues in 
his discussion of the sick soul that that those with troubled minds are naturally attracted to 
religion in a way that less troubled souls are not, and that the forms of regeneration 
advocated by “mind-curers”, such as relaxation, are “psychologically indistinguishable 
from the Lutheran justification by faith and the Wesleyan acceptance of free grace” and 
therefore available to people “who have no conviction of sin and care nothing for Lutheran 
theology” (James 1902, p. 128).   Equally, James says, the optimism induced by religious 
faith can become “quasi-pathological” because for “the man actively happy…. evil simply 
cannot then and there be believed in. He must ignore it; and to the bystander he may then 
seem perversely to shut his eyes to it and to hush it up” (ibid. p. 35).  This insight suggests 
that a phenomenon such as religious hatred may be a natural if overlooked accompaniment 
of religious faith, indeed “There are people for whom evil means only a maladjustment 
with things, a wrong correspondence of one’s life with the environment” (ibid., p. 51) 
which, he says, may easily be resolved.134  He contrasts this with others for whom evil is “a 
 
133 Considerations of ‘health’ and healthy-mindedness are a constant concern for James, being mentioned 
over forty times in The Varieties of Religious Experience. 
134 The full quotation is as follows: “There are people for whom evil means only a maladjustment with 
things, a wrong correspondence of one’s life with the environment.  Such evil as this is curable, in 
principle, at least, upon the natural plane, for merely by modifying either the self or the things, or both at 
once. ... But there are others for whom evil is no more relation of the subject to particular outer things, but 
something more radical and general, a wrongness or vice in his essential nature, which no alteration of the 
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wrongness or vice in his essential nature” which requires a supernatural remedy (ibid., p. 
51).135   
 
While James’ work on religion has been criticised on a number of grounds, including 
its over-emphasis on the role of subjective feeling, its use of case studies of the 
pathological, its comparative lack of interest in the social, historical and theological, and a 
certain lack of sympathy for religious experience outside that of the Protestant hegemony 
in America at the time it was written (Hart 2008), it is fair to say that it remains a valuable 
resource for scholars of religious psychology and there are three particular contributions 
that James has made to the thinking in this dissertation.  First “it would be hard to imagine 
the contemporary dialogue between psychology and religion without James’ 
contributions”, and James’ use of terms such as ‘sick soul’, ‘twice born’ and ‘healthy 
minded’ have shaped “cultural, religious, therapeutic, and academic discourse” even if they 
have not been consistently identified with him (ibid.).136 137  Secondly, James’ constant 
awareness of evil as a reality resonates with scholar-practitioners who have come face to 
face with phenomena which can only be so designated (Acland 1990, p. 110-111; 
Migliozzi 2016).  While reflections on the possible pathologies of individuals as a source 
of religious hatred need to be considered, it is when individuals come together to form 
communities and cultures that the full consequences of religious hatred are most liable to 
 
environment, or any superficial rearrangement of the inner self, can cure and which requires a supernatural 
remedy. ... But the deliverance must come in as strong a form as the complaint, if it is to take effect; and 
that seems a reason why the coarser religions, revivalist, orgiastic, with blood and miracles and 
supernatural operations, may possibly never be displaced. Some constitutions need them too much. ... 
There is no doubt that healthy-mindedness is inadequate as a philosophical doctrine, because the evil facts 
which it refuses positively to account for are a genuine portion of reality…..”  ((James 1902, p. 51-2)   
135 Hence the perceived importance of some form of religious conversion to beat addiction as advocated by 
bodies such as Alcoholics Anonymous (Addenbrooke 2015).   
136 While there is no evidence that James influenced Freud (Myers 1990), there is considerable evidence that 
James had an enduring influence on Jung (Taylor 1980). 
137 See for example David Wulff in Psychology of Religion: Classic and Contemporary (Wiley, New York 
1996).   
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become evident.138  Thirdly, James’ writing on the phenomenon of religious conversion 
have contributed to this dissertation’s thinking about how dialogue and diapraxis might 
induce similar epiphanies in those consumed by religious hatred. 
 
Complexes and religious traditions 
 
In Psyche and the Sacred: Spirituality beyond Religion (2012) the psychiatrist and 
Jungian analyst Lionel Corbett argues that religious traditions can be influenced by a set of 
complexes in the same way as individuals.  Christianity, for example, bases its idea of 
sinfulness on the story of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, and this in turn has shaped 
subsequent doctrines such as Original Sin and Infant Baptism, and, Corbett avers, via 
writings such as Augustine’s Confessions (400), these have formed “the complex of an 
entire religious tradition” (Corbett 2012, p. 90).  In a similar way, and more 
controversially, Corbett suggests that the constant persecution of the Jews over the 
centuries, from the time of slavery in Egypt until the Romans’ occupation of Palestine, lead 
to the development of a “collective victim complex” (ibid. p. 91), for which the 
explanation and antidote was the doctrine of the covenant that God is said to have made 
with Abraham.139  This combination of a complex based on victimhood, persecution and 
exceptionalism is a parallel to the stories of children abused in childhood who grow up to 
abuse others, “a process known as identification with the aggressor” (ibid., p. 92).  Corbett 
 
138 This subject is addressed in Chapter 11 with reference to clericalism. 
139 Corbett suggests that this covenant was the invention of scribes and priests in post-Exilic times who wrote 
a sacred history of the Israelites, portraying a golden past and the idea of the Jews being a chosen people, 
which they attributed to Moses. This was designed to rationalise the suffering of the Jewish people and 
explain that this suffering was because they had been insufficiently attentive to the laws of the Torah – which 
also encouraged a more zealous approach to the law and arguably an increasingly legalistic tradition (Corbett 
2012, p. 91). 
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notes that many psychologists “see this process at work in some of Israel’s current 
behaviour” (ibid.).140 
 
Corbett concludes his reflections on the relationship between complex and doctrine 
by arguing that Christianity continued the theme of vicarious suffering which the prophet 
Isaiah had begun by giving the Israelites the idea that their suffering was something they 
were bearing for the sins of heathen nations.  This enabled Christians to turn persecution 
into a form of victory and even psychological freedom guaranteed by the suffering and 
death of Jesus Christ.  Even if it is suspected that Corbett may be over-stating his case – 
because this sequence of argument suggests a teleological coherence to events that may 
have been largely random – there is room for further research into the psychological effects 
of repetition of doctrine through readings, recitations and rituals.  It may be that this 
process, designed as it is, at least to some extent, to open access to an adherent’s emotions, 
may also provide a route into his or her unconscious and therefore to the complexes 
residing there; this possibility is explored further in Chapter 7 below.141  This may be the 
process through which a religious complex can translate into human behaviour; there is 
research which does already tend to confirm this as a possibility though it is too limited to 
be regarded as definitive.142 
 
 
140 Corbett fails to provide supporting references for this claim and it should therefore be considered with 
some caution.  
141 Chapter 7 explores the idea that repetition of a doctrine such as that of Original Sin may act as a nocebo 
and have what has been called the ‘Golem Effect’, encouraging behaviour that falls below the optimum.  
Research has established the ‘Pygmalion Effect’ in education: the discovery that high expectations of school 
students will result in improved academic results. The Golem Effect is its opposite (see for example Oz, S, & 
Eden, D 1994, ‘Restraining the Golem: Boosting performance by changing the interpretation of low scores’, 
Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 79, no. 5, pp. 744–754; Reynolds, D 2007, ‘Restraining Golem and 
Harnessing Pygmalion in the Classroom: A Laboratory Study of Managerial Expectations and Task Design’, 
Academy of Management Learning & Education, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 475–483).  Bregman (2020, pp. 257-9) 
suggests the Pygmalion and Golem Effects are “woven into the fabric of our world”. 
142 See for example McClenon, J 2013, ‘Cognitive resource depletion and the ritual healing theory’ in 
Religion, Brain & Behavior, vol. 3, no.1, pp. 71-73. 
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Cultural complexes  
 
Although the idea of cultural complexes is not new143 it has been more thoroughly 
explored by Thomas Singer and Samuel Kimbles in The Cultural Complex: Contemporary 
Jungian Perspectives on Psyche and Society (2004) which brings together the work of 
several distinguished depth psychologists including Murray Stein, John Beebe and Andrew 
Samuels as well as Joseph Henderson.   As Singer and Kimbles point out in their 
introduction, this new application of Jung’s theory of complexes “makes no special claim 
to having the answer to what causes – or might heal – group and cultural conflict, but they 
offer a point of view that may be useful….” (p. 1) and for this reason the idea of the 
cultural complex is explored here at some length, beginning by emphasising the authors’ 
premise that “the psychology of cultural complexes operates both in the collective 
psychology of the group and in the individual members of the group” (p. 2).  As they also 
point out, although Jung included the cultural level in his schema of the psyche, his theory 
of complexes has never been systematically applied to the life of groups, and Jung never 
took advantage of the original theory of complexes to understand “the psychopathology 
and emotional entanglements of groups, tribes, and nations” (ibid.).  Yet some level of 
collective mentality is present in every individual’s psyche and forms the common ground 
for social continuity as well as the background to everyday life (Alho 2006).  
 
Had Jung pursued the idea of the cultural complex, he might have concluded that it is 
the active agent of the cultural unconscious in the same way that a personal complex is the 
active agent of the personal unconscious. It functions as the group version of a personal 
complex, anchored in the collective experience of the group’s historical and cultural 
 
143 The term may have been first used by Joseph Henderson of the C.G. Jung Institute of San Francisco in an 
unpublished letter to Jung in December 1943 (Singer and Kaplinsky 2010, p. 22). 
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recollection. This is not to say that Jung made no contribution to collective psychology.  
His 1936 essay ‘Wotan’, for example, analyses how the German psyche was becoming 
possessed by primitive and archetypal urges,144 and he highlights the dangers of “mass-
mindedness”.145  The idea of mass-mindedness is worth exploring further because a 
cultural complex is, almost by definition, a creature of the collective.  There can be little 
doubt that if the concept of the cultural complex had been developed in 1936 Jung would 
have embraced it wholeheartedly as it would have helped elucidate one of his major 
concerns at the time: the tension between the individual and the mass.   This is relevant 
here because one of the perennial problems for scholar-practitioners is trying to discern 
whether a certain view belongs solely to an individual, whether it is also held by a group of 
which the individual is part and is repeated because by doing so the cohesion of the group 
is secured and the identity of the individual as a member of it is reinforced, or a mixture of 
the two.  The value of further insight in this direction is not limited to the context of 
religious conflict: there are many situations where people are influenced by mass culture 
and group pressures apart from the religious or ideological.146  
 
Many of Jung’s most powerful statements about the relations between the individual 
and society, and about the dangers of mass-mindedness, appear in ‘The Undiscovered Self’ 
(1957).  The timing and context of this essay is important: Jung had lived through the rise of 
the dictatorships of Germany and Italy in the 1930s and their terrible consequences for 
 
144 It was this essay that gave rise to the accusations of anti-Semitism against Jung that persist to this day and 
have damaged his reputation (Samuels 1997) despite his repeated denials (e.g. Bauman 1949; Maidenbaum 
2002, pp. 232-233).   By focusing on the power of the Wotan myth and ignoring the social, cultural and 
political condition of Germany Jung gave the impression that he continued to support the spirit of neopagan 
Volkstumsbewegung that the Nazis had embraced in the 1920s and 30s.  
145 Throughout his writing Jung speaks of the dangers of identification with the collective psyche. For 
example in Two Essays on Analytical Psychology (1917, 1928) he observes how much our “so-called 
individual psychology is really collective” and “very special attention must be paid to this delicate plant 
‘individuality’ if it is not to be completely smothered” (Jung CW7, para. 241). 
146 It should be noted that complexes can be used to explain many aspects of human behaviour; for the 




Europe, and now perceived something similar both in the rise of communism and, perhaps 
more significantly, in the rise of scientific knowledge “based in the main on statistical truths 
and abstract knowledge and therefore imparts an unrealistic, rational picture of the world, in 
which the individual, as a merely marginal phenomenon, plays no role” (Jung CW10, paras. 
498-9).  Jung argues that scientific assumptions result in individual people suffering a 
levelling down and a process of blurring that distorts the picture of reality into a conceptual 
average.  There is some irony in this, given that Jung liked to insist on himself as a scientist 
and, some might argue, in his use of word association tests had employed the approach he is 
decrying here.  In the twenty-first century, subject to the power of global corporations and 
the mass media, dangers more urgent than the rise of the over-mighty State may be apparent, 
but it is still possible to share Jung’s concerns about the one-sidedness that “is always 
compensated psychologically by unconscious subversive tendencies” (ibid., para. 500).147   
But would he now argue for ‘Religion as the Counterbalance to Mass-Mindedness’ (1957) 
as he did in his essay of that title?  His argument was based on the idea of religion as a 
bulwark against the power of the State because “it is possible to have an attitude to the 
external conditions of life only when there is a point of reference outside them” (ibid., para. 
506), and religion, he goes on to say, provides such a standpoint and also “another authority 
opposed to that of the ‘world’” (ibid., para. 507) which provides “the evidence of inner, 
transcendent experience which alone can protect him from the otherwise inevitable 
submersion in the mass” (ibid., para. 511).   These days people might be more inclined to 
see religious adherence more as a symptom of mass-mindedness than as a defence against it, 
 
147 The United Kingdom’s vote for Brexit in June 2016 may be regarded as ‘subversive’ in this way; see for 
example Ishkanian, A 2019, ‘Social Movements, Brexit and Social Policy’, Social Policy and Society, vol. 
18, Cambridge University Press, no. 1, pp. 147–159. 
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which is a useful reminder that what pertains in one culture may not in another time and 
place, and that interpretation of ‘subversion’ depends on point of view.148   
Since the publication of The Cultural Complex Singer, Kimbles and other depth 
psychologists have developed their understanding of what a cultural complex is and how it 
functions.  For example, Singer and Kaplinsky summarise the cultural complex as a large 
scale social complex that forms in the cultural unconscious of groups (2010, p. 23).  The 
value of this theory is that it offers a new perspective for understanding the psyche of 
individuals who find themselves in conflict around their personal and group identity and 
the consequent internal and external pressures.  It also provides, they argue, a unique 
perspective for understanding the structure and content of the group psyche and especially 
for elucidating the nature of conflicts and attitudes among groups towards one another 
(ibid.).  In the same way as a complex in an individual is an emotionally charged group of 
ideas and images with an archetypal resonance, so the cultural complex similarly affects 
the psyche of individuals within collectives, whether those are groups, organisations, tribes 
or nation states.  The concept of the cultural complex rests on the idea of a cultural 
unconscious which can be conceptualised, according to Singer, “as closer to the surface of 
ego-consciousness than the collective unconscious, from which we understand the 
archetypal patterns to originate” (ibid.).  Singer goes on to say of the shared characteristics 
of personal and cultural complexes that: 
1.  They express themselves in powerful moods and repetitive behaviors. Highly 
charged emotional or affective reactivity is their calling card. 
2.  They resist our most heroic efforts to make them conscious and remain, for the 
most part, unconscious.  
3.  They accumulate experiences that validate their point of view and create a store-
house of self-affirming ancestral memories. 
 
148 An example of this is the Church of England’s 1984 report Faith in the City which can be argued as a 
recent point when ‘the Conservative Party at prayer’ was accused by the then Conservative government of 
‘Marxism’ (Dinham, A 2008, ‘Commentary: From Faith in the City to Faithful Cities: The `Third Way’, the 




4.  Personal and cultural complexes function in an involuntary, autonomous fashion 
and tend to affirm a simplistic point of view that replaces everyday ambiguity and 
uncertainty with fixed, often self-righteous, attitudes to the world.  
5.  In addition, personal and cultural complexes both have archetypal cores; that is, 
they express typically human attitudes and are rooted in primordial ideas about 
what is meaningful, making them very hard to resist, reflect upon, and 
discriminate. 
                     (ibid., pp. 25-6) 
 
 These five points are probably recognisable to most scholar-practitioners as 
describing situations they have encountered.149  The idea of the cultural complex, however, 
also needs to be approached with caution because while it may seem to fit a particular set 
of circumstances, extrapolating beyond this and claiming it can be applied to any situation 
is more problematic. As Kevin Lu cautions, “Too often, ‘applied psychoanalysis’ becomes 
‘wild psychoanalysis’ when interventions ignore the respective epistemologies and 
methodologies of the disciplines onto which depth psychological theories are being 
applied” (Lu 2013, p. 386).150  Moreover, as Singer and Kimbles make clear, the notion of 
cultural complexes is not the same as either cultural identity or national character but is 
easily confused with them (Singer and Kimbles 2004, p. 6), not least because cultural 
complexes, like personal complexes, can imbue those entrapped by them with a simplistic 
certainty about a group’s place in the world in the face of otherwise conflicting and 
ambiguous uncertainties (ibid., p. 7).  The importance of cultural complexes for Singer and 
Kimbles is that they can be activated and take hold of the collective psyche of the group 
and the psyches of individual members of the group: “cultural complexes can seize the 
 
149 For example, a meeting mediated in South Africa between black and Afrikaner church leaders included a 
“store-house of self-affirming ancestral memories”, a “simplistic point of view” and “often self-righteous 
attitudes to the world” to justify the then church-sanctioned doctrine of apartheid (Acland 1990, p. 165).   
150This is something to be remembered when it comes to the question of whether Jung can help to explain 
conflict that stems from religious differences more generally.  Dourley (2006) provides an introduction in his 
examination of the affinities between Samuel Huntington’s thinking in his seminal essay, ‘The Clash of 
Civilizations?’ (1993), and that of Jung, notably his identification of religion as key to the making of culture.  
Jung, argues Dourley, says religious conflict “represents the conflict between the archetypal powers bonding 
the conflicted communities” and “communities differentiated by their archetypal bonding, with the ever present 
danger of being rendered unconscious by such bonding….can readily find themselves compelled through the 
archetypal enmity such bonding generates to destroy the common human psyche that created them” (Dourley 
2006, p. 38). 
 
 91 
imagination, the behaviour and the emotions of the collective psyche and unleash 
tremendously irrational forces in the name of their logic” (ibid.). 
 
 This contention, and its application to religious communities, is illustrated in The 
Cultural Complex by Manisha Roy’s essay on how Puritanism in America turned a religious 
archetype into a cultural complex (ibid., pp. 64-77).  Roy argues that the American cultural 
complex is the consequence of the tension between the Judaeo-Christian God-image of 
Yahweh as the embodiment of “perfection” and “righteousness” and the Christian image of 
Christ which, in Jung’s view, was an archetype more concerned with “wholeness”.151  Roy 
contends that the early Pilgrims to America, escaping persecution in England, brought with 
them their puritanical faith and imposed it on the New World despite the political, 
environmental and physical obstacles in their way, and it is this that lingers on behind the 
scenes in the form of a cultural complex (ibid., p. 74).  She believes it is responsible for two 
of the most striking elements in American society: the tendency to strict judgment of others’ 
sexual and ethical morality, and “the absence of any awareness of one’s power shadow” 
(ibid.).152  She goes on to argue that this complex that enshrines the will to perfection also 
inclines the country’s leaders to self-righteousness and arrogance with no balancing input 
from the wholeness of the Christ-image.  Roy admits that the ethnic and cultural mix in the 
United States is enormously complex, and that each cultural tradition brings its own creative 
energies and cultural archetypes to the melting pot; nevertheless, she argues, “the simple and 
painful psychological fact [is] that the more unconscious a complex is, the more energy it 
can hold and the more likely it is to have negative and destructive effects” (ibid., p. 75).  If 
 
151 In Aion (1951) Jung writes: “The Christ-image is as good as perfect (at least it is meant to be so), while the 
archetype (so far as is known) denotes completeness but is far from being perfect…. The individual may strive 
after perfection….but must suffer from the opposite of his intentions for the sake of completeness” (Jung 
CW9ii, para. 123). Much of Jung’s psychology is concerned with reconciling the opposites and fractures 
within individuals in the name of achieving a psychological and spiritual wholeness.   
152 See below for discussion of the concept of the shadow in analytical psychology. 
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Roy is correct it might explain some of the social and political paradoxes that make a God-
fearing nation also one of the most divided and violent: it is not the fact of a cultural 
complex rooted in a particular form of religion that is the problem – but its one-sidedness.153   
 
 The Cultural Complex contains a number of other examples of what their authors 
consider can be regarded as cultural complexes: malinchismo, the tendency to reject one’s 
own culture, in Mexico; corruption in Brazil; racism generally; and ubuntu, the spirit of 
fellowship, humanity, and compassion (Gade 2012), an example of how a cultural complex 
can be available for positive ends.  The common thread in all these examples of cultural 
complexes is their ability to affect the fundamental feelings of those who experience them; 
the strength and depth of their lodging in the unconscious; their ability to accrue further 
experience that confirms their validity and resists dilution or variation; and, critically, their 
archetypal cores expressing primordial aspects of human experience.  These examples also 
suggest a causal nexus between cultural values, collective identity and the personality traits 
that dominate in a particular culture (Alho 2006).   While The Cultural Complex itself 
contains no explicitly religious examples other than that of Manisha Roy quoted above, it is 
not difficult to see how the hatred manifest in recent and current conflicts with religious 
dimensions could be increased by cultural complexes among protagonists.  Moreover, in 
papers written before The Cultural Complex Singer and Kimbles do provide some thoughts 
on how group complexes can take over an entire community or nation with destructive 
consequences.154  An essay of Singer’s, for example, notes that “radical Muslim terrorism is 
 
153 To some extent this is reminiscent of Integrative Complexity (IC).  Although a world away from Jung’s 
psychology in terms of theory and methods, IC confirms that extremist ideologies of any kind feature heavily 
polarised positions and simplified, black-and-white thinking through a lens that rejects shades of grey, any 
degree of ambiguity or any acceptance of other points of view. See for example Suedfeld, P, Tetlock, P and 
Streufert, S 1992, “Conceptual/Integrative Complexity,” in Smith, CP  (ed.), Motivation and Personality: 
Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis, Cambridge University Press, New York.  
154 It can also be argued that in 2016 the issue of Brexit took on quasi-religious significance for both its 
supporters and decriers: the bitterness of the language being used and the polarisation of believers and non-
 
 93 
a demonic, archetypal defence designed to protect and relive a collective spirit wounded by 
the loss of its scientific, technological and materialistic initiative to the West”.155   If there is 
an Islamic complex it is presumably based on the idea, belief and memory that there was 
once a golden age of Islam before the West intervened through colonization and the 
imposition of secular states that compromised the purity of Islam within the Muslim world, 
the consequence being that some Muslims now feel oppressed by the secular and godless 
West (Savage and Liht 2009, p. 490).   
 
The concept of the shadow  
 
There is one common archetype, the shadow, associated with all complexes, both 
personal and cultural, that is likely to amplify any feeling of hatred already associated with 
a complex.  The shadow is one of the archetypes which, Jung maintained, is an 
unconscious aspect of personality and the container of all of which an individual is either 
ignorant or reluctant to acknowledge.  "Everyone carries a shadow," Jung wrote in 
Psychology and Religion "and the less it is embodied in the individual's conscious life, the 
blacker and denser it is" (Jung 1938, p. 93).  One of the consequences of the shadow is the 
human tendency to project: to see in others the shadow aspects of oneself, and to react 
against those people because they embody what one does not wish to admit in oneself.  
These are the generalities of popular psychology and mentioned only as a reminder of what 
shadow and projection mean, very broadly, in the context of depth psychology.  But this 
contrast of light and dark is hardly new: indeed, one of the primary purposes of religion 
 
believers has all the hallmarks, using the Singer-Kimbles definitions, of cultural complexes being activated 
for both sides. 
155 Quoted from a review of Beebe, J (ed.) 2002, Terror, Violence and the Impulse to Destroy: Perspectives 
from Analytical Psychology, papers from the North American Conference of Jungian Analysts and 
Candidates,  Einsiedeln, Switzerland in Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2007, vol. 52, pp. 369–379. 
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has always been, arguably, to define the shadow side so that it may be avoided.  The 
polarity is sometimes made explicit for religious believers: the prophet Isaiah in the Old 
Testament of the Christian Bible, for example, says “Woe unto them that call evil good, 
and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet , 
and sweet for bitter….” (Isaiah 5:20, King James Version).  In Chinese Taoism the yin-
yang symbol shows us the alliance of opposites curled around each other and containing 
within each the pole of the opposite (Zweig and Abrams 1991, p.129), while the Sufi poet 
Rumi prefigures the idea of projection when he says “If thou hast not seen the devil, look 
at thine own self” (ibid.).  In Hinduism and Buddhism these aspects of light and dark are 
personified by gods and demons, the rakshasas, spirits, that inhabit the human mind in the 
form of largely negative emotions such as greed, jealousy and envy. 
 
Where there is a complex, there is a shadow, and the shadow is always involved in 
processes of change: “as in its collective, mythological form, so also the individual shadow 
contains within it the seed of an enantiodromia, of a conversion into its opposite” (Jung 
1959, p. 272).156  In the case of the cultural complex it contains the shadow aspects of the 
culture: prejudices, violence, indifference to social injustice (Corbett 2012, p. 164) and 
presumably, in parallel with the personal complex, the archetypes of enemies, treacherous 
 
156 Quoted in Collins, M, Hughes, W and Samuels, A 2010, ‘The Politics of Transformation in the Global 
Crisis: Are Spiritual Emergencies Reflecting an Enantiodromia in Modern Consciousness?, Psychotherapy 
and Politics International, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 162–176.  The concept of enantiodromia, which Jung borrowed 
from Heraclitus (Jung 1923, pp. 541-542) embodies the principles of balance and compensation at the heart 
of analytical psychology: “The spirit is also a self-regulation system that maintains its own balance, as well 
as the body. If any process goes too far, it will immediately cause compensation. Without the compensation, 
there will be neither normal metabolism nor normal spirit. People can regard compensation theory as a rule of 
spiritual behavior. The absence of one party will result in an overdose of the other party (Stevens, A (trans. 
Yang, S) 2007, A Brief Analysis of Jung, Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, Beijing quoted in 
Yali, X 2015, ‘Study on the "Enantiodromia" in Analytical Psychology’, Advances in Social Science, 
Education and Humanities Research, vol. 329, Atlantis Press, Beijing.) It should be noted that the conscious 
and unconscious are separate and the one may be employed in balancing the other: in other words 





strangers, evil intruders (Stevens 1990, p. 45).  When a cultural complex is activated, 
Singer argues, very primitive emotions – fear, hatred, and violent rage - are generated in 
individuals and groups of people, and with these come the shadow projections that explain 
the practice of scapegoating and demeaning society’s out-groups (Singer 2010).  It is a 
propensity that can be manipulated by national leaders: for example Hitler’s repeated 
mention of Untermenschen, subhumans, by which he meant people of Jewish and Slavic 
origin.  As Anthony Stevens describes, “By skilful use of the Nazi propaganda machine, he 
was able to induce a sizeable portion of the German population to project its shadow 
collectively onto these tragically unfortunate people” (ibid., p. 44).  This was the 
consequence of the shadow expressed through the German cultural complex in the 1930s 
and, Jung would presumably argue, was the enantiodromia which balanced Germany’s 
long history at the apex of European culture.  The importance of enantiodromia is 
something to which this dissertation will return in later chapters. 
 
The same shadow process has been enacted through the dark sides of religion 
(Corbett 2012, p. 236).  In some it is explicit: the Norse god Loki, for example, is the 
epitome of wickedness and dishonesty (Crossley-Holland 1980, pp. 162-172); the Egyptian 
pantheon contained the evil god Seth (or Set) (Velde 1977); and Manichaeism espoused 
the doctrine of two opposing principles, light and dark, in a constant cosmic battle.157  
Christianity is set apart, in Jungian thinking, by its insistence that God is entirely good 
even though the Old Testament indicates some genocidal tendencies and unbelievers in the 
 
157 Jung’s approach to Manichaeism was central to his thinking about Christianity: “Hence very early, in 
Clement of Rome, we meet with the conception of Christ as the right hand and the devil as the left hand of 
God, not to speak of the Judaeo-Christian view which recognized two sons of God, Satan the elder and Christ 
the younger. The figure of the devil then rose to such exalted metaphysical heights that he had to be forcibly 
depotentiated, under the threatening influence of Manichaeism. The depotentiation was effected this time by 
rationalistic reflection, by a regular tour de force of sophistry which defined evil as a privatio boni. But that 
did nothing to stop the belief from arising in many parts of Europe during the eleventh century, mainly under 




New Testament’s Book of Revelation are subject to angels bringing plagues (Chapters 15 
and 16). Jung points out that if Christians wish to be truly monotheistic then both good and 
evil must be obtained in the single image of God (Jung CW11, para. 357).158  The 
relevance of this to the generation of religious hatred is that when human beings are 
subject to circumstances that stimulate to action an unconscious religious complex, it is 
presumably as likely to activate the dark and shadow side of religion as it is to activate the 
light and love that religions prefer to emphasise.  This highlights the difference between a 
traditional God-image, where God is only good, and lived experience where events which 
raise questions about the absence or complicity of God, make belief harder.  As Lionel 
Corbett argues, “from a psychological point of view, our experience of God matters more 
than our doctrine of God…” (Corbett 2012, p. 166). 159 
 
To summarise this argument from psychodynamic psychology, personal and cultural 
complexes that have their roots in any religious tradition are as likely to stimulate 
destructive as constructive behaviour because, whatever they may profess, all religions have 
dark sides.  The next question is how the currency of destructive behaviour, which must 
include religious hatred, can spread so rapidly as to engulf entire populations.160  
 
The circulation of affect  
 
 
158 Jung famously (notoriously, for some) explored the dark side of God in Answer to Job (1952) which 
examines the psychological implications of the Book of Job. Jung has God realise, through his treatment of 
Job, that he is perhaps not wholly good after all, and this revelation pushes him into the process of self-
transformation that leads to his incarnation as Jesus (Stein 1999, p. 285). 
159 It was this that lead Jung to believe that the power of evil is more than simply human. While it could be 
argued that events such as the Holocaust or the atomic bombing of Hiroshima were purely the result of 
human behaviour, Jung felt that occurrences of such magnitude are far too terrible to be of purely human 
origin.  Corbett says that some theologians acknowledge this, for example Jim Garrison in The Darkness of 
God (1982) argues that Hiroshima cannot be explained away as a purely human disaster and that God must 
have been involved.  
160 The concept of the shadow is discussed further in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
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The concept of the complex has found its way into popular speech – for example 
someone may be remonstrated with for teasing a child: “Don’t do that – it’ll give him a 
complex” – but, generally speaking, the idea of the complex is usually subsumed into talk 
about emotions.  This is perfectly accurate even if only partially true, leaving out as it does 
the complex as a source of emotions, and therefore to understand the extent to which 
complexes are perceived in discussion of conflict attention must be paid to the emotions.  
This is not, at least as regards political and religious conflict, as ubiquitous as might be 
expected, perhaps because it is assumed that matters of high politics are immune from 
emotion and that politicians and diplomats move in circles exempt from the forces that 
shape human behaviour in most other contexts (Ross 2013, p. 152).161  This assumption 
cannot last beyond a moment’s reflection: whether the latest ructions in the world involve 
suicide bombing, financial crises, natural disasters or demonstrations against government 
policies, without exception they engage emotion as much as reason (ibid.).  It would be 
untrue to say that emotion has been entirely overlooked in the study of international 
relations and conflict resolution: the role of fear in shaping defence procurement, for 
example, or the dangers of groupthink in decision-making have both been comprehensively 
studied, but there is still some tendency to treat emotions “as periodic aberrations from 
some baseline of “rational” competency.  The result is an assumption that affective 
motivations can be set aside by standard models of rational action” (ibid., p.152).  
 
 
161 Ross’s insight on this point deserves more extended exposure: “Scholars informed by political theory have 
identified the need to disentangle the presuppositions associated with secularism in the West before religious 
elements of political agency can be properly understood. We are unlikely to comprehend the complex politics 
of terrorist organizations without connecting up discussions in security studies and foreign policy with 
insights from these fields. Transnational religious movements employing violence are—like Western 
humanitarian organizations who instead pursue liberal forms of advocacy—at once political, cultural, and 
normative projects that cannot be understood without attention to the way fluid circulations of affect unite 
their members and connect them to even broader audiences. While scholars may hold disciplinary 
conventions in great esteem, emotions that migrate across social settings, actors, and political issues 




Another element of emotions that is easy to overlook is that they are 
multidimensional.  All emotions carry with them, for example, physiological consequences 
– how people look and move; their ability to interpret their proprioceptive sense (Acland et 
al 2013); the social, cultural and political impacts of their emotional state – whether they 
respond with arrogance or empathy, for example, towards those who may not share their 
preoccupations; and their cognitive abilities will likewise be affected by how they feel and 
the acuity of their intuitive capabilities.  The cumulative effect of these is that social 
interactions must be regarded as the key medium of emotional exchange, and many 
important social interactions, particularly in situations of conflict, will be fleeting and often 
non-verbal.  The result is socially transmitted blocks of emotion that the political scientist 
Andrew Ross calls “circulations of affect” (Ross 2013, p. 218).    
 
It is not difficult to imagine how complicated becomes the task of the scholar- 
practitioner when, in addition to examining the normative structures of political conflict, 
for example, the practitioner must look also at how these circulations and re-circulations of 
affect have been formed, shaped and evolved into new forms that may be relatively 
transient.  Add to these the need to understand the complexes that may also have 
determined their development, and it becomes apparent how much data the practitioner 
must theoretically assimilate before deciding on any course of action.  Looking at the 
possible complexes, on the other hand, which may be driving the emotions, might be 
considered relatively straightforward given that both personal and cultural complexes 
usually have their roots in past experience which, certainly in the case of the latter, is 
usually a matter of public knowledge.   The scholar practitioner might conclude that it is 
generally easier to predict the emotions that arise from a complex than it is to start with a 













Part 3 of this dissertation examines religious hatred within the framework of six 
dimensions of religion.  These dimensions, whose provenance is discussed below, provide 
a way to think systematically about religious hatred for both the scholar and the 
practitioner.  They draw on the literatures of conflict resolution, psychology of religion and 
cognitive and psychodynamic psychology summarised in Chapters 3 and 4, and the aspects 
of hatred they highlight are reflected in the implications for dialogue and diapraxis set out 
in Chapter 12.  While deciding which dimensions to use has not been straightforward, as 
the discussion below illustrates, it is arguable how significant the final decisions about 
dimensions are when they are ultimately no more than structural lenses through which to 
look at religious hatred: as will become apparent, the drivers of religious hatred become 
increasingly clear and pan-dimensional.  The dimensional structure does, nevertheless, 
provide anchors for a subject that it is liable otherwise to become too fluid and diffuse to 
permit systematic thought.  
 
Exploring possible frameworks 
 
 
It is legitimate to ask from the outset about the nature and provenance of these 
‘dimensions’ and how they relate to various taxonomies of religion, though it is a 
discussion difficult to separate from wider discourse about the nature of religion itself.  
The most obvious taxonomy of religion is that which divides religions into ‘world’ or 
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‘universalistic’ religions, often those with the numerically largest number of adherents 
(Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism).  Alternatively they could be divided into the 
three divisions structuralists would call ‘degree-zero’: Religions of Antiquity, New 
Religions, and Religions of Traditional Peoples.162  But none of these describes the internal 
components of religion in a way that assists a scholar-practitioner understanding of how 
religious hatred might arise either generally or in the course of ‘conflict with religious 
dimensions’.  
 
The challenges in doing this are reflected in the dissection of religion by Ninian 
Smart which was published with six dimensions in The Religious Experience of Mankind 
(1969), with a seventh and eighth added two decades later for The World’s Religions 
(1989) only to be removed for Worldviews (1995) though increased again, to nine, for 
Dimensions of the Sacred (1996).  This process reflects the extent to which the content of 
Smart’s dimensions also evolved as he struggled with the attendant problem of definition: 
“if our seven-dimensional portrait of religions is adequate, then we do not need to worry 
greatly about further definition of religion” (1989, p. 21). He was particularly taxed, for 
example, as to whether Marxism should be included as a religion when it specifically 
proscribes “the invisible world” (1969, p. 21) which was crucial to his analysis on the 
grounds that personal religion “normally involves the hope of, or realization of, experience 
of that world” (ibid.).  The challenge to this has been that if one judges that Marxism 
proclaims a future classless utopia as an invisible world, then Marxism should surely 
qualify as a religion (Rennie 1999).  By 1995 Smart was including nationalism in addition 
to Marxism and humanism to what he calls “worldview analysis” while insisting that 
 
162 Lévi-Strauss, C 1950, Sociologie et anthropologie par Marcel Mauss, Presses Universitaires de France, 
Paris) quoted by Smith JZ 1996, ‘A Matter of Class: Taxonomies of religion’, Harvard Theological Review, 




secular worldviews are not religion but have “some of the same characteristics” (1995, 
p.45).  Despite this he still analyses them as religious because they have a “distinctly 
religious-type function” (1989, p. 25) and eventually concludes that “[T]he washing away 
of a fundamental distinction between religion and secular worldviews enables us to ask 
more sensible questions about the functions of systems of belief” (1994, p. 604).  By 1996, 
however, while the political and economic dimensions of religion have been included, 
albeit with little detail or explanation, Smart’s references to the invisible world have 
significantly declined despite his elevation of the Experiential and Emotional Dimension to 
its place at the head of his other dimensions.  This sequence of development illustrates both 
the tension between taxonomy and definition, and the difficulties concealed in a phrase 
such as ‘conflict with religious dimensions’.163  
 
While Smart and his many predecessors are correct in seeing religiosity as multi-
dimensional, the number and nature of these dimensions tends to depend on the purposes 
they are being called upon to serve, and when tested in the field the dimensions identified 
relate to the characteristics of those who are being sampled and to some extent the 
subjectivity of the interpreter.  It can reasonably be argued, therefore, that there are 
precedents for creating a list of dimensions that will serve the analytical needs of the 
 
163 Smart was by no means the first scholar to attempt such an analysis.  Looking briefly at past examples of 
such attempts, the theologian von Hügel in 1908 suggested that religion has three successive dimensions: the 
traditional, based largely on childhood experiences; the rational, which rests on the ability to think in 
abstract terms that comes with increasing maturity of reasoning; and the intuitive which grows out of the 
experiences of maturity. In a later example, in 1962 Glock divided religion into ideological, ritualistic, 
intellectual, experiential and consequential dimensions, while in 1998 Bailey in his documentation of 
Implicit Religion suggested it be defined in terms of commitment, social integration and religious and 
secular interrelationships. Such schemas have also been subjected to analysis in the field.  For example, in 
1966 Faulkener and DeJong tested Glock’s dimensions on a sample of students, revealing that, generally, 
while the experiential and consequential dimensions were quite distinctive, the others, particularly the 
ideological and intellectual, were more closely related even though the results, when interrogated further, 
revealed gender, denominational and inter-faith differences. Similarly, in 1982 Batson and Ventis conducted 
research into Allport’s concept of extrinsic and intrinsic religion (1959) which suggested a third orientation 
they called ‘quest’; this adds a dimension characterised by a willingness to be more open-minded and 
motivated by the search for personal growth (Hills P and Argyle M 2002, ‘A Psychological Dimension to 
Implicit Religion’ in Implicit Religion, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 69-79). 
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scholar-practitioner studying how religious hatred may be manifested in and through them.  
Beyond this there have also been attempts to grapple, as Smart also did, with what actually 
constitutes religion.  Greil and Robins (1994) for example distinguish between quasi- and 
para-religions.  The former are defined as forms of belief and behaviour that have a sacred 
dimension but lack formal organisation; environmentalism is an example.164  Para-religions 
are movements that while having an essentially secular focus, in their approaches and 
methods use processes similar to those of evangelical religion; Alcoholics Anonymous is 
an example.165  In addition to these, and perhaps inhabiting the world of both quasi- and 
para-religions, are the movements for self-development that have grown out of the 
popularisation of psychology, the development of holistic and alternative medicine and the 
evolution of New Age beliefs and other new religious movements (NRMs).  
 
 It becomes apparent that in exploring the concept of religious hatred as part of 
‘conflict with religious dimensions’ the discussion inevitably moves onto what ‘religious’ 
means and from there to what constitutes ‘religion’. The concept of religion is likely to 
remain contentious despite many attempts to categorise different types of religion in the 
quest for consensus but, as has been pointed out, in this regard religion is no different from 
concepts such as ‘the economy’, ‘politics’ or ‘society’ (Woodhead 2010), where scholars 
proceed without final definitions.  But, as Woodhead also points out, “the definition of 
 
164 Full discussion of the para-religious and psychodynamic dimensions of environmentalism are beyond the 
scope of this dissertation but might shed light on the nature and intensity of conflict over environmental 
issues. The mythological and religious traditions of many cultures include references to for example, ‘World 
Trees’ as the point of contact between the mundane and trans-mundane ((Eliade 1959, p. 256); ‘Sacred 
Groves’ have played a similar role (Hughes 1990).  Williams (1990) argues that such spiritual experience of 
the natural world involves the projection of unconscious archetypes, and the ignorance or repression of such 
archetypes can mean they assume a negative form that can overwhelm the conscious ego if the objects of 
those projections are threatened by, for example, environmental damage or degradation (Schroeder 1992).  
165 Alcoholics Anonymous was founded in 1934 by William G. Wilson, as a consequence of a remark the 
analytical psychologist Carl Jung had made to a patient whom he was treating for chronic alcoholism: “His 
craving for alcohol was the equivalent on a low level of the spiritual thirst of our being for wholeness, 




religion is not the same as the concept of religion” (ibid.).  The latter is criticised by all 
sides: by Christian theologians because ‘religion’ is a modern concept based on secular 
presuppositions that distort its reality; by secularists claiming it is too Christian; by 
postcolonial critiques who see ethnocentric imperialist biases forcing non-Western cultures 
into Western straightjackets; and by academics, including Woodhead, who observe that the 
“normativity of many sociological conceptions...in which a normal of ‘real’ religion 
(congregational, orderly, civic) has the effect of constructing alternative forms of religion 
as ‘fuzzy’, individualistic’, ‘eclectic’ and even ‘narcissistic’ ” (Woodhead 2011).  
Woodhead’s answer is to offer a taxonomy of five major concepts of religion that embrace 
its inherently multi- and inter-disciplinary nature: religion as culture, identity, relationship, 
practice and power, with a number of sub-categories within each.  Under the heading of 
culture, for example, Woodhead explores religion as belief and meaning, as meaning and 
cultural order, as values, as discourse, as ideology and mystification, and as tradition and 
memory.  Similar sub-categories under each of her main divisions, with explanations of 
their logic, antecedents and derivation, provide a comprehensive approach that in many 
ways overlaps with Ninian Smart’s.  Her taxonomy is compared with Smart’s below. 
 
  One exception is the concept of religion as power which, Woodhead argues, lies at 
the heart of religion but has been neglected in recent times largely because increasingly 
secular societies have tended to assume religion’s loss of social power.166  But, as 
Woodhead points out, power has always lain at the heart of religion, whether it is the 
power that is drawn from relationship with higher powers, or the powers wielded by 
religious institutions and elites over their adherents and followers and through their wider 
 
166 The British Academy’s The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding (Sylvestri and Mayall, 2015) 
is notable among recent publications for its appreciation of power as a dimension of religion that can be 
overlooked in the contemporary world. 
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influence in society.  The mention of power always catches the attention of scholar-
practitioners in the conflict resolution field because of the significance of power relations 
in all forms of conflict, and it is worth examining Woodhead’s dissertation more closely to 
appreciate whether this significance should be incorporated into an analytical framework 
designed to tease out how religious hatred contributes to religious conflict, given that 
hatred can have its roots in oppression by the powerful.  She highlights, for example, the 
importance of religion as a ‘compensator’ for those denied worldly power (Stark and 
Bainbridge 1985) and Robert Putnam’s idea of religion’s ability to build ‘social capital’ 
(Putnam 2000). Woodhead mentions also the importance of ritual in cementing power 
through the coordination of individual actions and solidaristic emotions and bonds to the 
point that the need for intellectual debate and agreement can be bypassed, referencing 
Kertzer’s naming of this as ‘solidarity without consensus’ (Kertzer 1988).167  The analysis 
of religion as a form of power has, according to Woodhead, far-reaching implications, 
from the macro-level where religion influences through alliance with class, party and 
gender politics to the micro, as in “the practice of young Muslim women in Europe 
wearing hijab and niqab.... as an attempt to win recognition for a form of identity which is 
self-defined rather than imposed by the majority society” (Woodhead 2011). 
 
  This appreciation of power in relation to religion stems in part from greater 
awareness of the ‘functional’ as well as the ‘substantive’ conceptions of religion, the 
former focusing on how faith is articulated in practice through its impact on the thinking 
and behaviour of individuals and groups (Gellner 1992, p.3; Frazer and Friedli 2015, p. 
31).  Silvestri and Mayall (2016) conclude that Duffy (2004) and Thomas (2005) are 
 
167 This is a useful reminder that individuals and communities can be moved to action without intellectual 
assent to the reasons behind that action or, indeed, as has been argued about the 2016 referendum on the 
United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union, without the reasons ever being clearly defined.   
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correct to say that “the experiential level (i.e. experiencing shared values and commitment) 
is as important, or perhaps even more important, than the intellectual and cognitive 
dimension of faith” (2015, p. 6).  The theme is reinforced by the conclusions of the 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz in his definition of religion as  
(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general 
order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality 
that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.       
              (Geertz 1993, p.90) 
 
Geertz’s subsequent words resonate with the stance of this dissertation when he says 
religion “tunes human actions to an envisaged cosmic order and projects images of cosmic 
order onto the plane of human experience” (ibid.).168  It is this power of religion to inspire 
belief in a world and an order beyond the current temporal reality that can lead eschatology 
to “turn a disaffected teenager into a suicide bomber” (Johnston and Cox 2003, p. 14).169  
 
The attractions of combining the theoretical and the pragmatic is also exemplified by 
the approach to understanding the scope of religion articulated by George Lindbeck in The 
Nature of Doctrine (1984). He categorises alternative theories as the propositional, the 
experiential-expressive and the cultural-linguistic (Lindbeck 1984, pp. 31-41).  The 
propositional describes religion as a set of propositional claims and organised beliefs about 
the world, handed down across time in the forms of sacred texts and stories, that place 
humankind in relation to a God or gods and provide guidance on the key questions that life 
throws at human beings.  The experiential-expressive approach to religion places its 
emphasis, as the name suggests, on people’s internal emotions, feelings and spiritual 
 
168 Geertz’s conception of religion has been criticised for mistaking religion for ideology in a way that is 
itself ideological (see Steel, S 2002, ‘George Grant: A Critique of Geertz’s Analysis of Religion’, Religious 
Studies and Theology, vol. 21, no. 2, p. 23-36.)  Notwithstanding this critique, Geertz’s appreciation of the 
nature of religious (or indeed, ideological) power remains useful in this context. 
169 It is this latter understanding of power, and the sense of control that may come in its wake, that is explored 
in Chapter 11 of this dissertation. 
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experiences of what Paul Tillich described as “ultimate concern” (Tillich 1957, p. 5); it 
also focuses on the transcendent, the eternal and the numinous, the ‘mysterium tremendum 
et fascinans’ (Otto 1917, p. 12).  The cultural-linguistic theory also reflects the influence of 
cultural anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz (1993).  Using this approach partly to 
criticise the expressive-experiential approach, Lindbeck sees religion as a force that shapes 
how people engage with the world: “...it is similar to an idiom that makes possible the 
description of realities, the attitudes, feelings and sentiments.  Like a culture or language, it 
is a communal phenomenon that shapes the subjectivities of individuals rather than being 
primarily a manifestation of those subjectivities” (Lindbeck 1984, p. 33).  While both the 
cultural-linguistic and expressive-experiential approaches are useful to provide a context 
within which to explore different understandings of religion, neither contribute particularly 
to explaining how and why religious hatred emerges in some social, political and cultural 
contexts, and in some individuals, but not others.  
 
  There is a point at which further discussion of the rightness or wrongness of 
conceptualizing typologies of religion ceases to have much value.  As Cox (1998) argues, 
“The problem centers on the capacity of scholars to create broad generalizations for the 
purposes of comparison while still maintaining an accurate account of specific data on 
which the generalizations are based”; in the post-modern debate further doubt is raised 
about this capacity.  At the heart of the postmodern critique is, argues Cox, a rejection of 
universals on the grounds, first, that unified knowledge about human societies and cultures 
is effectively impossible; secondly, that overarching interpretative theories of histories, 
cultures or societies are empirically unverifiable; and thirdly that any attempt to produce a 
comprehensive conceptual picture of cultures and societies ultimately flies in the face of 




While any scholar-practitioner with experience of religious conflict will be aware of 
the dangers both of over-generalisation and of reducing religion into just another point of 
view, defining what exactly falls within the scope of ‘religion’ remains challenging, and 
this is a further reason for establishing a clear table of dimensions before discussing how 
religious hatred fits into an understanding of religion. Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, 
both scholars at Bar-Ilan University, in Religion in World Conflict (2006), for example, 
describe the five social manifestations of religion “under which most of their 
understandings of religion can be placed” (p. 2).  These are religion as identity, belief, 
doctrine, institution and religion as a source of legitimacy.  A similar approach is taken in 
Approaching religion in conflict transformation: concepts, cases and practical 
implications (Frazer and Friedli 2015).  This publication by the Center for Security Studies 
(CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, a body which specialises in the 
mediation of religious conflict, is based on an appreciation of the understanding that active 
interveners in conflict, such as Swiss state-supported mediators, need to perform their 
roles.  CSS admits challenges from the outset concerning what is meant by ‘religious 
belief’, what religions are, what roles they play and how to understand them, reflecting the 
lack of agreement on the definition of religion even in the field of religious studies, but 
equally recognises the need for practitioners to have definitions on which to base their 
work. Frazer and Friedli, for example, use ‘substantive’ and ‘functionalist’ (2015, p. 31), 
the former defining religion by identifying characteristics such as belief in a higher being, 
the latter by what religion can achieve, such as giving people a sense of meaning and 
purpose or contributing to the building of communities.  Beyond this basic dichotomy 
Frazer and Friedli identify twenty-five different approaches to religion, gathering these 
under seven broad and overlapping groupings according to ‘family resemblances’ 
(Wittgenstein 1953, p. 31e): structural functionalist – societal cohesion; sociological 
organization; culture-constituting form; constructivist – response models for societal 
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needs; psychological dimension; perception of transcendence; and X-factor (Frazer and 
Friedli 2015, p. 32).   
 
CSS summarises its approach into five ways of thinking about religion designed to 
“strengthen the analysis of the role of religion in conflict and thereby improve 
corresponding initiatives to transform conflict” (ibid, p. 6).  These are religion as 
community, identifying the collective, community-forming aspects of religion where 
religion can underpin or enhance social cohesion, but may also create a dynamic that 
highlights boundaries between groups and contribute to identity-markers that can lead to 
religious hatred; religion as a set of teachings, characterizing religion as a set of inherited 
teachings on how things are and how they ought to be around which a society can unite, or 
which can also become a source of conflict where groups accept different teachings or 
teachings which challenge the status quo; religion as spirituality, focusing on personal 
experiences of the ultimate which can motivate people to conflict or reconciliation and 
emphasise either shared or different experience; religion as practice which focuses on the 
everyday life of customs, rituals and ceremonies which mark shared or diverse rites of 
passage or memory; and religion as discourse, understood as the words and language used 
to communicate which may also reveal whole ways of thinking about and interpreting the 
world, and in consequence areas of agreement and disagreement which may give rise to 
hatred.  Each of these dimensions, as is apparent from the above, includes what CSS calls 
‘dividers’ (sources of tension) and ‘connectors’ (capacities for peace).     
 
Using the literature  
 
At some point, and taking into account all the arguments outlined above, it has to be 
decided which are the dimensions of religion most likely to give rise to religious hatred 
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and through which religious hatred is most likely to be expressed and experienced.  The 
four lists in the table below summarise the work of scholars and practitioners mentioned 
above: a scholar of religion (Smart 1989), a sociologist with a particular interest in religion 
(Woodhead 2011), two political scientists with a particular interest in religious conflict 
(Fox and Sandler 2006), and one practising mediator and a sociologist of comparative 
religion (Frazer and Friedli 2015).   These four have been chosen for a number of reasons.  
First, those compiling them come from a range of backgrounds and they examine religious 
conflict from different angles: so the range of overlap suggests that such dimensions 
respond to some common cognitive recognitions.  Secondly, they also, albeit perhaps not 
intentionally except in the case of Richard Friedli, reflect practitioners’ need for structures 
that are readily comprehensible, because practitioners often have to make rapid process 
decisions under pressure and are unlikely to remember overly sophisticated formulations.  
Thirdly, they are immediately applicable: they provide practitioners with a framework 
within which fresh knowledge or new understanding can be safely lodged and recalled.   
 
Smart Woodhead Fox & Sandler Frazer & Friedli 
Ritual  





Narrative and Mythic  



















Although reducing each of these lists to these headings does not spell out the detail 
under each, and nor does it quite compare like with like given the differences in the detail, 
it does allow a quick comparison of the broad areas of dimension that each identifies.  
Three, for example, agree that ritual and practice is one dimension of religion; the fourth 
may include it under ‘doctrine’ or ‘institutional’.  Similarly, Frazer and Friedli use the 
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umbrella term ‘teachings’, equating roughly with Smart and Fox and Sandler’s ‘doctrinal 
and philosophical’ and ‘doctrinal/ideological’, while Woodhead puts these under ‘culture’ 
as belief and meaning, cultural order, values, discourse, ideology and mystification, and as 
tradition and memory.  The latter Smart includes under his ‘narrative and mythic’ heading 
and Frazer and Friedli under a blend of ‘community’ and ‘spirituality’, while Fox and 
Sandler see ‘legitimacy’ as the consequence of justification by religious observance.   
Similar observations can be made about other overlaps and combinations, though the 
teasing apart of the mythic, narrative and emotional and experiential dimensions of religion 
is particularly challenging.  It again illustrates the difficulty of agreeing exactly what is 
meant by the ‘dimensions’ of religion: it depends where you are coming from and what 
purpose you envision for the compiling of such lists of dimensions.170  
 
The purpose of this list of ‘dimensions of religion’ is to create a framework within 
which it is possible to examine how the psychological movers of religious hatred may be 
manifested and thereby contribute to religious conflict and also, albeit more tentatively, to 
provide a framework within which to conceive of systematic responses to religious hatred. 
The following paragraphs identify the dimensions of religion which provide a coherent 
framework to suit all these purposes.  Some historical examples are included to illustrate 
the type of circumstances they cover. 
 
170 The dimensions discussion could be much more extensive: Glock (1962) and Verbit (1970) distinguished 
between five or six dimensions; the sociologist of religion Hervieu-Léger (1999) proposed that four major 
dimensions can be organized as the poles of two bipolar and orthogonal axes, the first axis contrasting 
emotions with what she calls “culture” (corresponding to beliefs and intellectual and symbolic heritage) with 
the second axis contrasting ethics with community. Tarakeshwar, Stanton, and Pargament (2003) suggested 
that five dimensions (very close to those described by Verbit) could be helpful for studying cultural 
variability on religion. Atran and Norenzayan (2004) advanced ideas from evolutionary psychology that are 
in favour of some ‘naturalness’ and universality of the major aspects of religion across religions and 
societies. Data from large international sociological studies suggest the usefulness of a model distinguishing 
between beliefs, practice (or behavior), and affiliation (or identification) (e.g. Voas, 2007). The concision of 
Saroglou, V 2011, ‘Believing, Bonding, Behaving, and Belonging: The Big Four Religious Dimensions and 





The first dimension of religion to be considered is that of identity.  It is interesting 
that Woodhead and Fox and Sandler separate out identity as a discrete dimension of 
religion, Frazer and Friedli subsuming it under a mix of community, discourse and 
spirituality, and Smart tending to see identity as part of the social and institutional 
dimension, though it would perhaps be fairer to say that for him identity seems to be more 
of a given vested in the totality of all the dimensions. Fox and Sandler are clear on the 
fundamental importance of identity, citing the many different ways in which conflict 
scholars use religious identity, from deciding which conflicts are religious to examining, 
for example, the extent to which the Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir involves issues of 
religious identity (Fox and Sandler 2006, p. 3).  It can similarly be argued that the 
withdrawal of support from the Dutch Reformed Church over 1986-9 contributed to the 
ending of apartheid because Afrikaner nationalism relied for a major part of its legitimacy 
on its identification with the Christian religion, the Black opposition similarly relying on 
religion in part to shape its legitimacy as a government in waiting.171  Identity is also 
perhaps the dimension of religion most closely associated with hatred in that hatred can so 
often be about destroying or even eliminating the personhood of others as Chapter 3 
describes.  Personal and cultural complexes also both have their roots in the sense of 
individual and communal identity, so the relationship with identity must be an essential 
element in any psychodynamic approach to religious hatred. 
 
The doctrine and practice of religion can cause hatred and conflict because 
 
171 For an insight into these parallel routes to identity see Engdahl, Hans 2012, ‘Theology as politics 
in Afrikaner nationalism and Black consciousness’, Journal of Theology for South Africa, no. 144, pp. 4-25. 
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people’s practices differ (for example, how the sign of the cross should be made172) or 
because the everyday expression of a religion cuts across the needs, interest or values of 
others (as an ancient example, the safety of pilgrimage routes173) or because the practice of 
one person causes offence to another (for example, the eating of pork is offensive to Jews 
and Muslims).   These differences may sometimes seem trivial to the outsider, but they are 
a reminder that what may seem insignificant to one person may be anything but to another.  
Differences of doctrine are illustrated all too easily by the tensions and occasional hatreds 
among Catholics and Protestants that have led to conflict ever since the Reformation and 
remain relevant to this day in contexts such as Northern Ireland.  But the importance of 
doctrine differs from religion to religion, and from denomination to denomination within 
religions, and even between congregations (for example the differences of welcome 
afforded to gay Christians within different congregations of the Church of England).  
Practitioners need to have some understanding of doctrinal conflict and how it is perceived, 
interpreted and practised by individuals in specific situations and circumstances in order to 
understand how grounds for hatred may arise among some believers if individual or 
cultural complexes become activated in the course of its expression.174   
 
The emotional and experiential dimension of religion is important, particularly as a 
motivating factor, because arguably as many people feel as think their way to the beliefs 
 
172 For instance 1652 the Patriarch Nikon introduced changes to Russian Orthodox ritual, including how 
many fingers should be used to make the sign of the cross, which resulted in widespread persecution of the 
so-called Old Believers (старове́ры or старообря́дцы). This was only revoked in 1971. 
173 Reynald de Chatillon’s attacks on the Hajj pilgrim routes in 1181-2 raised politically useful questions 
about Saladin’s dedication to Islam (Lee 2016).  
174 One observer of a recent intra-Anglican dispute comments that doctrine is so loosely conveyed within the 
Church of England that adherents may believe whatever their personal prejudices incline them to believe 
(private communication, October 2017).  In contrast, others have no doubt where they stand: General 
William Boykin, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence under George W. Bush, has been quoted 
as saying that the United States would win the war against Islam because “our God” was bigger than “their 




and sacrifices demanded by faith (James 1902, p. 39; Frijda, Manstead & Bem 2000, pp. 4-
6; Frijda & Mesquita 2000, pp. 50-51).  It is as well therefore to look beyond intellectual 
arguments in matters of religion and appreciate the extent to which it is often an expression 
of deeply felt emotion that may not otherwise find expression; hatred is among the 
emotions that religion can stimulate even where is not the additional impetus of an 
individual or cultural complex to add weight to its expression.   
 
The mythological dimension that can bring to adherents a more transcendent sense 
of their role and place in the world and resonate with whatever individual or cultural 
complexes subsist unconsciously. One illustration is the contemporary show Kynren 
developed by an evangelical Christian to revitalize a depressed town in northern England; 
the partiality of the myth it portrays is doubtless an enduring part of its appeal (Bartie et al 
2020, pp. 281-304).  The mythological dimension of religion also contains adherents’ 
sense of their religion in a more down-to-earth, narrative sense, in contrast to the more 
transcendent sense of the mythic, though in practice the effect may be the same.  One 
example is the Voortrekker Monument on a hilltop south of Pretoria in South Africa, a 
reminder that people do not have to be ‘religious’ to value religion: both Kynren and the 
Voortrekker Monument are examples of this.175 Such blending of the mythic and narrative 
contribute to the role of religion in building identity, creating in-groups and out-groups, 
and fomenting suspicion, distrust and hatred where there is fertile ground in the 
unconscious. 
 
The dimension of a religion that reflects its sacred values is often what is most 
 
175 At one level the monument simply commemorates the Voortrekkers who left the Cape Colony between 
1835 and 1854; its marble frieze illustrates the toils, struggles and religious life of the Voortrekkers. At 
another level the monument enshrines elements of Afrikaner mythology which equate the Voortrekkers with 
the Children of Israel in search of the Promised Land.   
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readily perceived from outside, especially as societies arguably become less willing to 
accept the impacts of religious teaching on personal lives.  Conflict about sensitive issues 
such as abortion, genetic medicine and environmental stewardship are often underpinned 
by specific religious teachings, sometimes pointing in different directions, as well as by 
deep reverberations and unformulated intuitions within individual and collective psyches.  
The Church of England’s Shared Conversations project, which used conflict resolution 
methodologies to facilitate discussions of human sexuality, provided resources setting out 
all points of view and using both doctrinal and sociological arguments to illustrate moral 
and ethical issues.176  For some it is also a small step from claiming religious backing for a 
point of view to condemning others for not sharing it; in some cases even the discussion of 
a rival point of view, and the attempt to reconcile believers, has been condemned as 
sacrilegious in terms that amount to religious hatred.177  Sacred values can also take on 
material forms. Mosques, churches, stupas, burial grounds and other sacred spaces are 
always more than just physical anchors of spiritual allegiances: they can embody, both 
consciously and unconsciously, the meaning and significance of adherents’ beliefs, and 
attacks on them are experienced as more than just attacks on physical objects.  Examples 
include the Islamic State group’s attacks on ancient monuments in Iraq and Syria and the 
Taliban’s destruction of the Buddhist statues at Bamiyan in Afghanistan in 2001.178 
 
The final dimension of religion examined in this dissertation is that of power and 
control as described by Woodhead (2011).  It is important because hatred can often grow 
out of the sense of existential threat to identity and even survival that power can represent. 
 
176 See for example Grace and Disagreement: Writings to Resource Conversation and Grace and Dialogue: 
Shared Conversations on Difficult Issues http://www.sharedconversations.org/resources/ [viewed 30.11.17].  
177 Private communication, 2017.  
178 For an example of how a religious site can become a dimension of wider conflict see Jain, M 2017, The 
Battle for Rama: Case of the Temple at Ayodhya, Aryan Books International, Delhi. 
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The form such power takes will differ from situation to situation and comes in different 
types Acland (1990, p. 86).  Religion can still wield military power, for example, albeit 
indirectly, as was apparent during the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s when various churches 
assumed nationalist positions (Ivekovic 2002).  In addition to such cases, as Woodhead 
argues, there is the power that is perceived to be drawn by religions from their 
relationships with whatever higher powers they acknowledge, and through their historical, 
cultural and social influence.179  From a psychodynamic perspective the control that power 
enables is perhaps more significant than power itself.  
 
 
Religious hatred and the dimensions of religion  
 
Religion may have additional dimensions which are effectively sub-dimensions of 
these, or which include nuances not described above, but these provide a systematic 
framework within which Part 3 of this dissertation can consider the contexts in which the 
activation of unconscious psychodynamic movement can induce or increase religious 
hatred. 180  There is, however, another issue to be acknowledged and mentioned, although 
to consider it in the depth it deserves is outside the scope of this dissertation.  It is the idea 
that the expression of hatred, religious or otherwise, and in speech or action, is in some 
circumstances the expression of evil.  This rests on the idea, again beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, that religion is what stands between humankind and a collective surrender to 
the forces identified by Anthony Storr in Human Destructiveness (1972) and Human 
Aggression (1992).  The argument is, in sum, that human beings without the moderating 
 
179 For a full appreciation of religion and power see Johnston, D and Sampson C 1994, Religion: The Missing 
Dimension of Statecraft, Oxford University Press, New York. 
180 For example, Frazer and Friedli’s (2015) concept of religion as discourse, focused on the words and 
language used to communicate, can be considered to apply to all these dimensions.  Each of them also has 
some role in the creation of (religious) community so arguably ‘community’ can be considered as a 
consequence of their accumulation rather than as a separate dimension. 
 
 116 
influence of religion are prone to indulge their less attractive proclivities, and that religious 
hatred and conflict thrives on the failure of any or all of the dimensions of religion to fulfil 
their positive and benign purposes, both practical and psychological, and instead to allow 
spaces and vacuums in which the negative, malignant and easily manipulated processes 
described by Beck (1999) can begin to take root and in turn generate the deeper, 
psychodynamically rooted problems described in Chapter 4.  It may also be that the failure 
of any single dimension constitutes system failure in this context, leading to the likely 
failure of the other dimensions.  If this is correct, it suggests that it is the multi-dimensional 
nature of religion, and the possibility of cumulative system failure, which can make the 
failure of the positive aspects of religion so calamitous.181  Linking the failure of religion to 
the flourishing of religious hatred and thence to the expression of evil is a challenge to the 
doctrine of the privatio boni, that evil is merely the absence of good and in itself 
insubstantial.182  It can be argued that the failure to curtail religious hatred is more than just 
failure: it is in itself an evil act whose seriousness has perhaps not been appreciated to the 
extent that it should be.  This is why religious hatred and hate speech should be regarded 
not simply as inevitable by-products or symptoms of religious, social or political 
differences, but as phenomena that religious and secular leaders, as well as scholar-
practitioners in the conflict field, should address as a priority.    
 
181 It should be acknowledged that the failure or absence of positive secular values can have the same effect.  
Every society develops sets of beliefs and values, some of them derived from religion, others more secular in 
character.  A society where secularization marginalises religion will still have beliefs and values, but they 
may be implicit, unconscious and increasingly fragmented and perhaps because of this it may not be 
recognised when some or all of them become detached from the wellbeing of that society or its members.  
Over time the absence of values that are explicit and shared can create a vacuum in which toxic values can, 
unnoticed, begin to supersede more wholesome alternatives.   
182 This doctrine is usually attributed to St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430ACE).  See for example “Mali enim 
nulla natura est: sed amissio boni, mali nomen accepit” ("For evil has no positive nature; but the loss of good 
has received the name “evil.”") in The City of God, vol XI, ch. 9. For Jung this was a point of fundamental 
difference with the Christian Church.  In Answer to Job (1952) and Aion (1959) Jung argues that evil is 
psychologically very real and very much more than the absence of good.    
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The first dimension of religion in which the role of religious hatred is considered in 
this dissertation is that of identity, principally because it is arguably the aspect of religion 
most discussed since 11 September 2001 and its consequences, though in foreign policy 
and academic circles the subject has been argued over since Samuel Huntington wrote his 
seminal Clash of Civilisations article in 1993.183  Analysis of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) 
dataset suggests that until about 1980 religious and non-religious forms of ethnic 
nationalism caused approximately the same amount of conflict, but thereafter religious 
nationalist groups became increasingly involved in violence.184   Taken at face value, events 
such as 9/11 and scholarship such as Huntington’s appear less surprising: it shows that 
religion’s influence on conflict, especially on the sort of intra-state conflict shaped by rival 
nationalisms of all kinds, has been broadly increasing for some time.185  From this it is 
difficult to conclude other than that identity, as represented by various forms of ethnicity 
and nationalism, is certainly a dimension of conflict, and that religion can add both 
legitimation and the spark that ignites hatred.  
 
This does not, however, tell us what ‘identity’ really means to those for whom it is 
worth fighting over.  In conflict resolution circles it is common to understand religion 
primarily, if not wholly, as a signifier of identity and therefore to consider actual matters of 
faith largely as expressing historical, cultural or political perspectives in a specific social 
 
183 Huntington, S 1993, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3.  
184 The State Failure (SF) dataset shows a rise in religious violence beginning around 1965, though this may 
be attributed to the higher sensitivity of that dataset to changes in the level of violence. 
185 This tends to contradict modernization and secularization theory that for most of the 20th century 
predicted the demise of religion as a relevant political and social force in the modern era (Fox 2004). 
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context.  Secondly, both personal and practitioner experience suggest that personal identity 
is fundamental to personal agency: what people do depends in large part on who they feel 
themselves to be.  It could be argued that the first of these explains the second: so religious 
hatred and all its toxic consequences stem from the exaggerations, distortions and 
projections that accompany the assertion of religious identities.  
 
The contention in this dissertation is that this approach is too simplistic.  It does not 
explain why the relationship between religion and identity can become so toxic, nor why 
the moral and spiritual demands of a religious identity are not able to overcome the baser 
human instincts.  While it is undoubtedly true, as Robert Winston argues, that 
“....cooperation creates a common identity and a sense of safety and fellowship” it is also 
true, as he adds, that “We constantly make the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’; we 
differentiate ourselves from the group in the next valley or in the next country, or from a 
group that practices a different religion” (Winston 2002, p. 245).   The consequences of 
this ubiquitous human trait, Winston adds, “are brutal” as the history of the 20th century 
never fails to remind us.  If scholar-practitioners are to understand religious hatred and 
intervene more effectively in religious conflict they need more positive insight into why 
the appeal of religion in general, and some of its more strident varieties in particular, 
continues to grow and the role that its identity dimension plays in this.   As Mohammed 
Abu-Nimer argues, “It is clear that religious identity is an influential factor in the political, 
social, and economic realities as well as the values and cultural fabric of many 
communities in the world today” (Abu-Nimer 2012, p. 15). 
 
It is tempting to see this as an issue mainly for parts of the world, or sections of 
nations, outside liberal and secular circles in Western Europe or both coasts of North 
America, but there needs to be greater understanding of how this relationship between 
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religion and identity continues to work even in increasingly secular societies and among 
people who no longer consider themselves religious or who may even be actively hostile to 
religion.  In addition consideration needs to be given to the argument that identity in 
individuals is not fixed and static and may evolve over a lifetime (Erikson 1994), thereby 
making the psychodynamic approach to religion and identity particularly significant.  This 
chapter therefore unpicks the psychodynamic meanings that identity can have and their 
relationship to religious hatred.   
 
Religion and identity 
 
The attention focused on ‘strong religion’ (Almond, Appleby & Sivan 2003) since 
the attacks on New York on 11 September 2001 has tended to obscure the fact that all the 
great religions have long histories of ‘enclave culture’ (ibid. pp. 23-89) that emphasise 
religiously-determined identity and demonise, to greater or lesser extents, those who live 
outside the enclave whether they are of the same faith, with less commitment, or more 
decisively ‘Other’.186  It is a truism to say that the stronger and more extreme the belief, the 
greater the personal investment in it and therefore the more alignment there tends to be 
between adherence and identity, but this begs the question of those who are less extreme 
but no less invested in the sense of identity that religious adherence can bring: it is not only 
extremists whose personal identity is influenced if not shaped by their religion.  One 
example of this is the pivotal role that Orthodoxy has played in Russia since the official 
Christianization of Kievan Rus in 998, and even during periods when it has been contested, 
such as during the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725) and during the years of the Soviet 
 
186 It is also the proponents of strong religion who tend to draw the flak of the ‘New Atheists’ such as Richard 
Dawkins, Sam Harris and the late Christopher Hitchens, probably because the stronger the religion the more 
appealing targets those propounding it make for convinced secularists.   
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Union following the Revolution of 1917.  Orthodoxy has influenced everything from art, 
architecture and music to philosophy and political thought, to say nothing of its pervasive 
influence on everyday life and culture (Figes 2003, p. 301).187  As Russia seeks to restore 
its sense of national identity in the wake of two revolutions within a century, both with 
arguably calamitous results for ordinary people, it is natural that they should turn to an 
institution that has survived both, albeit not without damage, as a rare representative of 
continuity in a time of multiple fractures.188  The consecration in June 2020 of the new 
Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces (Главный храм Вооружённых сил 
России), celebrating the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany in 
what Russians call the Great Patriotic War, confirms these various threads as well as 
representing what is, in some respects, a profound enantiodromia. 
 
What is it about religion that can provide this sense of identity, whether for 
individuals or nations?  The answer may lie in the special claims that religious identities 
make.  David McPherson (2016) argues that such claims come in four forms: convictions 
of conscience that involve demands of the sacred; the intrinsic goodness of religion as a 
distinctive human good; the instrumental goodness of religion for society; and the special 
vulnerability of religion to political abuse. The cumulative effect of these, McPherson 
maintains, is that a religious identity involves “a framework of ultimate meaning derived 
from a “transcendent” or greater than human source that shapes one’s practical life-
orientation towards certain strong, categorical normative demands, which typically involve 
 
187 In Russian literature, in particular, the impact of Orthodox spirituality is most evident: it is difficult to 
imagine Dostoevsky, Tolstoy or Gogol without it, but equally writers of later and more perilous times, such 
as Bulgakov, Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn, include a spiritual awareness that it is different to that of their 
contemporaries in other nations.  This is sometimes attributed to a preference for discussing philosophical 
ideas in literature rather than, for example, in academic forums, “in keeping with the Orthodox view that the 
higher truths are to be perceived intuitively rather than purely rationally” (Clarke 2011).   
188 It also demonstrates that people can remain culturally religious even when prevented from practising their 
religion for decades. 
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a sense of the sacred”.  The evidence he cites in support of this claim is the “widespread 
experience of existential malaise or flatness of a life lived without any sense of ultimate 
meaning, the sacred, or the transcendent”.189   A similar point to this, but extended from the 
individual to the communal and national, is made in Rabbi David Rosen’s 2005 Templeton 
Lecture, Religion, Identity, and Mideast Peace.190  It argues, echoing McPherson’s points 
above, that because religion seeks to give meaning and purpose to who we are, it is bound 
up with all the different components of human identity, from the most basic such as family, 
through communities, ethnic groups and nations, to the widest components of humanity 
and creation.  He goes on to say that scholars studying the modern human condition have 
pointed out how much countercultures involving substance abuse, violence or adherence to 
cults and other movements are a search for identity by those who have lost traditional 
moral or communal orientations, concluding that “In the relationship between religion and 
identity, the components or circles within circles of our identity affirm who we are, but by 
definition at the same time they affirm who we are not!”, adding that “Whether the 
perception of distinction and difference is viewed positively or negatively depends upon 
the context in which we find or perceive ourselves (Rosen 2005).191 
 
In summary, religion provides identity to communities and nations not only because 
of the obvious bonds and boundaries it creates, but because with it comes a sense of the 
transcendent which binds adherents to commitments beyond the familial, parochial or even 
 
189 McPherson quotes Taylor (2007) saying that our secular age suffers from the “malaise of immanence”. 
Nietzsche identified in his critique of the “last man,” who epitomizes modern, civilized culture. The “last 
man” is the person who is no longer able to “shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man,” and whose “soul” 
is “poverty and filth and wretched contentment” because he (or she) is concerned only with ordinary human 
satisfactions (Nietzsche 1883). 
190 Rabbi David Rosen was, at the time of this lecture, the Director of Interreligious Affairs for the American 
Jewish Committee in Jerusalem and Chairman of IJCIC, the International Jewish Committee on Interreligious 
Consultations.  
191 Elsewhere in this lecture Rosen remarked on the absence of religious leaders representing their respective 
communities and faiths from the famous handshake on the White House lawn in September 1992.  He 
attributes the failure of the Oslo peace process in part to this absence.  Marc Gopin makes the same point in 
Between Eden and Armageddon (2000, p. 39). 
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national.  So seeing the label of religion as being simply a form of tribal designation is 
overlooking a whole complex of other and more intense meanings. While this may be 
obvious to any student of religion, the import of it may be less apparent to the convinced 
secularist and it may accordingly be overlooked (Gopin 2000, p. 39).  This may explain in 
part the lack of attention in depth paid to religion and religious adherence in much conflict 
resolution literature. 
 
What, then, does identification with a religious grouping offer to those individuals 
who accept it?  It offers a worldview that is utterly different from anything offered by any 
other sort of social group192: a worldview that provides sacred meaning, purpose and clear 
guidelines on how to achieve them (Park 2007), membership of an eternal community 
(Ysseldyk et al 2010), a sense of control in an unpredictable world (Kay et al 2009), and a 
form of ultimate self-enhancement (Alicke and Sedikides 2009).  In addition to these 
comforting cognitive anchors in a confused and confusing world, religious identification 
can also offer an immediate community of like-minded people willing to provide, at its 
best, the sort of social and personal support system that is so often lamented as lacking in 
the modern world (Putnam 2000).   Moreover, to quote Rabbi Rosen again, it is the lack of 
such commitments that create the vacuums of morality and responsibility causing many 
personal and social evils. 
 
 
This dissertation notes repeatedly the relative neglect of religion in conflict 
 
192 While membership of political or environmental groups could be said to offer the hope of a lasting legacy, 
neither can promise the personal salvation that is common to many religions and is arguably one of the 
factors that distinguishes religions from other worldviews.  Writing in May 2020, however, one is reminded 
of Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson saying that “The National Health Service is the closest thing 
the English have to a religion, with those who practise in it regarding themselves as a priesthood” (Lawson 
1992, p. 613).  Amidst the 2020-21 Covid-19 crisis for many it has offered a temporal form of personal 
salvation: the weekly applause for NHS staff, their privileged treatment in the community and the hailing of 
fallen heroes as martyrs has perhaps enhanced its quasi-religious status.  
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resolution literature.   The same point is made by the prominent conflict resolution scholar-
practitioner Mohammed Abu-Nimer, quoted above.  Abu-Nimer’s main focus is on efforts 
to involve religious leaders and communities more closely in peacebuilding initiatives 
where conflict has religious dimensions, and he discusses a number of reasons why this 
does not happen as much as it should.  First, he says religion and peacebuilding are 
regarded as a subfield “that still operates on the fringes of the larger field of peace and 
conflict resolution, which is itself situated on the fringes of international relations, a field 
dominated by realpolitik or a hegemonic power paradigm, both in academia and politics” 
(Abu-Nimer, 2012).  He also identifies “the secular cultural myth that religion and faith 
can and have to be kept outside of political and academic institutions”, and the myth “that 
conflicts are only or primarily about material resources and never about religious identity 
or other ideational factors” (ibid.).  This latter myth serves the needs of policy makers and 
religious: the former invested in power politics and interest-based diplomacy or 
negotiation, the latter refusing to accept the possible role of religious values, rituals, 
institutions, or doctrines in causing conflict or violence.  It is also the case that while 
scholar-practitioners have developed methodologies for intervention in conflict, there has 
been little adaptation of these methodologies to the particular demands of religious 
conflict, and consequently the subject of religious hatred as either cause or consequence of 
conflict is largely absent from the literature. 
 
Where scholars and practitioners have given thought to this subject, however, the 
scope for more such work becomes apparent.  Landon Hancock, for example, suggests that 
a scarcity of acceptable identities may be a source of conflict that receives too little 
consideration, citing the case of Northern Ireland during the 1960s when people living in 
the province were limited to feeling and being British and Protestant-Unionist or Irish and 
Catholic-Nationalist (Hancock 2003).  It may also be that the gradual growth of an 
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additional European identity, particularly in the Republic, began to erode the previous 
binary conceptions of identity (ibid).193  This suggests that multiple identities may have 
advantages for those caught in conflict, but experience conversely suggests that one result 
of this can be the need to negotiate amongst identities and even within individuals before 
progress is possible.  If there is a common approach to identity issues in religious conflict 
it rests largely on the role that identity competition plays in intergroup conflict.  The 
purpose of such competition is to protect, satisfy or enhance basic human needs, including 
psychological needs (Seul 1999).194   Religions are judged to satisfy such needs in ways 
that are more powerful and sustainable than other forms of added cultural meaning because 
they provide “cosmologies, moral frameworks, institutions, rituals, traditions, and other 
identity-supporting content that answers to individuals’ needs for psychological stability in 
the form of a predictable world, a sense of belonging, self-esteem, and even self-
actualization” (ibid.).  Seul goes on to aver that “The peculiar ability of religion to serve 
the human identity impulse thus may partially explain why intergroup conflict so 
frequently occurs along religious fault lines” and the “peculiar ability of religion to support 
the development of individual and group identity is the hidden logic of the link between 
religion and intergroup conflict” (ibid.). 
        
There is ample evidence to support Seul’s thesis as regards the composition of both 
communal and national identities: for example, to name but three, the confrontation 
between Sunni and Shia communities in Iraq; in Thailand, the notion of kwam-pen-thai 
(“Thai-ness”) is closely identified with Buddhism (Fleming 2014); and the growing power 
 
193 Hancock wonders about the dynamics by which people are forced into thinking of themselves, and being 
regarded by outsiders, solely as being members of one particular category from among the multiple (group) 
identities otherwise available to them (e.g. “Muslims”, as opposed to Gujeratis, Javanese, Sunnis or 
Alawites).  
194 The application of human needs theory to conflict resolution was pioneered by Australian diplomat and 
scholar John Burton (1915-2010), drawing on Maslow (1954).  
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of Hindu nationalism in India, which explicitly and sometimes violently invokes religion, 
and provokes religious hatred, in the name of nationhood. The corollary of such religious 
nationalism is the tension generated among minority religious groups feeling excluded by 
religiously exclusive notions of nationhood (Frazer and Friedli 2015) and its evolution into 
religion widening social fissures through exclusion and discrimination underpinned by 
claims of adherence to absolute truths.  Ultimately the play of such differences can lead to 
violence both within societies and internationally to the point where it has been argued that 
religion becomes a source of ‘cultural violence’ (Galtung 1969) that is used to legitimize 
other forms of violence.195 There is a risk, however, in attributing ‘cultural violence’ to 
religion in isolation: while it may define identity boundaries, it is more likely to be one 
among several factors that turn differences into divisions and then into hatred.  Economic 
factors, for example, may underlie religious differences to produce horizontal inequalities 
among culturally different groups, and this can produce the resentments that can lead to 
conflict (Stewart 2008).  This reinforces the conclusion that multicultural societies do not 
become conflicted simply because of the clash of multiple identities within them, but when 
these are combined with other factors (Fearon & Laitin 1996). 
 
Conflicting religious identities and the idea of the ‘Other’ 
 
No exploration of religious hatred in the context of identity can overlook the problem 
of conflicting religious identities, and nowhere is this more apparent than in the conflict 
around homosexuality within the Christian churches.  The experience of designing and 
mediating a series of conversations on the subject resulted in the key learning that how 
 
195 The relationship between religion and nationalism is an entire subject in itself. Kedourie (1961), for 
example, likened nationalism, which he saw as a Western export disastrous for the Middle East, to religion 
on account of its divisive potential. 
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such an issue is framed determines how it is discussed, and this makes the identity 
dimension particularly relevant.  It is common, for example, for more orthodox religious 
groups to deny that there is such a thing as homosexual identity, preferring to see 
homosexuality as an aberration, a sin, even a disability.  This is a stance which causes 
offence to those who claim that homosexuality is inborn rather being a ‘lifestyle choice’, 
and has resulted in a counter-argument that it is religion that is the adopted lifestyle 
(Ganzevoort et al, 2011); a recognition that making the argument one that turns on the 
politics of identity is a strategy often used by marginalised groups to highlight and 
challenge oppression by majority groups (Heyes 2008).196  This can backfire: majority 
groups often relish self-defined enemies of the status quo as it can legitimise 
discrimination, and in the case of religious groups it can be claimed that such 
discrimination is a way of protecting their religious identity and it also distinguishes them 
from both more liberal believers and from the secular world.197  
 
There will be further discussion of the “Other” in a moment but it is useful to 
introduce it at this point by looking, as Ganzevoort, der Laan and Olsman do, at Gerd 
Baumann and Andre Gingrich’s theory of “selving and Othering” (2004) which addresses 
how such controversies are framed.198  Baumann and Gingrich move beyond simplistic 
binary oppositions to look at a series of “grammars” to explain hatred and divisions more 
 
196 There is an argument that homosexuals began to replace communists as ‘the enemy’ of evangelical 
Christians after the Second World War and even more after the fall of the USSR in 1989 (Herman 1997) and 
thereby took their place in the cosmic battle between good and evil.   
197 In the case of homosexuality this is the continuing manifestation of a long-established phenomenon: “In a 
historical perspective, this is not exceptional, because homosexuality has often been associated with the 
stranger. In early twentieth century France, it was referred to as the German vice, whereas in Germany, it was 
called the French malady. In the sixteenth and seventeenth century it had been called the Italian vice, in the 
eighteenth French or English and in the nineteenth the “Arab way” (Tamagne 2004). Daniel Defoe wrote that 
it originated in Turkey, in Israel it is attributed to Arabs, in Algeria to the French, in sub-Saharan Africa to 
Europe, and so on (Greenberg, 1988). The missionaries called it pagan, and present-day evangelicals call it 
“the gay agenda”.  Homosexuality, it seems, is consistently interpreted as “Other”, thereby demarcating it 
from the self” (Ganzevoort et al, 2011). 
198 It should be noted that this theory is built on a reinterpretation of the anthropological work of Edward 
Saïd, E.E. Evans-Pritchard and Louis Dumont.   
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deeply.199  In the case of the homosexual-Christian divide the first grammar is 
“orientalising” in which Christians may attribute faithfulness to themselves and 
unfaithfulness or promiscuity to homosexuals while homosexuals may see themselves as 
tolerant, open and flexible while Christians are rigid, narrow-minded and repressed.200  On 
top of this, however, both may acknowledge some positive qualities in the Other, taking 
orientalising beyond crude binary stereotyping but orientalising still tends to be a barrier to 
meaningful dialogue.   
 
The second grammar is “segmentation” which recognises that people may belong to 
many different groups at different levels in the hierarchy of significance as it affects the 
issues.  For example, different homosexual subcultures may be quite separate from each 
other despite sharing the same heading, and likewise be in conflict with other minority 
cultures despite sharing their alienation from the majority culture.  This second grammar 
enables groups to characterise their opponents by reference to other minorities with whom 
they may share some common interests, so, for example, homosexuals, paedophiles and 
terrorists may all be conjoined as posing a threat to society’s values.  One of the 
segmentation shifts apparent in recent times is the relative fading of denominational 
differences, Catholics and Protestants for example, into new segmentations according to 
whether their perspectives are more liberal or conservative; liberal Catholics and 
Protestants now may make more common cause with each other than with more 
conservative members of their respective denominations.  One of the most recent and 
 
199 Baumann and Gingrich define “grammars” as “a simple shorthand for certain simple classificatory 
structures or classificatory schemata that we argue can be recognized in a vast variety of processes concerned 
with defining identity and alterity” (Baumann and Gingrich 2004, p. ix). 
200 “Many studies of homosexual behaviour give ample attention to the number of sex partners of 
homosexuals but fail to give corresponding numbers for heterosexuals, nor to explain a possibly high degree 
of promiscuity in light of the socio-cultural climate homosexuals live in or to differences between male and 
female homosexuality and the influence of gender differences. Without this kind of background, such studies 
contribute to the orientalising grammar” (Ganzevoort et al 2011). 
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perhaps most significant developments in segmentation is between those who espouse 
some form of religious affiliation and those who admit none.  While this is superficially the 
religious versus the secular, it is as liable to conceal divisions as to heal them and to 
crumble under pressure and the disappointment that allies are not as similar as they may 
have appeared in contrast to obvious opponents. 
 
The third grammar described by Baumann and Gingrich is “encompassment”.  This 
is swift to acknowledge difference but anxious to seek and discover higher levels where 
similarities may lie.  It is different from the segmentation grammar in that it is “defined by 
the characteristics of the self that are projected on the Other” (Ganzevoort et al 2011).  
This grammar is used particularly by dominant groups that want to incorporate minority 
groups first by allowing them their differences and then reinterpreting these to emphasise 
their similarities with the dominant group, which means the dominant group does not have 
to adjust its sense of self in relation to the Other.  One example of this is demonstrating 
sympathy with a minority group and willingness to support it and research its origins or 
tendencies without subjecting itself to the same process; the result being that the minority 
group is still ‘Other’ and its Otherness effectively pathologized by the majority.   This 
process is resisted by minority groups by the search for increasingly extreme ways, such as 
bizarre costumes, rituals or proclivities to demonstrate their difference and avoid being co-
opted to support the narrative dictated by the majority.   
 
All three of these grammars tend to be deployed by majorities who are determined to 
maintain their hegemony and undermine the legitimacy of their opponents while seeming 
to offer opportunities for minorities to share their dominance.  Once these tactics have been 
identified, however, the result is usually mistrust and an increasing unwillingness to enter 
into any process that may endanger whatever identity a minority may have achieved.  In 
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other words, attempts to deal with minorities’ Otherness by either orientalising, 
segmenting or encompassing serve mainly to underline the significance of being ‘Other’.    
 
The idea of being ‘Other’ can take root in contexts ranging in scale from families to 
nations and continents.  Marc Gopin’s work Between Eden and Armageddon (2000) brings 
together the study of religion and the study and practice of conflict resolution, and central 
to this is how religions approach Others and the tension between the human needs for 
belonging and integration in parallel with equally powerful needs for uniqueness and 
individuation.  He sees the former as consonant with the perpetual human need to search 
out new parts of the world around them, and to look for the underlying causes and origins 
of things which are typified in “numerous religious mythologies, as well as scientific 
enterprises” (ibid., p. 5).  The latter, meanwhile, expresses itself through the myriad ways 
in which human beings try to make themselves different, through everything from fashion 
and eating habits to membership, ironically, of exclusive groups that actually submerge 
individual character in the quest for distinctive identity and defence “in the context of the 
mass of humanity and the indifferent character of the universe” (ibid.)  It is this quest for 
meaning in the face of an apparently indifferent universe that can motivate both mystics 
and physicists. Gopin also draws attention to the modern tendency to see all religions as 
broadly similar and expressing universal values, a tendency he deplores on the grounds that 
such homogeneity is in defiance of the nature of religions, drawing as they do significant 
differences between believers and non-believers.  He does not see this human tendency as 
inimical to peace and conflict resolution, though; rather it underlines the importance of 






Identity and culture 
 
The final stopping place, in this review of identity as a dimension of religion and its 
relation to religious hatred as a cause of conflict, is culture.  One of the later realisations of 
conflict resolution as a field, as gradually anthropologists joined its social psychologist 
originators, is that culture matters more than was appreciated by earlier scholars in the 
field.  The debate continues about how much it matters, depending largely on which part of 
the field is being considered, but for anyone working on religious conflict it is difficult to 
see cultural difference as anything other than fundamental (LeBaron 2003, p. 4).201  The 
challenge, given that there can never be a comprehensive or finite description of a culture, 
is making the subject encompassable, but the six dimensions of culture that the 
anthropologist Edward Hall identifies in Beyond Culture (1976) provide a good starting 
point.202   Of these it is the second, individualism vs. communitarianism, that reinforces 
Gopin’s point, above, about the human tension between wanting to be unique and wanting 
to be part of a collective.   So if this tension lives within human individuals, and within 
human cultures, and within human religions, it is not difficult to see how its convergence 
or divergence in different contexts might well contribute to the other confusions and 




The evidence suggests that identity is an important, and perhaps the most important, 
contributor to hatred in the context of religious conflict.  This is because religion can 
 
201 For a succinct account of the debate in the field see pp. 302-7 in Ramsbotham O, Woodhouse, T & Miall, 
H 2005, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, (2nd ed.), Polity, Cambridge.  
202 The significance of Hall’s six dimensions of cultural difference for conflict resolution are described in 
Pillay, V 2006, ‘Culture: Exploring the River’ in LeBaron, M and Pillay, V (eds.), Conflict across Cultures, 
Intercultural Press, London, pp. 32-48. 
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provide individuals, communities and other groups with a sense of meaning and purpose 
that transcends material needs, demands and ambitions.  In addition it can help reinforce 
group bonds by drawing boundaries and denoting who should be regarded as Other.   This 
much both the literature of religion and conflict tells us.  What is less obvious, though, is 
why the sense of identity is so significant, and how the idea of the Other can, under certain 
circumstances, turn previously friendly neighbours into mutually hating enemies.  The 
psychodynamic lens provides some possible answers to these questions and there are two 
in particular to explore: Freud’s ‘narcissism of small differences’, and Jung’s reflections on 
persona, shadow and the Other.  
 
The narcissism of small differences 
 
Having a common religious identity is no guarantee of a hate and conflict-free life.  
As Staub (2012, p. 829) notes, “Identities can be formed around small differences.  
Sometimes hostility against those who differ only slightly from one’s own group is 
especially intense”.  There is no lack of examples of minor differences leading to major 
dissent, where the similarities among the protagonists, whether ethnic, linguistic, cultural 
and even physical appearance, are more striking than the differences; for example the 
Uzbek minority and the Kyrgyz majority in Kyrgyzstan; India and Pakistan; Northern 
Ireland, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Iraq and Belgium.  As Freud says, "It is precisely the 
minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of 
hostility between them".203  It often seems to be religious and confessional differences that 
 
203The idea of the narcissism of small differences first appeared in Freud’s essay, ‘The Taboo of Virginity’ 
which appeared in On Sexuality (Penguin Freud Library, 1991, p. 272),  although it may have based  on the 
work of the anthropologist Ernest Crawley. It first appeared in relation to human aggression in Civilisation 
and Its Discontents (1930) and is usually understood as referring to the role that harmless aggression can play 
in contributing to solidarity among members of a community. In the context of the hatred that can arise from 
religion, its two components, ‘narcissism’, and ‘small differences’, need to be considered separately; the 
starting point is Freud’s essay On Narcissism (1914).   
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symbolize the narcissism and exacerbate the least discrepancies.  These points have been 
made by a number of scholars including Kolstø (2002), Bjelić (2006) and Volkan (2006), 
all in relation to ethnic conflict.  Religious difference where other forms of identity are 
similar introduces another layer of complexity.  Andrade argues that religious hatred stems 
from “an otherwise surmounted suspicion that one’s beliefs are illusory, can be projected 
on to the other culture and eradicated” (2007, p. 1031), this being particularly true where 
similar beliefs are shared by rival cultures as they were, for example, by Orthodox Serbians 
and Catholic Croats in former Yugoslavia.  Figlio (2018, p. 20) comments that “political 
accounts must be given full weight, but they don’t account for the unease that irrupts into 
violence fuelled by hatred”.  
 
The idea that small differences can cause as much conflict as large ones is important, 
but in the context of religious hatred it is arguably much less important than understanding 
the narcissism that may accompany small differences.  A chapter about identity is an 
appropriate context in which to introduce the subject of narcissism and examine the role it 
plays in religion.  The first psychologist to use the word in a clinical context was probably 
Havelock Ellis (1898) who made a connection between Ovid’s myth204 and auto-eroticism 
(i.e. self as sexual object) in one of his patients; Freud also used the term in relation to 
sexuality in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905).  Ernest Jones (1913) 
seems to have been the first to put narcissism - what he called the “God-complex” - into a 
wider context as a personality trait, while Freud’s seminal essay On Narcissism (2014) put 
narcissism into a developmental perspective as a phenomenon that can only be understood 
 
204 In Ovid’s myth, Narcissus is a handsome young hunter, son of the river god Cephissus and the nymph 
Liriope, who spurns the advances of the nymph Echo, so-named because she was cursed to only echo the 
sounds that others made. After Narcissus rejects Echo, making her fade away until all that remains is her 
voice, the gods punish him by making him fall in love with his own reflection in a pool. Finding that the 
object of his love cannot love him back, he pines away and dies. The story may have derived from the ancient 
Greek superstition that it was unlucky or even fatal to see one’s own reflection (www.britannica.com/topic/ 
Narcissus-Greek-mythology [viewed 2.2.20]. 
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psychoanalytically.205  Discussion of narcissism evolved from psychoanalytical and 
clinical to more popular interest with the publication of Christopher Lasch’s Culture of 
Narcissism (1979) in which he offers a historical and cultural analysis of narcissism as a 
social as well as personal trait.  Although focused on the United States and now four 
decades old, this work retains a contemporary ring when it depicts what he sees as 
narcissism in society: “dependence on the vicarious warmth provided by others combined 
with a fear of dependence, a sense of inner emptiness, boundless repressed rage... pseudo 
self-insight, calculating seductiveness... intense fear of old age and death, altered sense of 
time, [and] fascination with celebrity” (p. 33, quoted in Konrath and Bonadonna, 2015).  
 
There are several connections between narcissism and religious hatred.  First, 
narcissism tends to be protected by hatred: it wards off shame by denigrating any person or 
fact which threatens to dent the ideal image that narcissism requires (Vitz and Mango 
1997), and religious hatred presumably achieves this through the same mechanism in any 
context where a religious image of the self is threatened.  Secondly, and following on from 
this, moral pride or any feeling of moral superiority to those who can be labelled as 
‘immoral’ or ‘sinful’ can also be defended by hatred which can, furthermore, be reframed 
into something of virtue by being called ‘religious’, and from there it is a short step to 
defending the behaviour that can accompany religious hatred.   This, at least, is the 
simplistic explanation, but there is another that is perhaps more disturbing and harder to 
 
205 Narcissism was not included as a personality disorder until the third edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM-III) (1980), perhaps reflecting a long debate as to whether narcissism was a normal 
and necessary stage of development (for example, Kohut 1966), inherently pathological (Kernberg, 1975), or 
a spectrum ranging from healthy self-esteem to overconfident self-importance involving fantasies of 
omnipotence and omniscience (Jones 1913).  More recently it has been recognised that narcissistic 
personality traits divide into the ‘grandiose’ and the ‘vulnerable’, the latter involving passive-aggression, 
over-sensitivity and insecurity (Krizan, Z and Herlache, AD 2018, ‘The Narcissism Spectrum Model: A 
Synthetic View of Narcissistic Personality’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 3–
31; Campbell, WK 2020, The New Science of Narcissism, Sounds True, Boulder, pp. 54-9; see also Eagle 
2018, p.p. 152-3). 
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address.  The truth, argues Figlio (2018), is that while consciously we exclude those who 
are Other, especially Others who are different, unconsciously we hate sameness and avoid 
it by creating delusional differences. He quotes Freud on the example posed by the 
experience of the Jewish diaspora when he argues that unfortunately all the massacres of 
the Jews in the Middle Ages did not suffice to make that period more peaceful and secure 
for their Christian fellows because “When once the Apostle Paul had posited universal love 
between men as the foundation of his Christian community, extreme intolerance on the part 
of Christendom towards those who remained outside it became the inevitable 
consequence” (Freud, 1930a, p. 114).  The implication here is that the Jews provided 
neighbours whom the host community could vilify and exclude, and occasionally 
annihilate, in order to retain a sense of its own coherence.  The challenge is not, as scholar-
practitioners faced with conflict are wont to argue, in managing difference, but in 
managing what Figlio calls the “endogenous unease in human society”.  He himself admits 
that this is a challenging thought, the idea that we hate difference being so deeply 
engrained and there being so much evidence of aggression between ethnic groups.  But he 
follows Volkan (1986, p. 187) in arguing that “we create minor differences, in order to 
strengthen the psychological gap between enemy and ourselves”.  Difference, it seems, can 
support a defence against self-examination and the possible revelation of a hated similarity.   
 
The persona, the shadow and the Other  
 
The lens of Jung’s analytical psychology provides another view of identity.  Jung, 
with a generally more sympathetic understanding of religion than many of those coming 
from more secular and humanistic standpoints, provides some particular insights into how 
identity is constructed and what can happen to it under pressure.  It begins with his 
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depiction of what he called the persona.206 It is the part of a person that is presented to the 
world, and Jung takes pains to comment on the relationship between this outer face and 
what may be happening on the inside.  He says, for example, that people who appear 
outwardly inflexible and unapproachable are often inwardly weak and malleable, “Their 
inner attitude, therefore, corresponds to a personality that is diametrically opposed to their 
outer personality” (Jung CW6, para. 802).  He explains this by saying that people who 
overlook their unconscious processes are easily influenced: the inner flexibility acting as a 
compensation for the outer rigidity.  This is a useful reminder that for Jung, and in fact 
from all psychodynamic perspectives, identity is never monolithic: there are always 
tensions between the outer and the inner, and between different elements of both.  People 
are always more than their persona, and the pursuit of a good life for communities as well 
as mental health for individuals often consists in integrating the disparate and sometimes 
dissonant elements of identity.  These tensions produce their own difficulties: one, for 
example, occurs when a person creates a persona that is too distant from their real nature 
and is unsustainable; another when a person identifies so strongly with a persona that other 
elements of their personality are sacrificed and their potential unrecognised and unlived 
(Stevens 1990, p. 42).  The result is people divided against themselves; and this is further 
complicated, Jung would say, by the emergence of the shadow as discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
A few Jungian terms, such as introvert and extravert (Jung’s spelling), have crept into 
everyday usage with users often being unaware of their origins.  The shadow as a term may 
be less familiar, but the idea behind it suffuses popular art and literature207 though its over-
 
206 Turn to persona in Jung’s “Definitions” (CW6, para. 672ff) and the reference is to soul.  This is a useful 
reminder that when he uses this term Jung is not referring to the Roman term for a mask, a semi-detached, 
superficial everyday face that people wear to meet the world, but what he regards as an integral part of every 
individual.  This is just one of the common misinterpretations of Jung’s work that has damaged his reputation 
in the academy. 




simplification contributes to the modern tendency towards the binary that reduces the human 
capacity for nuance.208 With the shadow come semi-familiar concepts such the defence 
mechanisms that people use to protect themselves from awareness of their darker parts, and 
the projection of them onto others.  The literature of identity is full of the many historical 
instances of enemies suffering the projection and scapegoating used to justify subsequent 
slaughter (Stevens 2002, pp. 271-2) and its regular appearance on the front pages of daily 
newspapers.  As Robins and Post note (1997, p. 302), “We need our enemies. They provide 
a comforting explanation of what is wrong with ourselves”. 
 
This is where the idea of the Other in psychodynamic psychology also needs to be 
considered.  This concept extends beyond Jung’s use of the term, but the focus here is on its 
use in psychodynamic psychology.209  Renos Papadopoulos observes that during his 
professional life Jung “understood the Other in terms of complexes, which were intrapsychic 
structures that had a semi-independent and autonomous existence within one's personality” 
(Papadopoulos 2002, p. 170).  In times of conflict these latent complexes become 
externalised and identified with actual or imagined enemies onto which the shadow is then 
projected.  The consequence is that individuals, communities or entire races are imbued not 
only with responsibility for creating internal tensions, but with all the negative 
characteristics of which people are unconscious in themselves.  If this sounds extreme and 
unlikely, it is useful to remember that “The distinction between what is “I” and what is “not-
 
208 It is sometimes overlooked that for Jung the shadow is not only a repository for the evil and darkness in 
people; it can also contain unrealised positive qualities. In his conclusion to Aion (1951), for example, Jung 
offers a balanced understanding of the shadow: “If it has been believed hitherto that the human shadow was the 
source of all evil, it can now be ascertained on closer investigation that the unconscious man, that is, his 
shadow, does not consist only of morally reprehensible tendencies, but also displays a number of good 
qualities, such as normal instincts, appropriate reactions, realistic insights, creative impulses, etc.” (Jung 
CW9ii, para. 423). 
209 The origin of Other, in philosophical usage, lies with Hegel who argued that the concept of the Self 
requires the existence of the Other (Berenson 1982). In psychological usage Jacques Lacan pioneered the 
term for similar reasons (Thibierge and Morin 2010). 
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I” is not so easily made as most people assume” (Harding 1965, p. 16).  Jung believed that 
the Christian churches, well aware of these dimensions of human life, were active in the 
suppression of it in order to maintain their control of the human psyche and because they 
recognised the psychic and social dangers that could be unleashed by the expression of these 
latent powers in the form of religious hatred.  If one of the characteristics of religious hatred 
is a disproportionate response to difference, it is reasonable to believe that the causes are 
likely to be to some extent unconscious.  In such situations it is not unlikely that some of the 
disproportionality is caused or augmented by acute awareness of the Other, compounded in 











Every dimension of religion has some overlay with others, and nowhere is this truer 
than where a person’s everyday practice of a faith - the prayers, worship, rituals, 
behaviours, celebrations of events, the use of symbols which demonstrate or illustrate the 
faith (Smart 1996, p. 72) - overlaps with the sense of religious identity which he or she 
draws from it.  These are the elements of religion through which religious identity is often 
most visibly and potently expressed because, unlike doctrine, hermeneutics, ethics or the 
other important but relatively abstract or disembodied elements of religion, they have a 
materiality and tangibility which bring them alive to believers and non-believers alike. 
Whether it is the abstinence from alcohol, the veneration of an icon, the requirement for 
pilgrimage or the everyday conduct of life, these are the signs of religion apparent to all.  
This chapter examines in particular contemporary religious fundamentalism because it is 
this practice of religion which is most associated with religious hatred and religious 
conflict, and because it affects the needs, interests and values of others, whether believers 
or non-believers. This chapter examines how fundamentalism is manifested and secondly 
the psychology of the fundamentalist mindset that motivates its practice and its 
consequences.   
 
Before addressing fundamentalism as a way of practising religion that can generate 
hatred and cause conflict, however, this dissertation looks briefly at how doctrine may 





Religious doctrine and the “Golem Effect” 
 
It is important to state as an introduction to the argument that follows that it is not 
going to discuss in any depth the history, credibility or theology of any religious doctrines 
but treats them rather as they might be regarded by a follower who accepts them as part of 
his or her upbringing and culture: a backdrop to everyday life, perhaps not very deeply 
considered but nonetheless absorbed, valued and respected.  The question to be asked is 
what unconscious effect might even such lightly worn religious beliefs have on someone?  
There is little scholarly literature on this subject, and what there is tends to focus on 
extreme situations and be distracted by the influence of factors other than belief.210  Even 
in In God’s Name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century, edited by Omer 
Bartov and Phyllis Mack (2010), a scholarly book whose stated purpose is to survey “the 
intersection between religion and state-organised murder” (p. 1), there are few mentions of 
specific doctrines which may have contributed to such killings.211  There is clearly scope 
for further psychological research, beyond the reach of this dissertation, that looks deeply 
into how the specifics of doctrine influence behaviour.  One point worth highlighting, 
however, is the ease with which any eschatological doctrine can be twisted to become a 
justification for extreme behaviour.  As Steven Pinker observes (2011, p. 395) any utopian 
 
210 For example, In God’s Name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century, edited by Omer Bartov 
and Phyllis Mack (Berghahn 2010), is a collection of essays that looks at the Armenian, Jewish, Rwandan 
and Bosnian genocides. These case studies review the use of religion to legitimise and motivate genocide as 
well as the potential of religious faith to resist mass murder and the role of religion in coming to terms with 
the legacies of atrocity.  The first point noted in an overview of these cases is that the victims of these 
genocides were murdered because they were Jews or Armenians or Bosnian Muslims regardless of whether 
they or their killers actually believed in any religious precepts (Bartov and Mack 2001, p. 2). Ronald Suny 
argues in the case of the Armenian genocide in 1915 that “these mass killings were not primarily driven by 
religious distinctions or convictions. Membership in a religious community (millet) was an important marker 
of difference, and religion closely corresponded to ethnicity, even in many cases to class. But the motivations 
for murder were not spontaneously generated from religion or even ethnicity but were driven by a cascade of 
influences— decades of hostile perceptions of the “other” exacerbated by a sense of loss of status, insecurity 
in the face of perceived dangers, and the positive support and encouragement of state authorities for the most 
lawless and inhumane behaviour” (Bartov and Mack 2010, p. 24). 
211 Most mentions of theology concern issues such as, for example, the theology of obedience which it is 
argued by some paved the way for Christian complicity in the Rwandan genocide (ibid., p. 147).   
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ideology is liable to lead to genocide for two reasons.  First, if the point of utopia is to 
make people safe, happy and contented forever and always, its moral value is infinite, and 
therefore any sacrifices along the way, however great they may be, can be perceived and 
justified as less than the ultimate value of the utopia when it is achieved.  Secondly, any 
utopia, however conceived, has to conform to a blueprint, and those who get in the way of 
it have to be removed for the sake of the vision and the majority.212  Daniel Chirot and 
Clark McCauley (quoted in Pinker 2011, p. 397) argue that communist eschatology 
mimicked Christian doctrine, beginning with perfection in the Garden of Eden, the arrival 
of the prophet Marx bearing truth in the form of science, and calling for a revolution that 
will lead to the triumph of the working class and the end of history because things will 
again be perfect.213  
 
The Golem Effect was mentioned briefly above in relation to psychological 
complexes and the idea of the cultural complex.  This section of this chapter explores this 
idea in more detail because if the theory could be empirically demonstrated to be correct 
then it could be argued that the implications for both religious doctrine and practice would 
be far-reaching.214  The essence of the idea of the Golem is the bringing to life of a 
 
212 Pinker also notes how often utopias hark back to Golden Ages, usually based on agrarian paradises, citing 
Mao’s agrarian communes, Pol Pot’s expulsion of Cambodian city-dwellers to rural areas (and the killing 
fields); even Hitler’s obsessive loathing of Jewry, which he associated with commerce and cities, was in part 
motivated by his desire to settle Germans in rural Eastern Europe (Pinker 2011, p. 396). There have been 
hints of similar attitudes in some of the political plans put forward by campaigning environmental groups 
ever since the back-to-the-land arcadian idealism of the flower-power era. 
213 Chirot and McCauley go on to say that Hitler’s promise of the Thousand Year Reich was no accident but a 
deliberate mimicking of the perfect foretold in the Biblical book of Revelation.  Bartov and Mack also argue 
that the Nazis in effect adopted the traditional Jewish concept of the Chosen People (stretching the definition 
of eschatology a little), “translating it into a doctrine of racial superiority and a collective mission to 
transform the world” (2010, p. 3). 
214 By way of background it should be explained that the Golem was originally in Jewish mythology a 
roughly formed clay figure, most famously brought to life by Rabbi Judah Loew of Prague, traditionally 
known as the Maharal, in order to protect the local Jewish community from the threat of  expulsion by the 
Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II (Kieval 1997).  Over a period of time, it is said, the Golem became 
increasingly corrupt and violent to the point where it had to be destroyed.  It should be noted that there are 
many versions of this legend and the Golem appeared in many times and places and continues to do so: the 




previously lifeless, inert material such as a lump of clay, to act as a perfect servant because 
it obeys any commands given by its creator, but which cannot be trusted because it will 
become destructive if left to its own devices. 215  In modern management and educational 
literature, the Golem Effect is used to describe the debilitating effect of low expectations 
and self-fulfilling prophecies on performance (Babad, Inbar and Rosenthal, 1982; Eden 
1990), being the counterpart of the Pygmalion and Galatea Effects used to describe the 
effect of positive expectations on, and self-expectations of, children or employees 
(Reynolds 2017).216   
 
The Golem Effect is much harder to research than the Pygmalion Effect within 
established ethical guidelines for social and psychological research because it would 
involve subjecting people to negative expectations.217  According to Rutger Bregman 
(2020, p. 258), the Golem Effect is a kind of nocebo that causes poor pupils to fall further 
behind, the homeless to lose hope and isolated teenagers to radicalise.  “It’s one of the 
insidious mechanisms behind racism, because when you’re subjected to low expectations, 
you won’t perform at your best, which further diminishes others’ expectations and thus 
further undermines your performance”.  The Golem Effect is also now well recognised in 
business and banking circles, its consequences manifestly apparent, for example, during 
 
215 The myths and stories associated with the Golem, together with exploration of their significance and 
relevance in a variety of settings are extensively discussed in Kieval, H 1997, ‘Pursuing the Golem of 
Prague: Jewish Culture and the Invention of a Tradition’, Modern Judaism, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 1-23 
and Glinert, L 2001, ‘Golem! The Making of a Modern Myth’, Symposium: A Quarterly Journal in Modern 
Literatures, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 78-94. 
216 The Pygmalion Effect was named first, in 1963, by Dr Bob Rosenthal who conducted an experiment in 
San Francisco to investigate the effect of telling random schoolchildren, and their teachers, that they were 
particularly clever.  The effects were remarkable, leading to high increases in IQ and attainment (Bregman 
2020, p. 255-258).  Since then the Pygmalion Effect has been tested in many different contexts and while it 
remains controversial (see for example Jussim and Harber 2005) it seems to have some validity although the 
role of self-fulfilling prophecies and the capacity of erroneous beliefs to create social realities remains a 
subject of research. In management education, the Galatea Effect refers to the idea that raising the self-
expectations of subordinates regarding their own performance will raise its level. (Eden, 1990). 
217 One notorious experiment to demonstrate the Golem Effect left a group of orphans with lifelong speech 
impediments (Silverman, F 1988, ‘The “Monster” Study, Journal of Fluency Disorders, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 
225-231, quoted in Bregman 2020, p. 258). 
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the 2008 financial crisis when people’s perceptions that a financial institution might be 
about to fail lead to a rush to withdraw cash which did indeed cause it to fail (Edwards, 
McKinley and Moon 2002).   
 
The argument of this dissertation is that some religious doctrines can have a Golem 
Effect, inadvertently causing religious hatred by activating beliefs and attitudes that result 
in harm to others.  The doctrine of Original Sin in Christianity, to offer a simplistic 
example, might be argued to have a Golem Effect: if we are mired in sin from birth 
anyway before we have even done anything wrong, then everything is hopeless and the 
addition of a few more sins will not make much difference.  Similarly, it can be argued that 
the concept of reincarnation, which should encourage adherents to seek merit in their 
current life in the hope of advancement in the next, could cause people to do less than they 
might to obtain that advancement on the grounds that there will be other opportunities in 
the future.  Moreover, if these doctrines are shared so that everybody believes in Original 
Sin, for example, then presumably the Golem Effect is magnified: everybody is sinful so 
everybody can be expected to behave badly and even if they do not in the present then it 
can safely be assumed that they will sometime in the future.  Could the cumulative effect 
be a community or a society in which the population expects the worst rather than the best 
of each other?  Meanwhile a doctrine of eternal life can persuade followers that what 
happens in the present is less important than what may happen in the future: so death by 
torture can be a route to salvation and part of the divine plan – hence the gruesome relish 
with which Christian martyrologies depict the demise of the saints and doubtless 
encouraged others, both torturers and victims alike, to follow their example (Pinker 2011, 
p. 17).  Similarly doctrines that promote the possibility of immortality as a reward for 
allegiance are also liable to create grounds for hatred.  If you are a committed Moslem, for 
example, then the advance of secularism is a threat and hating it sufficiently to don a 
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suicide vest and become a shahid in pursuit of paradise becomes a logical choice (Cave 
2012, p. 279).  The more the focus is on an eternal afterlife, it seems, the less inclination 
there is to tackle injustice and deprivation in this: the great movements for social reform 
such as the emancipation of slaves and equality between the sexes arose only when the 
preoccupation with the next world began to lose the long grip that had inured medieval 
society to the trauma of the everyday by creating hope in the life to come (ibid.).  Cave 
argues that most immortality narratives foster a profound selfishness in that they focus on 
the survival of the individual personality and the actions necessary for personal salvation 
rather than cultivate virtues such as empathy and compassion (ibid., p. 280).  Similarly, if 
faith of whatever kind claims exceptionalism, whether of individual, community or nation, 
then a possible result is a dangerous narcissism that may have destructive political, social 
or religious consequences; this too can be argued to be a species of Golem Effect.   
 
These arguments are speculative, however, in that it has proved impossible to find 
any scholarly literature or any record of experiment that discusses the Golem Effect 
directly in relation to any religious doctrine, despite the volumes of literature that analyses 
healthy and unhealthy ways of being religious such as that of William James (1902) 
already discussed.218  It seems intuitively likely that if some religious doctrines can have a 
Pygmalion or Galatea Effect and thereby encourage positive aspirations and moral 
rectitude, then others may have a Golem Effect and do the opposite: it is therefore 
 
218 They are not far, however, from what is known in psychology as ‘pluralistic ignorance’: the situation in 
which people individually may reject a norm but go along with it because they assume that most others 
accept it even if in reality they do not. It has been blamed for many social ills, from the support for racial 
segregation (O’Gorman, H 1975), for example, to climate change denial (Geiger and Swim 2017).  Bregman 
(2020, p. 261) wonders if negative ideas about human nature are a form of pluralistic ignorance, asking 
whether human fears that most people are out to maximize their own gain at the expense of others is not born 
of the assumption that this what most others think when in fact the majority would prefer a life based more 




reasonable to consider the possibility that some religious hatred may be a consequence, 




It is the practice of religion perhaps far more than its doctrines, though, that is 
arguably the common metric by which outsiders measure its merits or otherwise, not least 
because the behaviour of adherents often provides the only visible manifestations of their 
faith.  It has been argued (Haidt 2012, p. 250) that a focus on religious practices is a more 
reliable guide to the nature of religion than religious beliefs.219  It raises the question of 
which practices should properly be the focus of a dissertation on religious hatred, with 
some obviously less associated with the darker sides of religion than others. If George 
Orwell’s evocation of  “old maids hiking [biking in some versions] to Holy Communion 
through the mists of the autumn morning” (Orwell 1941)220 depicts one form of religious 
practice, then it could be argued the atrocities of Islamic State in recent years depict 
another, yet they are worlds apart both in terms of their impact on those immediately 
involved and upon popular understanding of the nature of religion.  The purpose of this 
chapter, however, is to identify how religious practice as a dimension of religion 
contributes to religious hatred.  The aspect of religious practice that has most obviously 
been associated with conflict in recent years is fundamentalism, and it should be made 
clear at the outset that this focus is not on Islamic fundamentalism or indeed on any 
specific model of fundamentalism, but on what has been called the “fundamentalist 
 
219 Haidt also argues that the New Atheists’ positions on religion are undermined by a model of religion that 
tends to begin and end with belief: “...trying to understand the persistence and passion of religion by studying 
beliefs about God is like trying to understand the persistence and passion of college football by studying the 
movements of the ball. You’ve got to broaden the inquiry. You’ve got to look at the way that religious beliefs 
work with religious practices to create a religious community” (Haidt, 2012, p. 250). 
220 The image clearly has some archetypal resonance for believers in a vision of a bucolic England beyond 
Orwell’s generation: it was famously (mis)quoted by Prime Minister John Major in his speech to the 
Conservative Group for Europe, 22 April 1993.  
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mindset” (Strozier et al 2010) on the grounds that “[F]undamentalism is not a religion but 
a way of being religious” (ibid., p. 216, emphasis added).  While this can be interpreted as 
meaning that fundamentalism is about practice more than doctrine, it is perhaps too 
reductionist to be conclusive and could lead the more iconoclastic towards the conclusion 
that the executioners of Islamic State and the conservative evangelicals of Anglicanism 
have something of the same mindset.  This would clearly be a gross exaggeration.  In 
popular parlance, though, ‘fundamentalism’ has come to be discussed as if it is a genus 
separate from more moderate religious practices.221  The argument here is that religion has 
always been practised along a spectrum of intensity from lip service at one end, through 
the social conformism of conventional piety, to the radical and evangelical at the other.222  
 
Definitions of fundamentalism 
 
The history and definition of what has come to be known as fundamentalism used 
here is that adopted by the Fundamentalism Project of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences which generated five volumes of evidence about fundamentalism in many 
contexts between 1987 and 1995.  This project, aware that no definition of fundamentalism 
would be greeted with wholesale approval, decided that what was required was a definition 
that would reflect the findings of case studies that would enable structured comparisons of 
movements and groups.  The definition finally agreed was  
 
221 The word ‘fundamentalism’ tends to be associated with Islam, especially since 11 September 2001, but it 
was first used in a 1920 editorial in the Northern Baptist Watchman-Examiner to describe the commitment of 
a group of conservative evangelical Protestants to preserve the “fundamentals” of the Christian faith from 
evolutionists and other critics of biblical literalism (Almond et al., 2003, p. 2).  There is some debate 
(Ruthven 2007, p. 4) about whether it is even appropriate to use the word ‘fundamentalism’ outside this 
original pre-millenialist Protestant context because, for example, one can argue that all believing Muslims 
should accept the inerrancy of the Qur’an as the unmediated word of God, and therefore by definition all 
faithful Muslims are fundamentalists.   
222 Such a spectrum of practice is nothing new: Gibbon notes in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 
“The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as 
equally true; by the philosopher as equally false; and by the magistrate as equally useful” (Gibbon 1776, 1.1). 
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“Fundamentalism”.... refers to a discernible pattern of religious militance by which 
self-styled “true believers” attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the 
borders of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to secular 
institutions and behaviors”.  
 (Almond et al 2003, p. 17) 
 
While a detailed analysis of the results of this project is outside the scope of this chapter, 
the results are nevertheless interesting to review twenty-three years after the project ended, 
not least for their continuing relevance in a world that, as regards the impacts of 
fundamentalism, has changed markedly in this time.223  Summarising the key findings of 
this project is not easy and risks the over-simplification and stereotyping that the project 
was at pains to avoid (Marty 1996) as well as overlooking the careful qualifications that 
surround its conclusions, but some seem to capture points relevant to any study of religious 
hatred.  
 
First, the project was careful, using its definition, to set out which movements within 
which religions it deemed fundamentalist.  It identified three particular categories of 
fundamentalist movement (Almond et al. 2003, pp. 23-89): the ‘enclave’ cultures within 
the Abrahamic faiths which may have additional ethnonationalist goals but whose primary 
base is in religion; Hindu and Buddhist movements that are syncretic and based as much 
on ethnonationalism as on religion; and a variety of other movements “that have been 
identified as fundamentalist by the media because of their religious trappings, militance 
and visibility” (ibid., p. 90) but which did not meet the project’s definition “because they 
do not originate in reaction to secularization and the marginalization of religion, and they 
do not strive to create a religious alternative to secular structures and institutions” (ibid.)  
These quotations are included for two reasons.  First, they demonstrate that what falls 
 
223 Indeed, the fact that this major study was concluded before 9/11 makes its results perhaps more objective 
than might otherwise have been the case. 
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within and outside definitions of fundamentalism has a somewhat arbitrary edge to it; and 
secondly, as the study of history demonstrates, religious movements can wax and wane 
within relatively short time periods.  So while the Fundamentalism Project has 
undoubtedly provided some useful markers, its conclusions, two decades on, should be 
treated with some caution. Bearing this in mind it is still useful to look at the nine 
characteristics of fundamentalism – five ideological and four organisational – that the 
project distinguished in its study of enclave cultures.  
 
Characteristics of fundamentalism 
 
First among the ideological characteristics is that fundamentalist movements are a 
reaction to the processes and consequences of secularization and modernisation affecting 
all religious communities, in particular the erosion of religion and its role in society.  
Fundamentalist movements may be assertive in pursuit of this: for example the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) in India seeking to suppress Muslims224; or defensive as in the case of 
Palestinian Muslims versus Israelis.  This ideological strain of fundamentalism manifests 
itself in four other ways.  It tends to be highly selective, focusing on arguments that 
support its case while preferring to ignore those that do not: fundamentalists within 
Christian Churches, for example, are arguably selective when they use Old Testament texts 
to condemn homosexuality while ignoring modern scholarship that provides alternative 
interpretations of the same texts.  They are also willing to accept the tools and technologies 
of modernity, such as the Internet and social media that help to spread their message, while 
simultaneously advocating the social mores of the late Iron Age.  It is Manichaean in the 
 
224 In a recent example of this a local BJP government in India omitted (or was rumoured to have omitted, 
which in terms of religious provocation comes to the same thing) mention of the Taj Mahal from its 
promotional literature on the grounds that it is a Muslim construction (private communication March 2018). 
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sense that there are no shades of grey: the fundamentalist approach is right, good and 
evidence of light in the world, with the certainty of purity and freedom from contamination 
of the unsaved outside; all else is dark and doomed.  There may be degrees of 
contamination, however: for Shi’ite Muslims the darkness includes first secularized 
Shi’ites, then Sunni Muslims, and then the world of the kuffar, the unbelievers (ibid. p. 96).  
This Manichaean approach is supported by two other considerations: first, that the relevant 
holy books are of divine origin, true in every particular, and secondly there is belief in a 
final consummation of the world in which good will triumph over evil and history will 
come to an end with the arrival of the Messiah or the Hidden Imam who will rescue 
believers from the horrors of the end times.225  Both these can be argued to influence the 
practice of religion in that they shape the atmosphere and the context in which ritual and 
worship are conducted.  
 
Organisationally all fundamentalisms again tend to have similar elements, 
particularly an elect membership and clear boundaries between the elect and the rest.  
These boundaries are in some cases physical: for example ultra-Orthodox Jews are 
required to live within walking distance of a synagogue.226  This emphasis on boundedness 
tends also to be reflected in the behavioural requirements of fundamentalisms such as 
certain forms of dress, conduct and diet.  Thus private issues tend generally to become 
public affairs, whether matters of worldview, sexuality, identity or gender differentiation.  
Relationships are often tightly controlled, reflecting the idea that the resources of the 
 
225 The Abrahamic religions’ cosmologies are relatively clear about the end times compared with those of the 
eastern religions.  Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist deliverances are more from alien invasion and overthrow though 
concepts such as the Khalistan of the Sikhs have a millennial air about them (Almond et al 2003, p. 97). 
226 This exclusivity is also reflected, presumably, in the preference for closed communities among sects such 
as that of the Branch Davidians raided and destroyed in Waco, Texas, in 1993 (Docherty 2001) though it 
should be noted that the Fundamentalism Project resisted labelling the Branch Davidians as ‘fundamentalist’ 
on the grounds that members’ loyalty was to their leader, David Koresh, rather than to a religious tradition 
(ibid., p. 91). 
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group, including breeding potential, are the property of all rather than individual members.  
The Fundamentalism Project scholars noted that the failure to understand that 
fundamentalists “project their readings of private and personal concerns onto the largest 
possible political canvas leads to many misreadings of fundamentalisms” (ibid.).  This 
explains in part, they contend, why fundamentalisms are uniformly patriarchal,227 and so 
concerned with apparently trivial symbolic issues such as (in the American context) prayer 
in state schools and the display of religious symbols on public property.  This is less about 
faith or imposing a certain morality, they argue, and more about whether it is “we” or 
“they” who are claiming the culture: the overlap with the identity dimension of religion is 
apparent.  With all this goes a typically authoritarian hierarchy with a charismatic leader, 
though interestingly it has also been observed (ibid. p. 98) that “membership is voluntary 
and orthodox insiders are presumed to be equal”.  This is not the outside impression of 
organisations such as Islamic State, but it may be that fundamentalist organisations in war 
zones, which were perhaps less prominent during the time of the Fundamentalism Project, 
are necessarily less equal than others in more stable settings.228  It is a reminder that the 
findings of the Project may need up-dating.229  
 
It may be argued that the characteristics above, while core to any description of 
fundamentalism, do not fully reflect the range of philosophies that many scholars include 
within broader categorizations of fundamentalism.  Ruthven (2003), for example, includes 
the Nazi idea of a Thousand Year Reich, and cites both that and modern communism as 
 
227 It may be that in this regard the Fundamentalism Project’s conclusions may become dated: a number of 
progressive movements on issues such as women’s rights and the environment, which have some 
characteristics of fundamentalisms, also have more matriarchal forms of leadership.  This has also been true 
of religious movements outside the mainstream; see Wessinger, C (ed.) 1993, Women’s Leadership in 
Marginal Religions, University of Illinois Press, Chicago.  
228 This point is speculative: it has not proved possible to find any research to confirm or refute it. 
229 And why the word ‘tend’ is used here so frequently: it needs to be appreciated that while all 
fundamentalisms have similarities, each needs to be understood on its own terms. 
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secularized versions of Judaeo-Christian eschatology.   It may be argued that such 
movements also rely on inerrant texts such as Hitler’s Mein Kampf  (1924) and Chairman 
Mao’s Thoughts (1964).  Ruthven also quotes the arguments of historians Christopher Hill 
and Norman Cohn that revolutionary movements in pre-modern times, such as the Fifth 
Monarchy Men,230 and the Anabaptists of Münster,231 driven as they were by “chiliastic 
expectations and end-of-the-world scenarios”, can be accurately described as 
fundamentalist.  Equally, he suggests that the doctrine of papal infallibility adopted at 
Vatican 1 (1869-70) corresponds to Biblical inerrancy, and that some New Age cults and 
new religious movements are also designed to provide similar sources of authority and 
certainty in an uncertain world.  It would be a mistake, however, to think that 
fundamentalism is confined to fringe cults.  Even parts of the mild, moderate and largely 
middle class gentility of the Church of England are subject to flurries of fundamentalism 
over issues such as homosexuality (Brown and Woodhead 2016, p. 62).  
 
Fundamentalism, hatred and violence 
 
This is an appropriate point to discuss the subject of fundamentalism, hatred and 
violence.  Does it follow that fundamentalism, as a contributor to religious hatred, leads 
inevitably to terrorism and violence?  Mark Juergensmeyer in Terror in the Mind of God 
(2017) takes the view that “politics and human ambition are behind most acts of violence 
 
230 The Fifth Monarchists were a group of Christians at the time of the English Civil war who believed that 
the prophetic dream of Nebuchadnezzar in Daniel 2 indicated that four empires (the Babylonian, Persian, 
Grecian and Roman) had already fallen and the fall of the fifth, the English Monarchy, would presage the 
Second Coming.  One of the Fifth Monarchists’ most prominent supporters was the regicide Thomas 
Harrison who was hanged, drawn and quartered for treason after the Restoration (Capp 2012). 
231 A group of radical Anabaptists established a sectarian government in the German city of Münster between 
February 1534 and June 1535.  This rebellion started with a Lutheran perspective but rapidly gained a 
political edge when it called for the absolute equality of all people in all things, including the distribution of 
wealth.  The increasing iconoclasm of those involved included the proclamation of royal powers in this new 
Zion and the legalization of polygamy.  The city was besieged by its expelled Bishop and when he triumphed 
the Anabaptist leaders were publicly tortured and executed, their bodies exhibited in cages hung from the 
steeple of St Lambert’s Church; the cages remain (Arthur 2011). 
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in public life, including those tarred with the rhetoric and symbols of religion” (p. 268) and 
that much of what is said about religious terrorism may be applied to other forms of 
political violence that are what Juergensmeyer calls ‘performance violence’ (p. 269).  The 
difference, he continues, is that terrorism associated with religion is “almost exclusively 
symbolic….. consistent with legendary images of grand encounters between existential 
foes” and “accompanied by striking claims of moral justification and an enduring 
absolutism, characterized by the intensity of the religious activists’ commitment and the 
transhistorical scope of their goals” (Juergensmeyer 2017, p. 270).  Juergensmeyer’s 
approach, “epistemic worldview analysis” (p. 12), like Freud’s, seems to start from the 
assumption that religious belief is always a proxy for other motivations.232  The weakness 
of this approach is that, unlike Jung’s, it precludes the possibility of intrinsic motivation, 
that religious adherence in pursuit of meaning and purpose to life found through 
relationship with some form of ultimacy is a goal in and of itself.  It can be argued that the 
absolutism described above by Juergensmeyer, and the cosmic dimension of such violence, 
suggest that the brands of religion most associated with such violence tend to be 
fundamentalist, and this applies as much to acts by individuals acting once and alone (such 
as the Norwegian Anders Breivik) as organisations and networks dedicated to long-term 
campaigns.233   
 
Psychodynamic approaches to fundamentalist doctrine and practice  
 
232 For an explanation of epistemic worldview analysis and its relevance here see Juergensmeyer, M and 
Sheikh, M 2012, ‘The Sociotheological Turn in the Study of Religion and Violence’ in The Oxford 
Handbook of Religion and Violence (eds. Jerryson, M, Juergensmeyer, M and Kitts, M), Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. It is built in part on Michel Foucault’s idea of the ‘episteme’ which he described by as a 
paradigm of thinking that “defines the conditions ….. of all knowledge” (Foucault, M 1973, The Order of 
Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences, Vintage, New York, p. 168). 
233 It is important to state that the vast majority of believers do not condone violence enacted in the supposed 
name of their faith. For example, the Pew Research Center reported in 2015 that 95% of Muslims regarded 
Islamic State as non-Muslim (http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-
muslim-populations-much-disdain-for-isis/ viewed 30.4.2018). However, it is also argued that “ISIS and 
other jihadist groups legitimise themselves through a repertoire of ideas that have broad resonance among 




Fundamentalisms, in and of themselves, are, to repeat the words of James Jones 
(Strozier et al. 2010, p. 216) just ways of being religious: it is how they are enacted by 
human beings on the ground that determines their impact.  This is true, of course, of any 
set of ideas, whether social, religious, political or indeed of any abstraction that can be 
played out in the real world with real world impacts.  So it makes sense to look not only at 
the characteristics of fundamentalist doctrine and practice, but at those of their adherents. 
As might be expected, there is a wide spectrum of evidence and opinion in the 
psychodynamic literature on the subject of fundamentalists. Conclusions at the two 
extremes of this spectrum provide an idea of the range of views along it and are worth 
quoting.  At one end are those who regard the fundamentalist mindset as evidence of a 
dangerous psychopathology composed of distinct characteristics, including dualistic 
thinking; paranoia and rage; an apocalyptic orientation that incorporates distinct 
perspectives on time, death, and violence; a subjugation to charismatic leadership; and the 
consequences of a conversion experience.  Added to these are “psychological themes of 
shame and humiliation, the need for simplified meanings, and most of all for the absolutist 
and totalized way things get structured in the fundamentalist mindset” (Strozier et al 2010, 
p. 11).  At the other end of the spectrum the fundamentalist mindset is regarded, in The 
Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism (Hood et al., 2005), as little more than a rigorous 
form of commitment to living with and from sacred texts, creating a way for them to 
interpret the world, as well as themselves in relation to the world, and to persevere in an 
inhospitable culture. “This meaning system encompasses all of life and is strongly felt, for 
it deals with issues of eternal importance.  It also provides a framework for motivation, and 
in the process helps meet several personal needs for meaning, such as purpose, value, 




This latter approach explicitly rejects the idea that fundamentalists have 
psychopathologies out of the ordinary, arguing that empirical psychology has failed to find 
any such traits such as a link with authoritarianism (ibid. p. 4), and that research claiming 
such links is an example of the social sciences’ prejudice against fundamentalists.  It also 
argues that the term ‘fundamentalism’ is widely misused as a synonym for bigotry, 
fanaticism, or anti-intellectualism.  The problem is, argues Carpenter (1997, p. 4) that 
‘fundamentalist’, like ‘puritan’, has become a word of wide usage and immense symbolic 
power.  “It has been spoken with derisive loathing and, no doubt, some fear in intellectual 
circles, for fundamentalist evokes images – such as the Scopes “monkey” trial in Dayton, 
Tennessee, in 1925 or, more recently, the widespread demonstrations against abortion – 
that represent deep and long-standing cultural conflicts in modern America” [emphasis in 
original].   
 
Instead the authors argue that fundamentalism is a logical possibility for any 
religion,234 and that it is the form religion takes when threatened by the philosophic, moral 
and scientific claims of modernity. The controversy around different psychological 
approaches to fundamentalism is reflected in responses to The Psychology of Religious 
Fundamentalism.  For example, Sara Savage in The International Journal for the 
Psychology of Religion described it as a “breakthrough in the study of religious 
fundamentalism” that “knocks prevailing stereotypes on the head” (Savage 2006).  In 
contrast, David Wulff in the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion described the book 
 
234 While the epithet ‘fundamentalist’ tends to be applied mostly to Christianity and Islam, there are 
fundamentalists in non-Abrahamic traditions, such as the Buddhist or Hindu.  Their adherence, however, 
tends to be less to inerrant scripture and more to people or ideas derived from an idealized past; the 
ethnonationalism of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India is an example (Anderson, E and Longkumer, 
A 2018 ‘Neo-Hindutva’: evolving forms, spaces, and expressions of Hindu nationalism, Contemporary South 





as “as frank an apologia for fundamentalism as one is likely to find authored by 
contemporary social scientists” which “would greatly benefit from a more strictly 
phenomenological turn, one that combines bracketing of their apologetic stance, immersion 
into a broader range of fundamentalist thinking, and sufficient critical distance to facilitate 
a penetrating analysis that would take us beyond what the fundamentalists can tell us 
themselves” (Wulff 2006).  This snapshot of two polarised views also provides the 
opportunity to make a number of important points to be held in mind when considering 
psychological commentary on fundamentalism and fundamentalists.   
 
First, much of the scholarly attention paid to fundamentalism, certainly pre-11 
September 2001, comes from North America and is predicated upon the American 
experience of fundamentalism – as is evident from the Carpenter quotation above.  
Secondly, the more recent literature has been influenced by the atrocities of Islamic State, 
the Taliban and other militant Islamic groups in the wake of the post 9/11 actions against 
Afghanistan and Iraq and during the ongoing horrors of Syria.  The widespread fear of 
fundamentalism is no longer confined, as Carpenter wrote in 1997, to intellectual circles 
but has become pervasive, and it is difficult to believe that this has not, to some extent, 
influenced psychodynamic scholarship as well as the popular presses.  Thirdly, and 
consequent to the above, the words ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘terrorist’ have become almost 
synonymous, psychologically, and this has a number of unfortunate consequences, the 
main one being that the more moderate forms of fundamentalism, which can be found in 
any religion, can be treated as extremist and dangerous.235 
 
 
235 A dramatic example of this was reported in The Daily Telegraph on Tuesday 8 November 2016:  
“Government officials know so little about religion that they cannot see the difference between Muslim 
extremists and traditionalist Anglicans – and so just assume both are a bit “bonkers” according to the 
Archbishop of Canterbury”.  
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Groups and group practices 
 
The issue is further complicated when the dynamics of group psychology are taken 
into account.  This is dangerous as well as important ground: the pitfalls of applying 
psychoanalytic theory to groups without sufficient awareness of the differences between 
individuals and groups is well appreciated (Marcus 1994),236 and likewise it is problematic, 
as touched on above, to use psychoanalytic approaches to individuals to explain why they 
may become more extreme in their practices, and yet many of these practices are, almost 
by definition, group practices (Victoroff 2005).  Psychoanalytic thinking about groups 
dates back to Freud’s first speculations in 1921 when he hypothesised that groups are 
formed and bound when the ego ideals of individuals are subsumed into those of their 
leaders and, how catastrophically we know to our cost, releases them from the constraints 
of personal conscience (Freud 1955).  Freud likened the relationship between a member of 
the group and the leader to a patient and a hypnotist: “just as the patient gives up his own 
judgment and especially his own moral and ethical standards and limitations and 
unquestioningly allows the hypnotists to be his guide, so the member of the group may 
give up his own morals and can be led to do what he would never do as an autonomous 
person” (quoted in Terman 2010, p. 18). 
 
There was extensive research into the psychology of groups and into the 
relationships between groups and leaders after the Second World War, not least in the 
 
236 Marcus argues that the group does not have a psychological structure, nor does it have the instinctual 
nature of the individual.  Similarly Kurt Lewin argued that “the organization of the group is not the same as 
the organization of the individuals of which it is composed” and “The properties of a social group, such as its 
organization, its stability, its goals, are something different from the organization, the stability, and the goals 






effort to understand how ordinarily moral individuals could be persuaded or induced to act 
in the ways they had done during the war years and in the years since (Klein 1948; 
Grinberg et al, 1977; Anzieu 1975).  Among the results of this work the conclusions by 
Wilfred Bion are particularly relevant to “the fundamentalist mindset [is] situated in a 
group psychological context” (Terman 2010, p. 27).  If a group is given no guidance or no 
specific task, Bion postulated on the basis of his research with groups, the group becomes 
organised by three basic assumptions that reflect primitive developmental anxieties and 
conflicts among the individuals of the group.  He labelled these assumptions ‘dependency’, 
‘fight-flight’ and ‘pairing’ (Bion 1961).  The dependency assumption is that the group 
leader will magically provide for the group; the fight-flight assumption stimulates the 
group to organise around the need to resist or escape some external enemy; and the pairing 
assumption is that a couple in the group will provide some sort of messianic certainty of a 
way forward.  This latter assumption, it can be reasoned, must be an invitation to anyone 
with a messianic streak to take advantage of their position in a group. 
 
Before leaving the subject of fundamentalism in the context of groups there are two  
additional scholars to be heard, one secular, one religious.  The secular is Eric Hoffer 
(1902-83), a stevedore on the San Francisco docks who wrote philosophical treatises in his 
spare time while living in railroad yards.  The first and most famous of his books is The 
True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (1951)237 which is concerned 
mainly with political movements but contains much that can equally be applied to religious 
fundamentalists. Hoffer makes a number of points worth remembering.  First, he describes 
the relationship between religion and guilt, saying that there is an unavoidable contrast 
between “loftiness of profession and imperfection of practice”.  The consequent feeling of 
 
237 After leaving the docks in 1964 Hoffer became an adjunct professor at the University of California and 
endowed the Laconic Essay Prize.  
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guilt promotes hate so that “the more sublime the faith the more virulent the hatred it 
breeds” (Hoffer 1951, p. 96).  Hoffer does not define what he means by a ‘sublime’ 
religion, but the point is that the aspiration to goodliness is no protection against negative 
consequences; in fact it may exacerbate them.238  A second useful point is that “fanatics of 
all kinds... hate each other with the hatred of brothers” (ibid., p. 86) and it is the fanatic and 
the moderate “who are poles apart and never meet”.  Hoffer’s point is borne out by 
experience on the ground: for example the divide between moderate and extremist 
Protestants in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s was sufficient to complicate 
peace-making across the supposedly larger divide between Protestants and Catholics 
(MacIver 1989).  This also reflects the experience of scholar-practitioners who have tried 
to ameliorate issues by talking to those who are on the moderate side of fundamentalism as 
a more reasonable route to the fanatics: it rarely works because the moderates tend to be 
seen as traitors to the greater cause.   Hoffer adds that “The opposite of the religious fanatic 
is not the fanatical atheist but the gentle cynic who cares not whether there is a God or not” 
(ibid.).  A third point concerns the psychology of proselytising.  Hoffer suggests that “The 
missionary zeal seems rather an expression of some deep misgiving, some pressing feeling 
of insufficiency at the center.  Proselytising is more a passionate search for something not 
yet found than a desire to bestow upon the world something we already have” (ibid., p. 
110).  This argument is absent from some of the more scholarly reflections on the subject 
of fundamentalism and the psychology of fundamentalists: that the anger and the certainty 




238 C.f. Blaise Pascal: “Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious 
conviction”  (Pensées 894, 1669). 
 
 158 
This latter point is reflected in a further analysis of the fundamentalist mindset.  Jung 
saw fanaticism of any kind as “overcompensated doubt” (Jung CW6, p. 41) while the depth 
psychologist Lionel Corbett sees narcissism as something similar: “when dogma about 
eternal verities is used to buttress areas of personal fragility, either because it would be 
intolerable to face the experience of the numinosum, even modified by ritual or symbol, or 
because dogma is used to defend against problems within the personality” (Corbett 1996, 
p. 33-4).  Corbett provides the example of pathological grandiosity, needed to maintain a 
fragile self-structure, being used to depreciate the religious values of other people, or using 
the anti-sexual or misogynistic bias of dogma to avoid dealing with personal inhibitions.  
Similarly, religious practice may be used by narcissistic personalities to create charismatic 
leadership styles that lead to them being idealised by their followers, and their followers 
being infantilised into submission.  The result of such individual pathologies can be a 
collective complex which “mobilizes in the group’s behaviour, emotion and life a 
defensive self-care system” (Singer and Kimbles 2002, p. 22) to protect the collective 
spirit.239 
 
Fundamentalism as a form of cultural complex   
 
In Chapter 4 the idea of the cultural complex (Singer and Kimbles 2004) was 
explored as a possible explanation of how religious hatred can grip an entire society.  The 
hypothesis here is that fundamentalism can, in certain circumstances, be a variety of 
cultural complex comprising a particular type of human mindset, and the behaviour 
associated with it, that finds its fullest expression in fundamentalisms of many sorts - 
 
239 Singer and Kimbles contrast this with Donald Kalsched’s 1996 account of how the individual psyche 
responds to trauma in defence of the self in The Inner World of Trauma: Archetypal Defenses of the Personal 
Spirit (Routledge, London).  
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religious, political, environmental, even psychological.  It is these, combined with certain 
combustible social and political circumstances that, borrowing Juergensmeyer’s metaphor, 
can provide the spark that leads to conflagration.  If an organisation, community or a 
society is gripped by ideological rigidity, resistance to change or intolerance of any person 
or body who represents what it conceives to be Other, then it provides a home and a banner 
for individuals with a mindset that values those characteristics, and thereby generate or 
contribute to the hatreds that can accompany them.      
 
Once such a cultural complex becomes established, then it could be argued that 
religious fundamentalism has little to do with religion and in this collective situation the 
accusation of psychopathology, denied when applied to individuals, may make sense, 
though this it be more evident in those leading and influencing the cultural complex than in 
the footsoldiers who sacrifice themselves in its name. There is evidence for this in Hartz 
and Everett (1989) reporting the work of Fundamentalists Anonymous240 and in the more 
recent work of those studying fundamentalist terrorism, for example, Schneider (2002); 
Atran (2006); Volkan and Kayatekin (2008); Strozier et al (2010); Unterrainer et al (2016).  
In the context of a cultural complex, statements such as “Fundamentalism is more a state of 
mind than a form of religion, more a psychological than a spiritual matter.  As a 
psychological state of mind, it is always pathological. Wherever it appears and in whatever 
form or context, it is psychopathology” (Ellens 2014, p. 221) begin to make more sense if 
it is accepted that it is the organism as a whole, rather than individuals within it, which 
maintains the complex.  This seems a way to explain how fundamentalism can provide a 
vehicle, opportunity and legitimacy for extreme beliefs and behaviour without implying 
 
240 An organisation established in 1985, modelled on Alcoholics Anonymous, to help those addicted to 
fundamentalist religions (Luce, J 1986).    
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that all who espouse strong religion are mentally deranged as this is clearly not the case 
(Almond et al 2003). 
 
In The Cultural Complex: Contemporary Jungian Perspectives on Psyche and 
Society (2004), Singer and Kimbles argue that Jung left a major gap in analytical 
psychology when he eschewed his original theory of complexes and instead went to the 
archetypal level of the psyche (p. 2).241  This was probably because he had a lifelong fear 
of the individual being subsumed in the collective having experienced the nullification of 
his father by collective religion and his early vision of Europe being bathed in blood and 
horror as a result of its surrender to the collective forces of militarism and empire (Jung 
1925, pp. 41-2).  Singer and Kimbles believe that their elucidation of the cultural complex 
is filling this gap by reclaiming the psychodynamics of the collective for analytical 
psychology, and in their observations of the ways that contemporary groups relate to each 
other and to the wider world they provide evidence that supports this claim.   They 
describe the intense collective emotion, the hallmark of an activated cultural complex, that 
accompanies expressions of group identity particularly as claims of victimhood form the 
nexus of group identities:  “Mostly these group complexes have to do with trauma, 
discrimination, feelings of oppression and inferiority at the hands of another offending 
group”.   In case such complexes are viewed as occasional and of little importance Singer 
and Kimbles argue that such group complexes “litter the psychic landscape and are as 
easily detonated as the literal land mines that scatter the globe and threaten life – especially 
young life – everywhere” (ibid. p. 7).  Any questioning of such claims of victimhood 
provokes “the full fury of that group’s psychic defenses” while the “inner sociology” of 
 
241 As mentioned above, it was by doing this and focusing on the primitive and mythical in his essay ‘Wotan’ 
(1936), avoiding the social, political and economic realities of Weimar Germany, that Jung laid himself open 
to accusations of anti-Semitism and fascination with Nazi mythopoesis.  
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such cultural complexes can “seize the imagination, the behaviour and the emotions of the 
collective psyche and unleash tremendously irrational forces in the name of their “logic” ” 
(ibid.).  With again the reservation that psychodynamic interpretation has to be cautious, 
this description of the activation of cultural complexes in groups provides explanations of 
psychological phenomena that are intuitively more convincing than their banishment under 
the heading of ‘psychopathology’.  Singer and Kimbles are both rehabilitating Jung and 











The emotional and experiential dimension of religion looks at religious hatred in the 
context of what Ninian Smart describes in The Religious Experience of Mankind (1969) as 
the “invisible world”, the “divine world” or the “sacred world”: visions and miracles, the 
intuition or appearance of celestial figures, ethereal music, the sense of being bathed in 
light and love, healing, conversion and the other intimations of powers and presences 
outside the normal.  These are the aspects of religion for which the cognitive scientists and 
the neurotheologians may have evolutionary and neuroscientific explanations, while for 
believers they constitute an inherent part of what constitutes religion (Rennie 1999).242  
This chapter looks both at the inward exploration of what religion means to individuals 
seeking meaning, purpose and community in their lives – and how even this can contribute 




These are subjects barely covered in the contemporary literature of conflict 
resolution.  This is not surprising: as has already been noted, while conflict literature 
covers the role of religion most frequently in terms of identity and/or cultural conflict, it 
rarely looks beneath the surface at what constitutes ‘religion’, let alone at what secular 
humanists might regard as the even less accessible phenomena of the numinous.  Stark’s 
explanation, originally aimed at social scientists but probably fitting conflict scholars as 
 
242 It was the lack of this dimension that originally, for Smart, differentiated religions from secular ideologies 
such as Marxism even if the latter may include a future utopia that is currently invisible.  He later found this 
distinction impossible to maintain.  
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well, suggests that the reason for this theoretical neglect has been that those who claim to 
have received revelations or to have communicated with the supernatural “are either crazy 
or crooked, and sometimes both”.  He continues by saying even many social scientists who 
assume the rationality of more mundane religious phenomenon, “find it quite impossible to 
accept that normal people can sincerely believe they have communicated with the divine” 
and “even the most unbiased social scientists typically have been unwilling to go further 
than to grant that the recipients of revelations have made honest mistakes, that they have 
misinterpreted an experience as having involved contact with the divine” (Stark 1999, p. 
287, original emphasis).  Stark concludes that all this is taken as self-evident as any 
scientist ‘knows’ [sic] that real revelations are quite impossible.  Indeed, at first glance it is 
difficult to imagine why someone wrestling with the realities and consequences of 
religious hatred and conflict might have the time or inclination to explore aspects of 
religion that seem remote from the more obvious manifestations of religion in the form of 
group identity and culture.243  It is also arguably the dimension of religion where the 
insights of depth psychology are potentially both most helpful and most liable to be 
misleading because of the subtlety and ineffability of the subject matter and the complexity 
of interpreting what may be tenuous evidence.  Nevertheless, if, as Stark suggests, social 
scientists are inclined to dismiss accounts of the numinous, one is left with few options 
other than to turn to forms of psychology which are prepared to entertain what human 
experience, if not social science, has always taken seriously.   
 
The argument as to whether depth psychology should be accepted to have the 
respectability of a science is particularly pertinent when it comes to these more fragile 
 
243 Gopin argues “there is much evidence that prosocial emotions are key to a stable non-violent society” and 
therefore “conflict resolution practice should have a much more constructive approach to, and even embrace 
of, emotions and intuitions, spiritual or secular, as critical to peacemaking and reconciliation” (2000, p. 49). 
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dimensions of religion.  The conclusion reached by the philosopher Michael Lacewing in 
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry (2013) that psychoanalysis is 
gradually overcoming its historical limitations, particularly in regard to its empirical 
methodology, and is in the process of becoming a science, is worth emphasising. 244  If this 
is the case, and proceeding with all necessary caution, it would seem curious not to give at 
least some consideration to what depth psychologies have made of numinous experience.  
It should at the same time be admitted that while recent research and scholarship245 in the 
field of neuroscience may have rendered the study of religious and numinous experience 
less subjective, it has also drawn ever more complicated lines among fantasy, imagination, 
neural stimulation, forms of mental illness such as temporal lobe epilepsy246, and what 
William James, writing a century ago, might have recorded as genuine encounters with the 
numinous.  While neuroscience continues to evolve it should be accepted, certainly for the 
deliberately cautious purposes of this dissertation, that for all its progress and fascination, 
neuroscience has added little of either moral or metaphysical significance to human 
understanding of the numinous in general or manifestations of religious hatred in particular 
except inasmuch as it may shed light on the psychopathologies of some individuals.  
 
Definitions of religious experience 
 
Ninian Smart’s sense of the experiential dimension of religion brings with it a 
discussion of what makes all religions so important to their adherents and so inexplicable - 
 
244 Lacewing, M 2013,‘Could Psychoanalysis be a Science?’ in Fulford, K,   Davies, M, Gipps, R, Graham, 
G, Sadler, J, Stanghellini, G and Thornton, T (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, 
Oxford Handbooks Online [viewed 12.2.20]. 
245 See for example McNamara, P 2009, The Neuroscience of Religious Experience, Cambridge University 
Press, New York. 
246 See for example Koening HG 2009, ‘Research on religion, spirituality, and mental health: a review’, 
Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 54, pp.283–91; Devinsky, O 2003, ‘Religious experiences and 
epilepsy’, Epilepsy Behavior vol. 4, pp.76–7. 
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alien, even – to practitioners in fields such as diplomacy, international relations and 
conflict resolution where, if religious collisions are not understood or responded to with 
sufficient insight and sensitivity, disaster can ensue.  In Dimensions of the Sacred (1996) 
Smart gives consideration to the visionary, meditative and inspirational forms of religious 
experience such as dhyana (purified consciousness) and bhakti (which Smart refers to as 
“the experience of the numinous Other”).247  Smart continually wrestled with what 
constitutes religious experience.  In Worldviews (1995) for example, he describes Otto’s 
‘mysterium tremendum et fascinans’ (1917, p. 12) as one type of religious experience and 
then says mystical experience “does not seem to have the qualities Otto ascribes to the 
numinous” because it is “quiet”, “empty of images” and “does not give rise to worship or 
reverence, in so far as there is nothing ‘Other’ to worship or revere” (1995, p. 61).  These 
notes are included to make clear one point from the outset of this discussion: that pinning 
down what scholars, mystics or indeed ‘ordinary people’ mean by, and describe as, 
religious experience is not straightforward and perhaps explains some of the resistance of 
psychologists and social scientists to what is least subject to empirical investigation.  
 
One place to start is with the work of the Religious Experience Research Centre 
(RERC) founded by Sir Alister Hardy at Manchester College, Oxford, in 1969, and now 
based at the University of Wales.248  Hardy, who had been a distinguished biologist, was 
convinced that religious experiences had biological roots and deserved systematic 
 
247 The Sanskrit is usually translated as attachment or devotion accompanied by deep affection.  In the 
Bhagavad Gita the term is used to designate a religious path, and the idea also informed the Bhakti 
Movement that inspired many religious movements throughout India and extended its influence to Sufism, 
Jainism and even Christianity.  See Flood, G 2003, The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism, Wiley-
Blackwell, Oxford and Neill, S 2002, A History of Christianity in India, 1707–1858, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.  
248 The Centre holds in its archives some 6,500 accounts of religious and spiritual experiences delivered in 
response to what became known as the ‘Hardy question’: “Have you ever been aware of or influenced by a 
presence or power, whether you call it God or not, which is different from your everyday self?” (Hardy, 
1979, p. 20; Franklin, 2014, pp. 7-8).   
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empirical study, claiming that such experiences are veridical and ‘real’ in the same sense 
as other observations of experience.249  As Walter Stace has said more recently, mystical 
experience is "a psychological fact of which there is abundant evidence" (Stace 1960).  
Some observers have been religious and interpreted their experiences within religious 
frames of reference; but there are also people of no religious persuasion who describe 
experiences “which they cannot but interpret as religious” (Rankin 2005).  Many of the 
accounts collected by RERC putatively reflect an awareness of “a greater reality 
underlying the physical world of the senses” (ibid.)  For many, while such experiences 
come unexpectedly and are often kept secret for fear of ridicule, they can be the most 
important event in their lives and provide a sense of meaning, direction and comfort that 
remains with them.  The RERC archive has enabled systematic study and classification of 
such experiences, and has contributed to the evolution of a vocabulary to describe them.250  
This work has been complemented by the work of, for example, the Exceptional Human 
Experience Network (EHEN) in the United States.251  One result of the RERC’s research 
has been some insight into the proportion of the population who claim to have had 
experiences that relate to the Hardy question.  Research published in 1997 found that 
between 31% and 49% of British people claimed to have had direct personal awareness of 
“a power or presence different from everyday life” (Argyle 1997), while later research has 
suggested that up to 76% of the British population “claim an awareness of a transcendent 
reality” (Hay and Heald 1998 quoted in Rankin 2005).  Research in 2013 by the think tank 
Theos, which describes itself as “a Christian think tank, committed to the belief that 
 
249 Hardy’s approach was rigorously phenomenological. 
250 For example, the psychologist Abraham Maslow refers to ‘peak experiences’; Andrew Greeley to ‘limit 
experience’ to indicate that these experiences suggest a limit or horizon of life beyond which there may be 
more; Marghanita Laski writes of ‘ecstasy’; R.M. Bucke prefers ‘cosmic consciousness’ (Rankin 2005). 
251 Both RERC and EHEN include the ‘out of the body experience’ (OBE) and ‘near death experience’ 
(NDE) which arguably belong in a slightly different category to those described as ‘religious’ both because 
of their nature and usual circumstances, and because there are now neurological as well as psychological 
explanations for these phenomena (see for example Blackmore, S 2017, Seeing Myself: The new science of 
out-of-body experiences, Robinson, London). 
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religion in general and Christianity in particular has much to offer for the common 
good”,252 found that 59% of people believe in “some kind of spiritual being or essence”, 
though unfortunately the methodology did not discover what exactly was meant by this.  
Belief in something does not, of course, equate to direct experience of it, but this mélange 
of figures suggests that a fairly large proportion of people in what is supposedly an 
increasingly secular country253 are still, in some way or other, open to the idea of spiritual 
experience and value the idea of some adherence to the non-material while being freed 
from association with any particular doctrines or institutions (Badham 2005) or, one might 
add, the constraints that accompany any formal allegiance to them.254 
 
If these figures seem high, it is perhaps worth reflecting on the extent of the 
bookshelves devoted to ‘spiritual’ matters in every bookshop, the plethora of festivals in 
which ‘spiritual’ studies or treatments are offered, and the popularity of everything from 
yoga to mindfulness retreats.255  The commercial value of such offerings suggests a 
substantial number of customers actively seeking experiences which the material world, 
despite its contemporary wealth, is unable to provide.   It may also be that the availability 
of such products is causing a rise in their consumption, and that they offer something not 
available through mainstream religion.  
 
 
252 Website www.theosthinktank.co.uk viewed 6.6.18. 
253 Numbers of people responding ‘none’ to the question of what religious beliefs they hold: 1983 – 31%; 
1993 – 37%;  2003 – 44%; 2013 – 51%; 2017 – 53%. Research also reveals that despite these figures ‘belief 
in a soul’ is 70%, belief in an afterlife 50%, and both figures appear to be increasing (Linda Woodhead, Anne 
Spencer Memorial Lecture, University of Bristol, 15 March 2018). 
254 There are also increasing numbers of people who designate themselves ‘spiritual but not religious’; see for 
example Erlandson, S 2000, Spiritual but Not Religious: A Call to Religious Revolution in America, 
iUniverse, Bloomington; Heelas, P and Woodhead, L 2005, The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving 
Way to Spirituality, Blackwell, Malden. 
255 When and whether to put ‘spiritual’ in inverted commas is a constant conundrum.  In this dissertation they 
are used where the claim to spirituality seems questionable: see for example Warrington, R 2017, Material 
Girl, Mystical World: The Now-Age Guide for Chic Seekers and Modern Mystics, HarperElixir, San 
Francisco, which appears to argue that some forms of shopping can be ‘spiritual’.  
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Religious experience and emotion 
 
Before the relationship between religious experience and religious hatred is 
examined some of what is called religious or spiritual experience, and that for which 
Rudolf Otto coined the term ‘numinous’, should be investigated more deeply.256  One 
starting point for this is the body and how the embodiment of sacred experience provides 
evidence that such experience is ‘real’.   There is something of this in William James when 
he writes of the “convincingness of these feelings of reality” that are “genuine perceptions 
of truth” (James 1902, p. 57), arguing that the physical symptoms of such experience, such 
as the shiver down the spine or the butterflies in the stomach, can be more significant 
purveyors of wisdom than theological formulae (ibid., p. 58).  More recently Anglican 
Archbishop Rowan Williams commented that “I don’t think any one of us can begin to 
discover again what religion might mean unless we are prepared to expose ourselves to 
new ways of being in our bodies” (Williams 2014).   The popularity of yoga retreats and 
other forms of embodied experience as spiritual activities echo these points, likewise the 
wilderness retreats that aim to reconnect people with the natural world in a manner 
reminiscent of the pantheism of Bruno, Spinoza, Emerson or Vyasa, author of the 
Mahabharata.257   Religious traditionalists might object that such moments cannot provide 
a proper experience of a divine that is above and beyond nature, though St. Francis of 
Assisi, patron saint of environmentalists, might have disagreed.  The key point is that 
human bodies, and the feelings they express, are not to be regarded as inferior to the 
processes of the mind.  As the neuroscientist Guy Claxton puts it,  
 
256 The root of the word ‘numinous’ is the Latin numen, meaning “a deity or spirit presiding over a thing or 
place (Collins English Dictionary 7th ed. 2005), so ‘numinous’ describes the presence or power of a divinity.  
It is important to note that it is etymologically unrelated to Kant’s noumenon, a Greek word describing the 
unknowable.  
257 Hinduism is arguably at least as pantheistic as it is theistic; see Kvastad, N 1975, ‘Pantheism and 
Mysticism’, Sophia, vol. 14, no. 2, pp.1-15. 
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Feelings are not a nuisance.  They are not – as Plato thought, and many still do – 
wayward and primitive urgings that continually threaten to undermine the fragile 
structures built by dispassionate reason.... Feelings are somatic events that embody our 
values and concerns.  They signal what we care about: what gives our lives meaning 
and direction.  
              (Claxton 2015, p. 5)   
 
The reason for emphasising embodied experience is that it is a powerful counter-
argument to all those who, engaged in conflict with others, are inclined to disregard their 
opponents’ concerns as ‘emotional’ and therefore unworthy of serious consideration, or 
those for whom ‘religious experience’ is by definition something not of this world, 
detached from ordinary human concerns and therefore not to be taken seriously.  Religious 
experience and emotion may be foreign to the worlds of the diplomat or the technocrat but, 
unaddressed, have a way of turning into actions that are all too real and relevant to their 
concerns.  As Dominic Moïsi points out in The Geopolitics of Emotion (2009), if the 
relationship between Christianity and Islam is based on what is experienced as systematic 
humiliation of the latter by the former, then it should not be surprising when steps are 
taken to reverse it.  Equally, if people more often feel than think their way to the beliefs 
and sacrifices demanded by faith (James 1902, p. 39; Frijda, Manstead & Bem 2010, pp. 4-
6; Frijda & Mesquita 2010, pp. 50-51), then it is likely that that those feelings find bodily 
expression, and possibly expression in acts of hatred or violence.  The intensity of religious 
feeling that enables self-sacrifice may be the same for the suicide bomber as it was for 
Father Damien when he laboured in the leprosy settlement on Molokai: this is why 
religious experience needs to be understood. 
 
It is useful to list the combination of emotional and somatic responses to religious 
experience to set out how wide-ranging and powerful they can be.  William James reported 
some of these in his Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), since when others have 
described more, some of them as the result of experimentation with hallucinogens such as 
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LSD.  Walter Pahnke, for example, in 1967 listed nine properties derived from the study of 
mystical experiences in “almost all cultures and religions” in an attempt to describe the 
“universal psychological characteristics” which appeared to be common to spontaneous 
mystical and experimental psychedelic experiences: 
1.   Unity is a sense of cosmic oneness achieved through positive ego-
transcendence....[...] the person becomes very much aware of being part of a 
dimension much vaster and greater than himself.....  
2.   Transcendence of time and space means that the subject feels beyond past, 
present and future and beyond ordinary three-dimensional space in a realm of 
eternity or infinity. 
3.   Deeply felt positive mood contains the elements of joy, blessedness, peace and 
love to an overwhelming degree of intensity, often accompanied by tears.  
4.   Sense of sacredness is a non-rational, intuitive, hushed, palpitant response of 
awe and wonder in the presence of inspiring realities..... 
5.   The noetic quality, a feeling of insight or illumination that is felt on an intuitive, 
non-rational level and has a tremendous force of certainty and reality.... a gain 
of insight about such things as philosophy of life or sense of values.  
6.   Paradoxicality.... A person may realize that he is experiencing, for example, an 
"identity of opposites".258 
7.   Alleged ineffability... the experience is felt to be beyond words, non-verbal, 
impossible to describe...... 
8.   Transiency means that the psychedelic peak does not last in its full intensity, but 
instead passes into an afterglow and remains as a memory. 
9.   Persisting positive changes in attitudes and behaviour are toward self, Others, 
life and the experience itself. 
(Pahnke 1967) 
     
In addition to these nine the neuroscientist Patrick McNamara (2009) identifies a further 
eight based on more recent analyses: 
10.   an enhanced sense of personal power or even that one has been specially 
blessed by God; 
11.   enhanced “theory of mind” capacities (these are capacities to accurately guess 
their mental states and emotions of Others); 
12.   changes in sexual behaviours (these can be enhanced or dramatically 
diminished); 
13.   changes in reading/writing behaviours.....most often these manifest as an 
enhanced interest in writing (in pathological cases, this becomes a form of 
hypergraphia259); 
14.   enhanced awareness and appreciation of music [...] 
 
258 McNamara (2009, p. 15) describes this as “the ability to respectfully hold opposing points of view”.  The 
ability to empathise with, if not to hold, opposing points of view is a quality demanded of effective third 
parties in the conflict field and there is of course literature on religion as a form of mediation: for a recent 
example see Meyer, B 2020, ‘Religion as Mediation’, Religion, Media and Materiality, vol. 11, no. 3. 
259 Hypergraphia is defined as “the tendency towards extensive and, in some cases, compulsive writing in 
temporal lobe epilepsy”.  The writing is often concerned with moral or religious issues (Waxman, S and 




15.   complex visual and metaphoric imagery (These complex visual metaphors are 
usually related to the sense of noetic insight that accompanies intense religious 
experiences.  The religious ideas are felt as so meaningful that only complex 
symbolic visual imagery could capture them); 
16.   ritualization (This is the propensity to perform ritual actions when religious 
experiences are heightened); and 
17.   encounter with God or spirit beings.  
(McNamara 2009, pp. 15-6) 
 
McNamara points out that not every religious experience will contain all seventeen of 
these properties, and relatively mundane experiences may contain few beyond positivity 
and determination to change behaviour towards others (ibid. p. 16).  Equally, not all such 
experiences may result in the transformation of personality and behaviour any more than 
the experience of being ‘born again’, in Christian nomenclature, can be guaranteed to last 
once the intensity of the original experience has dissipated.  For some the purpose of 
mystical experience is the elevation of the human spirit, though whether the form this takes 
in different religions, for example the state the Sufis describe as al-insan al-kamil, the 
‘perfected human’ (Geels & Belzen, 2003, p. 10), what the Buddhists describe as ‘perfect 
mind’ (Kakar, 2003, p. 109), or the ecstasies of Christian mystics are in any way 
equivalent depends on descriptions of experiences that are notoriously difficult to compare 
(Claxton 2014).   
 
Effects of religious experience 
 
It may be objected that a line should be drawn between mystic states, whether 
induced by religious ecstasy or hallucinogenic chemicals, and the more everyday religious 
experiences induced, for example, by attending a religious celebration.  The question here 
is whether situations of confrontation and conflict, which draw believers into the need to 
defend their beliefs or sense of religious identity, may also induce more emotional (rather 
than cognitive) appreciations of their faith which might explain to some extent the passion 
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with which religious issues are argued and fought.  Perhaps the quest for religious 
experience is both stronger and less conscious than is customarily appreciated, and is in 
part the quest for stronger experience per se.  If this need for strong experience is met, then 
maybe its first effect is to intensify everything else that people associate with their religion, 
including the need to justify it to others and themselves in terms as vigorous as the feelings 
it induces.  
 
Leaving aside the more mystical dimensions of religious experience, it has to be 
asked how the more everyday forms of religious experience, such as those concomitant 
with attending celebrations, festivals, rituals or forms of worship, may contribute to 
religious hatred.   In this there seems to be some convergence in the scholarship of 
neuroscientists and depth psychologists (Lacewing 2013).  Both are concerned with how 
religious experience affects the human sense of Self, the first relying on data and empirical 
research, the latter more on the knowledge that flows from professional experience and 
intuition.  Patrick McNamara bases his model of the Self on two theories supported by 
recent empirical psychological literature: that of the Self as a collection of schemas 
(Markus and Wurf, 1987) and the Self as a story (Bruner, 1990).260  The former rests on 
work on representational and information-processing properties of the self-concept, the 
latter rooted in the tradition of narrative psychology.  These meta-theories contribute to 
two sub-theories of the Self: the theory of self-regulation and the theory of possible Selves 
– including the ‘ideal Self’ (McNamara 2009, p. 24) - that people hope or expect to 
become, or fear to become, in the future.  The narratives of these possible future Selves are 
designed to evolve the present Self, through the resolution of its internal conflicts, into a 
 
260 While drawing on McNamara’s 2009 book The Neuroscience of Religious Experience for guidance on the 
interface between religion and brain science, it should be noted that McNamara himself is acutely aware that 
this science, and especially the science of neurotheology, is still in its infancy, and therefore any conclusions 
based on it must still be regarded as tentative.  Précising his complex arguments also risks distorting them. 
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more complete Self.  “We evaluate our current and past Selves”, says McNamara, “with 
reference to possible Selves” (ibid., p. 25).261  Possible Selves are relevant because of the 
role they play in self-regulation, particularly through events such as regular attendance at 
religious rituals, for example, which activate other possible Selves including the ‘ideal 
Self’ mentioned above.  This ideal Self then provides a standard against which the current 
Self can be measured in terms of progress towards its ultimate goal, including the 
resolution of internal conflicts between the current and the desired (Oyserman, Bybee, 
Terry and Hart-Johnson 2004 quoted in McNamara 2009).  The highest standard of all is 
the God to which the religious process is oriented and towards which believers are directed 
through prayer and ritual in the attempt to become possessed by the spirit of God, however 
conceived.  The parallels with Jung’s concept of the psychological journey of 
individuation, explored in further detail below, are apparent even if Jung insisted that a 
vision of the mysterium tremendum is not the goal (Stein 2006, p. 48). In fact, argued Jung, 
becoming marooned in the land of the numen would constitute a state of possession and 
inflation which is generally destructive for individuals and groups (ibid.).   
 
The language of religion is suffused with this notion of an ideal Self whose 
apotheosis is union with ultimacy of some kind.  The Christian Bible provides an example:  
“I in them and you in me, that they may become perfectly one......” (John 17:23).  This 
very high standard of an ideal Self leads also to the idea of the ‘divided Self’ which 
religion promises to heal (McNamara 2009, p. 26).262  This is an idea which will draw a 
nod of recognition from any scholar-practitioner in the field of conflict resolution: those 
 
261 C.f. Markus, H and Nurius, P 1986, ‘Possible selves’, American Psychologist, 41, pp. 954-969. 
262 In pursuing this strand of thought it is important to concede that the idea of the Self is not universally 
accepted.  Dennett (1991) for example argues that there is no single Self responsible for all our actions, but 
rather a centre of “narrative gravity” (p. 410) which creates drafts of experience and the illusion of single-
mindedness.  McNamara rejects this argument on the grounds that individuals, even children are “are 
designed by nature as strategic agents” (McNamara 2009, p. 27).  
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who cope with their internal doubts and divisions by projecting them onto those they 
perceive as enemies or just Other are all too familiar; once someone or some party or group 
is so categorised it becomes easier to marginalise or demonise them and to justify 
consequent behaviour based on such assessments.  McNamara reasons that a divided 
consciousness has its advantages, such as being able to deceive ourselves, and being able 
to believe two contradictory points of view simultaneously as the alternative to the 
cognitive dissonance that human beings find uncomfortable.263 McNamara also argues that 
creating a unified sense of Self is difficult and costly in terms of the effort involved in 
suppressing the goals, habits and desires that contradict the values of a unified and perhaps 
ideal Self, and therefore that in some circumstances, from an evolutionary perspective, it 
makes sense to live with a divided rather than unified Self.  Again, there seems little in 
McNamara’s arguments with which a depth psychologist would disagree. 
 
Ideas about the unified Self and the divided Self are relevant to this dissertation for 
two reasons.  First, McNamara argues that a unified Self makes for a strong agent, and 
strong agents are essential to promote and manage the within-group cooperation that has 
always been vital for human survival.  He adds that such cooperation is not always benign 
in that one of the most powerful forms of coalitional cooperation is warfare, and religion 
appears to have been crucial for development of individuals who could wage effective 
warfare.  He dismisses the idea that religion is merely about producing nice little boys and 
girls: “it is also about producing real, mature, autonomous, and free adults, adults who 
could wage effective war when necessary” (McNamara 2009, p. 32).  Whether or not one 
is prepared to go quite this far, it does suggest that experience such as collaborative ritual 
or individualistic prayer and meditation enhance the possibility of a unified Self which can 
 
263 This ‘compartmentalization’ (Brewer 2011) may explain how some people with a modern scientific 
education can also be Creationists.  
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both reinforce group loyalty against outsiders and provide powerful agency in support of 
survival.  With this perspective it is little wonder that states have long co-opted even 
supposedly pacifist religious movements into supporting their ambitions.  It goes some 
way to explain the sometimes contentious bonds between established religions and secular 
states: the unified Self becomes the unified nation.  Secondly, the idea of the divided Self 
is central to understanding how emotional and religious experience is relevant to 
understanding religious hatred; the rest of this chapter is devoted to exploring and 
explaining this relevance.   
 
Religious hatred and the divided Self  
 
This argument begins with William James and Lecture VIII, ‘The Divided Self, and 
the Process of its Unification’ in his Varieties of Religious Experience.  James argued that 
a divided consciousness was part of the inheritance of humankind and one of the purposes 
of religion was to bridge and heal this division (James 1902, pp. 129-30).  In the hundred 
years since James it has also become possible to confirm, to some extent, his speculation 
that internal human divisions are the consequence of inheritance: as he put it, 
“Heterogeneous personality has been explained as the result of inheritance - the traits of 
character of incompatible and antagonistic ancestors are supposed to be preserved 
alongside of each other” (James 1902, p. 129).264  The existence of the divided Self has 
arguably provided as strong an internal motivation for people to take religion seriously as 
has the utility of the unified Self for aiding external human cooperation.  But a divided Self 
is no more a recipe for a tranquil life than a divided state: if it is not to overwhelm the 
 
264 For further explanation of the genetics of divided consciousness see Haig, D 2006, ‘Intrapersonal conflict’ 




individual’s mental stability it must be managed.  McNamara calls this management 
process to reduce the tensions between the current Self and the ideal Self ‘decentering’ 
(McNamara 2009, p. 44), and it is this process, he argues, that religion aims to procure.   
 
Decentering [staying with the American spelling] does this by temporarily 
decoupling the executive Self, the current Self that controls cognitive and motor functions, 
from its position of control so that it is open to emotion and experience. In other words, it 
allows the busy, everyday Self to take a step back and take a look beyond its immediate 
cognitive environment in order to harness greater and different resources and thereby build 
a “new identity... larger and more complex than the older Self....” (ibid. p. 47).   This 
paraphrasing of McNamara’s account of the decentering process hardly does justice to a 
sequence of complex arguments and descriptions of cognitive and non-cognitive processes, 
and yet these are no more than the empirical confirmations of long-held truths.  McNamara 
himself acknowledges that “Many scholars (e.g. Freud, Propp, Jung, Campbell, Eliade) 
have noticed that the experience of growth into a better or ideal Self is accomplished via 
integration of the old into the new or better story” (ibid., p. 51).265   The end result of this 
integration of old and new, especially in the context of religious experience, is some sense 
of elevation, less attachment to old desires and grudges and a consequent sense of freedom 
and expansiveness as well as what McNamara calls the “quiet dignity so characteristic of 
genuinely religious individuals” (ibid., p. 55).  In extreme cases the result may be the 
religious ecstasy that acts as a bridge  
that connects the adept to the very absolute, divine, and transcendent entity, realm, or 
state taught in the religious doctrine.....(as in Hindu darshana, Sufi hal or wajd, or 
Catholic visio beatifico), immersion (as in Vedantic brahman or Christian unico 
mystica), release of ‘self’ from the body (as in some yogic practices, or the vanishing 
notions of ‘self’ to open up the space of a blissful emptiness (as in some Buddhist 
meditation practices).  
(Malinar and Basu, 2008, p. 246) 
 





How, though, can this apparently benevolent centering process contribute to the fomenting 
of religious hostility and hatred if its fruits can be seemingly so positive?   
 
The short answer, according to McNamara, is that it can sometimes go wrong. 
Decentering, he explains, occurs in four stages, paraphrased as follows:  
Stage 1.  The sense of agency of the current Self is inhibited; 
Stage 2.  The current Self becomes open to new possibilities and a new Self; 
Stage 3.  A process of searching for ways to reconcile the old and new Selves 
begins, looking for ways to create a new version of the Self that can 
encompass deeper and better solutions to internal conflicts; and 
Stage 4.  The new Self, closer to the ideal Self, binds and integrates the old Self, 
creating a new identity that is larger, more complex and more unified than 
the previous Self. 
(Adapted from McNamara 2009, p. 47)  
 
Problems arise if, in Stage 3 of this process, the search process fails because it is prevented 
from starting or finishing, for example because the openness to non-cognitive influences is 
inhibited by the discomfort of fellow members of a religious community, or because the 
pressures of material circumstances leave it incomplete, and then in Stage 4 the binding 
process still takes place.266  This means that the old Self binds with itself  because no new 
or ideal Self has emerged during the search process, and therefore the old identity is 
actively reinforced.  If this happens existing convictions will be continually reconfirmed 
and held with ever greater force and certainty; the more it occurs, whether through self-
agency or at the behest of others, the more bound to itself the old Self becomes, and the 
harder it is for the individual to accept new ideas or indeed any which challenge the 
increasingly bounded sense of Self.  The end result is the narcissism and fanaticism evident 
 
266 Remembering that one of the possible (and contested) etymological origins of the word ‘religion’ is the 




in any form of religious extremism.267  So religious experience, instead of being the great 
liberator and expander of the Self through exposure to non-cognitive sources of 
knowledge, intuition and inspiration instead faces an impregnable attachment to the old 
and the limited (Vonk and Visser 2020). 
 
This is, as mentioned above, a much paraphrased and simplified version of 
McNamara’s complex arguments based on empirical research.  It resonates, however, with 
much that has been written by depth psychologists before the advent of modern 
neuroscience.   
 
Healing the divided Self 
 
Depth psychology can provide similar insights to neuroscience when it comes to 
exploring how the religious process can go wrong, and this is particularly pertinent when it 
comes to understanding fundamentalist and extremist religious movements that have an 
irrational core inaccessible to argument and resistant to reasonable compromise (Main 
2006). Main argues that “Depth psychology, as the discipline par excellence for exploring 
and theorising about the irrational, may be able to provide insights that enable this 
irrationality to be more effectively engaged” (ibid.).268  In fact, the differences in style and 
approach among neuroscientists and depth psychologists may occlude similarities of 
conclusion uncomfortable to both as has been noted in this chapter.   Jung, long derided as 
 
267 The focus here is on religion but the same process could, presumably, operate in relation to any system of 
beliefs or values which aims to deepen, consciously or not, the sense of meaning and purpose an individual 
seeks through it.   
268 It is arguable that approaches which take religion seriously, including its non-rational and experiential 
elements, are better placed to inform those trying to establish dialogue with fundamentalists, for example, 
than those based on secular approaches which see fundamentalism in largely social, political, historical or 
ideological terms.  This also perhaps explains the plethora of books by depth psychologists published since 
9/11 (for example, Hillman 2004; Jones 2002; Stevens 2004; Covington et al 2002; Beebe 2003).   
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a mystic and religion-obsessed eccentric by his academic critics, described what he called 
the individuation process in terms little different from what McNamara describes as the 
goal of healing through religion:  
Individuation means becoming an ‘individual’ and, in so far as ‘individuality’ 
embraces our innermost, last, and incomparable uniqueness, it also implies becoming 
one’s own self. We could therefore translate individuation as ‘coming to selfhood’ or 
‘self-realization.’” 
                  (Jung 1953, p. 173)  
Similarly, the mechanism of McNamara’s decentering process bears a resemblance to what 
Jung called the ‘transcendent function’, the mechanism by which conscious and 
unconscious tendencies are integrated: “The function is called ‘transcendent’ because it 
allows an individual to transcend his or her attitude and arrive at a new one; it potentiates 
psychological growth” (Miller 2004, p. 14).  The development of the transcendent 
function, as the final chapter of this dissertation makes clear, is an important response to 
the problem of religious hatred.   
 
If psychological growth is the chief aim of modern psychotherapists, and if the 
argument that contemporary psychotherapy, like religion, is also trying to deal with the 
human feeling of incompleteness (Corbett 2012, p. 113) is accepted, then the forms of 
salvation offered by priest and therapist have to this extent begun to converge.  Jung made 
the same claim in two essays written some 90 years ago, ‘Psychoanalysis and the Cure of 
Souls’ (1928) and ‘Psychotherapists or the Clergy’ (1932).  In these Jung refers to healing 
as a “religious problem” and says modern man wants to know “how he is to reconcile 
himself with his own nature – how he is to love the enemy in his own heart and call the 
wolf his brother” (Jung CW11, p. 341).269  The same issues are raised by William James 
(1902, p. 172) when he describes St. Augustine’s “psychological genius” in recognising 
 
269 Quoted in Spiegelman, J 1984, ‘Psychotherapists and the Clergy: Fifty Years Later’, Journal of Religion 
and Health, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 19-32. 
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the “the trouble of having a divided self”.  This is again pointing, like McNamara, to the 
problem of religious hatred being parallel to the problem of self-hatred among people 
whose internal life is divided.  This argument is also not, as might be thought by those 
critical of him, peculiar to Jung.  The psychoanalyst Melanie Klein describes hatred as a 
kind of primal rage, the innate hatred of the death instinct of life itself as though it 
recognizes the moral superiority of the life instinct (Vitz and Mango 1997). Perhaps 
positive religious experience and the intense affirmation it brings is a natural antidote, a 
vaccination against this death instinct, and the lack of such experience enables the death 
instinct and hatred to remain.270    
 
Religious experience is supposed to be the process that heals these divisions and 
negativities, but if the inward process fails it is easier, less painful, to project them outward 
onto others – the unbelievers, the backsliders, the unclean – all forms of the great and 
dangerous Other.  Similarly Corbett warns that all religious experience risks triggering a 
shadow side: ways of emphasising one’s own importance, using compassion to impress 
others; even using meditation as a means of feeling superior to others who do not meditate 
(Corbett 2012, p. 211; Vonk and Visser 2020).  Investment in any creed can, ironically, 
says Corbett, “impede the discovering of spiritual truth by reinforcing the ego” (ibid.) and 
inviting comparisons with those on a different path. 
 
270 Melanie Klein (1882-1960) also popularized the concept of ‘splitting’, originally developed by the 
psychiatrist Ronald Fairbairn (1889-1964) as part of object relations theory.  In psychoanalytic theory 
splitting is regarded as a defence mechanism that operates by polarising everything into the extremes of good 
or bad. There may be some correlation with the idea of the divided Self as described by McNamara and again 
we see a pre-figuring of the convergence of psychodynamic psychology proposed by Michael Lacewing 
(2013).  For the sake of completeness another convergence should also be acknowledged here: "The 
emergence of depth psychology was historically paralleled by the translation and widespread dissemination 
of the texts of yoga... for the depth psychologies sought to liberate themselves from the stultifying limitations 
of Western thought to develop maps of inner experience grounded in the transformative potential of 
therapeutic practices” Shamdasani, S (ed.) 1996, The Psychology of Kundalini Yoga: Notes of the Seminar 






Religious hatred as the failure to heal 
 
All of the above suggests that religious hatred may be a consequence arising from 
failures of religious experience.  This is not intended to mean that the individual who fails 
to achieve mountaintop enlightenment becomes frustrated and resentful of those who have, 
nor that the resolution of spiritual emergencies involves a retreat into the blaming of 
others, but rather that the frustration that grows out of the failure to develop a meaningful 
religious life of some kind could turn into a hatred of the self and perhaps a resentment of 
others as a means to deflect its self-destructiveness.  This idea grows out of reflection on 
what may be meant by “a meaningful religious life”, and it reflects a point made earlier: 
that the core problem of religious hatred may not be too much religion but too little of the 
sort that nourishes a person’s internal life and inoculates it against surges of religious 
emotion which can turn destructive.  What Jung called the individuation process has been 
mentioned above and it is worth describing this in more detail to illustrate how it relates to 
the idea of a religious life that provides some immunity against religious hatred. 
 
There is, as ever, a danger on drawing too much on the work of a single individual, 
especially one as controversial as Jung, but in the sixty years since his death others have 
continued to develop his ideas.   One dimension of his work about which this is true is 
lifespan theory in developmental psychology (Stein 1998, p. 172), though Jung’s role in its 
origin is not always recognised (see for example Baltes et al 2006; Hill and Allemand 
2020).  One significance of lifespan psychology is that it contradicts the work of those who 
attribute most of psychological and character development to infancy and early childhood.  
Jung saw development as something that continues throughout life to its very end, and 
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religion as having an important role in this.  In Modern Man in Search of a Soul (1933) he 
says:  
I have treated many hundreds of patients. Among those in the second half of life - 
that is to say, over 35 - there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was 
not that of finding a religious outlook on life. It is safe to say that every one of them 
fell ill because he had lost that which the living religions of every age have given 
their followers, and none of them has really been healed who did not regain his 
religious outlook. 
(Jung 1933, p. 234)271 
 
This needs to be understood in the context of the five stages of consciousness development 
that Jung perceived (Jung CW13, pp. 199-201).  The first stage is described as 
participation mystique,272 referring to unconscious unity between the observer and the 
observed, a characteristic of small children before they can distinguish between their own 
presence and that of others. In the second stage a sense of separateness develops and with 
it projection becomes more discrete and discerning though parents remain major carriers of 
projection including of the omniscience and omnipotence attributed to them by their 
offspring.  This lasts until the teenage years when suddenly parents know nothing and 
projection shifts to individuals and institutions, from celebrities, sports and music stars to 
political parties and religious bodies, which gradually replace personal opinions with 
collective opinions, views and values (Stein 1998, p. 181).  This process of projection 
continues through partnering and parenting, and in fact, says Stein, the development of 
consciousness stops here with individuals continuing “to project positive and negative 
features of the psyche into the world around and to respond to the psyche’s images and 
powers as though they were located in external objects and persons” (ibid.).  If conscious 
development does continue into a third stage, it involves abandoning and often de-
 
271 This statement may explain, among other reasons, why Jung is treated so warily by more secularly 
inclined psychologists. 
272 Jung borrowed the term from the anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl.  For a critique both of Lévy-Bruhl’s 
work and Jung’s use of it see Segal, R 2007, ‘Jung and Lévy-Bruhl’, Journal of Analytical Psychology, vol. 
52, pp. 635-658. 
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idealising projections, with the projected psychic contents becoming more abstract and 
manifesting as symbols and ideologies.  This is the point at which philosophy and theology 
become possible for the individual, with the power of projection allowing ideas and entities 
such as gods, and law, and concepts such as truth and beauty to take on the numinous 
power once granted to parents and pop stars.  At this stage of development subjective 
projection is replaced by more objective evaluations of the world and the development of 
principles that can be applied to it: “In place of unconscious empathy based on 
participation mystique or projection, one has rules that dictate duty” (ibid. p. 182).  This is 
the beginning “of finding a religious outlook on life” of which Jung speaks above, and 
while in a contemporary and largely secular society it is liable to be quite unconventional it 
can have the advantage of bringing stability and a degree of maturity especially to a 
disordered psyche or a chaotic life.273   
 
The next stage of development is different in kind: what Stein calls “the radical 
extinction of projections” and the creation of an “empty center” which he equates with 
“modern man in search of his soul” (ibid., p. 183).  He sees this as the time when human 
beings lose their sense of being anything more than parts of a socio-economic machine, 
where they count for little, and whatever grander sense of meaning and purpose they might 
have had is replaced by moments of pleasure and largely utilitarian values.  Jung himself 
describes as being at this stage people “who believe in ego consciousness and in what we 
call reality…..”.  Jung believed that European ego consciousness was inclined to bury or at 
least suppress the unconscious, with the result that it then tends to turn against us and 
become a cause of neurosis (Jung, CW9i, para. 221).  This, supposedly, is the modern 
human: secular, atheist, humanist, perhaps, though in the context of everything being 
 
273 Hence the references in 12-Step Processes to a “Greater Power” to whom some control must be ceded. 
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relative and without any sense of the certain.  In reality, however, Jung says that the ego 
has taken on the projections previously attached to the external world, and in particular 
becomes inflated with a God-like sense of its own importance: an ominous development in 
that such inflation makes it hard for a person to respond to their environment, to make wise 
decisions or to express empathy with others.  It is, in short, the road not only to 
megalomania, but to the social and political horrors that beckon when people are immune 
to social or moral restraints.  Stein also argues (ibid., p. 185) that fear of this stage of 
development is one of the reasons the fundamentalists of the world become trapped in the 
earlier stages of development.  Despite these dangers, he also argues that the removal of 
projections and the taking of personal responsibility are real psychological achievements 
which pave the way for the fifth and final stage of development.   
 
This involves recognition of the limitations of the ego, awareness of the unconscious 
and its powers, and a willingness to interact directly with the psyche and its archetypal 
relationships (ibid., p. 186).  In one sense this fifth stage of development comes full circle 
back to participation mystique and a world that respects the myths and divinities of the 
ages and an appreciation that, in psychic terms, such things are as ‘real’ as the material 
world embraced in the fourth stage of development.  While the overall purpose of 
individuation is not religious, being the forging of psychological wholeness, the 
reconciliation of internal opposites and the integration of conscious and unconscious, the 
process could not take place without a development of religious consciousness.274  As will 
 
274 While Jung stopped at Stage 5, as described, there are indications that he envisioned further stages.  For 
example, in ‘The Psychology of Kundalini Yoga’ (1932) he discusses the attainment of states of 
consciousness in the East that surpass what was then known in the West.  He was sceptical about the 
possibility of Westerners achieving them, but suggested that Stage 6 would involve some sort of ecological 
relation between the individual psyche and the natural world.  This led him to investigate physics and 
cosmology with physicists such as Wolfgang Pauli (1900-1958), with whom he wrote The Interpretation of 
Nature and the Psyche (1952) which contains his paper ‘Synchronicity – An Acausal Connecting Principle’ 
(Main 2000).  
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become clear in Chapter 12, individuation through what is called in this dissertation 
‘epiphanic intervention’ and the activity of the transcendent function is also, it is 
suggested, central to the transformation of religious hatred.   
 
Essentiality of religious experience and emotion  
 
This chapter has looked at two causes of hatred that can spring from the emotional 
and experiential dimension of religion.  One is internal division, the other is the failure of a 
development of consciousness that takes people beyond forms of religion that seek to 
emphasise Otherness and more rigid forms of belief.  Can the particular toxicity of 
religious hatred be put down to the frustration and disappointment, to say nothing of the 
sacrifices, privations and self-denials, caused by failed investments in religious experience 
or the inability to appreciate religious emotion?  It is certainly easy to argue that hatred is a 
human phenomenon that casts a greater shadow in the context of a process that is supposed 
to be healing, and it is also worth noting that hatred is a discrete phenomenon and to 
understand that for individuals it can have positive as well as destructive consequences. 
Some people find that by focusing on their hatred they no longer feel hopelessness or 
despair: it becomes a source of strength, meaning, power, energy and even of identity as in 
Northern Ireland or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Corbett 2012, p. 154).275  By this token 
hatred can also strengthen the sense of Self, indeed it can become an ideal Self in its own 
right, so that whatever increases hatred increases the Self, and any attempt to decrease 
hatred may be experienced as an attempt to weaken the Self.  “.....This is why hatred is so 
 
275 Schwartz (1997) argues that the basic tenet of the religion of the Hebrew Bible is that “one God 
establishes one people under God." This, in turn, she says, means that “monotheism is a myth that grounds 
particular identity in universal transcendence. And monotheism is a myth that forges identity antithetically—
against the Other” (quoted in Countryman 1999).  Countryman argues “The problem may, indeed, be 
endemic to monotheism and unavoidable since monotheism can imply a degree of unity in all experience that 




difficult to get rid of, and also why preaching against hate is often ineffective.  When evil 
behaviour is being used to maintain emotional balance, no amount of moral teaching will 
change the behaviour” (ibid., p. 155). 
  
Religious experience, whether of the mystical or more mundane variety, can be 
positive or negative in effect.  At its best, it inspires people to act with greater compassion 
and humanity, encouraging them to think and experience more broadly, making them more 
tolerant of difference and more understanding of human frailty.  At its worst, when it goes 
wrong, it can reinforce existing prejudices, blind people to obvious inequities, and even 









Scholars have wrestled with the place and meaning of myth since before Sir James 
Frazer published his monumental survey, The Golden Bough, in 1922, but that remarkable 
publication, for all its deficits, brought home how enormous and inexhaustibly complex 
any venture into the subject of myth quickly becomes even before rival psychodynamic 
approaches and interpretations are taken into account.276   The approach taken here 
therefore is to look for specific insights into what Ninian Smart calls the mythological 
dimension of religion  (Smart 1969, p. 18) and for the light they may cast on the origins 
and reasons for religious hatred.277  The chapter begins by looking at mythology through 
the eyes of three scholars, Ninian Smart, Mircea Eliade and Joseph Campbell, who, though 
now controversial figures in the field, can be said to have laid its foundations.  Their 
distinctive approaches, while complementary, also provide a sense of the contrasting ways 
the subject has been treated and provide a background for using William Doty’s 
encyclopaedic Mythography (1986/2000) to understand how myths and rituals need to be 
studied and understood, David Leeming’s thematic anthology The World of Myth (1990) 
and Tim Read’s Walking Shadows (2019) for a contemporary psychiatrist’s insights into 
myth and archetypal crises.  Also considered is the Hero’s Journey, what Campbell called 
the ‘monomyth’, that appears in cultures across the world, and the implications of this for 
individuals influenced by it.  These discussions provide the background for exploration of 
the idea of ‘cosmic war’ which, this dissertation argues, shapes much modern mythology 
 
276 For an account of Freud and Jung’s approach to mythology see Segal, R 2003, ‘Jung’s very twentieth-
century view of myth’, Journal of Analytical Psychology, vol. 48, pp. 593-617. 
277 As previously noted, Smart renamed and renumbered his ‘dimensions of religion’ periodically throughout 
his life.  For this chapter the 1969 definition of the ‘mythological dimension’ is used. 
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and provides both conscious and unconscious contributions to religious hatred.  
 
Approaching mythology  
 
Smart describes a myth as “a moving picture of the sacred” (Smart 1973a, pp. 79-
80), whose forms, while having much in common with the depiction of fairy tales, legends 
and historical narratives, are distinguished by the presence of sacred beings, whether good 
or evil, that provide an illustration of the relationships between the sacred, transcendental 
or supernatural and the everyday world.278  Smart is also clear that terms such as ‘myth’ 
and ‘mythological’ are not used to imply, as in common usage, that the content of these 
stories is false; he sees them as neutral terms that simply report what has been said, written 
or believed.  This approach contrasts with that of  Philip Wheelwright, for example, who 
says “The very essence of myth....[is] that haunting awareness of transcendental forces 
peering through the cracks of the visible universe”.279  While Wheelwright’s point is made 
from a theistic perspective, he catches something of the tensions between the visible and 
the invisible that underlie all descriptions and explanations of myth, and in his “haunting 
awareness” also the fascination that myth has always exerted for anthropologists and 
scientists as much as for historians, philosophers and theologians.280   
 
The density of scholarship about the critical difference between myths and other 
stories makes arriving at a final perception challenging but there does seem some 
 
278 Smart includes in his studies of mythology not just stories directly about God (as in the Book of Genesis) 
or the gods (as in Homer’s Iliad) but also of the historical events that are significant in a religious tradition, 
such as the Passover ritual in Judaism that re-enacts the children of Israel’s delivery from bondage in Egypt, 
arguing that historical events of this kind effectively function as myths (Smart 1969, p. 18).   
279 Quoted in Schorer, M 1959, ‘The Necessity of Myth’, Daedalus, vol. 88, no. 2, pp. 359-362.  
280 This is a term that Smart alternatively used and shied away from in successive editions of The Religious 
Experience of Mankind.  The final edition, published in 1996 as The Religious Experience, includes 
references to ‘the invisible world’. 
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consensus that the purpose of the former is not entertainment, though they may have that 
value, but that myths are vehicles for ritual and symbolic events that enshrine moral and  
psychological lessons.  Myths tell us how to live, how to act, especially how to navigate 
the differences between order and chaos when faced with the inevitable moral and social 
dilemmas that accompany human life.  One of the first points of departure for those 
studying the significance as opposed to just the description or provenance of mythology 
has long been the work of Joseph Campbell (1904-87).  Where Frazer documents the world 
of myth, Campbell seeks to understand, explain and make myth relevant, even normative, 
for contemporary readers.  He elucidates what he sees as the four functions that myth 
serves: the first three being the mystical function that “opens the world to the dimension of 
mystery, to the realization of the mystery that underlies all forms”; the cosmological 
dimension “showing you what the shape of the universe is”; and the sociological function 
“supporting and validating a certain social order”.  It is the fourth function, though, that 
really persuades him of the importance of myth: “the pedagogical function, of how to live a 
human lifetime under any circumstances” and, he adds, “Myths are clues to the spiritual 
potentialities of the human life” (ibid.).  It is the second and fourth of these functions that 
are most relevant to this dissertation: the latter because, like anything pedagogical, the 
teaching can be for good or ill; and the former, cosmological dimension, because within it 
are found the stories that, for some, provide evidence of ongoing cosmic wars in which 
human beings should take sides.281   
 
Both of these are reflected in the work of Mircea Eliade (1907-86).282 Eliade shares 
 
281 For examples of such evidence see Juergensmeyer 2017, pp. 182-203. 
282 Since Eliade’s death his anti-Semitic views and his involvement with Romanian fascism have tainted his 
reputation (see Berger, A 1994, ‘Mircea Eliade: Romanian Fascism and the History of Religions in the 
United States’ in Tainted Heroes: Antisemitism and Cultural Heroes, Harrowitz, N (ed.), Temple University 
Press, Philadelphia, pp. 51-74). 
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Smart’s perceptions of myth while taking them a step further in that he sees the purpose of 
myths as telling the story of human origins and establishing the pattern for all significant 
events in human life (Eliade 1996, p. 430).  For Eliade, myths tell of the original 
homogeneity of time and space and how these are interrupted by hierophanies, 
manifestations of the sacred, which create order for the human occupants of a chaotic 
world.  So myths are primarily cosmogonic, providing a sense of the roots of the world and 
ritual that people can re-enact and thereby anchor themselves in an era constantly beset by 
change.  For Eliade myths and rituals are rooted in sacred space and sacred time, and result 
from manifestations of the sacred into profane space and time.283  These hierophanies 
create fixed points around which religious communities can frame their existence and 
perform rituals which take them back to the origins of divine creation.  This is important 
because religious people desire to live in “a sacred world, because it is only in such a 
world” that they possess what he calls a “real existence” and the chance of expressing “an 
unquenchable ontological thirst” (ibid., p. 64).  Reaching this point Eliade also defines the 
differences between ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious man’ [sic], a polarisation which he 
implies is greater than we customarily realise.  Religious man, says Eliade, “lives in two 
kinds of time, of which the more important, sacred time....[is] a sort of eternal mythical 
present that is periodically reintegrated by means of rites” (ibid., p. 70).  Non-religious 
man also experiences the ebb and flow of time and the celebrations that punctuate it; the 
essential difference being that non-religious man does not experience intervals of sacred 
time, nor the mystery that accompanies them or the “man’s deepest existential dimension”, 
 
283 In The Sacred and the Profane Eliade uses the example of a church: “For a believer, the church shares in a 
different space from the street in which it stands. The door that opens on the interior of the church actually 
signifies a solution of continuity. The threshold that separates the two spaces also indicates the distance 
between two modes of being, the profane and the religious. The threshold is the limit, the boundary, the 
frontier that distinguishes and opposes two worlds - and at the same time the paradoxical place where those 





the link to his own life and death (ibid., p. 71).  If this gulf between the religious and non-
religious is as extensive as Eliade believes, it may explain the tendency of believers to feel 
unconsciously superior with their insight into the infinite, and non-believers resentful of 
that superiority and motivated to diminish it.  This combination of narcissism on the part of 
the former, and resentment among the latter, can provide the grounds for both anti-
clericalism, which is discussed in Chapter 11, and for wider motivations to hate.  
 
Societal impacts of myth 
 
This polarisation also raises questions about the significance of religious myths for 
different sectors of the population.  A similar point is raised by Campbell when he 
distinguishes between local and universal manifestations of myth and its relationship to 
ritual (Cox 2010, p. 95).  Campbell says myths and rituals work together by “disengaging 
[the believer] from his local, historical conditions and leading him toward some kind of 
ineffable experience” (Campbell 1970, p. 462).  While local myths may convey local 
meanings for a community, when they feed into rituals they bring an experience of the 
universal which can transform the community’s understanding of itself.  For example, the 
memory of a boy who lost his life in the Great War grows from half-forgotten history to 
something much greater when he is remembered as part of national Remembrance Day 
celebrations: sad and local loss is transformed into national self-sacrifice in the struggle for 
a greater good.284   
 
 Taken together, Smart, Campbell and Eliade are saying that myths provide a picture 
 
284 This may also, at the same time, change that community’s sense of who ‘belongs’ as part of it, leading to 
the ‘them and us’ that can become the grounds for segregation and ultimately genocide.  The local myths 
which can bless people with ‘ineffable experience’ may also lead, inadvertently, to experiences of a much 
less healthy kind as is explored below through the work of René Girard. 
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of the sacred and of divinity which can bridge the chasm between the transcendent and the 
everyday, thereby bringing a sense of (divine) order.  This may be so, but in the everyday 
world myth may legitimate the bringing of the order desired by one group against the 
interests of another.  The scholarly vision of myth as invariably beneficent is not always 
replicated on the ground.  Furthermore, the rituals by which myth is made flesh - 
metaphorically (or literally, for some) in the case, for example, of the Last Supper  - can 
also become as much a source of division as of sanctity and unity depending on the context 
in which they are performed and who determines who may participate.  The logic of 
religious ritual is that the repetitive enactment of words and movement induces a certain 
inner state of mind, such as humility, or awe, or respect, or worship, in those participating.  
It is also true that things outward can excite things inward, and this is probably closer to 
most people’s experience than the more abstract processes described by Smart, Eliade and 
Campbell.  Take the example of the Voortrekker Monument on a hilltop just south of 
Pretoria in South Africa.  As previously mentioned, the monument commemorates the 
Voortrekkers who left the Cape Colony between 1835 and 1854, its marble frieze 
illustrating the everyday struggles and religious life of the Voortrekkers.  Beyond this 
simplistic level the monument enshrines elements of Afrikaner mythology that equate the 
Voortrekkers with the Children of Israel in search of the Promised Land.285  The 
contribution of such monuments to a people’s perception of their history and identity 
should not be under-estimated (Everett 2003).  Until relatively recently representatives of 
the DRC and the apartheid government told the story of South Africa in terms that more 
clearly reflected the mythology told through the Voortrekker Monument than through a 
 
285 This mythological element arguably made a significant contribution to Afrikaner Nationalism and to the 
acceptance of apartheid as a form of quasi-religious doctrine, institutionalised religious hatred in all but 
name, by the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) even until the late 1980s.   The symbolic significance of the 
monument is arguably recognisable in recent efforts, not all of them successful, to play down its former 
social and cultural value for Afrikaners and re-brand it as a symbol of reconciliation and nation building (van 
Vollenhoven 2017).   
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more objective history of the country.286 
 
This difference between the abstract and academic analyses of myth, and the impacts 
of myth on the ground, has been pointed out by David Lewis-Williams’s criticism of the 
moral philosopher Mary Midgely when she said “Myths are.... imaginative patterns, 
networks of powerful symbols that suggest particular ways of interpreting the world” 
(Midgely 2007, p. 28).  Lewis-Williams (2010, p. 276) argues that while this is how myth 
may be perceived within the academy, it is not how myths tend to have been perceived and 
held in much of human history and still are in some places.  He illustrates this by 
suggesting that to say Muhammed was not bodily raised into heaven could put one at 
serious risk in some parts of the world: the difference between imaginative patterns, 
networks of symbols and divine revelation can be a matter of life and death.  As Kautsky 
(1965) says, quoting from Merton (1957, p. 421), “If men define situations as real, they are 
real in their consequences”.  The point worth emphasising, even if it is a truism about 
myth, is that stories which cannot be literally true may still have serious meaning for those 
who tell them.287    
 
Impacts of myth on individuals  
 
 
286 One extravagant version of the Afrikaner myth, told by a very senior DRC churchman, was that South 
Africa was a land empty of human inhabitants when his ancestors discovered it (private communication 
1986). A similar myth, widely believed to this day, is that the Australian government classified its Aboriginal 
people among the fauna and flora until the 1967 constitutional referendum (https://www.abc.net.au/news/ 
2018-03-20/fact-check-flora-and-fauna-1967-referendum/9550650). 
287 Vamic Volkan uses the term chosen glories to describe the narratives of a mythical and heroic past which 
often demonizes other groups and is available for political leaders to call on in their efforts to mobilise 
support for nationalist agendas.  He also uses chosen traumas to describe grievances which have benefitted 
from myth-making for political ends (Volkan, V 1999, ‘Psychoanalysis and diplomacy: Part I. Individual and 




The aspect of mythology that must now be considered is its impact on individuals, 
recalling what Campbell calls “the pedagogical function, of how to live a human lifetime 
under any circumstances” (Campbell 1991, p. 34), starting from creation myths designed to 
ground the individual with a vision of how things have come to be, proceeding through the 
disordering inevitable in the life of the individual as much as the world, and then setting 
out how this disorder can be redeemed through the actions of the individual.  This is the 
basis for Campbell’s concept of the ‘monomyth’ which he uses in The Hero with a 
Thousand Faces (1949) to describe the Hero’s Journey, supposedly the archetypal pattern 
taken by many myths and stories in which “A hero ventures forth from the world of 
common day into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered 
and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the 
power to bestow boons on his fellow man” (Campbell 1949, p. 23) .288  The significance of 
the Hero’s Journey as an archetypal myth is, for those who are willing to accept the 
insights of archetypal psychology, that it reflects innate human tendencies, hard-wired in 
the mind and dating back to humankind’s earliest days.  
 
A good example of this monomyth is the Enûma Eliš, the Babylonian myth.289  It 
begins with how the universe and the important things in life arrived, moves on to an event 
which disrupts the established order and introduces the concept of suffering, and concludes 
with the resumption of the original order as a consequence of the heroic actions of an 
 
288 In recent years the idea of the monomyth, and some aspects of Campbell’s scholarship, have been 
questioned in, for example, Ellwood, R 1999, The Politics of Myth: a Study of C. G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, 
and Joseph Campbell, SUNY, New York) and Northup, L 2006, ‘Myth-Placed Priorities: Religion and the 
Study of Myth’, Religious Studies Review, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 5–10. The thrust of Ellwood’s criticism is of 
Campbell’s "oversimplification of historical matters and tendency to make myth mean whatever he wanted it 
to mean".  
289 The Enûma Eliš was discovered in 1849 in the ruined library at Ashurbanipal in Mosul, Iraq, the ancient 
city of Nineveh.  Its one thousand lines were written in Old Babylonian in cuneiform script on seven clay 
tablets dating from the 7th century BCE, though some elements of the myth may pre-date this by a 
millennium or so (Heidel, A 1942, The Babylonian Genesis, University of Chicago Press, Chicago). 
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individual “primal man”, the Hero being the god Marduk in the case of the Enûma Eliš 
(Wink 2001, p. 261).   A similar example is that of the Grail story and the hero Parsifal, 
one of the knights of the Round Table, perhaps more resonant for European and North 
American audiences in view of its Christian setting, and one that has been repeatedly told 
and interpreted through psychodynamic and particularly Jungian lenses not least by Emma 
Jung and Marie-Louise von Franz in The Grail Legend (1960).   
 
This tripartite structure is common to many myths though the values highlighted, both 
negative and positive, within each may vary according to the needs and preferences within 
each tradition, as may the fifteen or so stages of the story which Campbell identified within 
this central structure.  The essential structure of departure, initiation and return can be seen 
in any number of monomyths from those of the ancient world, through those of the great 
religions, to the epic stories of our current age often translated into cinema, such as The 
Lord of the Rings, Star Wars, and His Dark Materials.  The central thrust of all such stories 
is the journey from blindness, unconsciousness or naivety towards wisdom, maturity, 
moral awareness and self-sufficiency.  Whether or not this structure is as universal as 
mythologists such as Campbell claim, more significant is the effect on those exposed to 
such stories through the process of ‘mythical incorporation’ (Dillon 2010). Such a process, 
which in the past and still in some contexts would be expected to be undergone as part of 
mythic ritual and ceremony at certain times during a lifespan, usually after some prior 
initiation ritual (Eliade 1958), is understood to involve the incorporation of the participant 
into the person of the primal man and consequently his or her experience of the power, 
healing and identification with the qualities of the primal man, the Hero.  The purpose of 
this is to enable the participant, now also Marduk, Jesus, Mohammed or Gautama Buddha, 
 
 196 
to live the life of this primal man in addition to his or her own life290 and thereby find the 
psycho-spiritual healing and grounding they may hitherto have lacked.291   
 
In addition to this, says Dillon (2010), myths reveal two types of hero, the affirmative 
and the transcendent.  The former acts to affirm the original order of the universe 
following whatever event disordered it, so Marduk in the Enûma Eliš acts to reverse the 
suffering and chaos caused by his parents, and Jesus acts to redeem humanity in the wake 
of Adam’s disobedience in the Garden of Eden.  The transcendent hero, meanwhile, ushers 
in an entirely new order that takes him or her beyond the original vision of the world, and 
beyond its mythical and symbolic order.  Furthermore Dillon (2010), supported by Bloom 
(1993), argues that in some ways much modern religion is already Gnostic in nature in that 
“the Gnostic hero... seeks to transcend the limitations and binaries of the mythical and 
symbolic order in order to attain ‘direct knowledge’ (i.e. gnosis) of the Godhead”.292   This 
suggests that believers who emphasise personal relationships with the divine effectively 
transform heroes such as Jesus into Gnostic heroes while at the same time giving Lucifer 
his traditional role as “the adversary in this Christian variant of the ancient Near Eastern 
combat narrative” (Forsyth 1987, p. 7).  This would go some way to explain the way that 
 
290 A young person today, initiated into contemporary culture by the trappings of an expedition to the cinema, 
might find in Frodo Baggins, Luke Skywalker or Lyra Belacqua a similarly primal hero.  Indeed, in the 1990s 
the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution sponsored an exhibit called Star Wars: 
The Magic of Myth which discussed the ways in which Joseph Campbell's work shaped the Star Wars films 
(Kripal 2008, p. 189). 
291 It was realisation of the healing potential of myth and ritual that caused psychotherapists such as James 
Hillman (1983) to argue for their use in therapeutic processes.  
292 The 2nd-century Roman Catholic bishop Marcion, generally regarded as one of the first Gnostics, 
perceived a battle between the true and loving God of the New Testament and Yahweh of the Old Testament, 
referred to as the “Demiurge”, who was false and evil (Dillon 2010). The literature of some independent 
pentecostalist churches, such as Hillsong (https://hillsong.com, viewed 6 August 2018), seems to demonstrate 
some of the characteristics of a modern Gnosticism in the quest for the “small spark of the true God trapped 
within the human body” (ibid.). 
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the devil is personalised in evangelical churches and the intensity of the hatred generated 
among such congregations for any satanic associations.293 
 
Mythology and religious hatred 
 
Psychodynamic psychology emphasises the importance of myths, albeit assimilated 
unconsciously, for making sense of the everyday world.  In The Cry for Myth (1991), for 
example, the psychotherapist Rollo May argues that every individual seeks – “indeed must 
[original emphasis] seek if he or she is to remain sane - to bring some order and coherence 
into the stream of sensations, emotions, and ideas entering his or her consciousness....” 
According to May, each one of us is forced to deliver for oneself what in previous ages 
was done by family, custom, church, and state, namely, form the myths through which we 
can make some sense of experience (May 1991, p. 29).  The absence of such a sense of 
order and coherence in any life is a recipe for anger at oneself and the consequent 
projection of negative qualities onto others as a means of disowning them – both of which, 
in some circumstances, can evolve into hatred.294  Secondly, disagreement within any 
organisation or community which draws identity and legitimacy from a mythology, can be 
perceived as the process of rejecting a primal myth, potentially resulting in a fractured state 
where incoherence may reign.  Thirdly, this would require the arrival of a hero to do the 




293 Satan deserves more space in this dissertation than the constraints of space allow.  See Neil Forsyth’s The 
Old Enemy: Satan and the Combat Myth (Princeton University Press 1987) for a comprehensive treatment.  
294 For a brief para-scholarly exploration of projection resonant with the work of Jung and Campbell see 
Johnson, R, 2016, Inner gold: Understanding psychological projection, Chiron Publications, Asheville. 
295 Which is what seems to have happened in Bosnia in 1992-5. “Before a town was “purified” of its non-
Christians, religious leaders would often hold formal religious services for Bosnian Serbian troops” (Van 
Gorder 2014, p. 129).  
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One might argue that every political manifesto is in some sense trying to answer 
May’s cry for myth, although modern political parties tend to be wary of the overtly 
mythologized shows of, for example, the Nazi Party in the 1930s (Jackson 2006).  If the 
monomyth is as perennial and as ingrown in the human psyche as mythologists such as 
Campbell argue, then it is its absence that needs to be feared because, as Anne Campbell 
implies in the title of her review of James Waller’s Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People 
Commit Genocide and Mass Killing (2007), “Human Nature Abhors a Vacuum” (Campbell 
2009).  Without a positive path to follow, some individual human beings, as Waller 
demonstrates, will default to the negative.  Where there is the absence of a positive 
mythology provided by credible and respected institutions there is always the is the danger 
of it being filled by anti-hero mythology.  ‘Drill’ music, which idolises the hero who leaves 
normal life to be initiated into something different but, crucially, either does not return or 
returns with powers dedicated to breaking down rather than building up, is suggested as an 
example of this (Stuart 2020).296  In summary, both myth and its absence can provide 
opportunities for hatred rooted in the unconscious need for it or the equally unconscious 
awareness that there is a vacuum to be filled. 
 
Modern myths and the importance of story-telling 
 
With the contemporary weakening of the traditional forms of religion which provide 
sustaining mythologies, does it follow that the overtly religious monomyth is a thing of the 
past outside the churches which preserve the resonant and intuitively true stories that for 
 
296 See for example ‘Drill, the ‘demonic’ music linked to rise in youth murders’, (www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ 
drill-the-demonic-music-linked-to-rise-in-youth-murders-0bkbh3csk, viewed 10 August 2018), and Stuart, F 
2020, Ballad of the Bullet: Gangs, Drill Music, and the Power of Online Infamy, Princeton University Press, 




example Kastrup (2016) values?  A more recent answer to the cry for positive monomyth, 
conscious or unconscious, is Kynren, a sound and light show established by an evangelical 
Christian that is contributing to the restoration of a northern English community devastated 
by industrial recession over the past thirty years.297  While Kynren is not ostensibly 
‘religious’, it draws heavily on religious history, symbolism and metaphor, as well as on a 
romantic nationalism, to promote a para-Christian identity for what is a largely secular 
community.  Kynren is an example of monomyth, intended or not, which incorporates the 
journey of a young hero called Arthur (of course) as he witnesses the challenges and 
triumphs of English history before returning renewed to the 21st century.  While Kynren is 
also in the great tradition of historical pageant (Bartie et al., 2018 and 2020), a sceptic 
might be tempted to call it a propagandized history excluding the more inconvenient and 
less attractive elements of the national story.  Even if Kynren is, for the more sophisticated, 
a distinctly bowdlerized and even manipulative version of British history, its use of up to 
1700 volunteers per evening presumably encourages a renewed sense of meaning and 
community in Bishop Auckland and its people, to say nothing of its effect on the many 
thousands of spectators who have seen it over the past few years.  If Kynren is an example 
of how powerful the monomyth can be, then it is also a cautionary example of how easily 
such a performance could be perverted.   
 
Given the importance of myths and their role in shaping both communal and national 
histories, as well as personal beliefs, it is curious that their role does not receive more 
detailed scrutiny in conflict resolution literature.  One context in which conflict resolution 
scholar-practitioners have looked at myths is that of cultural conflict.  Michelle LeBaron, 
 
297A glance at the promotional videos on the Kynren: an epic tale of England website (www.kynren.com 
viewed 8 August 2018) provide a sense of the spectacular nature and scale of this event as well as its 
purpose: “the name Kynren echoes the Anglo Saxon word 'cynren', meaning generation, kin, or family 
and Kynren's aim is to show how our forebears lived, over the course of 90 thrilling minutes.”   
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for example, argues that uncovering myths is a way to reveal embedded values and 
different ways of perceiving the world, especially in situations where historically some 
voices have been ignored or marginalised (LeBaron 2003, p. 280).  LeBaron’s approach to 
myths reflects the concerns of the scholar-practitioner and contrasts with those whose main 
interest is analysis rather than the possible utilisation of myths for third party intervention 
that may help to create understanding and motivation for change for those involved in 
conflict.298  LeBaron’s sensitivity to the importance of myth stems in part from her 
appreciation that the narratives, the stories, that people tell each other have power, shaping 
communities’ and nations’ understandings of the past and expectations of the future, which 
makes them important when it comes to understanding the causes of conflict and the 
possibilities for peace (Kautsky 1965; Casebeer 2008 quoted in Huffman 2016; Gopin 
2000, p. 15).299 
 
Depth psychologists tend to see myths as positive in nature: they reveal the structures 
of psychic life, they provide access to the numinous, and they give human beings life 
lessons to help them make sense of a chaotic and uncertain world.  They also have their 
negative sides: the Voortrekker Monument and the mythology of the Great Trek helped lay 
 
298 LeBaron also sees the exploration of myths as fruitful for the misconceptions they can reveal about 
people’s own groups and who they see themselves to be.  She uses the example of Disneyland where the 
myth of the American West is communicated through ‘Frontierland’, a constructed environment which 
embodies the theme of “rugged individualism” and “individual initiative” (LeBaron 2003, p. 280) as 
exemplified by the archetypal figure of the Lone Ranger.  As LeBaron comments, “these interpretations are 
not necessarily faithful to the views of history held by indigenous people, contemporary scholars, or the early 
settlers themselves, yet around them has grown an aura of truth....Contemporary historians suggest that the 
American West was settled as a result of a “large scale federal presence in the form of troops, infrastructural 
improvements (roads), and economic incentives such as land grants” (Francaviglia, R 1999, “Walt Disney’s 
Frontierland as an Allegorical Map of the American West”, Western Historical Quarterly, vol. 30, no.2 pp. 
181-2, quoted in Slatta, R, 2001 “Taking our Myths Seriously: The Western Forum”, Journal of the West, 
vol. 40, no. 3). 
299 LeBaron is apparently rare in recognising the importance of appreciating myth in conflict resolution.  A 
search of CR literature and journals produces some mentions of myth as a substitute for truth, and occasional 
recognition that myth can be important as a motivator of conflict (describing, for example, the rationale for 
Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka as ‘mythological’ (Svensson 2007), but otherwise there seems no 
practitioner recognition of the importance of working actively with myth.   
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the foundations for apartheid in South Africa by strengthening the self-identity of 
Afrikaners and reinforcing their sense of exclusivity in the same way as English 
nationalists might take heart from the myth of England as depicted in Kynren.  These are 
common examples of where the blurring of myth and history can be used for political, 
religious and social effect, and while some of that effect might be to foment hostility 
between different identity and cultural groupings, and possibly such hostility could have a 
religious aspect to it as part of the identity-making, it would be an exaggeration to say that 
either is likely directly to cause the type of religious hatred with which this dissertation is 
concerned.  The role of myth, as a dimension of religion, in causing such hatred, is central 
neither to the literature of the psychology of religion nor to that of conflict resolution.  
Bringing the two literatures together, however, and joining them with understanding and 
experience of how hatred and conflict can arise, it becomes apparent that there are aspects 
of religious mythology that can have a role in shaping the thinking of some individuals and 
perhaps communities.  As Campbell says, “The individual has to find an aspect of myth 
that relates to his own life” (Campbell 1991, p. 33).   
 
Cosmic war: where myth bleeds into reality  
 
One aspect of mythology discussed above is the prevalence in the world’s religions 
of creation myths, most of which have common elements developed in the pre-scientific 
past to explain how and why the world has come to be as it is.  Myths such as the Garden 
of Eden in the Christian Bible also explain the advent of evil and suffering in the world as 
a result of Adam’s consumption of the fatal apple (Genesis 3: 5-7).  In parallel with these 
beginning times there is also for some Christians the myth of the end times: of the 
‘Rapture’ and the millennial kingdom following the final cosmic battle between good and 
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evil in the place called Armageddon.300  All three monotheisms of the Middle East include 
vivid, sadistic and arguably pathological fantasies about how the end will come and the 
horrors awaiting the infidels, or the enemies of the Lord, according to which tradition is 
followed.  Internet forums warning that the end times are imminent are striking not only 
because of the certainty with which they predict the future, but the relish with which they 
imagine the fate of those who disagree with them.301  These are prophets of violence and 
retribution and they take their cue from scripture.  While one may not wholly agree with 
Marc Gopin that “This is an important clue to why and when Western religions, in 
particular, turn to solutions of extreme violence to resolve the problems and tragedies of 
life” (Gopin 2000, p. 10), in that it ignores many other reasons why this may be, the 
general tone of the Book of Revelation, for example, does not provide any great impetus to 
reconciliation and is inconsistent with the “love your enemies” approach emphasised 
earlier in the Christian New Testament.  There is a psychodynamic pattern common to all 
ideologies that emphasise this cosmic dimension of religion, for example the ideology of 
the radical Sikh: 
1. The cosmic struggle is played out in history [all italics original].  In order to 
commit violence, the devout must believe that the cosmic struggle can be 
realized in human terms.  The struggle between good and evil as depicted in the 
great Hindu epics has continued in historical time.  The contemporary adversary 
is identified with the legendary demonized foe. 
2. Believers identify personally with the struggle.  Under the guidance of their 
spiritual leaders, the devout feel personally responsible for the moral decadence 
in the world.  A battle between good and evil is taking place within the soul, but 
by joining forces with others, the true believer can externalize the battle field. 
3. The cosmic struggle continues in the present. Despite the appearance of calm 
and tranquility, under the surface the battle between the forces of good and evil 
still rages. 
4. The struggle is at a point of crisis.  Apocalyptic rhetoric is used to promote a 
sense of urgency to join in the momentous battle. 
5. Acts of violence have a cosmic meaning.  To act in the service of one’s faith is to 
demonstrate great valor and piety.  Not to so act is a sin…… 
 
300 The Rapture is an eschatological idea popular with some evangelical sects, mainly North American. For 
example, the Left Behind books depict the Rapture and the attendant sufferings of those not raptured in grisly 
detail.  They have been accompanied by similar books for younger people, films and video games. 
301 The regular announcements of imminent Rapture have created a mythology of their own, coupled with all 
the elements of modern conspiracy theory; see for example Frykholm, A 2004, Rapture Culture: Left Behind 
in Evangelical America, Oxford University Press, New York. 
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(Robins and Post, 1997, p. 177) 
 
The problem is that images that could be of such end times have become a staple of 
the international news cycle. As Dale Stolz says, “All of this parched ground of global 
problems provides a fertile field for the eruption of collective psychic energy and images. 
Long-forgotten, unconscious mythic images reappear when there is trouble in the land.  In 
Freud’s parlance, it is the return of the repressed” (2011).302  The more that the evening 
news resembles the visions of Armageddon, the more encouragement there is for people to 
believe not only that it may happen for real, but that it may actually be desirable as an 
alternative, because coupled with the myth of Armageddon and cosmic conflict is the myth 
of a return to a Golden Age in which one or other (ultimately benevolent) God will usher 
in a world of peace and plenty.  In fact the urge to create such a world may be as much a 
reason for religious terrorism as the urge to destruction; Jessica Stern’s interviews with 
religious terrorists around the world reveal a longing for such a world where things are 
simpler and clearer: “It is about purifying the world” (2003, p. xi).303  
 
The argument here is that myths such as that of Armageddon can be directly 
responsible for religious hatred in that they encourage the abandonment of hope and reason 
in preference for revenge and retribution: in many ways they embody the Golem Effect 
discussed in Chapter 7 of this dissertation.   They are particularly dangerous for those 
prone to delusion or to paranoid or schizophrenic states where internal disorder can be 
 
302 Stolz also reminds us of what Joseph Campbell writes about the power of mythic thinking: “...mythology 
is no toy for children...For its symbols...touch and release the deepest centers of motivation, moving literate 
and illiterate alike, moving mobs, moving civilizations.... The world is now far too small and our stake in 
sanity too great for any more of those old games of Chosen Folk (whether of Jehovah, Allah, Wotan, Manu, 
or the Devil) by which tribesmen were sustained against their enemies in the days when the serpent still could 
talk” (Campbell 1959, p. 12).  
303 Stolz also quotes from a tape sent by Osama bin Laden to Al Jazeera TV on February 11, 2003 in which 
he said: “We also stress to honest Muslims that they should move, incite, and mobilize the [Islamic] 
nation.....so as to liberate themselves.... to establish the rule of God on earth” (Stolz 2011). 
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projected onto the external world (Read 2014, p. 101).  They also encourage what 
Campbell called ‘mythic inflation’, “the exaltation of the ego in the posture of a god” 
(Campbell 1959, p. 80).304  This image is reflected in the story of the emperor’s new 
clothes305 which resonates with those wary of the effects of rank, wealth or power on those 
who are unable to resist the inflated sense of importance and entitlement that can 
accompany them.306  The same can apply to priests, imams and other gurus, especially in 
the context of religious ritual where the costumes and the general theatricality of religious 
events can encourage both inflation and narcissism amongst those who claim to act as 
intermediaries between gods and people: “Individuals take upon themselves the powers 
and attributes that, they believe, belong to a deity, even to the extent of believing the deity 
is incarnated in their own persons or that they are enacting the will of the deity” (Baring 
and Cashford 1991, p. 171).307  It is one of the reasons why some religious groups choose 
to adopt more austere approaches to dress and ritual: to avoid the dangers of the priestly 
caste taking on the mantle of divinity.  Mythic inflation and narcissism can also contribute 
to fundamentalist attitudes: dogma can be used to disguise religious doubts, to avoid 
dealing with personal fragilities around subjects such as sex, and can also be used to avoid 
 
304 Carl Jung also identified inflation as a peril particularly for Westerners who attempted Eastern yoga (Jung 
1917, CW7, para. 243) because he suspected that attempts at detachment were “mere liberation from moral 
considerations” (ibid., CW11, paras. 825-6) but his concerns about psychological inflation were much wider: 
“An inflated consciousness is always egocentric and conscious of nothing but its own existence. It is 
incapable of learning from the past, incapable of understanding contemporary events, and incapable of 
drawing right conclusions about the future. It is hypnotized by itself and therefore cannot be argued with. It 
inevitably dooms itself to calamities that must strike it dead” (ibid., CW12, para. 563). Joseph Campbell 
amplified his idea of mythic inflation in relation to Jung’s concern about yoga: “...not mythic identification, 
ego absorbed and lost in God, but its opposite, mythic inflation, the god absorbed and lost in ego” (Campbell 
1959, p. 80).  
305 The enduring power of Hans Christian Andersen’s tale of a vain and gullible ruler is reflected in the fact 
that the phrase “the emperor’s new clothes” generates 82,600 references to titles in Google Scholar (viewed 
20.5.20). 
306 The story that the Romans supposedly recognised the dangers of inflation by having a slave whisper 
“Remember you are mortal” in the ears of a victorious general during his Triumph has been largely 
discredited, however; see for example Beard, M 2007, The Roman Triumph, Harvard University Press, 
Harvard.  
307 The issue of clerical narcissism is discussed in Chapter 11. 
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the affective power of ritual or symbol that may involve disconcerting contact with the 
numinous (Corbett 1996, p. 34). 
 
When myth leads to martyrdom  
 
If the idea of Armageddon is dangerous because it encourages despair, and inflation 
and narcissism are a risk for those whose mythology gives them a place in pageants of 
faith, perhaps most threatening to all are those who claim that they are engaged in the 
reality, rather than the mythology, of cosmic war, and are prepared to sacrifice their lives, 
and the lives of others, in this role.  Mark Juergensmeyer comments that  “...the concept of 
sacrifice makes sense only within the context of cosmic war” (2017, p. 211) and there is 
nothing new about martyrdom: a minority of people throughout history have sought 
martyrdom in the name of their faith in addition to the countless others upon whom it has 
been forced.308  While our contemporary experience of voluntary martyrs in the form of 
suicide bombers is not exceptional, it colours the way that religion is perceived more 
widely in secular societies already impatient with many aspects of religion.  
Juergensmeyer’s extensive scholarship on the subject of cosmic war sets out how 
prevalent, and how potentially dangerous, the mythology of such a war is in many parts of 
the world, and it provides a link between the mythology of cosmic war and the generation 
of religious hatred.  The background to cosmic war is both mythological and 
transcendental, drawing on legends of the past such as the expulsion of Lucifer from 
heaven, and on metaphysical conflicts between good and evil.  Juergensmeyer summarises 
the relationship between cosmic and everyday conflict as follows: 
 
308 Though it has recently been argued that the number of Christian martyrs has always been exaggerated; see 




What makes religious violence particularly savage and relentless is that its 
perpetrators have placed such religious images of divine struggle – cosmic war – in 
the service of worldly political battles.  For this reason, acts of religious terror serve 
not only as tactics in a political strategy but also as evocations of a much larger 
spiritual confrontation.  
(Juergensmeyer 2017, p. 184) 
 
The extent and influence of the gospel of cosmic war is now, according to 
Juergensmeyer, global in character: it lies behind Islamic State and Al-Qaeda; militant 
Sikhs and Hindus in India; Aum Shinrikyo in Japan; the Kach party in Israel; Ashin 
Wirathu’s militant Buddhists in Myanmar; the slaughter perpetrated by Anders Breivik in 
Norway; and parts of the violent campaign against abortion clinics in the United States.  
While it is tempting to marginalise people such as Breivik or Timothy McVeigh, the 
Christian militiaman who bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, as 
unhinged extremists, it is harder so to characterise entire movements. Juergensmeyer 
describes the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation through the eyes of activists on both sides 
who see the confrontation as “the absolutism of cosmic war that makes compromise 
unlikely” (ibid., p. 193) with those suggesting compromise lambasted as traitors and as 
much the enemy as the other side, and both preferring war over peace.  He also explains 
that while such overtly religious conflicts such as the Crusades and the Wars of Religion in 
the sixteenth century have usually been described as “wars in the name of religion” rather 
than “wars conducted in a religious way”, it may be that there is an explanation for the 
extremes of violence and hatred that are often witnessed during such conflicts.309  When all 
these things come together with the need to assert a threatened identity or dignity, the 
 
309 Juergensmeyer quotes the historian Natalie Zemon Davis who has uncovered what she describes as “rites 
of violence” in her study of religious riots in sixteenth century France which constituted “a repertory of 
actions, derived from the Bible, from the liturgy, from the action of political authority, or from the traditions 
of popular folk practices, intended to purge the religious community and humiliate the enemy and thus make 
him less harmful” (Davis 1973).  Davis observes that the extreme ways of defiling corpses and desecrating 
religious objects had “perverse connections” with religious concepts of pollution and purification, heresy, 
and blasphemy” (ibid.).  Juergensmeyer comments that such events are, in their own way, “religious”, and 
that one of the “main businesses of religion” is to create a vicarious experience of the warfare that is usually 
imagined as being conducted on a spiritual plane (Juergensmeyer 2017, p. 196).   
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depersonalization of enemies that enables them to be hated as less than human, and the 
impossibility of compromise or surrender, it begins to be possible to see how believing in 
the notion of a cosmic war can lead directly to terrible enactments of human hatred. 
 
The psychology of Armageddon 
 
Reading Juergensmeyer and wondering how his work integrates with the 
theoreticians of myth discussed above raises the question of whether there is a distinctive 
psychology of apocalypse and Armageddon which might explain the relationship between 
mythology and religious hatred.  One angle on this investigation is the attitudes of people 
when faced with the real life possibility of Armageddon.  Public opinion research in the 
early years of the Cold War, for example, revealed what was referred to as an 
‘Armageddon Complex’.  Nearly half of those polled expressed the desire for the forces of 
good (in this case the United States) to engage in what were regarded as the forces of evil 
(the Soviet Union) in a final battle even if it resulted in catastrophe for both countries.310  
The author of the commentary on these results, Maurice Farber, who was at the time a 
professor of psychology at the University of Connecticut, puts forward two hypotheses to 
explain them.  The first is that personal frustrations are reflected in aggressive political 
opinions; the second “that feelings at any particular moment are powerfully influenced not 
so much by the immediate situation as the psychological future time perspective  i.e. the 
outlook for the future” (Farber 1951; original emphasis).  Further analysis revealed that the 
poorer a person’s outlook, the greater the desire for this ultimate confrontation.  In the 
seventy years since this work was carried out polling and interpretation methods have 
evolved enormously so these results need to be regarded with some caution; Farber himself 
 
310 See Farber, M 1951, ‘The Armageddon Complex: Dynamics of Opinion’, Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 
15, no. 2, pp. 217-224. 
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admits that whether future outlook, as a phenomenological variable, determines mood, or 
vice-versa, remains open because “variables on this level have hardly been explored” 
(ibid.).  Nevertheless, the idea of some correlation between personal outlook and desire for 
cosmic catastrophe is intriguing.  It seems intuitively possible that if a person has little to 
lose then a catastrophe which consumes all may feel like the ultimate revenge on an 
indifferent world.   
 
Another approach is to consider in greater depth a modern myth of the end times, the 
Left Behind books and films created by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins.311  This modern 
version of the Book of Revelation has been a publishing phenomenon albeit less in Europe 
than in North America and other parts of the world; at the time of LaHaye’s death in 2016 
the sixteen books had sold some 80 million copies and spawned four full length films and a 
video game.  This follows in the footsteps of other equally popular dispensational literature 
and films such as Hal Lindsey’s The Late, Great Planet Earth (1970) in establishing so-
called ‘rapture’ fiction as a sub-genre of Christian literature (Guest 2016).  It is the 
popularity of such literature that commands the attention of anyone seeking to understand 
fantasies of total annihilation: is it just delivering a vicarious thrill similar to that of the 
horror movie, or is it responding to something more profound in the human psyche that 
explains this cosmic dimension of religious hatred?  The subject has been thoroughly 
explored by Richard Fenn in Dreams of Glory: The Sources of Apocalyptic Terror (2005).  
Fenn observes that one of the purposes of apocalyptic vision is to train its receivers to 
expect more of life, and of themselves, before it is achieved.  He quotes O’Leary (1994) on 
how this premillenialist thinking requires believers to improve the world before the longed-
for consummation which places heavy psychological demands upon believers, enjoining 
 




them to practice self-purification in anticipation of the final Judgment, “they had to 
consistently hold their intense anticipation in check and turn their attention to organizing 
their everyday lives by planning for a future that most believed was unlikely at best” 
(O’Leary 1994, pp 136-7). 
 
Being a believer in the rapture or the coming apocalypse is not cost-free: it requires  
motivation and investment to anticipate the calamity that will befall others but not oneself.  
Fenn explores a number of reasons why, psychologically, a person might be prepared to 
make such an investment.  For example, Fen (2005, p. 107) says that while many 
individuals live reasonably happy and successful lives, they also wonder if they have 
somehow missed the boat, reaching a point in their lives when they wonder what they 
might have done or who they might have become had they only taken another course 
earlier in their lives: “the apocalyptic vision may appeal to those who feel they have a debt 
of unsatisfied love or animosity or with an unfulfilled potential” (Fenn 2005, p. 107).  For 
those who cannot be described as even ‘reasonably happy’ but are instead enduring failure 
at work, living in a declining family or community, losing social standing of experiencing 
any form of rejection or isolation, or in any way “mourning the loss of themselves” (ibid., 
p. 110) there is again a motivation for everything to end.  Fenn points out that in both cases 
what is really at stake is the loss of time to do other things, or the burdensome passing of 
time in hand with the knowledge that nothing can change until death at last ends the 
suspense: fear of death being another motivation for belief in rapture and apocalypse 
according to (Weber 1979, p. 229).  In these motivations are reflected the observation of 
the historian Norman Cohn in The Pursuit of the Millennium (1957, p. 14)312 that 
 
312 It is interesting to note that the original edition of Cohn's Pursuit of the Millennium (1957) offers a 
detailed application of psychoanalytic theory to apocalypticism. Cohn argues that those seeking an 
explanation of millennial movements “cannot afford to ignore the psychic content of the phantasies which 
have inspired them. All these phantasies are precisely such as are commonly found in individual cases of 
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apocalyptic thinking has tended to emerge in regions where rapid social and economic 
change is taking place and at times when displays of wealth are highly visible but 
unavailable to the majority of the population.  Seen in this light, Armageddon looks 
not only like the end of the world but revenge especially against the rich and secular; 
it certainly qualifies as a potential source of religious hatred. 
 
Mythmaking and scapegoating 
 
 There is another side to apocalyptic thinking that adds to this: the division into 
the saved and unsaved – in the Christian tradition those raptured go straight to heaven 
and those left endure the years of tribulation before the Second Coming.313  This is a 
form of ultimacy that generates religious hatred because apocalyptic beliefs, apparently 
or actually legitimised by religious authority, provide fertile ground to breed incipient 
paranoia.  While sometimes danger will seem to come from alien Others, from infidels and 
their more fanatic followers, at other times it will seem to come from within, from people 
who look familiar, but who are in fact agents for an enemy.  As Fenn (2005, p. 72) has it, 
“The arch-typical enemy in apocalyptic visions is therefore someone like the Devil or the 
Antichrist, who wears disguises to make him seem familiar, safe, and benign, but who 
poses the ultimate danger to all who come under his spell”.  So the usual suspects in the 
apocalyptic nightmare are not only other super-human forces, but “suspicious strangers of 
 
paranoia. The megalomaniac view of oneself as the elect, wholly good, abominably persecuted yet assured of 
ultimate triumph; the attribution of gigantic and demonic powers to the adversary; the refusal to accept the 
ineluctable limitations and imperfections of human existence, such as transience, dissension, conflict, 
fallibility whether intellectual or moral; the obsession with inerrable prophecies— these attitudes are 
symptoms which together constitute the unmistakable syndrome of paranoia. But a paranoiac delusion does 
not cease to be so because it is shared by so many individuals, nor yet because those individuals have real 
and ample grounds for regarding themselves as victims of oppression." (p. 309) in the revised edition of The 
Pursuit of the Millennium (1980) Cohn reduces the emphasis on psychoanalytic interpretation.  
313 It should be remembered that apocalyptic thinking is not confined to Christianity: “In the major religious 
traditions the cosmic-historical awareness there present has resulted in a proliferation of eschatological 
forms…..the presence of scenarios of dramatic world-endings and their ensuring results for man” (King, W 
2011, ‘Eschatology: Christian and Buddhist’, Religion, vol. 16, pp. 169-185; original emphasis ). 
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all kinds who have become domesticated”.  The relationship between apocalyptic myth and 
this demonization of whatever Other is available is confirmed in René Girard’s Violence 
and the Sacred (1972).  Girard emphasises two basic characteristics of human violence: 
that it is more difficult to quell an impulse towards violence than to rouse it, but once 
roused the urge towards violence “lingers on” and “must find an outlet” (Girard 1972, p. 
2).  There is a reminder here of the nature of hatred: neither hatred nor violence erupt and 
decline in moments, and both need an object on which they must be vented before they 
will subside.  This latter point is central to Girard’s approach: if human violence cannot be 
used against whatever originally inspired it, then it will find a surrogate victim based on 
vulnerability and availability (Golsan 2002, p. 30).314  In this way the apocalyptic vision 
can play into the hands of those who need a surrogate victim who can become a focus for 
the animosities or vengeance of a group so that the consequences can be relatively 
confined and divisions within that group can be focused outwards.  This enables social 
harmony to be restored and, Girard argues, enables the development of culture and 
civilisation.  He calls this the “sacrificial crisis” because it requires the sacrifice or at least 
expulsion from the group of a surrogate victim or scapegoat (Girard 1972, pp. 39-67).315  
Girard emphasises in Violence and the Sacred (1972) and Things Hidden Since the 
Foundation of the World (1978), and later works such as The Scapegoat (1982) and Job, 
the Victim of his People (1987), that scapegoats are not necessarily drawn from the 
marginalised as modern use of the word tends to suggest.  In The Scapegoat Girard 
observes that members of royal families frequently make good scapegoats, citing the 
 
314 Girard cites the example of Medea from Euripides’ tragedy who slaughters her own children as substitutes 
for her faithless husband Jason. Girard’s argument is that however horrible such conclusions, they do provide 
a means of escape from the traps and dilemmas posed by human violence.  
315 This process also, Girard argues, triggers the “mimetic desire” that is the other cornerstone of his 
contention: that violence among human beings rests on one desiring something that another has, and that in 
this process they begin to resemble or mimic each other. This aspect of Girard’s work has been criticised on 
the grounds that his claims for mimetic desire as an explanation of every aspect of human nature are too 
sweeping, overlook alternate explanations, and are derived from the reading of fiction rather than from 
empirical research (Palaver 2010; see Golsan 2002, p. 116 for an overview).  
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example of Marie Antoinette whose position as both queen and foreigner made her 
distinctive and ideal for the projection of revolutionary France’s problems.316  This 
visibility accounts for the use of religious and ethnic minorities as scapegoats, thinking of 
historical anti-Semitism and current moves against Moslems in India; Girard calls these 
“reservoirs of scapegoats” (Girard 1982, p. 18) to be called upon when the larger 
community is looking for a common enemy.  One common feature of such scapegoating is 
accusing those targeted of the most reprehensible of crimes, such as rape, incest and 
bestiality, hence the ‘blood libel’, the historical accusations against Jews of child murder 
(Dundes 1991).317  Girard remarks that such crimes “seem fundamental. They attack the 
very foundation of cultural order, the family and the hierarchical differences without which 
there would be no social order” (ibid., p. 15); the purpose of such accusations being to 
“bridge the gap between the insignificance of the individual and the enormity of [the] 
social body” (ibid). 
 
Following the sacrifice of the scapegoated individual or community there is then a 
strange reversal of fortunes. As Golsan says, as a result of the mimetic process, the 
scapegoat can come to be universally perceived as a saviour.  Originally blamed for the 
onslaught of violence contaminating the community, after the sacrifice the victim is 
revered for removing it. “Once damned as the source of chaos, the victim is now venerated 
as the wellspring of social harmony. In essence, the scapegoat becomes an oxymoron: both 
a blessing and a curse” (Golsan 2002, p. 36).  Girard’s explanation is that this allows the 
 
316 Girard also uses Job as an example of a scapegoat, providing an interesting contrast with Jung’s use of the 
same figure. 
317 Modern anti-Semitism continues the tradition of hostility towards and suspicion of Jews since very early 
times until the present, exemplified and perhaps institutionalised by the notorious forgeries called The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Cohn 1967) and now finding new life in the ‘adrenochrome’ and Corvid-19 
conspiracy theories of the QAnon movement in the United States (see for example Ackerman, G, & Peterson, 





majority to avoid responsibility for its own violence by attributing this to a source outside 
itself, thereby establishing a distinction between two different types of violence: the “bad” 
and “impure” for which the scapegoat is responsible, which “corrupts, divides, 
disintegrates and undifferentiates” (Girard 1991, p. 214) and for which the scapegoat is 
blamed having introduced the original contagion, and the sacrificial violence directed 
against the scapegoat which is “good” and “pure”, which “heals, unites and reconciles” 
(ibid.), and which is justified and even sanctified by divine precept.  
 
Scapegoating is perhaps the most immediate and apparent form that the intrusion 
of mythology as an active if largely unconscious component of human functioning can 
take.  But it would be a mistake, this dissertation argues, to discount the more obscure 
roles that myth can play in fomenting visions of what it means to be human that can, 
inadvertently or otherwise, contribute to religious hatred.  Myth is by its nature an 
aspect of ultimacy, and if the concept of ultimacy contained within it includes forces 
of division, whether human or cosmic, then hatred will never be far behind even if it 






Chapter 10: Sacred values  
 
 
Introduction   
 
This chapter examines the concept of sacred values, which figure extensively in 
contemporary scholarship that examines the psychology of religious hatred, especially 
where extremist or fundamentalist religion is involved.318  In earlier scholarship of religion 
this concept seems to have been assumed to be part of the moral and ethical dimensions of 
religion, subsumed under the study of ritual and sacrifice, or sometimes taken to be so 
much at the heart of all religion that it requires no further discussion.319  Conflict resolution 
literature tends to address the concept of sacred values rather more explicitly, perhaps 
because in the early days of the field there was a tendency to divide all conflict, perhaps 
somewhat simplistically, into ‘conflicts of interest’ and ‘conflicts of value (Aubert 1963, 
pp. 26-42).  The former were defined as conflicts largely over material interests such as 
land, money and resources, and the latter over more abstract issues such as identity, 
tradition, national pride - and religion.  It is also perhaps true to say, as has been observed 
already, that the conflict scholars of half a century ago were largely secular humanists for 
whom the decline of religion was a given and therefore difficult to conceive of as still a 
serious source of conflict.  Despite geopolitically seismic events such as the Iranian 
revolution of 1979 and the rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland, both to some extent 
inspired by religious pressures, this attitude tended to prevail until the equally seismic 
events of 11 September 2000 when finally it became apparent that religion was not, after 
 
318 See for example Jones, J 2002, Terror and Transformation: The Ambiguity of Religion in Psychoanalytic 
Perspective, Brunner-Routledge, Hove; Atran, S 2010, Talking to the Enemy: Violent Extremism, Sacred 
Values and What it Means to be Human, Penguin, London.  
319 Ninian Smart, for example, has as one of his dimensions the “Ethical and Legal”.  He acknowledges in his 
description of this dimension that “we must distinguish between the ethical teachings of a faith.....and the 
actual sociological effects and circumstances of a religion” (Smart 1969, p. 20).  
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all, an aspect of human and political life that could safely be overlooked.  As the 
philosopher Mark Taylor says, “You cannot understand the world today if you do not 
understand religion. Never before has religion been so powerful and so dangerous” (Taylor 
2007, p. xiii).  The first half of this chapter examines sacred values in some depth as a 
prelude to considering how they contribute to religious hatred. 
 
The nature of sacred values  
 
Sacred values have been defined as “any value that a moral community implicitly or 
explicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that precludes 
comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values” 
(Tetlock et al. 2000).  While such a definition is not accepted in its entirety by all scholars 
for a number of reasons to be discussed in due course, and which are of extreme 
importance in the context of initiatives to resolve conflict,320 the phrase “possessing 
infinite or transcendental significance” does capture the essence of what is generally meant 
by sacred values.321  Contained within it are also a number of implications about sacred 
values that are worth noting as a prelude to discussing their significance in the context of 
religious hatred.  
 
It is important to be clear about what is meant by ‘the sacred’.  Traced back to the 
Latin sacer, sacrum, sanctus, for the Romans sacrum means a consecrated thing, anything 
that belonged to the gods and could be encountered inside a temple while what was outside 
 
320 The phrase “precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular 
values” is particularly significant as shall be seen when discussing below experiments to test the durability of 
sacred values in the face of inducements to trade them. 
321 It should be noted however, that “Humans sacralise countless things, including water, wine, cows, dung, 
trees, books, buildings, and rocks. The types of item that humans sacralise appear unbounded, but possibly 




the temple was pro – in front of, outside of – the fanum, temple, and therefore profanus – 
profane, unholy (Kripal 2014, p. 94).  This distinction is significant because it helps anchor 
the tension between sacred and profane, and the difficulty of understanding one except in 
relation to the other.  It also illustrates the extent to which the idea of ‘the sacred’ exists on 
a spectrum, extending from the holiest of holy at the one end to the taboo and even 
demonic at the other.  It does not follow from this, however, that what is sacred is 
inevitably good: it should once again be remembered that Rudolf Otto defined the sacred 
or holy as the human experience of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans (Otto 1917), 
both terrifying and alluring, and is often more about its power and potential (Riesebrodt 
2010, pp. 74-5) than what is morally good.   It is also important, particularly in the context 
of conflict, to realise that there is nothing that is universally sacred: almost anything, 
Kripal argues (2014, p. 95) can become sacred within a particular social and historical 
context.322   
 
If the definition of what is sacred is fluid, its reach is determined more by its inherent 
power than by any rectitude it may possess.  This idea of the sacred being defined by its 
power rather than its holiness, where holiness is aligned with righteousness, casts a whole 
new light on what sacred values can mean.  Kripal illustrates the idea of the sacred being 
powerful by reference to the Biblical story of the Ark of the Covenant and what happens 
during its transportation by King David and his priests in 2 Samuel 6, 1-7.  The unfortunate 
Uzzah reaches out his hand to steady the Ark against its shaking by the oxen moving it, 
 
322 An extreme example of this, described recently by a religious education teacher, is ‘Pastafarianism’ whose 
deity is the Flying Spaghetti Monster (FSM).  The Church of the FSM was originally created in 2005 as a 
lighthearted means for opponents of religion to combat the teaching of Creationism and Intelligent Design 
and is in effect a modern version of Russell’s teapot, the analogy formulated by the philosopher Bertrand 
Russell (1872–1970) to demonstrate that the philosophic burden of proof lies on the person making claims 
rather on those trying to disprove them (Garvey 2010).  While the whole idea of the FSM is of course 
preposterous, a visit to its official website (www.venganza.org viewed 22.8.20) is thought-provoking as well 




and is immediately struck dead by God.  The story makes the point that the Ark carries real 
power and should only be touched by someone qualified to do so.  The Ark is akin to a 
nuclear reactor (in Kripal’s image) and while its immense power is of service to the 
community, it is a power that, unless it is handled with care, also presents an awesome 
danger.   
 
This latter aspect of the sacred is perhaps less immediately apparent in most sacred 
objects.  Pre-revolutionary Russia’s miracle-working icons, for example, never seem to 
have posed any direct risk to worshippers, though their power was sometimes perceived as 
an indirect threat to ecclesiastical tranquility by church authorities (Shevzov 1999).  The 
power they possessed, in addition to that of healing, was of convening the faithful in 
multitudes, reinforcing the faith of the already faithful, and bringing comfort and 
reassurance to an enslaved population in a way that the ‘official’ church could not.323  No 
less sacred to some contemporary neo-Druids, Wiccans and followers of the ‘New Age’ 
are the stones of Stonehenge, though again the power of them comes in diffuse forms.  
Philip Shallcross, for example, says “The past is a potent source of inspiration . . . the past 
is the realm of our ancestors, and for the Druid, our ancestors are our companions and 
teachers in this life” (Shallcrass 2000, p. 7).324  The power, again, may be indirect and 
contextual as when Brian Fagan argues that architectural structures like Stonehenge 
provide “the setting, a powerful form of nonverbal communication that kept the messages 
 
323 The Russian Orthodox Church seems not to have had clearly established rules by which particular icons 
would become specially venerated. Several terms were used to describe such icons (‘miracle-working’ – 
chudotvornaia, ‘specially venerated’ - osobochtimaia and ‘locally venerated’ -  mestnochtimaia) but the 
criteria for using one term over another were not clearly defined. Technically, it appears that icons could be 
referred to as chudotvornye only if so recognized by the Holy Synod. Yet laity frequently used that term in 
reference to icons not officially recognized as such (Shevzov 1999). 
324 If the sacred can also be defined by the willingness of people to go to war over it, then the “Battle of the 
Beanfield” of 1985 during which some five hundred solar festivallers were arrested by police after they were 
denied access to Stonehenge (Chippindale 1986) provides some evidence of the contemporary sacredness of 
the site.  
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of ritual, and of the mythic world, in people’s minds” (Fagan 1998, p. 8).  This is despite 
the association of Stonehenge with Druidry being spurious (Cusack 2012): whatever the 
reality, the association has become part of folklore and folk memory and has enabled 
modern Druids’ claim to an indigenous form of British spirituality (Shallcross 2000).325 
 
Sacred values and behavioural motivation 
  
 The significance of all values, sacred or otherwise, is that they often provide the 
motivation for human beings to engage in behaviour which may carry risks as well as 
rewards.  For this reason scholar-practitioners find it essential to understand the values in 
contention and their meaning, in terms of aims and goals, for those in conflict.  So much is 
obvious: but the actuality of values also provides other indicators of significance.  First, the 
operation of values indicates that those involved have goals in mind, even though they may 
be, at the point of intervention, poorly conceived or expressed. Those goals, in turn, exhibit  
the aspirations of the individual (Karoly 1993, p. 274) and also about who this person 
wishes to become in terms of their identity because goals are highly personal and reveal 
much about a person’s previous experience, current commitments and personal values 
(Emmons 2005).  Whether goals determine values, or values goals, is a moot point: Reker 
and Wong (1988), for example, are clear that they are self-reinforcing in that both goals 
and values provide guidelines for living and orient people towards what is valuable, 
meaningful, and purposeful. At the same time people draw psychological benefits from 
affirming some solidarity with societal values and the collective rituals through which 
these are expressed (Durkheim 1976).   
 
325 The experience of managing dialogue among the various claimants to authority over the future of 
Stonehenge attests to the passion with which such claims, however doubtful in fact and archaeology, are 




Why and how do some values become sacred?  To paraphrase Durkheim, the lack of 
sacred values poses risks to both individuals and societies in that without them, and the 
rituals that accompany them, humankind can lose the qualities that provide significance for 
otherwise meaningless lives.  This point of view sees human beings as always drawn to 
moral frameworks and reluctant to see matters of principle sacrificed on the altar of 
expediency.  As Tetlock et al put it, “Homo sociologicus will not surrender without a fight 
to homo economicus” (Tetlock et al, 2017).326  It is reasonable to argue that values - or 
indeed anything from a particular place to a particular object - become sacred when they 
are perceived with “respect and veneration” and are thereby provided “with the ability to 
function as a particular source of significance in people’s lives” (Silberman 2005).  
 
Scholar-practitioner Donna Hicks has taken this further in focusing on the core 
concept of dignity as an essential prelude to appreciating the significance of sacred values. 
Hicks argues that the human longing for dignity, which she defines as the “feeling of 
inherent value and worth” (Hicks 2011, p. 6) provides those in conflict with the sense of 
safety which is essential if they are to risk, for example, negotiating with an enemy.  She 
argues also that there is an evolutionary basis for the importance of respecting the dignity 
of others: it lays a foundation for the relationships that underpin human community and 
survival (ibid.).  Hicks’s arguments are underwritten by researchers in cognitive-
evolutionary science (see for example Eisenberger and Lieberman 2004)327 who emphasise 
 
326 When the history of Brexit comes to be written there will be questions over whether the Remain campaign 
erred in basing its arguments on economic projects rather than engaging with the value-based campaign of 
Leave. Homo sociologus, it may be decided, did indeed prevail over homo economicus. 
327 Eisenberger and Lieberman point out (Eisenberger, N and Lieberman, M 2004, ‘Why rejection hurts: a 
common neural alarm system for physical and social pan’, Trends in Cognitive Science vol. 8, no. 7, pp. 294-
300) that while many psychologists assume that high self-esteem is associated with psychological well-being 
and low self-esteem with depression, anxiety and other psychological problems, it may not be ‘self-esteem’ 
per se that contributes to psychological well-being, but rather the state of social connectedness that underlies 
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the absolute significance of individuals being accepted by their communities both for their 
own and their community’s collective health.328  It is also useful to look at the reverse: at 
what happens when people are afforded no dignity or, worse still, when dignity is absent 
and replaced by shame, particularly unacknowledged shame.  Sheff and Retzinger’s 
Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts (2001), a study of how 
violence is triggered in many settings from the domestic to the international, cites evidence 
that violence frequently arises from the denial of shame and consequent alienation in 
relationships.  This is particularly significant for young people: the evidence points to 
social alienation making young people more inclined to radical values and prepared to use 
violence in asserting them (Pretus et al, 2018).  To have shame, however, there must first 
be values, and values significant enough, should they be denied, suppressed or 
contravened, to trigger those feelings of shame.  Sacred values are a two-edged sword 
when it comes to human motivation.  Positive values can lead people to noble, heroic and 
self-sacrificial action in pursuit of a cause; yet those same values can render people 
vulnerable should they be challenged, frustrated or denied by others. It is this duality which 
makes sacred values of critical significance in how religious hatred is approached and 
treated and which also gives them their power as unconscious motivators of human 
behaviour. 
 
Valuing sacred values  
 
 
this construct. This supports arguments that note religion’s value both in building individual well-being and 
social coherence. 
328 There is also research that indicates that if people experience severe social rejection then their judgment 
may also be affected as they try to be re-included in their group either by over-conforming to group norms or 
deliberately indulging in behaviour that seeks the attention of the group as a precursor to re-inclusion (Zadro 
and Williams 2003, p. 325).  The consequences of such behaviour in a situation of group conflict or 
insecurity can be imagined. 
 
 221 
The power of the sacred to lead, oppose, persuade and pursue is not in doubt, though 
it is a power that can be indirect, oblique and ancillary to other forms of influence.  When 
sacredness is attached to values, however, it can gain a hard-edged quality that it may lack 
in other contexts.  The definition of sacred values adopted by Tetlock, Peterson and Lerner 
(1996), and quoted above,329 illustrates the unwillingness to compromise them as a key 
characteristic, and reflects the experimental work done by Philip Tetlock and Jeremy 
Ginges in Israel.  This work has been widely quoted in conflict resolution literature to 
demonstrate the difficulties which adherence to sacred values poses for those mediating 
and negotiating in contexts such as the Middle East.  This work begins with the fact that 
for religious Zionists the Land of Israel is sacred territory and its surrender, even in return 
for political and financial benefits, is as much unthinkable as unacceptable. The strength of 
the opposition to the idea of “land for peace” was brought home in 1995 by the 
assassination of Yitzhak Rabin by Yigal Amir, a religious Zionist, because Rabin was 
close to agreeing to cede parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to an interim 
Palestinian government in return for numerous benefits to Israel (Clark 2014, p. 141).  For 
Amir and other religious Zionists this was beyond the authority of any Israeli government 
given that this meant giving up territory that had been granted to the Jews by God in the 
Abrahamic covenant (Stern 2003, pp. 90-2).  In 2007 Jeremy Ginges, Scott Atran and 
others conducted a field study to examine under what circumstances some might be 
prepared to trade a sacred value for a tangible benefit.  One of the main findings of this 
research was that the ‘rational actor’ model of negotiating behaviour has its limitations. 330  
Those participants holding to a sacred value (who regarded Muslim control of East 
 
329 “.....those values that a moral community treats as possessing transcendental significance that precludes 
comparisons, trade-offs or indeed any mingling with secular values”. 
330 The ‘rational actor’ model in negotiation theory is based on rational choice theory which holds that 
individuals, faced with a number of options, will take account of all the necessary information available to 
distinguish among those options, and will then act consistently to make the best self-determined choice of 
action.  Even within economics, the field where rational choice theory originated, its limitations are 
increasingly recognised (e.g. Foley 2003; Bourdieu 2005).  
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Jerusalem as a sacred right) were not only less likely to accept a trade-off that had added 
‘sweeteners’ (Israel paying each Palestinian family $1,000 a year for ten years), but were 
gravely insulted by the thought that they might give up a sacred value for a financial 
incentive (Ginges et al 2007).331   This is an example of what Norenzayan calls the 
“backfire effect”  (Norenzayan 2013, p. 168): not only are some people unwilling to 
sacrifice what they see as sacred truths or commitments even in the name of peace, the 
suggestion that they might do so indicates, as they perceive it, a contempt for those values 
and therefore for them personally.  
 
Pseudo-sacred and fungible values   
 
While the definition of what is sacred may be relatively static, it does not follow that 
the values attached to it will remain constant, nor does it mean that a belief or value that is 
said to be ‘non-negotiable’ can never change (Francis 2016).  In practice sacred values can 
and do evolve in response to changing circumstances.332  In the light of this there is a line 
of argument that denies the inflexibility of sacred values.  Thompson (1998), for example, 
argues that truly sacred values cannot exist because of their function as a utility, and the 
critical factor is not how much it takes to compensate someone for a sacred issue, but what 
factors allow trade-offs to occur on sacred issues: “The term “sacred” describes people’s 
preferences on issues on which they view themselves as uncompromising” (Thompson 
 
331 One possible explanation for this is the neural evidence “that when individuals naturally process 
statements about sacred values, they use neural systems associated with evaluating rights and wrongs (TPJ) 
and semantic rule retrieval (VLPFC) but not systems associated with utility. The involvement of the TPJ is 
consistent with the conjecture that moral sentiments exist as context-independent knowledge in the temporal 
cortex” (Berns GS, Bell E, Capra M, Prietula M, Moore S, Anderson B, Ginges J, and Atran S 2012, ‘The 
price of your soul: neural evidence for the non-utilitarian representation of sacred values’, Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society [viewed 11.2.19]. 
332 Even thirty years ago, for example, the idea of women priests in the Church of England was considered by 
many to be deontologically inconceivable, yet in 2017 30% of Church of England clergy were female; also in 
that year just over 50% of ordinands were women (Statistics for Mission 2017, Church of England). Thirty 
years may seem a long time, of course, for those with a frustrated vocation.  
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1998, p. 266). The problem is, however, that labeling an issue as sacred may be, or may be 
perceived, as a negotiating ploy rather than a reflection of a heartfelt value, though the 
genuine anointing of certain issues as sacred can remove them from bargaining 
consideration and increase the likelihood of a favorable settlement. 
 
While it seems that not everything has its price, it is also important to mention what 
have been called “pseudo-sacred” values (Clarke 2014, p. 142).  These are values that are 
declared to be sacred for as long as those advancing them feel themselves to be in a strong 
position but are reduced or abandoned when that position becomes weaker (Bazerman et al 
2008; Tenbrunsel et al 2009).  Clarke (2014, p. 142) relates the example of the Lacandon 
Mayans in Mexico who appear to regard trees as sacred because, should a tree be cut 
down, a star will fall from the sky; they are consequently reluctant to agree to any logging 
in their forests.  They have agreed some tree harvesting, however, on the grounds that their 
negotiating position was weak and some selective logging would be preferable to no 
agreement and indiscriminate logging that would pose a greater threat to the stars.  The  
experience of mediating dialogue over issues that are supposedly non-negotiable on the 
grounds of sacred values replicates the Lacandon story: as time moves on and the full 
picture becomes clearer, some concessions begin to appear preferable to no agreement and 
uncertain outcomes.   
 
In addition to this it can be argued that sacred values are also subject to what 
psychologists call the ‘fundamental attribution error’ (Ross 1977; Nisbett and Ross 1980; 
Ross and Nisbett 1991).   Put at its simplest, this is the human tendency to explain human 
actions with too much emphasis on a person’s character and too little on the situation in 
which they find themselves (Goldie 2002, p. 161).  The result of this is the presumption 
that character trait differences are the most relevant predictors of future action when there 
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may in fact be other considerations that weigh as heavily on those making the decisions 
(Ross and Nisbett 1991).  Something similar seems to happen when it appears that sacred 
values are being violated: their nature is considered immutable, like character traits, rather 
than being responses to a situation which may change when the situation is perceived to 
change, as the example of the Lacondon Mayans demonstrates. One consequence of this is 
conflict caused by different interpretations of what constitutes a sacred value and when it 
should be regarded as fungible.333 
 
To complete this summary of why even supposedly sacred and non-negotiable values 
tend in practice to be more flexible than their adherents care to admit there are three further 
examples worth noting from literature relating to values and relevant as the background to 
understanding how they may contribute to religious hatred.  First, Fiske & Tetlock (1997) 
distinguish three kinds of trade-off when it comes to sacred values: routine trade-offs are 
those where typically one item is traded for another within a single relational model; taboo 
trade-offs are those where a sacred value is traded against something with no such value 
(as in the cash for values example above) and tragic trade-offs are those where sacred 
values are traded against each other.334  The art of politics, Tetlock points out (quoted in 
Pinker 2011), is in large part about reframing taboo trade-offs as tragic trade-offs, so 
“keeping troops in Afghanistan is reframed from ‘putting the lives of our soldiers in 
danger’ to ‘guaranteeing our nation’s commitment to freedom or ‘winning the war on 
terror’. Pinker comments that “the reframing of sacred values.... may be an overlooked 
 
333 A vivid illustration of this at the time of writing (May 2020) is the situation of the Prime Minister’s 
special adviser who interpreted coronavirus pandemic lockdown rules to legitimise a journey that others 
regarded as contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the rules. His situation is complicated by the fact that the 
lockdown rules seem to have acquired a sacral status that in public perception places them beyond 
interpretation.  
334 Steven Pinker (2011) quotes the novel Sophie’s Choice (Styron 1979) as presenting the ultimate tragic 




tactic in the psychology of peacemaking” (Pinker 2011, p. 763).  Secondly, an 
understanding of how values may be fungible has been developed to aid understanding of 
judicial decision-making (MacDougal and Lasswell 1992).  Rather than looking at possible 
trade-offs as described above, this jurisprudential approach looks at how different jurists 
may order values in different hierarchies, thereby reaching different judicial decisions 
despite being faced with the same facts and evidence.335  Thirdly, beyond the scope of this 
dissertation there is a burgeoning literature on value hierarchies that supposedly reflect 
competing social frameworks and paradigms.336 
 
Broader perspectives on sacred values  
 
It might be thought that situations such as the Israeli-Palestinian are extreme and that 
the reluctance to compromise sacred values is a specifically religious phenomenon but this 
is not the case.  Clarke (2014), for example, cites the case of the National Rifle Association 
(NRA) in the United States, quoting its “notorious slogan “from my cold dead hands” ” (p. 
141-2) and the words of its former president, Charlton Heston (cited in Marietta 2008, p. 
767, fn.1): “....we know that there is sacred stuff in that wooden stock and blued steel”.   It 
can be argued that as members of the NRA tend to be strongly Christian and patriotic their 
relationship to their weapons goes beyond the entirely secular.  While the weapons are 
sacred for the NRA, the earth and its ecosystem are sacred for many more, and this second 
example of the sacred, arguably semi-detached from the religious, is perhaps more telling.   
The recently deceased John Cairns captured the spirit of this in his essay ‘Sustainability 
 
335 For example, judicial decisions in relation to sentencing offenders take into account a number of factors 
such as public safety, need for punishment and the likelihood of rehabilitation, all of which compete for 
emphasis when the sentencing decision is made and are influenced by each decision-maker’s values and 
priorities (personal communication 22.8.20). 
336 See for example papers given at the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy collected at 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/MainValu.htm [viewed 27.5.20]. 
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and Sacred Values’ (2002)337 where the notable convergence of the scientific and the 
sacred looks beyond the long-established science versus religion debate.338  Cairns 
describes his shock following the statement by the Union of Concerned Scientists in 1992, 
when over 1600 scientists from 71 countries, including over half of all living recipients of 
the Nobel Prize, declared: 
As scientists, many of us have had profound experiences of awe and reverence 
before the universe. We understand that what is regarded as sacred is more likely to 
be treated with care and respect. Our planetary home should be so regarded. Efforts 
to safeguard and cherish the environment need to be infused with a vision of the 
sacred.  
         (UCS 1992) 
 
Cairns’ shock was not that his scientific colleagues would put their names to such a 
statement, but that this statement attracted so little attention given how remarkable it was.  
Since then it has become commonplace for environmental literature to advocate a 
relationship with our home planet in which sacred values inform scientific and 
technological approaches to conservation and sustainability.339  It is also becoming more 
common for religious leaders to swing the resources of their congregations behind renewed 
efforts to improve human stewardship of the earth.340 341 
 
 
337 Cairns, J 2002, ‘Sustainability and sacred values’, Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics, vol. 2, 
pp. 15-27.  
338 The conflict model of science vs. religion seems to have begun in the mid-19th century. John William 
Draper’s History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science (1874) established this as the default to think 
about the historical relations between science and religion.  It was translated into 20 languages (notably 
becoming a bestseller in the late Ottoman empire where it probably influenced Atatürk’s belief that progress 
meant science superseding religion).  A little later Andrew Dickson White’s A History of the Warfare of 
Science with Theology in Christendom (1896) referred to a ‘conflict between two epochs in the evolution of 
human thought – the theological and the scientific’. 
339 See for example publications such as Resurgence which embraces “a vision where spiritual fulfilment and 
material wellbeing are in balance and science is in constant conversation with wisdom 
(https://www.resurgence.org/about/vision-statement.html [viewed 8.2.19]. 
340 See for example the Pope’s 2015 encyclical Laudato Si. 
341 The belief that the perception of the natural environment as sacred may help to protect it, however, may be 
misplaced. Sonya Sachdeva argues (Sachdeva, S 2016, ‘The Influence of Sacred Beliefs in Environmental 
Risk Perception and Attitudes’, Environment and Behavior, vol. 49, no. 5, pp. 583–600) that the very fact of 
seeing somewhere as sacred may result in it being perceived as the “epitome of purity” and thereby protected 
from pollutants and other environmental risks; this may, however, be a minority view. 
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The argument for regarding nature as sacred is rooted in the belief that the 
conceptual barrier between humankind and the natural world has done much to enable our 
destruction of it, and that sacralising, or re-sacralising, nature would provide a counter to 
this (Milton 1999).  This conceptual barrier is more apparent in western industrialised 
culture, based on the Biblical injunction that humankind should have dominion over the 
world (Genesis 1: 26-8), than it is in non-western traditions.  Sponsel and Natadecha-
Sponsel (1993, quoted in Milton 1999) point out that the Buddhist worldview situates 
humankind within nature, while Posey (1998) sees the “sacred balance” expressed in some 
indigenous cultures as providing the requisite guidance.  Milton (1999) argues, however, 
that in some contexts the sacredness of nature depends on it being seen as separate from 
humankind.342  Regardless of the relationship between nature and humankind, it has been 
suggested that environmentalism is characterized by four kinds of ‘ecological piety’ 
(Szerszynski 1997, p. 50).  Monastic piety applies to environmentalists who retire from the 
world to be as self-sufficient and ‘green’ as possible; sectarian piety is directed at social 
change rather than renunciation but requires the same degree of personal commitment; 
churchly piety covers those who express their commitment through organisations 
espousing the requisite values; and folk piety through green consumerism with 
environmental awareness expressed through the choices in everyday living.  The 
significance of this, according to Szerszynski, is that it reflects that contemporary piety is 
inspired not so much by the thought of divine beings as by action grounded in 
environmental values.  Such responses to environmental values are essentially religious, he 
argues, and therefore address the sacredness of nature.343   
 
342 Whether humankind should be considered part of ‘nature’ remains a controversial point.  Ellen and Fukui 
(1996) provides an interesting overview of this issue. 
343 This approach to nature is underpinned by Goodin’s theory of green value (Goodin 1992, p. 19ff, quoted 
in Milton 1999).  Goodin argues that people can find a larger context, and some meaning, purpose and 
pattern in their lives, through their relationship with the natural world in the same way as they do through 




This brief overview of some environmental approaches to sacred values suggests that 
in the near future, in an age of putative environmental catastrophe, that the process of re-
ordering of values from the consumerist to the ecological will take on similar 
characteristics to the process of re-ordering religious values in past centuries.344  Advocacy 
by organisations such as Earth First!, Greenpeace, the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
and, most recently, Extinction Rebellion, is increasingly reminiscent of old-fashioned, 
Salvationist evangelising complete with eschatological threats.345  It is not difficult to 
imagine a future in which sacred values, based on the growing reality of earth in the form 
of Gaia as avenging angel, motivate significant numbers of people to defy political 
complacency and take to crusading in the name of justice and equity just as their forebears 
did in earlier campaigns against unheeding governments.346   
 
Sacred values and religious hatred 
 
If the purpose of religious hatred is to eradicate a person or a community by severing 
the internal bonds that provide integrity, the bonds that ensure relationships, and the bonds 
of faith that provide salvation, and thereby eradicate the individual or the collective, then 
we need to explore how the existence, use or abuse of sacred values can enable this.  The 
first way is simply by being unaware of them, often illustrated by reference to the 
destruction of sacred land or burial sites in first nations territories such as in Canada and 
Australia (Carmichael et al 1994), and consequently failing to pay it sufficient respect.  
 
344 The publication of This is a Crisis: Facing up to the Age of Environmental Breakdown by the Institute for 
Public Policy Research in February 2019 (while the first draft of this chapter was being prepared) alerts 
policymakers to the seriousness of the situation. 
345 WWF’s current campaign film, Not making a choice is a choice (online at www.wwf.org.uk) is an 
apocalyptic presentation that posits personal responsibility in a similar manner to eschatological preaching 
[viewed 26.5.20]. 
346 See Lovelock, J 2006, The Revenge of Gaia, Penguin, London. 
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The second is more complex: the conflation of the sacred and the secular.  An interesting 
example of this is the conflict that broke out following publication of Salman Rushdie’s 
novel The Satanic Verses (1988).  In February 1989 the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 
then supreme leader of Iran, issued a fatwā calling for the death of Rushdie and of anyone 
associated with the publication of the work on the grounds of blasphemy.  Rushdie himself 
later argued in his essay ‘Is Nothing Sacred?’ (1990) that literature is the one place in any 
society where, within the secrecy of our own heads, we can hear voices talking about 
everything in every possible way”, reflecting his belief in literature as a “privileged arena” 
for exploring the bounds of the sacred.  For the Ayatollah, and for many Muslims, there are 
no such bounds and therefore everything must be treated as sacred: a concept that both 
confuses and affronts some Western secular sensibilities (Husain and Rosenbaum 2004).  
This raises questions about Eliade’s concept of the sacred and the profane (1957): if there 
is no such boundary does it follow that the sacred must always be presumed for fear of 
transgressing others’ sense of the sacred? The answer to this lies, according to Daniel 
Shapiro (2016, p. 108) in learning to speak the language of the sacred and looking for what 
can be held in common as sacred.   
 
There is a final aspect of sacred values in relation to religious hatred: meaning.   
Dozier points out that meaning is “uniquely significant” to human beings because “the vast 
majority of our thoughts, emotions, and behaviors are shaped by meaning systems of our 
own creation” (2002, p. 10).  He argues that meaning rather than instinct is so important to 
our species that our limbic system has evolved “a powerful tendency to blindly interpret 
any meaning system that we deeply believe in as substantially enhancing our survival and 
reproduction” and it is this which causes us to experience “strong primal feelings of joy 
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and well-being coupled with an exciting new sense of purpose” (ibid., p. 11).347    It is this 
feature of the human brain that is also capable of decoupling our behaviour from its 
survival impulse, which enables us to be committed to a belief system and a set of sacred 
values even if it includes beliefs or values that are objectively self-destructive.  The 
emotional and non-rational commitment to such systems that provide us with our personal 
senses of meaning and purpose also leaves us vulnerable to interpreting differences of 
meaning as threats to our survival.  This is why when any form of religious hatred or 
discrimination is tolerated, let alone encouraged, there may be few rational limits to the 
actions that may be legitimised or the damage that they may do.  In other words, using 
Dozier’s arguments, religious hatred invariably involves an attack on the very systems that 
give people meaning and purpose in their lives: it is always more profound than it may 
appear.  The significance of this, when it comes to understanding why religious hatred is 
more than just a question of disliking what someone else believes, can hardly be 
exaggerated. 
 
Psychodynamic understanding of sacred values 
 
The final section of this chapter explores the relationship between sacred values and 
religious hatred.  The link between these, in scholar-practitioner experience, is uncertainty 
and the vacuum it creates (Friend and Hickling 2005, p. 8; Acland 2008).  The argument, 
in its simplest form, is that sacred values provide people with anchors to a sense of security 
and stability.  When these anchors are loosened, whether by the erosion of societal bonds, 
by the thinning of religious or ideological commitments, or the pressures of economic 
hardship or indeed anything else that makes people feel less secure in their homes, 
 




relationships and identities, uncertainty turns from being a mild inconvenience to a 
disquieting dislocation.  The resultant fear and anxiety provokes the instinct to fight by 
seeking new certainties in stronger ideology, religion or identity, or to flight into some 
form of extremism, either of which may carry hatred as the new price of belonging and the 
appearance of certainty.  Both fight and flight usually result in more conflict, more 
dislocation and thus more uncertainty.   
 
The link between uncertainty and all types of extremism was recognised in the 
September 2013 special issue of the Journal of Social Issues.348  The introductory essay by 
Michael Hogg, Arie Kruglanski and Kees van den Bos begins by recognising that the 
psychological relationship between uncertainty and extremism is complex and its nature 
rests on what is meant by uncertainty, how uncertainty relates to neighbouring constructs, 
what the focus of uncertainty is, what we mean by “extremism,” what aspects of extremism 
we focus on, and what the psychological processes are that may translate uncertainty into 
extremism.  Scholar-practitioners are often advised to look particularly for three types of 
uncertainty (Hickling and Friend 2005, p. 8).  The first is relevant elements of the 
immediate environment: for example the data on which decisions may be based, such as 
the reliability or otherwise of estimates and predictions.  The second concerns 
relationships: whether others will do as they say, and what decisions may be made by 
others which have an effect on an immediate albeit unrelated situation.  The third is 
guiding values, whether political, religious or cultural, implicit or assumed, which set 
directions and guide operating principles.   The influence of uncertainty on any situation of 
conflict should never be under-estimated and interventions to reduce uncertainty are often 
 
348 The essays in this edition were selected from a group of papers presented at a conference on uncertainty 
and extremism organized at Claremont Graduate University in November 2009. The meeting was sponsored 




fundamental to securing assent to more far-reaching interventions to reduce conflict.349 
 
The form of extremism of interest here is religious hatred and its possible 
manifestations, noting that there is some correlation between periods of societal instability 
and sociopolitical and ideological extremism that includes religious extremism, citing 
events as far removed and apart as the collapse of the Roman Empire, the Great Depression 
of the 1930s which lead to the slide into fascism, communism and nationalism, and the 
current upsurges of religious extremism in parts of the Muslim world (Lane 2011; Staub 
1989).  Common to all such situations is people feeling uncertain about the accuracy of 
their perceptions, beliefs and attitudes and hence seeking out others who are similar to 
themselves, partly to check and look for confirmation of their own positions, but also to 
reaffirm the cohesiveness of their bonds with like-minded people (Swann, Rentfrow and 
Guinn 2003).  This can have the effect of cementing the social influence of those who 
promise the most certainty, whether they are political demagogues, represent extremist 
belief systems or even financial fraudsters who benefit from uncertainty in times of fiscal 
crisis by promising spurious guarantees of wealth and security (Altmeyer 2003).  This 
reflects how broad manifestations of uncertainty can be: people can feel uncertain about all 
sorts of things, from their perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, values and relationships to their 
careers, their future and their place in the world; and even more crucially about their sense 
of self and identity especially in the context of the multiple uncertainties of the 
 
349 US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was vilified for his statement on 12 February 2002 in which he 
said “Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, 
there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that 
is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones 
we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free 
countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones (Defense.gov News Transcript: DoD News 
Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, United States Department of Defense (viewed 1.9.20). In 





contemporary world.  “Uncertainty can be weak or strong, transitory or enduring, and 
important or trivial….. Uncertainty is multifaceted and thus how people respond to 
uncertainty is also multifaceted” (Hogg et al, 2013). 
 
Finding a community of people who share one’s beliefs, attitudes and prejudices and 
insulate one from the views of those who might challenge those makes perfect sense, 
whether that community is a political party, a newspaper, a church or an online social 
media group.  In addition it becomes self-serving to label those who disagree as heretics 
and deviants who are not only wrong but also morally suspect – because only the morally 
suspect would consider undermining what is obviously the consensus. Equally obviously it 
makes sense to follow those, whether in person or in publications, who harbour no doubts 
as to the rightness of the cause and are energetic in condemning those who do.  This can 
even lead people to accepting an existing social structure if it provides the desired stability 
and certainty even if it puts it adherents at a disadvantage (Jost and Hunyadi 2003).350  It 
can also lead people to investing in the most egregious conspiracy theories. 
 
The links between uncertainty, extremism and religious hatred are well explained 
through the social psychology-based arguments set out above, but the link back to sacred 
values is less apparent; it might appear more logical to discuss uncertainty in relation to 
power and control, the subject of the chapter following this.  Psychodynamic psychology 
can provide this link by following David Tacey’s contention that “We have to go outside 
conventional boundaries…..and descend into the unconscious, to where sacred values fall 
 
350 This is what is known as System Justification Theory (SJT), the idea within social psychology that beliefs 
which justify the existing system are psychologically comforting. It is based on people having a range of 
needs, material, relational and existential,  that can be met by the status quo even when this disadvantages 
specific individuals.  It can also explain psychological phenomena such as cognitive dissonance (see Jost, J 
and Andrews, R 2011, ‘System Justification Theory’ in Christie, D (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Peace 
Psychology, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden,  pp. 1092-3.). 
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when they are no longer upheld by culture” (2013, p. 64).351  Culture for Tacey, in this 
context, means the social stability that religious and political certainties can bring, and it is 
the ending of these certainties that mean sacred values retreat into areas of the psyche 
where they remain latent.  Tacey sees the forces of what he calls ‘fanatical religion’ 
replacing these sacred values and quotes Jung from ‘The Spiritual Problem of Modern 
Man’: “I believe I am not exaggerating when I say that modern man has suffered an almost 
fatal shock, psychologically speaking, and as a result has fallen into profound uncertainty” 
(Jung CW10, para. 155).  Later in that essay Jung warns that “No psychic value can 
disappear without being replaced by another of equivalent intensity” (Jung CW10, para. 
159).  It is the contention of this dissertation that in some circumstances it is the medium of 




351 When faced with uncertainty the human tendency is to estimate what certainty might mean or, if that is 
not possible, proceed by making assumptions.  Both estimates and assumptions will, in the absence of any 
firmer data, be value-based (Friend and Hickling 2005, p. 332).  
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The final dimension of religion this dissertation considers in relation to religious 
hatred is that of power and control, exercised through a mixture of agency and influence 
(Woodhead 2011).  The forms power takes differ from situation to situation, but in most 
situations, Acland (1990) argues, in addition to the ‘hard’ power inherent in military 
materiel, money or resources, there are also those now often described as ‘soft’ power, 
such as education, culture, the dissemination of information and moral and religious 
influence.352  In addition to such cases, as Woodhead argues, there is the power that is 
perceived to be drawn by religions from their relationships with whatever higher powers 
they acknowledge, and through their historical, cultural and social influence.  The focus on 
power, however, can be misleading because power alone does not inevitably prevail.353  
This illustrates the importance of differentiating not only between hard power and soft 
power, but between power and capability to control which is the purpose of all power: 
“Power is one’s ability to affect the behavior of others to get what one wants.  There are 
three basic ways to do this: coercion, payment, and attraction.  Hard power is the use of 
coercion and payment.  Soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through 
attraction” (Nye 2008).  Hard power can be quantified at source; capability needs to be 
 
352 These may also wield forms of hard power, directly or indirectly, as was apparent during the Balkan 
conflicts of the 1990s when various churches assumed nationalist positions (Perica 2002). 
353 A potent example of this confusion was the general assumption in Western foreign and military policy 
circles in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 that the Afghan mujahideen 
opposing the massively powerful and technologically superior Soviet forces would be rapidly defeated.  In 
fact the Soviet-Afghan War lasted until 1989 when the Soviet Union finally withdrew.  One of the key 
reasons, among many, was that the Soviet Army was equipped and trained to fight a war on the flat plains of 
Central Europe against forces similarly armed and deployed; it was marginally effective, notwithstanding the 
appalling brutality which accompanied its operations, against small groups of lightly armed guerrillas moving 
rapidly through mountainous territory and supported by a civilian population (Fremont-Barnes 2012). This 
confusion of power with capability prevailed despite the US experience in Vietnam a decade earlier, and 
arguably continued with the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. 
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assessed at its point of impact in terms of the ability it provides to control people and 
circumstances.  Soft power, meanwhile, is best measured by its results and usually over the 
longer term.  Education, for example, may be an invitation to learn through attraction and 
thereby to achieve influence; foreign aid may be an expression of goodwill and genuine 
benevolence, but it can also be hard payment to buy what cannot be coerced or attracted.   
These are the basics of power and control: the question is where religion, and religious 
hatred, find a place in this wider context.  
 
The impetus to control 
 
It might be thought that the contemporary influence of most religion falls mainly 
under the heading of soft power compared with the past realities of armed crusades or 
seeking divine intervention in aid of a cause or a country but there are exceptions, for 
example efforts in the United States to oppose state funding for contraception and abortion 
(Haynes 2012, p. 137).  Lurking in the background of all exercises of soft power are efforts 
to influence and, more subtly still, and even if not consciously intended, to control the way 
others think, feel and act.  The focus in this chapter therefore is more on the narrower issue 
of control than on the wide open spaces of power which are too broad to be encompassed 
here.  
 
 If religion is in part about giving meaning, purpose and structure to life through 
relationships with higher and larger powers, then in the wake of these comes a sense of 
control both for those providing and serving the religion through its institutions and the use 
of scriptures, rituals and homilies, and for those accepting its benefits for person and 
communal life and the strictures and constraints which accompany them.  Control as the 
enactment of power has long been identified as central to human motivation (Kelley 1971); 
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Adler deems it “an intrinsic ‘necessity of life’” (Wolman 1981, p. 289) and Hood et al 
(2018) quote Reid (1969) describing power as “one of the basic human desires”.  They add 
that “although the ideal is actual control, the need to perceive personal mastery is often so 
great that the illusion of control will suffice” (ibid., p. 22; original emphasis).  The 
significance of this is that religion is one of the means by which human beings seek 
control, particularly over the aspects of life and the worst of circumstances where some 
sense of control can counter the uncertainties and provide the meaning that may otherwise 
be lost.  The ability to pray while chaos reigns can provide this sense of control; the 
unchanging timelessness of religious ritual can provide a sense of stability in an unstable 
life;354 and it seems that the appeal to supernaturalism, whether the conventional forms as 
offered by the main religions, the more esoteric offered by magic or that practised by the 
spiritual-but-not-religious, increases when the efforts of secular control systems appear to 
be failing (Gibbs 2018, pp. 79-83).   
 
Beyond these, there is no lack of research demonstrating that a sense of control is an 
important contributor to people’s senses of physical and mental well-being (Jackson and 
Bergenman 2011; Wink, Dillon, and Prettyman 2007).  It complements and reflects other 
indicators of mental health, such as the sense of agency in the world and the corresponding 
internal locus of control355 (Schieman 2008) with their attendant mental health benefits 
such as lower tendency to depression (Jang et al. 2006).   The question of whether religious 
belief affects one’s sense of personal control has given rise to two hypotheses, 
‘relinquished control’ and ‘personal empowerment’ (Schiemann 2008).  To summarise 
 
354 Which is perhaps why changes to ritual are so bitterly fought. 
355 ‘Locus of control’ is defined as the degree to which people feel they, rather than external forces, control 
the events of their lives.  The concept is significant in the psychology of religion where research 
demonstrates that intrinsic religious orientation correlates with internal locus of control (Kahoe, R 1974, 
‘Personality and achievement correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations’,  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 812–818). 
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these, the former predicts that people who believe in divine control over their lives will 
report a lower sense of control than those who do not356; the latter asserts that “beliefs 
about God's omnipotent power provide a sense of coherence and meaning to life that helps 
people reconcile life's uncertainties and adversities” (ibid.).  The personal empowerment 
hypothesis is complicated, and perhaps contradicted, by the fact that many who believe in a 
powerful god believe in their collaboration with this power, thereby enhancing their own 
potency, and there is research to suggest that some people come to rely on such an external 
source of power to achieve a sense of internal control.357  Notwithstanding the cautions 
about such research, and these two contrasting hypotheses, perhaps the most important 
aspect of this research for this dissertation is the establishment of the relationship between 
belief and control because, as previous chapters have illustrated, loss of the sense of 
control and agency is one of the foundations for religious hatred. 
 
Constraints as control  
 
In addition to offering believers a sense of control, whether through collaboration 
with a greater power or through trusting in the surrender to it, religions also involve 
accepting constraints on what might otherwise be natural desires358 which sometimes 
means putting wider social interests ahead of self-interest and self-gratification.359  Indeed, 
 
356 In the words of William James, "There is a state of mind, known to religious men, but to no others, in 
which the will to assert ourselves and hold our own has been displaced by a willingness to close our mouths 
and be as nothing in the floods and waterspouts of God" (James 1902, p. 54). 
357 The results of this research need to be viewed with extreme caution: they were based on American adults 
from mainly monotheistic faiths and with no apparent controls for cultural bias.  Personal experience 
suggests that people of other faiths can be more fatalistic regardless of locus of control.   
358 What James Strachey describes as "the irremediable antagonism between the demands of instinct and the 
restrictions of civilization" in his introduction to Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents (Strachey, J 1962, 
‘Editors' Introduction’, in Freud, S Civilization and its Discontents, Norton, New York, pp. 11–12). 
359 The 2020 coronavirus pandemic has arguably demonstrated both a majority willingness to put collective 
interests ahead of self-interest, as Bregman (2020) would aver, and a tendency to condemn those who are 
unwilling to do this.  It will be interesting to see in the years ahead whether this represents a wholesale shift 
from the emphasis on personal self-interest to collective self-interest, or whether it is a temporary 
phenomenon in response to specific circumstances.  
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the failure to operate self-control has always been regarded by most religions as an 
impediment to spiritual progress.  Even acknowledging that definitions of morality and 
goodness are as controversial as those of amorality and immorality, the people who adhere 
to religions generally have a fairly straightforward understanding of what constitute the 
former whether they flow from the Eightfold Path or the Ten Commandments, foremost 
among them being the willingness to follow divine commands and the Golden Rule.360  In 
the opposite corner are, for example in the Western Christian tradition, the Seven Deadly 
Sins which constitute failures of self-control: “More precisely, virtues seem based on the 
positive exercise of self-control, whereas sin and vice often revolve around failures of self-
control. Insofar as it is fair to regard vice and sin as the opposite of virtue, the centrality of 
self-control to both is an impressively consistent theme. We submit that it is fair to 
consider self-control the master virtue” (Baumeister and Exline 1999).361  Baumeister and 
Exline go on to describe virtuous self-control as “The Moral Muscle” (ibid.), explaining 
that like any muscle it grows stronger with exercise and helps people to feel secure not 
only in their virtue, but in their control over themselves and their circumstances.  The loss 
of this control carries with it the fear of being overwhelmed by powerful emotions, either 
one’s own or that of others, and especially of the uncontrolled aggression of others 
including the possibility of annihilation (Robins and Post 1997, p. 80).   
 
 
360 Leaving aside the fundamental flaw in the Golden Rule as pointed out by George Bernard Shaw in Man 
and Superman: the assumption that others want to be treated as you do (Shaw 1903, p. 227). 
361 The exception is possibly Pride which today tends to be celebrated as self-esteem: a contrast to the 
historical avoidance of pride lest, in pagan mythology, it invited hubris or in Christian traditions the 
comparison of mere mortals with God.  The social significance of this change may be under-estimated: 
“Throughout most of history and most of the world, morality has existed as a major counter-force to self, and 
virtue has represented the internal overcoming of self-interested behavioural tendencies. Now, however, 
these seemingly eternal opponents appear to have joined forces. This change is arguably the most radical 




The mention of the fear of annihilation signals that this is beginning to move into the 
territory, considered below, where loss of control begins to blend into paranoia.  Most of 
the time healthy individuals avoid this slippery slope because they employ a variety of 
defence mechanisms to cope with stresses such as the threat of or actual loss of control 
(ibid.), defence mechanisms being among the processes described by depth psychology 
and supported by increasing neurological evidence (Berlin 2011; Eagle 2011).  But the 
individual who has not developed healthy defence mechanisms may fall back on more 
primitive ones: denial, distortion and delusion, especially delusional projection where 
hatred and annihilation of others is the alternative to being controlled by them.  Robins and 
Post (1997, p. 80) quote the Kleinian psychoanalyst James Grotstein, who characterised 
human beings as “meaning-obsessed”, comparing the inner turbulence caused by this fear 
of annihilation to the black holes described by astronomers which swallow everything, 
including light.  So overwhelming is this dread of meaninglessness that it creates an 
imperative to find or if necessary invent meaning (Grotstein 1990).  If the moral or 
religious constraints that people feel imposed upon them by their faith begin to threaten 
their sense of control, then the alternative can be to create an alternative world in which 
they determine what is right and wrong and, more significantly for this dissertation, who is 
right and wrong. 
 
Compensatory control  
 
Before the shift from control to paranoia is explored further the concept of 
‘compensatory control’ deserves mention.  Using the theory of compensatory control, it 
can be argued that religious beliefs can act as defence mechanisms when other sources of 
control are lacking.  There is evidence (Kay et al, 2008 & 2010; Laurin et al, 2008) that 
religious faith or commitment to secular institutions or ideologies can operate as forms of 
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control that compensate for loss of control in other areas.362  More extreme religious 
ideologies are likely to be adopted by people who live in sociocultural contexts that limit 
both personal control and confidence in the power and accountability of government.  
From a CCT (Compensatory Control Theory) perspective this may cause people to invest 
their need for control in religious beliefs that provide a sense of control.  This effect is not 
just apparent in more economically and politically unstable nations.  Individuals living 
within wealthy countries, especially those in lower socioeconomic status communities, 
may feel constrained in their access to resources or limited in personal control of their own 
lives (Pargament 1997; Kay and Eibach 2013).363 
 
Kay and Eibach argue that Compensatory Control Theory provides unique insights 
into the importance of control motivations, and how religious and secular ideologies can 
satisfy these motivations, to the extent of being able to predict extreme adherence to 
different ideologies.  They qualify this, however, by stating that compensatory control 
processes do not necessarily or inevitably result in active extremism: but this is more likely 
to happen when people perceive threats to their sense of control in parallel with economic 
and sociocultural factors that lead individuals “to channel all of their compensatory control 
strings into a single outlet” (ibid.).  Kay and Eibach go on to argue that by highlighting the 
common theme of control in otherwise diverse, social, political and religious ideologies, 
CCT makes an important contribution toward understanding the psychological functions of 
 
362 It has been demonstrated experimentally that in addition to “believing in an interventionist God” there are 
two other sources of compensatory control: “perceiving patterns in noise” [randomness] or “adhering to 
superstitions and conspiracies”, and “defending the legitimacy of the socio-political institutions that offer 
control” (Kay, A, Gaucher, D, Galinsky, A and Whitson, J 2009, ‘Compensatory Control: Achieving Order 
Through the Mind, Our Institutions, and the Heavens’, Current Directions in Psychological Science, vol. 18, 
no. 5, pp. 264–268). 
363 The relationships between low economic status and religiosity are examined in Brandt, M and Henry, P 
2012, ‘Psychological Defensiveness as a Mechanism Explaining the Relationship Between Low 




ideological extremism. The theory proposes, and the research evidence supports, “that 
when people experience random, threatening events they defensively embrace ideologies 
that restore their faith in internal or external sources of control in their lives, and these 
sources of control are substitutable” (ibid.). 
 
While CCT can arguably be applied to all ideologies, it should be noted that 
ideologies that include supernatural beliefs are particularly effective in helping people cope 
with the anxieties provoked by randomness and unpredictability in life events.  Kay and 
Eibach cite Malinowski (1954) in support of this contention, maintaining that established 
rituals help to cultivate a spiritual imagination that enables people to perceive 
manifestations of the supernatural in everyday events and circumstances.364  Ara 
Norenzayan’s Big Gods (2013) also confirms that many aspects of human behaviour are 
affected by the idea of watchful deities or supernatural entities having the power to 
intervene in the mundane.  An interesting and suggestive parallel to findings about the 
relationship between the need for control and acceptance of supernatural presence is the 
correlation between the need for control, belief in the paranormal and narcissism.  
Individuals with a tendency to narcissism are prone to fantasies of success, wealth and 
beauty, and in particular to having control over others.  Research suggests that there may 
be an indirect link between narcissism and paranormal belief through proneness to fantasy 
(Irwin 1990; Roe and Morgan 2002), and it is a short step from there to the link between 
narcissism and religious belief described in Figlio (2018), Herman and Fuller (2018) and 
Vonk and Visser (2020). 
 
364 Though the accessibility and value of supernatural control beliefs are likely to vary according to the 
religious traditions adhered to. For example, Luhrmann (2012) describes how evangelical Christians 
emphasise learning what they perceive to be the voice of God during prayer and throughout their lives.  Such 
practices would presumably make religious compensatory control more effective; Kay and Eibach cite Ault 
(2004) as describing a similar process among Baptists.  They do not, however, mention equivalent practices 





Terror Management Theory 
 
While Terror Management Theory (TMT) has its origins in anthropologist Ernest 
Becker’s The Denial of Death (1973), it is possible to see it as an extreme form of 
compensatory control – death is, after all, the ultimate annihilation for those who cannot 
accept the safety net of an afterlife.  Becker argues that much of human action is designed 
to distract us from the inevitability of our own death, and this horror of annihilation drives 
us as individuals and as social beings to create everything from personal reward systems 
through systems of meaning such as laws, constitutions and religions, to assertions of 
power and control to defend ourselves against the fear and anxiety that the idea of death 
brings with it.  He argues that “The idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal 
like nothing else; it is a mainspring of human activity - activity designed largely to avoid 
the fatality of death, to overcome it by denying in some way that it is the final destiny for 
man” (Becker 1973, p. ix).  The idea is explained more fully by Pascal Boyer in Religion 
Explained (2001): 
Some social psychologists speculate that our attachment to social identity, to the 
feeling that we are members of a group with shared norms, may in fact be a 
consequence of the terror induced by mortality. In this "terror-management" account 
the principal source of motivation for human beings as for other animals is the 
evolutionary imperative to survive. Many cultural institutions—shared symbols, 
shared values, a sense of group membership—are seen as buffers against this natural 
anxiety.  
         (Boyer 2001, p. 205) 
 
TMT is supported by some evolutionists (for example Greenberg, Pyszczynski and 
Solomon, 1986) arguing that fears about anything that threatens human survival have an 
adaptive value because they help to avoid such threats and thereby facilitate genetic 
survival, while being opposed by some evolutionary psychologists (for example 
Kirkpatrick and Navarrateb, 2006) on the grounds that such forms of generalised anxiety 
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are not adaptive and do little to ensure survival.365  This may be so, but even those who 
profess not to be religious may think more about ultimacy in the face of death, and given 
the emphasis in many religions on some form of survival after death, it seems reasonable 
that religion is one means by which human beings try to cope with the idea of mortality.  
As Atran remarks, “Believing in God and the afterlife is a way to make sense of the brevity 
of our time on earth, to give meaning to this short existence” (2010, p. 445). 
 
 Why, though, should this fear of death lead to religious hatred?  The first question is 
whether, if religious hatred intends the obliteration of others, then its expression is not in 
some senses an assertion of the will to life, if necessary at the expense of others?366  In this 
respect the purveyor of religious hatred is playing the ultimate zero sum game (Axelrod 
1984, p. 121).367   Secondly, if religious belief is a way of denying the finality of death, 
could it be that religious hatred of others, wishing their utter obliteration, is a form of 
unconscious and symbolic power-play: ‘by hating you we are denying your power to 
survive’?  These are posed as questions for lack of evidence that they have previously been 
asked or answered.  Looking at this ultimate power of religion – the power of life over 
death, however conceived – is coming full circle to look again at the preservation of 
identity in the face of the power of others to eradicate it.  If people are prepared to fight for 
their beliefs and values, abstractions in comparison to identity as a signifier of continued 
 
365 Both these positions overlook the possibility that human beings survive death and that there is, as many 
religions have always argued, a transmundane world.  In this case Boyer, Becker and these evolutionists 
would be profoundly wrong.  This is a possibility of which scholar-practitioners need to be mindful when 
working with people for whom the transmundane world is a reality.  
366 This is finding a parallel between religious hatred and the evil that comes with a state of mind associated 
with the death drive that fuels the destruction of emotional meaning, joie de vivre, the envy of life and 
vitality (Migliozzi 2016). 
367 The concept of the ‘zero-sum game’ is much studied by scholar-practitioners in the conflict resolution 
field who need to persuade their interlocutors that ‘win-win’ games are possible.  One of the situations where 
win-win games are less likely and zero-sum outcomes the default are where one or other of those involved 
needs to assert their agency at all costs – hence its relevance to questions of survival. 
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existence, it should be less surprising that they are prepared to fight for the power to assert 
and defend their identity to death and beyond (Ysseldyk et al, 2011).   
 
 In summary, people as individuals and as communities or nations find their survival 
and ongoing identity anchored in part through religious allegiance, and when 
circumstances require them, in their perception, to defend, protect or assert the powers that 
protect their identity, then religious hatred can become both a means to rally brothers in 
arms and an end in itself as an expression of that determination to survive.  There are no 
“atheists in foxholes”368 in part because religion is used to stave off the threat of death as 
the ultimate dissolution of control, but also because religion can legitimise and even add a 
sacred edge to whatever battles have to be fought to maintain control.  
 
From control to paranoia 
 
There is a point at which fear of losing control, whether by direct means or through 
some form of compensatory mechanism, can begin to shade into paranoia (Shapiro 1967, 
pp. 73-80), and one of the forms through which this may be expressed is religious hatred.   
One of the characteristics of religious hatred, like paranoia, judging from both research and 
personal experience, is that it seems often to spring from the obsession with a single idea, 
whether it be the ordination of women, the acceptance of  homosexuality or the Hindu 
 
368 There seem to be no certain origins of this aphorism. Nathan Heflick and Jamie Goldenburg predicted in 
2011 that “atheists would be buffered from mortality concerns if their atheistic worldview – no life after 
death – was challenged, but not if it was supported. Results confirmed the hypothesis and were also found for 
theists and agnostics. These findings support TMT's claim that literal immortality is of paramount importance 
in ameliorating death concerns” (Heflick, N and Goldenberg, J 2012, ‘No atheists in foxholes: Arguments for 
(but not against) afterlives buffer mortality salience effects for atheists’, British Journal of Social Psychology 
vol. 51, pp. 385–392). 
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demonization of Muslims.369  Robins and Post (1997, p. 174) argue that the hallmark of the 
paranoid mindset is the overvaluation of a single idea, the domination by one over-riding 
concept.  Regardless of whether this idea has merit the paranoid grossly and obsessively 
exaggerates its importance, subordinating every other value to it and willing to commit any 
act to fulfil it: “The complete dominance of this idea means that paranoid fanatics live 
within a closed ideational system, a sealed castle of invincible ignorance immune to 
competing consideration”.  
 
The significance of the relationship between paranoia as a consequence of feeling the 
loss of control and religious hatred needs to be treated with some caution, but the evidence 
does suggest that it should be regarded as a serious possibility.  One of the likely 
oppositions to such an idea is that paranoia is indicative of a dangerous and relatively rare 
mental health condition.  This would be mistaken: “the paranoid outlook is associated with 
a wide range of pathologies, from entirely normal to severely psychopathological” (ibid., p. 
3); it is possible for people to be ‘paranoid’ without being seriously psychologically 
disturbed.370  Freeman et al (2005) discovered that “suspicious thoughts” are a “weekly 
occurrence” for 30-40% of people, with 10-30% having “persecutory thoughts”.  While 
only 5% went so far to as to believe in more improbable threats such as conspiracies 
against them, one of the symptoms of relatively serious paranoia, if extrapolated to the 
entire population of the United States (approximately 330 million) or the United Kingdom 
 
369 Mezey, J 2006, ‘Neocolonial Narcissism And Postcolonial Paranoia: Midnight's Children and the 
‘Psychoanalysis’ of the State’, Intervention: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, vol. 8, no. 2 pp. 
178-192. 
370 Some of this evidence is drawn from Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred (Robins, R and 
Post, J 1997). At the time of publication of this book Robert S. Robins was professor of political science at 
Tulane University having served several presidential administrations as an intelligence officer and consultant 
in political psychology and been a visiting scientist at the Tavistock Clinic in London.  Jerrold M. Post was 
professor of psychiatry, political psychology and international affairs at George Washington University 
having founded and run the Central Intelligence Agency’s Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political 
Behavior (later the Political Psychology Division) which specialises in the psychobiography of world leaders. 
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(approximately 67 million) this would suggest that respectively some 16 million American 
and 3 million British people may fear some loss of control over their lives to unspecified 
‘Others’ as well as perhaps being more vulnerable than the majority to the conspiracy 
theories that circulate freely in the age of the Internet.  Even taking into account the 
acknowledged limitations of this research,371 this does suggest a large number of people 
who may be psychologically inclined towards the acceptance that unspecified Others may 
pose a threat to their autonomy: “[….] a central psychological motivation for conspiratorial 
thinking is to serve as an antidote for the poisonous feeling of powerlessness” (Robins and 
Post 1997, p. 57). 
 
 
So paranoid thinking is more common than might be supposed, and likewise some 
openness to conspiracy theories.372  It does not, of course, follow from this that all religious 
hatred is evidence of paranoia, or all those that feel religious hatred towards others are 
suffering from some form of psychosis: such conclusions would be an unwarranted 
medicalising of what is, as other chapters have shown, more usually the consequence of 
social and psychological pressures.  It is, however, suggested here that religious hatred 
rooted in paranoia and conspiratorial thinking may in some circumstances, for some 
individuals and some communities, be one of the antidotes to feelings of loss of control or 
impaired autonomy: perhaps an extreme form of compensatory control (Stojanov and 
Halberstadt 2019).  This may be particularly so for those for whom religion is 
ontologically important; it may even be that “religion, rather than enabling persons to gain 
emotional distance from their paranoid thoughts and feelings, actually increases the 
 
371 Freeman et al note the limitations of their research including “an epidemiologically representative sample” 
and the sample mainly comprising “young adults who may have higher rates of suspiciousness”.   
372 The documentary film The Social Dilemma (2020), too recently published at the time of writing to have 
received scholarly appraisal, describes in apocalyptic terms how social media is inducing paranoid beliefs in 




emotional intensity of them by giving them divine justification” (Carlin 2010).  If that 
religion feels marginalised, in some way threatened or even just subjected to pressure to 
change its form or expression, amplifying resentment into hatred, or inspiring the same 
emotion in family, community or fellow adherents, may reduce a sense of powerlessness 
and provide some sense of control.  While initially such a course of action might be 
rational as a form of defence, the danger is that such feelings can escalate, bolster self-
belief even if it is based on delusional thinking, and perhaps provide reasons for perceiving  
new conspiracies especially if these reasons and beliefs make others responsible and “will 
divert the sufferer from dealing with genuine problems and will lead him to tilt at the 
imaginary windmills of conspiracy” (Robins and Post, 1997, p. 62).   
 
The next stage of this process is familiar from previous chapters of this dissertation: 
the projecting of uncomfortable internal feelings on to an external enemy with the resultant 
prejudice, scapegoating and ultimately genocide.  Robins and Post argue that just as the 
paranoid find comfort in creating a pseudo-community of enemies, they can also find 
comfort in belonging to a group united against common enemies. This transition from 
individual to group paranoia is critical to understanding how large movements and nations 
can be convinced to go to war, sometimes against their better judgment (ibid., p. 83).  The 
ultimate threat to control, after all, is annihilation, whether of the nation, the culture or the 
individual through the medium of conquest, suppression or death.  
 
 
Control through clericalism  
 
Over the last twenty years or so one of the issues that has come to the fore and done 
immense damage to religious institutions is child sexual abuse.  The link to religious hatred 
is apparent mostly in the hatred for institutions that this issue has engendered among both 
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believers and non-believers, but it is initially difficult to see any wider links to religious 
hatred.  Indeed, the subject is most often viewed in terms of sexual perversion and 
criminality, the connection with religion being only that membership of a religious 
institution has in the past provided opportunities for such abuse.  A scholar-practitioner 
with direct experience of the issue, however, describes child abuse as “rape of the soul” 
which resonates with definitions of religious hatred that equate hatred with the annihilation 
of  personhood.373  Reading reports of such abuse in religious institutions, for example that 
of the Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2017), makes such a direct link between abuse and 
clericalism and ecclesiolatry as to warrant some research into clericalism to explore the 
extent to which it might give rise to other forms of religious hatred.  While clericalism is 
historically most associated with the Christian churches and particularly with the Roman 
Catholic Church, from a psychological point of view it can become entrenched in any 
institution or organisation that begins to value itself, its own members and its reputation 
more than those whom it is intended to serve.  As the Royal Commission makes clear, 
clericalism has been identified as a contributing factor that has enabled child sexual abuse 
in the Catholic Church (RC 2017, p. 612 and extensive fn. 169).374  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, however, clericalism is treated as potentially a problem for all religions, and it 
must be emphasised that the purpose here is not to pillory the Catholic or any other 
Christian church, but to explore why and how it can happen, and the consequences in terms 
of its possible contribution to generating an environment in which religious hatred may 
take root.   
 
373 Personal communication 1.9.20. 
374 In his Address to the Synod Fathers at Opening of Synod 2018 on Young People Pope Francis said: 
“Clericalism arises from an elitist and exclusivist vision of vocation, that interprets the ministry received as a 
power to be exercised rather than as a free and generous service to be given. This leads us to believe that we 
belong to a group that has all the answers and no longer needs to listen or learn anything. Clericalism is a 
perversion and is the root of many evils in the Church: we must humbly ask forgiveness for this and above all 




One frequently cited definition of clericalism is that included in a 1983 report by the 
United States Conference of Major Superiors of Men, In solidarity and service: Reflections 
on the problem of clericalism in the Church.375 The report summarised it as “The 
conscious or unconscious concern to promote the particular interests of the clergy and to 
protect the privileges and power that have traditionally been conceded to those in the 
clerical state”, adding that there are attitudinal, behavioural and institutional dimensions to 
the phenomenon of clericalism.  The report goes on to say that clericalism arises “from 
both personal and social dynamics, is expressed in various cultural forms, and often is 
reinforced by institutional structures”, describing the symptoms of clericalism as “an 
authoritarian style of ministerial leadership, a rigidly hierarchical worldview, and a virtual 
identification of the holiness and grace of the church with the clerical state and, thereby, 
with the cleric himself” (CMSM 1983).  This description provides a number of indications 
that would point to problems for any organisation.  Among them are the restriction to 
members of only one gender, inhibiting the diversity of viewpoints; the reservation of 
critical powers (in this case the administration of the sacrament) to an elite; a hierarchical 
model of leadership that can inadvertently exclude an understanding of problems lower 
down in the organisation; and perhaps most potentially dangerous of all, the inculcation of 
a sense of superiority towards those outside the organisation.  The Irish clinical 
psychologist Maureen Gaffney is quoted in a commentary on the Australian Royal 
Commission report (but it could be a commentary on any organisation with the 
characteristics mentioned above) as saying the Roman Catholic Church in Australia has all 
 
375 The organisation’s website says “CMSM is both the common voice for major superiors and the primary 
common resource serving leaders of male religious in the United States. Our members are major superiors 
and councilors of more than 200 monastic communities and provinces that include 16,000+ Catholic 




the characteristics of the worst kind of such an institution: “rigid in social structure; 
preoccupied by power; ruthless in suppressing internal dissent; in thrall to status, titles and 
insignia, with an accompanying culture of narcissism and entitlement; and at great 
psychological distance from human intimacy and suffering” (O’Hanlon 2010). 
 
Another aspect of power and control noted by the Royal Commission as a contributor 
to clericalism is the role played by sex (or rather, in the case of the Catholic Church, that 
played by celibacy).  The report comments that throughout the history of the Church, 
power associated with sex has had symbolic meaning because power was accrued by those 
who overcame sex.  Although sex was banished to the person’s unconscious, it was not so 
much controlled as denied, and the men who attained this mastery of themselves were  
acknowledged as spiritual masters because it could be managed only by especially 
estimable people who were all the more admirable because they were exceptional.  This 
established the link between celibacy and purity, not least in the eyes of their followers, 
ensuring the position of superiority for those who achieved it while also enabling the 
church to reinforce its own power through a system of strict behavioural control.  “In a 
system of this kind, the setting apart of the priest based on the rule of celibacy was the sign 
of power exercised over a laity treated as less significant…  the priest’s identity becomes 
equated with his role”, and as a consequence, the personhood of the priest becomes 
invested with the wielding of this (RC 2017, p. 619). This explains how sex can be 
significant as a factor in the power and control exercised by a religion.   
 
A similar factor derives from the notion that ordination into a priesthood brings 
ontological change: “The priesthood is not just the deputing of an individual to take on a 
particular role. It is more than a function; it is a radical reorienting of the whole reality of 
the person.  He is changed at the level of his being ...” (ibid., p. 620). The danger is, as 
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some commentators on the Royal Commission report make clear, and the evidence 
supports, that for some individuals such a sense of change can result in feelings of 
superiority and entitlement that enable some abusers to justify their conduct to themselves 
and to feel that they are protected by their status and the compliance of their victims 
because of that status.  This can turn clericalism into “a close relative of pathological 
narcissism” (Frawley-O’Dea 2007, pp. 151).  It can also, to use the language of depth 
psychology, result in inflation and what Jung called development of the ‘mana personality’ 
(Jung CW7, paras. 387-390).   
 
Evolution of religious control 
 
The mana personality is one of many Jungian concepts that is less than 
straightforward and often overlooked.376  It is allotted very little space in Jung’s Collected 
Works and in fact is only described in detail in ‘The relations between the ego and the 
unconscious’ (1928), but it is crucial to an understanding of both power and control as a 
dimension of religion and how these have evolved beyond the traditional bounds of 
religion.  In psychodynamic terms the mana personality represents the stage of the 
individuation process that involves a person’s ego embodying the contents of the collective 
unconscious, with the danger of the person becoming identified with those and thereby 
risking a major inflation followed by deflation rather than moving forward to a 
development of the individuated Self and a more complete personality (Sorge 2020, part 
1).  Translating this from psychodynamic language, what it means is that people can 
 
376 The term ‘mana’ is originally a Melanesian-Polynesian expression that describes the sacral power 
emanating from holy people and places.  It may be used to describe either a divine power, a magical 
shamanism  or a universal force of some kind and has been recognised by anthropologists and ethnologists in 
many belief systems around the world.  Its nearest equivalent in the Judeo-Christian tradition is the concept of 
the charism, the endowment of a gift given by the Holy Spirit.   
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become possessed by the sense of sacral power conveyed by sacred office and either 
believe themselves to be a mixture of hero, magician, medicine man and a demi-god to 
lesser mortals, or be overwhelmed and drowned by exposure to the depth and complexity 
of the unconscious.  Jung says this produces in some patients “an unmistakable and often 
unpleasant increase of self-confidence and conceit”, encouraging them to think they know 
everything, and, more significantly, the depths of their own minds.  Others, meanwhile, 
can feel themselves crushed by the contents of their unconscious, losing their self-
confidence and abandoning themselves “with dull resignation to all extraordinary things 
that the unconscious produces” (Jung 1928, para. 221). The relevance to those who aspire 
to be ministers, priests and gurus is very obvious: the process of ontological change 
described in the Royal Commission Report as presenting the danger of clericalism is 
psychodynamically very real.   
 
What is the link between the mana personality problem and religious hatred?  There 
are two answers.  One is that if the inflated wins over the crushed, to use Jung’s image 
above, the result can be a saviour complex.  The guru or minister or priest believes he or 
she has been placed on earth to redeem others and may wield whatever powers he or she 
can accumulate to do so, including demonising Others: it is not unusual for dictators to 
believe they are playing a role ordained by divine providence which justifies any means to 
achieve their ends (Robins and Post 1997, pp. 113-140).  The other answer is that it is also 
not unusual to find others willing to project such a calling onto those who put themselves 
forward as such.  Jung saw this in Germany and Italy during the 1930s: the longing for 
such a saviour to rescue those nations from their travails.  He himself even made the 
mistake of, briefly, seeing Fascism and Nazism, and their leaders, as quasi-religious 
movements erupting from the unconscious, the saviour complex being an archetypal image 
of the collective unconscious which naturally becomes activated in troubled times (Jung 
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1935a, para. 369).377  Such phenomena have also become more common in contemporary 
times: the rise of populist political leaders and movements; the claims of campaigners to be 
saviours opposing what they see as apocalyptic tendencies; even the ubiquity of 
superheroes in popular culture.  All these can be seen as mana personalities, real or 
invented, vying for religious or quasi-religious hegemony over those who respond to their 
sacral power or missionary call: “the saviour complex as mass psychology” (ibid.), or 
perhaps the saviour complex finding its home in the cultural complex.  
 
There is one further aspect of the mana personality in relation to religion, hatred and 
control that should not go unmentioned: its role in the establishment and cultivation of 
cults, both free standing and as movements within established religions.   It will be clear 
from the references to personal inflation, saviour complexes and populism above that the 
same descriptors can be applied to the people who create and perpetuate cultic forms of 
belief and leadership.  The delinquencies of such leaders are well rehearsed and there is no 
need to reproduce them here, but sometimes overlooked is the fine line between 
mainstream religious institutions and the movements within them which, while adhering to 
the main precepts of whichever faith they espouse, cultivate an exclusivity which, overtly 
or more covertly, claim to represent a more perfect truth and usually one that the institution 
has neglected or compromised in its desire to be more widely acceptable.  There is nothing 
new about such movements: every mainstream faith has experienced sects and breakaways 
claiming a greater authenticity and commanding the loyalty of its particular followers.  The 
problem comes when either the breakaway movement or the affronted mainstream seeks to 
denigrate the other, and does so by making their followers Other and therefore, at the 
 





extreme, objects of hatred.  In such situations the confrontation of mana personalities 
across the divide, the “unintentional influence on the unconscious of others” (Jung CW10, 






PART 4: DISCUSSION 
 






This dissertation has explored one central theme, the intensity and persistence of 
religious hatred, and has used the literatures of conflict resolution, the psychology of 
religion and cognitive and psychodynamic psychology to investigate possible explanations.  
One of the clearest impressions is that in none of these is the topic of religious hatred 
addressed as specifically, systematically or as comprehensively as the subject deserves, 
and therefore the process of exploration has involved a combination of wide reading in 
each field of study, extrapolations from research into similar subjects, and to a certain 
extent extemporising from over thirty years’ experience of working with groups of people 
divided, sometimes violently, by matters of belief and value. 
 
In this final chapter the focus shifts to considering the implications of this research 
for dialogue and diapraxis, approaches employed by practitioners tasked with trying to 
bring together people whose relationships are sometimes coloured by religious hatred.  It 
must be emphasised that these implications are tentative and directed as much towards 
theory-building as praxis, albeit influenced wherever possible by the experience of 
practitioners.  The chapter begins with a discussion of dialogue and diapraxis to put the 
subsequent discussion into context.  It then reflects on the chapters covering the six 
dimensions of religion and the implications for praxis before advancing some conclusions 




Dialogue and diapraxis 
 
The term ‘dialogue’ is commonly used by practitioners in the conflict resolution field 
to describe the process of interaction among protagonists brought together to review and to 
try to resolve their differences.  Such conversations tend to be carefully designed by 
practitioners to provide participants with the best opportunity for identifying areas of 
common ground, tackling differences and building at least sufficient relationship to enable 
them to discuss difficult issues despite the internal pressures of interest and emotion and 
the external demands of constituencies.  Because of these pressures it is usual for 
practitioners to act as impartial mediators and facilitators, helping participants to 
understand each other, to clarify areas of difference and language, to create a structure 
within which issues can be discussed systematically.  They also contribute to the 
containing of the high emotions that often accompany such conversations through enabling 
strong feelings to be expressed while creating safe spaces within which they can be heard.  
Such a process puts a premium on what is known as process design. This involves taking 
account of context and history (what has happened in the past, how the situation has arisen, 
previous efforts to resolve the situation); clarifying purposes and products378 (what the 
process is intended to achieve, what the participants need to have at the end of the 
process); identifying and recruiting participation (who are the people involved, whom they 
represent, the roles they take, the expertise available); selecting process methods (and 
deciding the order in which to use them); and resources (the time and money available to 
support the process).379   
 
378 ‘Purposes’ include what will be different at the end; ‘products’ can be divided into the ‘visible’ (treaties, 
agreements, contracts) and ‘invisible’ (trust, relationships); see Friend, J and Hickling, A 2005 (third edition), 
Planning Under Pressure, Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford. 
379  For examples of detailed process design in the context of complex conflicts see LeBaron, M and 
Carstarphen, N 1997, ‘Negotiating Intractable Conflict: The Common Ground Dialogue Process and 
Abortion’, Negotiation Journal, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 341-361; Fitzduff, M, 2002, Beyond violence: Conflict 




The mechanisms through which such dialogue is managed may include shuttle 
mediation; ‘caucus’ meetings380; analytical workshops; core groups of key 
‘stakeholders’381; representative groups to preserve relations between leaders and their 
constituencies; process management groups to ensure efficiency and accountability in the 
way an intervention process is conducted; and numerous methodologies to keep 
protagonists focused both on solving problems and building relationships with each 
other.382  The practitioner role can thus require the ability to assimilate and utilise a great 
deal of specialised knowledge particular to each situation while at the same time managing 
the dynamics of group processes, the drafting of sensitive documents and the moment-to-
moment handling of complex and sometimes heated interactions for which there is no 
script.  The multiplicity of tasks calls for both physical and emotional stamina and often 
some speed and ingenuity in responding to unfolding circumstances.383   
 
‘Diapraxis’, meanwhile, was first used by the Danish theologian Lissi Rasmussen in 
‘From Diapraxis to Dialogue’ in the 1988 Newsletter of the Office on Christian-Muslim 
Relations.384  Rasmussen conceives of diapraxis as “dialogue as action” (original 
emphasis), in which a common praxis is essential, contrasting this with dialogue in which 
 
Goldberg, SB, 1988, Getting disputes resolved: Designing systems to cut the costs of conflict, Jossey-Bass, 
San Francisco; Jeong, HW, 2005, Peacebuilding in postconflict societies: Strategy and process, Lynne 
Rienner, Boulder; Moore, CW, 2014, The mediation process: Practical strategies for resolving conflict, John 
Wiley & Sons, London; Carpenter, S and Kennedy, W 1988, Managing Public Disputes, Jossey-Bass, San 
Francisco. 
380 A term used mostly in legal and commercial mediation and dispute resolution, it describes private and 
confidential meetings between third parties and protagonists. 
381 Defined as, literally, those with a stake in the issues. 
382 There are numerous guides to forms of intervention.  One of the most enduring is Christopher Moore’s 
The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco), currently 
in its fourth edition and a comprehensive primer on the subject. 
383 For an overview of how scholar-practitioners work see Roberts, M 2007, Developing the Craft of 
Mediation: Reflections on Theory and Practice, Jessica Kingsley, London. 
384 At the time of writing Rev. Dr. Lissi Rasmussen was chairwoman of the board of the Danish Islamic-
Christian Study Center for Co-existence. The Center was established in May 1996 by a group of Christians 
and Muslims to build positive relations between citizens with Christian and Muslim backgrounds.   
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talking is central.  She argues that “We need a more anthropological contextual approach 
to dialogue where we see diapraxis as a meeting between people who try to reveal and 
transform the reality they share. From there theological questions can be asked and dealt 
with. Out of a diapraxis may emerge a deeper meeting, a dialogue” (Rasmussen 1988).  
Rasmussen’s reasoning is that ‘dialogue’ is too focused on communication and not enough 
on wider forms of interaction that would see human beings working, experiencing and 
living together.  This would foster a dialectical relationship between theory and practice 
based on the practical aspects of religion such as the equality, reciprocity and collective 
ownership she saw while working in Africa.  She argues that while in Western Europe 
conflict among religions is less overt than elsewhere, it still persists in people’s minds and 
perceptions despite the increasing intermingling of cultures and religions.  The problem is 
no longer, she believes, so much about relating to people who are different, but managing 
the encounters between and within human beings.  The only way to counter the pressures 
of this is to enable people to work and strive together for common goals, both getting to 
know each other as individuals and building a shared ownership of their activities whether 
these involve the everyday tasks inherent in living together or working together to produce 
works of art, literature or shared understanding.385   
 
Rasmussen does not see diapraxis as a process relevant only to situations of religious 
conflict (she shares this dissertation’s perception that religion is never the root cause of 
conflict but is not infrequently used to incite hatreds between different communities) but 
 
385 For recent examples of diapraxis in action see Bitter, J-N and von Blarer, D 2011, ‘Tajikistan: Diapraxis 
between the Secular Government and Political Islamic Actors’ in Religion in Conflict Transformation, 
Politorbis no. 52, Center for Security Studies, Zurich, pp. 85-87; Puoskari, E and Rossi, A 2019, ‘Bridging 
faiths and worldviews through dialogue’ in Gruener, S, Smith, S and Hald, M (eds.), Dialogue in 
Peacebuilding: Understanding Different Perspectives, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, pp. 196-
207; Karam, A 2019, ‘From Dialogue to Diapraxis in International Development’, International Journal on 
Human Rights, vol. 16, no. 29, pp. 33-39; Tjelle, E 2020, ‘Towards a green diapraxis: Experiences and 




one that builds on religion as a motivator to shared values and mutual cooperation that are 
equally important to secularists (ibid.).  Rasmussen is also clear that diapraxis means 
questioning the status quo, taking into account power differences among participants, and a 
willingness to be open and to accept mutual critiques: all as a precursor and a foundation 
for dialogue.  In many respects her concept of diapraxis contains echoes of conflict 
transformation rather than resolution: a determination to seek out and change the roots of 
difference rather than simply negotiate the surface symptoms.  As mentioned earlier in this 
dissertation, if it is conflict transformation that is required as a response to religious hatred, 
then diapraxis makes sense as a process that goes beyond dialogue. 
 
The implications: preparatory responses  
 
This section sets out some reflections on the necessary preparations that practitioners 
should make when approaching any conflict with religious dimensions.  The first point is 
to appreciate that any conflict in which religious hatred plays a part is inevitably and 
always multidimensional because religion itself is multidimensional.  This dissertation has 
looked in some depth at six dimensions - identity, doctrine and practice, emotion and 
experience, mythology, sacred values and power and control – based on the dimensions of 
religion discussed with most frequency in the literature.  These should be regarded as a 
minimum: in particular situations there may be others which fall outside these six, or 
which are subsets of one or more of them.  However they are defined and identified, 
different dimensions of religion need to be recognised, analysed and understood as a 
precursor to whatever interventions may be designed because the intensity of religious 
hatred arises from the combination and accumulation of multifarious sources, and from the 
likelihood that their origins may be negatively reinforced by their presence in the 




Secondly, as psychodynamic psychology makes clear, the influence of what is 
outside consciousness can wield a disproportionate power, and so it is with the components 
of religious hatred: what is not apparent is sometimes at least as important as what is.  The 
focus needs to be not only on the headline-grabbing actions of religious extremists but also 
on the more everyday predilections and prejudices of those whose behaviour contrasts with 
their purported beliefs.  The eruptions of discord over the re-ordering of pews in a village 
church, for example, can be as revealing psychologically as a symbol of other religious 
hatreds as anything written about rival beliefs.386  So, thirdly, the religious psychology of 
individuals is as important as that of groups and communities because while in some 
instances the cumulative effect of individual behaviours both influences group behaviour 
and creates the overall culture and climate within which certain patterns of behaviour can 
survive and prosper, the reverse can also be true.  The cultural complex can result in a 
cycle of cause and consequence in both directions, escalating the chances of individuals 
being excluded and communities becoming less tolerant and more prone to conflict as a 
consequence of religious hatred.   
 
Next, it should be noted that religious hatred’s primary contribution to conflict is to 
erect psychological and behavioural obstacles which cannot easily be circumnavigated, set 
aside or reframed by using the normal methods available through dialogue or other forms 
of intervention.  It is possible, for example, to overcome differences of interest or ambition 
by looking for new avenues of advantage for both parties, or to resolve interpersonal 
 
386 Such issues, and their accompanying symbolism, should always be analysed psychodynamically because 
symbolism is the language of the psyche (Jung 1964, p. 232).  The pews in one church, for example, 
symbolised the desire for order, the submission of congregants to minister, and the social hierarchy within the 
community.  The removal of some pews to create more social space was experienced by some congregants as 
the casual and thoughtless rejection of long-established values.  
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differences through a frank conversation that untangles the consequences of poor 
communication or sheds new light on distorted perceptions.  Hatred, trailing as it often 
does the suspicion that all initiatives are designed to mislead and undermine, requires 
interventions that go beyond the cognitive rearrangements of interests, values and fears.  It 
corrupts the very processes of thought that make reinterpretations of established positions 
possible; it poisons the common humanity that can enable even sworn enemies to put aside 
their differences in the name of greater goals.  In short, religious hatred is a form of 
psychic bondage that renders normal human intercourse and relationship impossible, and 
adds further dimensions, often unconscious, that deepen and widen the gulfs between 
people.  In the language of conflict resolution such conflict is often described as 
‘intractable’387: the inability to disengage; it leaves people feeling trapped and without 
hope of escape from their predicament.  This is where the more profound processes of 
diapraxis, investing in bringing people to live and work together, may offer a way forward 
that a dialogue process alone cannot. 
 
The next preparatory points arise from the general points made at the outset of this 
dissertation and need to be held in mind by any practitioner, or an institution supporting 
her or him, contemplating any form of intervention in a conflict where religious hatred is 
apparent.  It must be appreciated that most contemporary politicians, diplomats, academics 
and conflict resolution practitioners, certainly from Western countries, tend to be educated 
into mindsets that are more secular than religious even if their origins might have 
inculcated some religious belief, if only culturally.  Because of this they tend to treat 
religion as a mixture of identity marker and cultural inheritance comprising a set of non-
 
387 See for example LeBaron, M and Carstarphen, N 1997, ‘Negotiating Intractable Conflict: The Common 




rational beliefs and values that impede progress.  As Mohammed Abu-Nimer says, when 
the officers and managers of most organisations operating within secular or non-religious 
governance frameworks design their programmes, they tend to build partnerships with 
secular civil society groups and professionals who share with them the same secular 
ideological assumptions of promoting diversity, human rights and sustainable 
development.  In parallel with this he identifies among policy and development 
practitioners a basic resistance towards engaging religious leaders, believing that religion 
and religious institutions should be confined to their primary function of providing 
theological and spiritual services to communities. Additionally there is sometimes an 
anxiety that any engagement beyond these parameters might constitute a violation of the 
principle of separation of church and state. “What is missing in such approaches……is an 
authentic read of the local context, including major players and power relations, which 
would reveal that religion and [faith-based organisations] are relevant beyond mere 
theological issues” (Abu Nimer 2018, p. 7). 
 
Practitioners need to educate themselves, their colleagues, their sponsoring 
institutions and possibly some protagonists in the situations in which they work into a more 
nuanced understanding of religion to ensure that the adherents of any religion, and their 
beliefs, are respected, taken seriously and engaged empathetically.  Another trap for 
secular thinkers when confronted with religious hatred, or indeed with any form of 
religion, is to retreat to generalities and simple binary answers: the religion is true or 
untrue; it is the cause of all conflict or a universal force for good; adherents are rational or 
irrational; their faith is good or evil.  The reality is always more complex: religions are 
always a mixture of history, myth, belief, culture and custom, and their adherents bring a 
mixture of reason, intuition, emotion and experience to their apprehensions of the divine 
and the numinous.  They are also a cross-section of any human populace: good, bad, 
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reasonable, extreme, and the consequences of faith are as varied as the consequences of 
any other human activity: a blend of the benevolent, the indeterminate and the corrupt.  
Binaries and generalities have to be resisted in the name of uncomfortable reality and its 
many shades of grey.  
 
Following on from this, it should be appreciated that religious hatred generally has a 
number of causes, including those clearly rooted in history, social issues, political beliefs, 
peer pressure and occasionally personal psychopathologies, and those whose origins can be 
less exactly attributed but may include emotional and spiritual perspectives and choices 
that appear in some ways non-rational to outsiders or more secular observers.  While the 
former can be subject to intellectual analysis, because naturally the context, environment 
and history of any situation in which religious hatred arises are always going to be 
relevant, and so also are the material motivations of those involved, the failure to speak 
also the languages of the heart and soul as well as that of the mind and body, will limit 
what any intervention can achieve.  The emotional and spiritual dimensions of religious 
hatred cannot be addressed by cognitive and rational means alone: interventions in 
response to them also need to explore avenues that are relational and symbolic, these being 
the languages of emotion and spirit (LeBaron 2002, p. 17).  To put this into popular 
parlance, changing minds often means changing hearts first – which is why the idea of 
epiphany and epiphanic intervention becomes important. 
 
The suggestion of psychopathology among the causes of religious hatred listed above 
needs to come with its own caution.  Practitioners need to be aware of what is known as 
the “Fundamental Attribution Error” (Ross 1977; Tetlock 1985): the tendency to attribute 
to internal attitudes behaviour which is actually the consequence of external circumstances.  
It can be tempting to try to explain away socially aberrant behaviour by focusing on the 
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mentality of the individual rather than pausing to consider what may have been other 
motivating factors. It is useful for practitioners to remember that, when faced with 
someone they believe is behaving ‘irrationally’, they need to question whether they 
understand them well enough.  It is as well to believe that human beings never act 
irrationally: there is usually some reason and logic, however fleeting or contorted, behind 
even the most apparently irrational behaviour.   There is also danger in labelling such 
behaviour too swiftly: what appears to be hatred can be a substitute emotion that people 
resort to because it is more accessible, and perhaps more satisfying to express, than 
emotions that may be more accurate but also more complex and perhaps more distressing.  
For example, as Dozier says, “A sense of being trapped is a common precursor to the 
development of a hate reaction” (Dozier 2002, p. 21). 
 
Implications of religious hatred as a “psychospiritual” problem  
 
The “psychospiritual”388 generally falls outside the remit of practitioners in conflict 
resolution but when looking at the implications for addressing religious hatred it cannot be 
avoided, and for this reason it seems inevitable that practitioners faced with religious 
conflict should have some basic familiarity with recent psychodynamic literature.  In 
recent years interest in the spiritual dimensions of psychology, psychiatry and 
psychotherapy has grown tremendously; in Spirit and Psyche (2003) the scholar and 
psychotherapist Victor Schermer identifies what he calls a new paradigm for addressing 
 
388 ‘Psychospiritual’ has become familiar in psychological and religious scholarship as a term loosely used to 
describe the integration of the psychological and the spiritual, and is commonly used to describe therapeutic 
systems, including secular and quasi-secular systems, that see a spiritual dimension to the human as being 
essential to psychic health and full human development.  Included in such systems is Jungian psychology, 
Roberto Assagioli’s ‘Psychosynthesis’, the archetypal psychology of James Hillman and the transpersonal 
psychologies of, for example, Ken Wilber, Stanislav Grof and Abraham Maslow (Gleig, A 2010, 
‘Psychospiritual’ in Leeming DA, Madden, K and Marlan, S (eds.), Encyclopedia of Psychology and 
Religion, Springer, Boston). 
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the “psychospiritual self” in the light of empirical evidence that spirituality is linked to 
human development.  Ursula King argues that whether this new paradigm is “experienced 
as a dark night of the soul or as transforming illumination of the spirit” (2008, p. 120) it is 
rooted in human development and not to be dismissed with the “spiritual skepticism” 
shaped by “predominantly Freudian views based on instinctual biology” (ibid., p. 119).389  
In other words, practitioners need to take spiritual issues seriously – not least because, 
logically, negative conditions of the spirit, such as hatred, should be considered and 
evaluated through the same lenses as more positive spiritual directions.  If the way to 
develop spiritual health is through practices such as prayer and meditation, then it may be 
argued that part of the answer to religious hatred as a spiritual condition may be through 
processes or practices designed to address it and to develop spirituality as a form of 
intelligence (Emmons 2000).   
 
The work of Victor Schermer is also relevant to another aspect of religious hatred.  
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation the addictive quality of hatred was mentioned, and this 
deserves further discussion.  To provide some context, consider a group of people who 
have been brought together to discuss some issue of mutual concern that is obviously so 
deeply felt by some members of the group that they find it difficult to have any 
constructive dialogue with those with whom they disagree.  The reluctance to enter such a 
process, even if it is to discuss something relatively trivial, is usually born of fear, 
disrespect and disdain, and these are gateways to hatred.  If this group does meet it is likely 
that these embers could easily be fanned into personal hatreds with all their possible 
 
389 King (2008) argues that this is reflected in three areas of research on human development: infant 
development occurring within a living-systems, relational perspective; research on higher states of 
consciousness including dreaming states, the brainwaves of meditators and left/right brain functions; and on 




consequences.  This embryonic, latent hatred can be regarded as similar to a form of 
addiction - not unlike addiction to alcohol or drugs in that exposed to certain temptations, 
inducements or circumstances, it is easily kindled into stronger life.  As every practitioner 
will attest, in most communities there are individuals, sometimes coalesced into groups, 
who seem particularly sensitive to imagined slights and prone to inflating molehills into 
mountains, who are generally inclined to become disproportionately involved in conflict, 
and who on occasions even seem to relish the toxicity which follows in such situations.  
While it is difficult to know whether it is the conflict that attracts them, the opportunity to 
express certain aspects of their personality or the chance to attack others, the element of 
repetition in their involvement suggests something akin to a form of addiction.  
 
This raises the question of what can replace such addiction. The first answer is 
derived in part from Victor Schermer’s observations in the 30th S.H. Foulkes Annual 
Lecture, published in the Journal of Group Analysis in 2006.390  Schermer, trained in the 
psychoanalytic traditions of object relations theory, became interested in what he was to 
call the ‘psychospiritual’ paradigm when he took up an appointment as a clinician in a 
substance abuse rehabilitation unit.  Schermer’s interest in the application of spirituality to 
psychotherapy was stimulated by his surprise at the improvements and self-transformations 
he witnessed, which his patients “attributed to spiritual awareness and awakening” 
(Schermer 2006, pp. 446-7).  The interest that this aroused lead Schermer to realise that 
earlier clinicians, among them William James and Carl Jung, had made similar 
observations, and that Alcoholics Anonymous, with its quasi-religious approach to 
addiction, had its origins in the Oxford Movement.  Schermer also discovered that 
 
390 S.H. Foulkes was the originator of group psychotherapy in the 1940s. Foulkes reasoned that since human 
beings are fundamentally social beings and most of our difficulties arise in our relationships with each other, 
it makes sense to explore, understand and try to change our behaviour in a group context.  
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mainstream psychoanalysts such as Bion (1970), Rizzuto (1998), Eigen (1998) and 
Grotstein (2000) had discussed psychospiritual approaches to therapeutic intervention and 
the achievement of the “transcendant position” (Grotstein 2000, pp. 300-302, quoted in 
Schermer 2006) that “allows the person to live with a higher degree of resilience, creativity 
and integration”.  This approach, coupled with the experience of AA, suggests that 
addiction can be transcended. 
 
The second answer lies in the work of the Canadian scholar-practitioner Michelle 
LeBaron who has written and practised extensively using relational, symbolic and creative 
means of addressing deep-rooted and intractable differences of worldview and relationship 
among diverse peoples (LeBaron 2002, 2003, 2004, 2013, 2016).  LeBaron brings a 
particular awareness that conflict work that does not aim to transform its subjects as well 
as resolve their problems is doing no more than suppress symptoms rather than address 
causes.  It seems possible that some combination of psychodynamic and psychospiritual 
approaches, coupled with relational and creative approaches to religious conflict, including 
for example use of the performing arts such as music, dance and storytelling, integrated 
into forms of dialogue and diapraxis could enable both substantive issues and an addiction 
to hatred to be addressed.391 
 
Implications for dialogue and diapraxis identified in Chapters 1-5 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation established its purposes and reviewed the 
literature of conflict resolution, the psychology of religion and psychodynamic psychology.  
 
391 The recent proliferation of conferences, events and scholarly publications linking the arts and conflict is 
evidence that this thinking is beginning to spread; for an overview see Bang, A 2016, ‘The Restorative and 
Transformative Power of the Arts in Conflict Resolution, Journal of Transformative Education, vol. 14, no. 
4, pp. 355-376. 
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The role of the practitioner, and whether he or she should have a personal religious faith or 
practice, was one of the first issues raised.  From the sections above the conclusion is that 
whether or not practitioners have a faith of their own, they should be knowledgeable about 
the faith of others and not just about the facts of faith but have an inside knowledge and 
understanding of what it means to be a believer.   The question of whether they should 
have a personal faith remains open: in some situations it will be an advantage; in others 
having no faith may be worse than having the ‘wrong’ faith. 
 
A similar dilemma attends the question of whether practitioners should have some 
familiarity with psychodynamic literature and be able to act, to some extent, as 
psychotherapists.  This is a question that is regularly discussed by conflict resolution 
practitioners who work in marital mediation, and whose clients are often as much in need 
of therapy as they are of resolution of their specific problems.  While it is an idea that 
makes practitioners uneasy (Roberts 2007, pp. 85-6; Bush and Folger 1994, pp. 97-8) 
because of the danger of confusing two very different roles, the fact that religious hatred 
has internal as well as external causes, as this dissertation has demonstrated, means that 
some psychological understanding would seem essential for practitioners.   The literature 
reviewed in Chapter 2 gives some indications of what should be on their reading list, and 
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss some critical concepts in cognitive and psychodynamic 
psychology that should be familiar.  
 
The role of the shadow, for example, is in psychodynamic literature central to an 
understanding of religious hatred, and there is an implication that consideration should be 
given to adapting the processes of identification and integration designed for individuals, 
through dialogue and diapraxis, to work in larger settings.  The analytical psychologist 
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Marie-Louise von Franz, proposes the following (paraphrased) process for identifying and 
integrating the shadow:  
1.  Identify the projection; 
2.  Differentiate between object and projection; 
3.  Evaluate the moral issue which the shadow presents; 
4.  Illuminate the reality beyond the projection; and 
5.  Reflect “on how such an overpowering, extremely real, and awesome experience 
could suddenly become nothing but self-deception”. 
 (Von Franz, 1980, p. 10) 
 
Wolfgang Giegerich proposed helping patients to work through a number of stages in a 
similar process:  
1.  The enemy or crusade stage, characterised by fear, in which the enemy is 
definitely outside and different from us; 
2.  The heretic or witch-hunt stage, associated with condemnation, in which the 
projection has receded to the point that the enemy is among us; 
3.  The turncoat or subversive stage, associated with cynicism, in which the shadow 
is deliberately used to justify social or political ends;  
4.  The mea culpa stage, characterised by guilt, in which we fully acknowledge the 
shadow within our self; and 
5.  The hospitality or the accomplished integration stage which creates identity at a 
higher level.  
(Giegerich 1991, pp. 86-106)   
 
It is not difficult to imagine how a competent process designer could translate processes 
such as these into a form that would work with groups, and it seems reasonable to believe 
that where the interests of groups or even nations are at stake, and conflict is caused or 
augmented in whole or part by shadow projection, either or both of these would be logical 
processes to work through especially in settings, such as conflict with religious identity 
dimensions, where shadow projection is a factor in generating religious hatred (Storr 1972, 
pp. 124-137).392   
 
392 Such a process occurred with a group of Israeli and Palestinian academics and diplomats over the course of 
a week-long conference. The first two stages were accompanied by both fear and condemnation.   The third 
stage was characterised more by weary resignation than cynicism, and in the fourth the guilt was 
acknowledged in admissions that both sides had some responsibility for their situation.  It would have been 
unreasonable in the circumstances to expect a full integration in the final stage, but if ‘hospitality’ includes a 
senior Israeli diplomat dancing with an equally senior Palestinian activist, then that was achieved.  These 
stages did seem to take the participants beyond the usual rituals of mutual denial and projection (personal 




As important as having some insight into the psychology of religion and the religious 
is having an equal insight into the structure of faiths and the risk factors involved should 
they be present in a situation of conflict.  The sociotheological approach, for example, 
takes the logic of theology and the religious reasoning of protagonists and relates it to their 
social setting, thus providing a way into the epistemic worldviews of others that counters 
simplistic images and stereotypes (Juergensmeyer and Sheikh 2012).  Mark Owen and 
Anna King’s identification of eight prominent risk factors in religion and peacebuilding 
also provides a theoretical framework enabling a systematic approach to the 
conceptualisation and design stages of peacebuilding projects (Owen and King 2019).  
Straightforward frameworks such as these need to be extracted from the pages of specialist 
journals and transported to the desks of politicians and diplomats as well as conflict 
resolution practitioners.393  
 
Dialogue and diapraxis have been discussed at some length above.  The conclusion 
here is that diapraxis is more likely than dialogue alone to enable the strength of epiphany 
that can overcome some of the causes of religious hatred, but it is not always possible for 
protagonists to live and work alongside each other for the sort of periods necessary for 
Rasmussen’s vision of transformative change to take root.  There is some evidence, 
however, that dialogue processes in combination with LeBaron’s relational and creative 
approaches to conflict can have transformative effects.  For example the chapters by Toni 
Shapiro-Phim, John Burt and Carrie Herbert in The Choreography of Resolution: Conflict, 
Movement and Neuroscience (2013), the results of a LeBaron-inspired project to look at 
 
393 During ten years as political negotiation trainer for the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office the author of this dissertation never met any diplomat who had ever been exposed to the most basic 
conflict or negotiation literature.  
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the role of the performing arts in conflict resolution, describe projects in Cambodia and 
Liberia where non-verbal diapraxis has crossed boundaries where dialogue alone would 
have stalled. 
 
Implications for dialogue and diapraxis in Chapters 6-11 
 
 
The identity dimension - restoring the Other 
 
 
These following sections reflect on the six chapters considering the six dimensions of 
religion identified in Chapter 5, looking particularly for implications that can contribute to 
theory-building for praxis, beginning with identity.  The first point to note is that while 
identity is crucial, it is rarely as straightforward as it appears.  It usually has a number of 
layers to it, each of which has a different meaning for both its holders and beholders.  
Directly challenging a proclaimed identity is never wise, but accepting it without further 
exploration can be misleading for all.  In addition identity is fluid in that different 
manifestations of identity may appear, or be proclaimed, at different times and in different 
circumstances.  Religious identity seems to be particularly prone to adaptation, not least 
because religion itself is multidimensional.  When it comes to the relationship between 
religion, identity and religious hatred, and particularly the problems posed by religiously-
based hate groups, there are no simple answers beyond the need for leaders of the religious 
mainstreams to promote tolerance and understanding at every opportunity.  This nebulous 
note can, however, be supplemented by something more specific: positive efforts to meet 
the needs that such groups provide to their adherents and particularly to the younger people 
they recruit.  Religious hatred does not take root in a vacuum: if people are seeking and 
finding a sense of identity through such groups then dialogue and diapraxis need to help 





Much of the emphasis in the literature of religious hatred is on the significance of 
‘the Other’, the process of ‘Othering’, the dangers of stereotyping and scapegoating, the 
ease with which human beings project their own internal fears and grievances onto Others 
and in the process demonise and dehumanize them, paving the way to the ghetto and the 
concentration camp.  There is nothing new in this: as Ursula King says, “At all times and 
in all places people have dealt with Others; they have accepted or rebuked, loved or hated, 
oppressed or liberated Others” (King 2008, p. 53).  As she goes on to point out, though, an 
encounter with ‘the Other’ can also be a source of “surprise, enrichment and joy” (ibid.) 
and it seems likely that the experience and views and perceptions of many Others will be 
required if humankind is to surmount the local and global challenges to be faced in the 
future.  She does not, however, suggest how we deal with the inevitable differences that 
arise when Others come together.  This first focus area for any group process is therefore 
in some ways fundamental to all the others: if it proves impossible to go beyond ‘Othering’ 
then it is doubtful whether addressing any of the other dimensions can succeed.   
 
Psychological processes such as stereotyping and projection are familiar to all 
practitioners in the conflict field: they are two of the ways in which human beings deal 
with the uncomfortable reality that finding ways to blame others for our predicaments is 
the easiest way to evade the responsibility for managing differences more constructively.  
Both stereotyping and projection rely on the tendency for people to generalise, particularly 
when they feel angry, and part of the process of withdrawal from projection and 
stereotyping is to facilitate a shift from the general to the specific.  With such a shift the 
Muslim person is no longer a representative of a group of Others but a specific individual 
with whom it is possible to discover things in common, to have a relationship, to discover 
the ways in which this individual is different from the generalised image of what it 
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previously meant to be Muslim.  Projection is more complicated because it involves first 
acknowledging that what is being projected has its origins within oneself, and that the 
process of seeing Otherness in Others in part springs from the reluctance to own everything 
in oneself.  Projection begins with fear of ourselves, not fear of the Other, and this can be 
the hardest for people to accept.394   
 
One of the usual recommendations for reducing hatred of others who are different is 
to cultivate the gift of empathy: the ability and willingness to stand in the shoes of the 
Other, to experience what they experience and to understand it in the way that they do, and 
by so doing to become part of a new collective.  The problem with empathy is enshrined in 
the French proverb “tout comprendre, c 'est tout pardonner” – the danger is that a request 
for empathy for others can be perceived as the first step in being asked to abandon one’s 
own values and standards.  So asking people to invest time and effort in understanding 
other cultural traditions, for example, has to be crafted in a way that leads to them being 
able to stand back from all such traditions in order to trace their history and origins and 
how they have developed over time: the process of opening a dialogue rather than driving 
people to shelter in their familiar trenches.  Identity-level conflicts are recognised in the 
conflict resolution field as being notoriously difficult to resolve, to the point of 
intractability (LeBaron and Carstarphen 1997; Rothman and Olson 2011).395  It should not 
be assumed, however, that religious conflicts where identity is a significant contributor to 
conflict arise because of religious dissimilarity. The empirical evidence, based on data 
from intra-state armed conflicts between 1989 and 2003 using the Uppsala Conflict Data 
 
394 As a simple illustration, working with Christians opposed to homosexual behaviour it is sometimes 
apparent that those who are most fervently homophobic have homosexual tendencies: it is easier to keep 
denying aspects of oneself that feel shameful and be over-alert to them in others.   
395 In May 2001 the Journal of Peace Research produced a Special Issue on Conflict Resolution in Identity-
Based Disputes.  
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Programme is that conflicts where protagonists belong to different religious traditions are 
no harder to resolve than those where they belong to the same religious tradition (Svensson 
2007).396  One of the conclusions of research on resolving religious conflict is that efforts 
should be made to prevent conflicting parties from developing their demands in religious 
terms, given that negotiated settlements are more likely if religious claims are not involved 
(Mayal & Silvestri 2015).  But this ignores the point that conflict around identities is not 
about claims: it is more existential in that identities exist, even if only marginally different, 
and if identity is the dimension of religion aiding or abetting the expression of religious 
hatred or the causes of conflict, then it has to be addressed. 
 
One approach advocated by the scholar-practitioner Jay Rothman is the ARIA 
approach, ARIA being the acronym for four categories of conflict intervention that align 
with different conflict types: Antagonism, Resonance, Invention and Action (Rothman 
1997).  It is the first category of intervention, Antagonism, that Rothman advocates as the 
approach to conflicts rooted either in the past or in identity-based conflict because it is the 
“hurts and indignities of the past” (ibid.) which contribute to antagonisms and hatreds.  He 
sees the gradual surfacing of these antagonisms through designed processes of dialogue 
and mediated empowerment and confrontation as the way forward in such situations.  
While respecting Rothman’s scholarship, expertise and ongoing engagement with conflict 
in many parts of the world, it can be argued that his approach is not sufficiently reflective 
of the particular demands of intervention in conflict where religion is an active ingredient 
and is at odds with that of Marc Gopin, equally prominent and active as a scholar-
 
396 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at Uppsala University in Sweden is the world’s main 
provider of data on organized violence and the oldest ongoing data collection project for civil war, with a 
history of almost 40 years. Its definition of armed conflict has become the global standard of how conflicts 




practitioner.  Gopin starts from the contention that any form of preset or formulaic method 
of intervention is unlikely to be effective in identity-based conflict because “the tight 
relationship between identity, personal legitimacy, and the drive to create religiously 
unique cultural expression is high” (Gopin 2000, p. 63), especially when religious identity 
is being used to mark one identity in opposition to another, which Gopin calls “negative 
identity” (ibid.).  He calls instead for intervention that takes the form of “a hermeneutically 
reworked sense of religious identity” using indigenous approaches to change that result in 
the protagonists undergoing a shift in mentality that results also in changes in behaviour 
based on the appeal to a new hermeneutic.397  Gopin contends that his experience suggests 
that “a slow and steady process of exposing [religious advocates] to the humanity of their 
enemies combined carefully with exploring alternative hermeneutic religious paths often 
creates a quiet revolution in religious thinking” (ibid.)398 He adds that with more moderate 
sections of the religious community it might be possible to raise universal human 
commitments, such as human rights, as the basis for a multi-cultural and multi-religious 
society, but for many of the most extreme religious people such human commitments can 
only come about when deeply perceived threats to identity and existence have abated.399  
Gopin’s approach draws heavily on the work of John-Paul Lederach, a Mennonite scholar-
 
397 The ‘shift in mentality’ may be more significant than the ‘new hermeneutic’. This may be achieved, 
according to Beck, through “the clarification and modification of the belief system that predisposes the  
individual to overreact to supposed threats, the development of strategies to catch the hostile sequence in its 
earliest stage, and the abandonment of violence as an acceptable weapon” (Beck 1999, pp.17-8).  This is also 
the process advocated by Genocide Watch for preventing genocide.  For example, Stanton advocates: 
“Vigorously protest use of dehumanizing words that refer to people as “filth,” “vermin,” animals or diseases; 
deny people using such words visas and freeze their foreign assets and contributions; prosecute hate crimes 
and incitements to commit genocide; jam or shut down hate radio and television stations where there is 
danger of genocide; provide programs for tolerance to radio, TV, and newspapers; enlist religious and 
political leaders to speak out and educate for tolerance; organize inter-ethnic, inter-faith and inter-racial 
groups to work against hate and genocide” (Stanton 1996). 
398 It is interesting that a similar process is used in the opposite direction. “.....radicalisation develops when 
people are, first, confused about their identities and, second, search for a meaning for their role within society 
or in a community” (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). “Isis are able to use a powerful marketing brand that 
transcends all boundaries and has created a central identity with which many.... young people have 
identified” (Awan, Imran 2017, ‘Religion, Identity and Radicalisation’ in Journal of Muslims in Europe, 6, 1-
21.) 
399 There is an urgent need for more research into the circumstances in which such hermeneutic re-working 
can or cannot work.  
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practitioner who has always emphasised the importance of exploring indigenous methods 
of conflict resolution rather than calling on outside models of intervention (Lederach 
1994).  The Gopin-Lederach method of using and building on existing thinking to create 
new attitudes to Others, coupled with Baumann and Gingrich’s concept of grammars 
(2004), seems to constitute a logical approach to the reducing the problem of the Other as a 
source of religious hatred.   
 
 
The doctrine and practice dimension - cultural complexes and the Golem Effect 
 
  
This section looks at three aspects of doctrine and practice.  The first, following on 
from the section above on identity, considers the implications of shared and different 
doctrines and practices for group identity.  In the wake of this the significance of cultural 
complexes is considered and also the Golem Effect and the implications of this for those 
who lead religious organisations. 
 
Hate groups value signs, symbols and the rituals of show and parade because they 
embody meaning and identity in the same way as religions use the same means to create in 
tangible form the ideas they embrace.  As much or more than this, symbols and rituals 
provide vehicles to express the power and solidarity of group activity, which in turn brings 
peer group validation, a feeling of the power of being part of a larger whole and having a 
unified purpose.  Equally, those whose ideas or practices are different may not only 
threaten this sense of unity but introduce the possibility of the cause becoming in some 
way contaminated and this contagion undermining not only the individuals pursuing the 
common cause, but the very cause itself.  The more extreme the cause and the more 
committed its supporters, as with many forms of fundamentalism, the more vulnerable they 
may feel to such sources of contamination.  It is worth noting that the proponents of more 
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extreme doctrines often seem to feel more vulnerable than those whose beliefs are more 
mainstream, hence the fissiparous nature of minority sects, whether religious or political.400   
 
If divergences among believers in the same creed can be dogmatic and even provoke 
violence, as is the case between Sunni and Shia in Islam, for example, then the divergences 
between religions themselves are even greater despite the wishful thinking of religious 
pluralists and perennialists:   
On matters of cosmology (the order and meaning of the universe), theodicy (divine 
governance), soteriology (theory of human redemption), and theological 
anthropology (the status of human nature and freedom in relation to the sacred), to 
mention only a few basic doctrines, religions display profound and abiding 
differences that no amount of translation and clarification will fully resolve.  
(Appleby 2000, p. 151) 
 
Even broad ideas and concepts that might be expected to have some resonance across 
cultures, adds Appleby, carry different nuances of meaning that have to be acknowledged 
and negotiated, so any attempt at cross-cultural dialogue in pursuit of interreligious 
cooperation needs to find or work out a “second order religious language” (ibid.) that 
provides a common vocabulary while remaining true to the theological claims of each 
religious community involved.   This is a crucial point for those mediating interreligious 
dialogue to appreciate: the desire and willingness of those involved to avoid confrontation 
by agreeing to common propositions which, when put to the test, may prove to be so 
generalised as to be worthless in terms of real progress towards reconciliation.401 
 
 
400 It is hardly scholarly but one of the most eloquent expressions of this characteristic is often held to be the 
scene in Monty Python’s Life of Brian which displays rival factions in opposition to the Roman occupation of 
Judaea (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iS-0Az7dgRY [viewed 26.4.19]. 
401 Following in detail the progress of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC), 
established in 1969 to advance ecumenical progress in relations between the two churches, reveals the extent 
to which mutual professions of goodwill and serious intent based on many areas of common belief can be 
insufficient to overcome issues of real difference such as the ordination of women or attitudes towards 
homosexuality and same-sex relations.  
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Another danger of syncretism is that it can mask real differences that, like all 
suppressed conflict, eventually return to haunt even those with the best intentions.  It is 
always possible to find overlaps in doctrine, such as regarding concepts of mercy, 
reconciliation or love, but such overlaps can achieve little unless they are matched by 
material actions on the ground.  A shared belief in the importance of human loving, for 
example, may not extend to a shared endorsement of same-sex marriage.  Similarly, shared 
principles, particularly ones expressed in general language, are easy to agree: the oil 
executive and the environmental campaigner have no difficulty in affirming the importance 
of the natural world and the dangers of climate change, but they still find it hard to agree 
on whether fossil fuels should be left in the ground.402  This desire to agree, even at the 
price of platitudes, may form part of a religious cultural complex that can include, for the 
Church of England for example, the vague liberal niceness that so infuriates those who 
favour stronger religion (Brown and Woodhead 2016, p. 19).  Teasing out the nature of 
cultural complexes through the process of dialogue would in some situations form a useful 
precursor to more substantive discussions because it would enable protagonists to 
understand better the significance of the substance. 
 
  
Practitioners do well to remember that those whose faiths are very different may 
regard each other more sympathetically than those whose beliefs are more closely aligned.  
In the conflict resolution world this is sometimes characterised as the phenomenon of the 
 
402 This is not to decry to the process of agreeing the language of shared principles, however, because these 
may bring other benefits.  A private meeting among Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) and Anglican leaders in 
South Africa in 1986, for example, to explore areas of common ground and shared principles made limited 
progress during the meeting but lead indirectly some months later to the DRC renouncing the doctrine of 
apartheid – a move which helped to undermine the legitimacy of the apartheid government.  It is possible that 
it was the recognition of a common humanity, rather than the shared principles, that made the difference. 
(Private correspondence with participant, December 2018). 
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‘loyal enemy’ and the ‘disloyal enemy’.403  The former are those with whom one’s 
differences are obvious; the latter, being putative allies, are far more dangerous: in 
common parlance they deliver the knife in the back rather than the chest.  The importance 
for practitioners lies in identifying where real enmity and hatred may lie: the likelihood is 
that it will be among those whose differences are less pronounced.  Such hatred, stimulated 
by Freud’s “narcissism of small differences” (Freud 1929, p. 305), leads to hypersensitivity 
about differences, a proneness to aggression in pursuit of their maintenance and the need to 
identify and even exaggerate differences to preserve and inculcate feelings of separateness 
and selfhood (Gabbard 1993).  Faced with this situation practitioners are well advised to 
invest time and effort in establishing their recognition of differences, and of those rival 
selfhoods, in order to build relationships with protagonists through their confidence of 
those recognitions.  This runs against the natural inclinations of practitioners to emphasise 
what is common among protagonists as a prelude to building upon it.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 raises the question of the Golem Effect, questioning the 
psychological effect of doctrines such as original sin, reincarnation and eternal life.  There 
is an abundance of research on the relationship between religion and physical and mental 
health which tends to contradict the generally negative assumptions of earlier 
psychodynamic literature though there seems to be little agreement about the specific 
mechanisms involved.  The Golem Effect of religious doctrine has not, so far as it has been 
possible to discover, been researched to date.  If it could be demonstrated that doctrines 
such as Original Sin can contribute, albeit unconsciously, to religious hatred by 
encouraging believers to think of themselves as sinners and behave as such, then religious 
 
403 While it has proved impossible to discover the origin of these terms, there is a hint of Victorian 
colonialism about them.  One might speculate that they originated with the Indian rebellion of 1857 as a way 
to differentiate between Indian troops who remained loyal to the British Raj and those who did not.  
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leaders whose organisations propagate such doctrines would be faced with those 
implications.  Whether or not such research is conducted, and regardless of the results, it 
makes sense for adherents to any doctrine to explain how it contributes to their thought and 
action to ensure that others appreciate what matters to them and, pace Appleby above, 
where there may be common ground and difference. 
 
The emotional and experiential dimension – re-directing “energy flows”  
 
 
The emotional and experiential dimensions of religion are perhaps the most difficult 
for those who cannot share the feelings associated with sincere belief in part because it is 
those feelings that bring the psychic energy to a room.404  Practitioners often refer to 
working with “the energy in the room” but experience suggests that this tends to be based 
on intuition rather than on any concept of the nature and flow of psychic energy.  Jung’s 
concept of psychic energy stems from his contention that everything in the psyche has an 
opposite, that the flow of libido between these opposites shapes human behaviour, and that 
the greater the difference between the opposites, the greater the libido - the psychic energy 
- involved.  Praxis involves intervening in this perception of opposites and consequent 
tensions among people: the more profound the differences between them, the greater the 
energy generated by the resultant conflict and the more strenuous the practitioner has to be 
to contain and channel it in constructive directions.  Just as with the psychic life of an 
individual, if the flow of energy is too much in one direction, or if it is blocked, then the 
tendency will be for protagonists to feel their interests or ambitions are being neglected and 
to develop, as a consequence, feelings of frustration and impotence.   
 
404 Although both Freud and Jung recognised the idea of ‘psychic energy’ the term has suffered in recent 
years from its association with vague New Age theories and needs rehabilitation through the work of, for 




The challenge to practitioners is to maintain a balance of communication and 
commitment, of homeostasis, among the participants in processes of dialogue and 
diapraxis.  The answer lies in part in Jung’s concept of compensation: that a weakness or a 
failing or too great a strength in one area needs to be compensated for by an adjustment in 
another.  If a participant’s energetic direction is thwarted in some way, for example when it 
becomes apparent that he or she cannot achieve what was originally desired or expected, 
the progression of libido may stop and energy regress into the unconscious where it 
activates complexes and causes a divide between ego-consciousness and the unconscious, 
resulting in internal conflict and either the lack of motivation or the inability to move 
forward.  Until the participant can deal with this new internal situation progress becomes 
difficult, but in time the libido stimulates neglected functions, the ego is challenged to use 
new thoughts and emotions that come into consciousness, and the person matures to the 
point that they can deal anew both with conscious and unconscious needs (Stein 1998, pp. 
79-80).  If progress appears to be thwarted by the reluctance of participants to accept a 
blockage to the direction of their energies, time needs to be invested in a way that 
stimulates unconscious activity; in many contexts providing the time and space for people 
to tell their stories, exploring the emotional and experiential dimensions of their beliefs, for 
example, will answer this need.  In this context religious hatred needs to be seen as a 
source of psychic energy that can be re-directed in more positive directions.  
 
The importance of story-telling as a vehicle for such energies should never be under-
estimated (Abu-Nimer 2001).  Conflict is one of the contexts in which people test out who 
they are and discover who they can be, and the telling of their stories is one of the ways 
they construct coherent emotional identities to cope with the pressures of conflict and to 
heal what may have become divided within them.  In this situation the role of the 
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practitioner can be seen as being an exemplar of this process, inclining individuals towards 
greater knowledge of themselves so that the result of conflict and of emotions such as 
religious hatred is not denial and projection but growth and integration through the 
emergence of what Jung calls the ‘transcendent function’ (Jung 1957).405  Its significance 
in relation to the emotional and experiential dimension is that it assists individuals, as the 
term suggests, to transcend the thinking and feeling that has brought them to their 
predicament and replace it with a fuller awareness of their choices by bringing together the 
conscious and unconscious elements within them. It is perhaps useful for practitioners, 
working as facilitators or mediators, to think of themselves as living embodiments of the 
transcendent function especially when it comes to managing the emotional and experiential 
expressions of their clientele, and it is for this reason that it is helpful if practitioners can 
empathise with the issues that arouse strong emotion.  
 
The mythological dimension - the re-framing of myth 
 
 
The psychotherapist James Hillman confesses in A Terrible Love of War (2004) that 
he was unable to explain his own behaviour, let alone his patients’ (p. 7), until he 
discovered the work of the Neapolitan Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), whose Scienza 
Nuova (1725) set out to explain the historical cycles that underlie the rise and fall of all 
societies.  Causal reasoning is a latecomer, says Vico according to Hillman, the basic layer 
of the mind being poetic and mythic, providing the recurring themes and ubiquitous 
patterns and forces that play through human lives and societies and which Hillman 
interprets as archetypal (Hillman 2004, p. 7-8).  These archetypal patterns embrace both 
rational and irrational events, including religion, sexual love, violence and war – all 
“timeless themes of human existence given meaning by myths.  Or, to put it otherwise: 
 




myths are the norms of the unreasonable” (ibid., p. 9).  Hillman goes on to explore the 
extent to which the unreasonable and the imaginal are responsible for so much of the 
human inclination to conflict: “imagination is the driving force, especially when 
imagination has been preconditioned by the media, education, and religion, and fed with 
aggressive boosterism and pathetic pieties by the state’s need for enemies” (ibid., p. 25). 
 
While Hillman provides a polemic rich in insights into the nature and experience of 
war and how the mythologies of different ages have encouraged and sustained it, he also 
teases out a response to it using those same mythological processes underpinned by 
psychological reasoning.  He provides as an example a sequence of responses to the 
Homeric Hymn to Ares, the god of war, building on the method of classical therapy that 
sees the cure for a problem in the problem itself: similis similibus curantur: cure by means 
of similars (ibid., p. 202).406  So, the principle goes, if Ares (Mars) gives us war, then Ares 
should be asked for help to respond to it.  His responses include appreciating the virtues of 
the martial spirit, being robust and honest in understanding the frailties of civilization, 
uncovering the deceptions and delusions that support the rush to war, and having the 
courage to be restrained in the face of provocation.  It is only a small move to imagine how 
similar steps could be taken in response to the mythological dimensions of religious hatred.  
A dialogic process could appreciate the strengths of feeling that lie behind religious hatred; 
acknowledge how it falls short of the beliefs and norms of whatever religion is professed; 
explore how it has arisen and what factors support it; examine how these might be tamed 
and constrained; search for alternatives that will respect the original feelings but channel 
them into new hopes and opportunities.  This is known as re-framing in dialogue parlance: 
framing religious hatred in terms that respect its mythological dynamics could add new 
 
406 The principle behind medical vaccinations and homeopathy. 
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impetus to proven method.  
 
This approach, however, only addresses the mythological dimension of religion at an 
objective level: it is limited in its ability to reach the archetypal level, where for example 
the myths of Armageddon and Rapture dwell, that Hillman regards as the essence of the 
mythological.  To reach this level the mythological and the personal need to be brought 
together through symbols and metaphors to enable a more profound appreciation of how 
images and their associated emotions are formed. LeBaron (2003) balances the need to 
work at this level with a practitioner’s concern for introducing structure and process in a 
way that brings together the immediate and the mythic.  She sees three levels at which 
exploring myths is useful when cultural stories have evolved around long-unquestioned 
assumptions: at the personal level where family myths have helped to create identity; at the 
interpersonal level where myths about relationships and roles, reflecting cultural 
understandings, can be uncovered; and at the intergroup level where myths about cultural 
groups can be examined for what they reveal and also what they hide (LeBaron 2003, p. 
281).  Translating these three levels into praxis could mean inviting protagonists to begin 
by identifying myths that have shaped their own stories: thinking, for example, about the 
influence of elders on their own lives, remembering physical objects from their childhood 
which symbolised, for better or worse, the values they imbibed when the foundations of 
their current personalities were being laid, or exploring how myths of the end times have 
shaped their present experience.   When this way of reflection has been established 
protagonists can begin to reflect similarly on personal relationships with peers, colleagues 
and others, and perhaps parallels found in religious history or mythology to illustrate the 
nature of these relationships together with, again, ideas or artefacts that may symbolise 
them.  Finally larger relationships and parallels can be explored and more probing 
questions asked about how different groups are imagined and symbolised, drawing on 
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image and metaphor where words are insufficient to realise the depths of identity.  Such a 
process can create habits of thought that replace old assumptions with new understandings 
and shared cultural meaning (Clark 2002, p. 5). 
 
 
The sacred values dimension - exploring constellations of value and uncertainty 
 
 
Practitioners are tempted to place emphasis on sacred values that are shared in the 
belief that these can provide firm foundations for moving forward to material and 
operational issues.  This, again, is something that is not as straightforward as it appears 
because in the context of all conflict, and perhaps religious conflict in particular, the 
relationships between values and emotions is usually complex. While values may carry 
emotional as well as moral meaning, emotions may reflect much more than abstract 
articulations of a religion’s norms or mores: religious hatred, for example, may be 
generated either by what is or is not of value (Dozier 2002, p. 284).  The significance of 
emotional meaning is that it can carry more weight than cognitive meaning, and it may 
explain the willingness to go to war in the name of a religion which values peace: the 
emotional value of defending the homeland taking precedent over the cognitive concept of 
peace as an abstract value.  It may also explain the willingness of suicide bombers, for 
example, to carry out acts in the name of religion which appear to contradict the sacred 
values of the cause they profess to support.  
 
This issue is complicated by the tendency of those who preach religious extremism to 
be ambiguous about their support for violence in its name. As Appleby notes (2000, p. 94), 
“the constant use of metaphor and veiled allusion, apocalyptic imagery and heated 
rhetoric” are not always intended to be taken literally: while they are useful to fan the 
flames, they can also be disavowed as a set of instructions to be followed.  Appleby gives 
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the example of Sayyid Qutb, the leading member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
whose inflammatory language in Ma’alim fi-I-Tariq (Milestones) appeared to legitimise 
the use of violence against Islam’s enemies and was used by his disciples to justify the 
assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.  Qutb himself, however, denied that he 
intended Islamists to attack individuals, only institutions (ibid.).  It is useful for 
practitioners, therefore, to ensure that the expression of sacred values is heard 
metaphorically and understood eschatologically as well as literally.  In fact, sacred values 
should never be taken in isolation but appreciated as part of a pattern and hierarchy of 
values that govern both an individual’s or a community’s everyday life and the meanings 
which either or both give to the wider sweeps of historical movement.  So, for example, 
being pro-abortion means upholding both an individual woman’s right to determine her 
own destiny and at the same time upholding women’s right to choose as part of the larger 
issue of women’s rights as they have evolved over the past half century or so; equally, 
being anti-abortion is targeted not only at an individual woman making that choice but at 
the idea that a woman’s right to choose is less sacred than the life of the child she carries.  
It is equally true, however, that in some circumstances, such as pregnancy caused by 
sexual assault, some anti-abortionists put the rights of a woman above those of her unborn 
child (Manninen 2014, p. 174).  While it is unpopular in some absolutist circles to say it, 
values are rarely so sacred that in no circumstances are they ever relative to other 
competing values.  Having said this, when faced with someone expressing absolute values, 
the wise practitioner listens very carefully before asking, rather gently, the sort of 
questions that encourage people to examine the sense in which a value is so sacred that it is 
never open to interpretation, comparison or qualification. 
 
The challenge for praxis is how to turn values from the abstract to the more concrete 
so that their emotional force, and their relationships with each other, can be felt as well as 
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thought; at the same time the hierarchies, ambiguities and uncertainties of values need to 
be acknowledged.  One way to do this is perhaps to adapt the process of ‘constellations’ 
which has in recent years become a method used by practitioners in the conflict field.  
Originating in the field of family therapy, constellations is a diapractic way to model the 
past and present relationships of people living within a dysfunctional family system.  It 
involves placing non-speaking individuals, representing key figures, into spatial 
relationship with each other and with the problem-holder with the help of the problem-
holder and a family therapist/facilitator (Cohen 2006).407  The method is now used beyond 
the field of family therapy to help people involved in, or studying, situations of conflict to 
understand the perspectives of all involved so that the systemic relationships among them 
become clearer.  Although there is no scholarly record of such a method being used in 
situations where different value systems are operating, experience in several political 
contexts suggests that it would be effective in helping protagonists to understand respective 
values, how they inter-relate, and areas of convergence and divergence.  It could also elicit 
the uncertainties associated with each value: their relative significance, how they might be 
reduced or managed, contingency plans if neither is possible, and the consequences of each 
value applied to its full extent. 
 
The power and control dimension – heresies of the heart  
 
This final section looking at the implications for dialogue and diapraxis of religions’ 
propensities for seeking power and control over their adherents and in the wider world 
 
407 Family constellations work was pioneered by the German psychoanalyst Bert Hellinger who observed 
during sixteen years as a missionary in Zululand the importance of Zulu reverence for past generations of 
ancestors and their continuing influence: “Family Constellations are grounded in the epistemology of 
existential-phenomenology and the Zulu-influenced ontology of trans-generational connectedness. The clinical 
methodology originated with the family systems therapy of Virginia Satir and Ivan Boszormenyi-Nagy” 
(Cohen 2006).  See for example Boszormenyi-Nagy & Spark (1973);  Satir (1987); Hellinger (2002a); Franke 
(2003).  For a non-academic description of constellations use outside family therapy see Whittington, J 2020, 
Systemic Coaching and Constellations: The Principles, Practices and application for individuals, teams and 
groups, Kogan Page, London.  
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focuses on what Ryan LaMothe calls “heresies of the heart” (LaMothe 2010).  By heresies 
of the heart he means the human proclivity to absolutize the relative and contingent and by 
so doing to embrace the totalitarian tendency to believe in the superiority of one’s own 
beliefs and the inferiority of the Other and his/her beliefs. This conceiving of the Other as 
inferior results in a narrowing of the capacity for emotional intelligence.  The type of faith 
manifested in heresies of the heart, vis-à-vis the Other, “involves the distortion of the 
theological principle of imago dei and a corresponding distortion of trust, loyalty, and hope 
wherein the Other is either treated as an object-person to be assimilated or excluded”.  In 
his fury at this treatment of the Other, LaMothe seems torn between ascribing it to idolatry, 
the heresy of the heart which tempts human beings to “rely on the idea of Truth to alienate, 
depersonalize, and coerce other human beings” (ibid.) or to “a lack of emotional 
intelligence and an eclipse of the capacity for emotional wisdom” (ibid.).  Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer also identifies human folly as a heresy of the heart in his Letters and papers 
from prison (1953, p. 8) and advises against trying to reason with a fool on the grounds 
that it is both useless and dangerous as it does not take much to make a fool aggressive: 
“Neither protests nor force are of any avail against it, and it is never amenable to reason. If 
facts contradict personal prejudices, there is no need to believe them, and if they are 
undeniable, they can simply be pushed aside as exceptions”.  
 
The power and control dimension of religion, and the implications of compensatory 
control mechanisms, Terror Management Theory and clericalism, are left until last because 
in many ways they provide the apotheosis for this entire dissertation.  It can be argued that 
religious hatred is the ultimate form of control: if hatred is strong enough it shapes identity; 
it defends faith and doctrine; it determines emotion and experience; it asserts certain values 
at the expense of others; it even decides which are the dependable myths around which to 
build in-groups and out-groups.  If faith is such that it enables an act of self-martyrdom as 
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part of it then in effect it provides control even of mortality (Huffman 2016).  In sum, 
putting the need or desire to control at the heart of religious hatred complements the 
argument that religion has always been about maintaining control, of self and others, in the 
face of social or political enemies or of an indifferent universe (Geyer and Baumeister 
2005).  It can also be argued that religious hatred provides a form of control in the fact of 
the uncertainty discussed in Chapter 10.  In relation to this, Diego Gambetta and Steffen 
Hertog’s Engineers of Jihad (Princeton University Press 2016) reveals a number of 
intriguing facts about the composition of jihadist groups, among them the fact that 
engineers are fourteen times more likely to be found among Islamist militants than in the 
general population, and four times more likely to be part of a militant group than graduates 
with other degrees (p. 162).408  Gambetta and Hertog’s  explanation is that engineering is a 
field that attracts individuals with a need for cognitive closure, clear-cut answers, a sense 
of order, hierarchy and a dislike of ambiguity.409  Such characteristics are not limited to 
those who espouse Islamic radicalism: similar traits have been identified among those who 
follow other traditions (Pratt 2010).410   
 
The implications of this need for certainty and control potentially pose a challenge 
for scholar-practitioners interested in designing processes of dialogue and diapraxis that 
have at their heart a willingness to surrender some control and to live with some ambiguity 
in order to develop more finely nuanced understandings of Others and of their different 
 
408 Gambetta and Hertog’s research also reveals that university graduates in general are over-represented, 
proving that “the core of the Islamist movement emerged from would-be elites, not from the poor and 
dispossessed” they argue that graduates and engineers in particular are frustrated by the lack of opportunities 
and social mobility in the Islamic world (Gambetta and Hertog 2016, p. 33). 
409 For a summary of the arguments and evidence marshalled in the book see an earlier article: Gambetta, D 
and Hertog, S 2009, ‘Why are there so many Engineers among Islamic Radicals?’, European Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 201-230.  
410 There is also anecdotal evidence.  For example, after interviewing a young Christian priest who believed 
in the literal truth of the Creation as described in the Book of Genesis this author was surprised to discover he 
was an engineer and had had a modern scientific education. It reinforces the idea that sometimes personal 
needs or character traits are more significant in forming personal beliefs that more objective considerations. 
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needs and beliefs.  For all the talk of careful design and controlling the process of 
communication and exchange, such processes are intrinsically liable to take whatever 
forms their participants determine: mediators and facilitators can shape and channel and 
sometimes divert if they become too difficult, but they need a certain latitude if they are to 
be creative in terms of helping to develop new ideas and attitudes.  To corral them too 
closely would be to fashion new ‘heresies of the heart’.  Nevertheless, this dissertation 
argues that the theoretical starting point for dialogue and diapraxis should be that they are 
intended as, and designed to be, processes of transformation and epiphany, because 
nothing short of these is adequate to counter religious hatred or powerful enough to 
overcome the desire for certainty and control that shapes the mindsets that most need to be 
reworked. For this reason the rest of this chapter goes beyond the reductionism involved in 
looking at the implications of each dimension of religion and focuses on this need for 
building a theory of conflict transformation and epiphany for those consumed with 
religious hatred. 
Conflict transformation and the transcendent function  
 
As the discussion of the literature of conflict resolution and transformation in 
Chapter 2 (p. 33) made clear, the transformative approach is based on the need to address 
the root causes of conflict by eliminating the structural injustices or distorted frames of 
reference that feed it.  Where religious hatred is a cause of conflict, or even a contributory 
factor in sparking or prolonging conflict, then scholar-practitioners need to have a strategy 
for replacing it with at least neutral feelings towards those who are its objects, and 
preferably a more sympathetic understanding of them and their beliefs and values which 
takes into account the possibilities, uncertainties and implications explored in previous 
chapters of this dissertation.  The challenge lies in enabling this within the normal 
constraints of dialogue and diapraxis, such as time, money, the willingness to engage and 
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the need to keep participants safe from others and sometimes themselves.  The final section 
of this dissertation will focus, however, purely on how dialogue and diapraxis might in 
theory bring about the sort of psychological transformation that would nullify or reverse 
among participants any tendencies to religious hatred.  In building this theory attention has 
been paid to the extensive literature on the nature of “epiphanies” among both the 
religiously inclined and the purely secular in the effort to identify the circumstances and 
processes that cause people to undergo sometimes radical changes of heart and mind.  
Research into this has started with William James’s illustrations of these in his Varieties of 
Religious Experience and drawn on more recent literature such as Lofland and Skonovd 
(1981), White (2002), Snook et al (2018) and McDonald (2008).  It has also drawn on 
Jung’s concept of the ‘transcendent function’ mentioned already in Chapters 2 and 8 and 
discussed at further length below.   
 
McDonald provides a starting point in his description of narrative research to identify 
the nature and circumstances of epiphanic experience as it affected the lives of his research 
subjects.  These could be considered factors to be taken into account when determining the 
nature of dialogue and diapraxis processes designed to trigger transformative changes.  He 
summarises these as follows: 
Concept  Description of Concept411 
Antecedent state  Epiphanies are preceded by periods of anxiety, 
depression, and inner turmoil  
Suddenness  Epiphanies are sudden and abrupt  
Personal transformation  Epiphanies are an experience of profound change and 
transformation in self-identity 
Illumination/insight  Epiphanies are an acute awareness of something new, 
something that the individual had previously been blind 
to  
Meaning making  Epiphanies are profound insights because they are 
deemed significant to the individual’s life  
 
411 Each description is fully referenced in McDonald, M 2008, ‘The Nature of Epiphanic Experience’, 




Enduring nature  Although the actual epiphany is a momentary experience, 
the personal transformation that results is permanent and 
lasting  
      (McDonald 2008) 
 
It is likely that many scholar-practitioners have observed such shifts during their work.  It 
is quite normal, for example, for participants in conflict resolution processes to exhibit 
signs of anxiety in advance of such processes; equally, sudden breakthroughs and new 
insights are not unusual, and participants’ relief at such changes can profoundly affect their 
behaviour and sense of self in the long as well as the short term.412  It is important to note, 
though, that negative epiphanies can be as constructive as the positive; mediators are often 
described as agents of reality when they confront those in conflict with the consequences 
of their actions.  Whether it is the possibility of losing a war or an expensive battle in a law 
court, the process of being forced to face up to realities can remove the scales from one’s 
eyes.413  
 
So establishing such epiphanies as the deliberate purpose of dialogue and diapraxis 
processes intended to address religious hatreds is in principle quite encompassable: the 
challenge is to do it effectively and in a way that avoids the resistance that many 
participants might feel if they were to perceive some degree of manipulation in the process.  
This is where an appreciation of the transcendent function, and that fact that the 
transcendent function “mediates between a person and the possibility of change by 
providing, not an answer, but a choice” (Samuels 1985, p. 59, original emphasis), might 
 
412 Sudden breakthroughs of this type are not confined to actual interventions in conflict.  It is likely that most 
conflict resolution teachers and trainers have experienced students, sometimes senior practitioners in other 
disciplines, who have reached new and unexpected realisations about previous or current situations and 
relationships.  This perhaps indicates the extent to which conflict is under-addressed even in professional 
circles. 
413 A phrase that seems to have its origins in the story of St Paul regaining his sight after his epiphany on the 
road to Damascus (Acts 9: 1-22). 
 
 294 
assist in the development of a theory of epiphanic intervention that involves not 
manipulation but opportunity.414  
 
The significance of an enhanced awareness of the transcendent function for dialogue 
and praxis is that it would put a decisive emphasis on the need for transformation, for a 
discernible shift in consciousness responding to Einstein’s famous dictum that “No 
problem can be solved at the same level of consciousness that created it”.415   The role and 
function of the transcendent function can be summarised fairly simply: “The function 
which mediates opposites…... it facilitates a transition from one psychological attitude or 
condition to another” (Samuels et al 2010, p. 150).  In this definition the transcendent 
function also “represents a linkage between real and imaginary, or rational and irrational 
data, thus bridging the gulf between consciousness and the unconscious” (ibid.).  Anthony 
Stevens offers a different insight in Archetype Revisited (2002).  Focusing on 
developments in neurology he suggests that the aim of Jungian psychotherapy is “to reduce 
the left hemisphere’s inhibition of the right hemisphere and to promote increased 
communication in both directions across the corpus callosum” (Stevens 2002, p. 315).  
This would then correspond, he continues, to what Jung called the transcendent function.416  
 
414 As Dehing (1993) points out, Jung used the term transcendent function surprisingly infrequently given its 
significance.  He used it first in 1916 in a paper that was not published for some forty years, ‘The 
transcendent function’ (CW8, 1957), and subsequently in Psychological Types (CW 6, 1921); ‘The relations 
between the ego and the unconscious’ (CW 7, 1928); ‘Psychological commentaries on “The Tibetan Book 
Great Liberation”’ (CW11, 1939); ‘On the psychology of the unconscious’ (CW7, 1943); Symbols of 
Transformation (CW 5, 1952); Mysterium Coniunctionis (CW14, 1955-6) and ‘A psychological view of 
conscience’ (CW10, 1958) as well as in three seminars and four letters.   
415 Research has failed to find a definitive source for this much-quoted remark.  Einstein seems to have said a 
number of things along these lines, referring mainly to the need for new thinking in the nuclear age.  The fact 
that it has become a popular (mis)quotation suggests that it carries some resonance. 
416 Stevens also draws attention to the speculations of Rossi (1977) that religious practices such as prayer, 
ritual, the use of mantras and mandalas have the effect of promoting bilateral hemispheric integration, an idea 
supported by research (Gluck and Stroebel 1975) that EEG records “show greater synchrony between both 
sides of the brain in subjects practising transcendental meditation” (Stevens 2002, p. 315).  This bringing of 
both hemispheres into greater harmony “offers a plausible neurological basis for the ‘higher consciousness’ 
which Jung described as the primary consequences of the transcendent function” (ibid.).  It is as well to note 
that neuroscience has proceeded a long way in the time since Stevens was writing and doubtless has much 
further to go, so conclusions on this point should be appropriately cautious. 
 
 295 
One of the fullest examinations of the concept to date is Jeffrey Miller’s The Transcendent 
Function (2004), sub-titled Jung’s model of psychological growth through dialogue with 
the unconscious which captures its importance for this dissertation: that if there is an 
ultimate answer to the problem of religious hatred then it lies in the ‘haters’, through the 
process of examining in depth the reasons for their hating, learning how to transcend the 
unconscious forces as well as the cognitive reasons that compel it.  But Miller argues that 
this is not just a task for the haters: a willingness to explore such unconscious forces, and 
how to respond to them, is something that needs to be woven into the entire culture.  “We 
[depth psychologists] bemoan the fact that the culture is in denial about its shadow… but 
we do nothing outside the analytic situation to remedy that” (Miller 2004, p. 134).  He calls 
for “philosophers, teachers, clergy people, ethicists and others who focus on values” to 
become more involved in public discourse to ensure “ the cultural application of the 
transcendent function can be profitably used particularly with social issues that manifest 
highly divisive positions since those positions probably evidence affect indicative of a 
deeper, denied field” (ibid., pp. 134-135).  As Miller describes situations that merit the 
application of the transcendent function, such as abortion and tension between the genders 
and generations, and how it operates in everyday life, it becomes apparent that much of 
what happens in dialogue and diapraxis is already, albeit unknowingly, acting to initiate 
the transcendent function.  For example, Miller says that “animating the transcendent 
function is as much a perspective as it is an act” (ibid., p. 137): the perspective that rejects 
the either/or in favour of the both/and approach is something that mediators and facilitators 
constantly encourage to move people away from divisive dichotomies.  Similarly Miller 
sets out the need to look beneath the surface, to discern what is happening not just in the 
observable cognitive field but buried deeper and indicated by the dissonance, for example, 
in relational interactions.  Again, one of the skills emphasised in training third parties is the 
ability to ask questions that promote inward reflection and a wider awareness of others’ 
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needs and values.  In such situations the transcendent function is an enhanced awareness 
that sensitises both third parties and participants to the undercurrents influencing an 
interactive process.417 
 
As regards the activities that “when incorporated into our normal lives, serve to 
increase or spark the transcendent function” (ibid., p. 140), among these Miller identifies 
meditation, artwork, music, yoga, poetry, dance, theatre and creative writing because they 
“allow the mind to quiet down and thereby naturally come into closer contact with hidden, 
unknown, or unconscious material” (ibid., p. 141).  This is the logic that has stimulated 
interest in the use of the creative arts to add new dimensions to conflict resolution; as the 
neuroscientist Emily Beausoleil says of dance, for example, “When creative movement 
elicits imagination, the hold of habitual patterns and perceptions is loosened and parties 
can begin to experiment with “rechoreographing” in conceptual, emotional and behavioral 
terms” (Beausoleil 2013).  As she indicates by the inverted commas around 
“rechoreographing”, dance can be metaphorical as well as literal: it is not suggested that 
suave politicians or hard-bitten insurgent leaders are encouraged to dance together, but the 
use of elaborate metaphors or mind maps to describe or help visualise complex thinking, 
for example, are already well-established methods among practitioners particularly for use 
in situations where participants may be reluctant or unable to establish or continue 
dialogue processes using purely cognitive means.  Whatever the actual methods employed, 
 
417 A further point, which may be particularly relevant to situations involving religious conflict or religious 
hatred, is that the idea of the transcendent function undoubtedly has metaphysical and spiritual overtones.  
Although Jung emphasised his credentials as a scientist and was always anxious not to be seen as a 
metaphysician, as has been discussed previously, Miller says “Some believe there is a clear reflection of the 
Divine in the transcendent function despite Jung’s protestations to the contrary” (ibid., p. 115).  In support of 
this contention Miller quotes the psychotherapist Ann Ulanov arguing that this is really what Jung means by 
the word transcendent because “it is precisely through the workings of the transcendent function that we 
receive evidence of the Transcendent in the metaphysical sense operating within us, much like religious 
tradition describes the Spirit of God moving us to pray” (1996, p. 194), adding that the solutions that arise out 
of the activity of the transcendent function have a numinous quality that reflect a transpersonal presence 
responding to inner conflict.  
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the point is to engage the non-cognitive dimensions of emotion and experience and 
thereby, according to Iain McGilchrist, also enhance awareness of the Other that right 
hemisphere brain activity enables (McGilchrist 2009, p. 93).418  The use of the creative arts 
in bringing a new consciousness to dialogue and diapraxis is no longer a novelty among 
scholar-practitioners but an explanation of their value, based on the combination of depth 
psychology and neuroscience, adds legitimacy to approaches that are still regarded as 




The purpose of this dissertation has been to examine religious hatred, particularly 
through a psychodynamic lens, and to explore some of the implications for scholar-
practitioners in the field of conflict resolution tasked with responding to situations of 
conflict fuelled by religious or para-religious beliefs.  It begins by exploring the literatures 
of conflict resolution and transformation, the psychology of religion and psychodynamic 
psychology focusing on scholarship relevant to religious hatred.  Using this background it 
identifies six dimensions of religion (identity, doctrine and practice, emotion and 
experience, mythology, sacred values and power and control) to use as a minimum 
theoretical framework within which to look more closely at how religious hatred manifests 
itself and the consequences that can result.  The final chapter summarises and reflects on 
some of the implications for praxis arising from religious hatred within each of these 
dimensions and considers how processes of dialogue and diapraxis might in theory be 
conceived and designed to respond to participants divided by such hatreds.   
 
 
418 Iain McGilchrist’s The Master and his Emissary (2009) is a controversial work of neurophilosophy that 
argues how the divided brain has influenced the development of music, language, politics and art. 
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The dissertation reaches three major conclusions within which are others, more 
tentative, where the need for further research is indicated.  First among these is that a 
divergence is arising between scholars and practitioners in the secular West and those in 
parts of the West and in other parts of the world where religious adherence is growing and 
increasing in its influence on social, political and international affairs.  This divergence 
stems in part from ignorance of traditional religion among those who consider themselves 
non-religious, and in part from living in cultures where religion is often considered to be of 
marginal significance.  The resultant lack of empathy for the religious is a disadvantage for 
politicians and diplomats at the national and international levels; for leaders of diverse 
communities; and for scholar-practitioners in the conflict resolution field.  All need to 
remember that a religion does not have to be objectively ‘true’ to be powerful or 
meaningful for its adherents.  In particular scholar-practitioners would be assisted by a 
better appreciation of psychodynamic as well as social and political approaches to the 
problem of religious conflict, especially those which provide insights into the role of 
religion in personal and cultural development particularly in relation to cultural complexes.  
An appreciation of the concept of the shadow, and the psychological tendency to balance 
an extreme in one area of affect with morbidity in another, is also useful. 
 
The second major conclusion is the importance of understanding the 
multidimensionality of religion, the value of a holistic approach to recognising how, in any 
situation, religion may be expressed through a number of its many dimensions, and how 
religious hatred may have its roots in any or all of these dimensions.  One likely explanation 
for the intensity of religious hatred is the cumulative effect of hatred felt through multiple 
dimensions.  While the identity dimension is critical in generating senses of what constitutes 
Other, this may be as often rooted in a reference to a mythological past as to the present: it is 
wise to investigate all aspects of the past, whether factual or putatively counterfactual, 
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before concluding that current circumstances weigh more heavily.  Fundamentalist religion, 
or religion aimed at supporting non-religious causes such as ethnic nationalism, can acquire 
the characteristics of a cultural complex rooted in past experience which may include 
religious hatred and can in some circumstances cause adherents to marginalise and even 
demonise those considered Other.  Equally, while sacred values may in some senses be 
shared, they do not in and of themselves provide sufficient common ground to eclipse 
partisan issues; and while they may be more fungible than at first appears, attempts to trade 
issues of material value against those of sacred value can be interpreted as insulting to the 
latter.  There is also some evidence that the experiential dimension of strong religion can 
have an addictive quality, and where this type of religion inculcates the hatred of others or 
their beliefs or values, that too can become addictive.  It is often argued, especially by 
secularists, that religion has historically provided a medium of popular control for the more 
politically or socially powerful – the ‘opium of the people’ in Karl Marx’s famous phrase419 
– but a psychodynamic approach suggests that the power commanded by religion is as often 
personal and related to fear of the uncontrollable in terms of death and the desire for some 
relationship to ultimacy as demonstrated in clericalism.  The dissertation also suggests that 
certain types of religious doctrine can have a Golem Effect resulting in unintended 
psychological consequences for adherents and implications for those who may be considered 
Other.  This conclusion is very tentative, however, and needs further research. 
 
The third overarching conclusion is that processes of dialogue and diapraxis 
addressing religious hatred need to consider, as one of their prime purposes, what is called 
here ‘epiphanic intervention’: the deliberate intention to induce some sort of psychological 
 
419 The full quote is "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul 
of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people"; it was published in the Introduction to Marx’s A 




epiphany as the best or only effective way to respond to hatred as a condition of mind.  
This conclusion is intended as a hypothesis requiring further testing because while there is 
anecdotal evidence from scholar-practitioners that such epiphanies are possible and 
realisable, and there is evidence that epiphanic intervention can address other forms of 
addiction, there is insufficient evidence to indicate the circumstances or processes within 
which such reversals of attitude and behaviour, enantiodromia, may be triggered and 
achieved with addiction to religious hatred, nor whether certain types of process can be 
expected to be more effective in some situations or with some types of participant.  This 
conclusion is based on the determination that religious hatred is at its heart a 
psychospiritual problem which is unlikely to be addressed by interventions based on purely 
material considerations.  This suggests that processes to address religious hatred need to 
involve activities, reflections and the cultivations of relationships specifically designed to 
reduce perceptions of the Other and broaden participants’ appreciation of their own 
psychic biases and the origins of the hatreds they may feel. 
 
If there is an additional, more general conclusion, it is that in recent years there has 
been a dearth of original theory-building in the conflict resolution field, the exception 
being the efforts devoted to developing creative and arts-based approaches to conflict 
generally and belief and value-based conflict in particular.  It may be that this is to a 
certain degree inevitable in a field that is coming to maturity, especially where it is doing 
so within the established structures of law or diplomacy, for example, but nevertheless the 
need for sound theory and innovative practice becomes ever more pressing in the face of 
an increasingly complex world.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in the way that 
religion, for long assumed to be a depleted force, is again in the ascendant beyond the 
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